

PRESS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATEAugust 6, 1980
No. 209BSTATEMENTS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR PETER TOWE,
ENVIRONMENT MINISTER JOHN ROBERTS

AND

EPA ADMINISTRATOR DOUGLAS COSTLE

AT THE SIGNING OF

THE MEMORANDUM OF INTENT

ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION

Washington, D.C.

August 5, 1980

DEPARTMENT OF STATE / CDC/MR

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's a pleasure to participate in this ceremony and I'd like to welcome our distinguished guests, Ambassador Towe from Canada, Ambassador Curtis of my own state, Administrator Costle, distinguished Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen.

In 1978, I worked with other Members of Congress on a measure of considerable relevance to our business today. It was a resolution calling for negotiations to protect the mutual environment of Canada and the United States. Obviously, I could not dream then that today I would have this added role in the same hopeful enterprise. The memory further heightens my pleasure at the chance to sign this Memorandum of Intent on Air Pollution. It is a matter of consequence to both of our countries. And it is a matter that is close to my heart as a New Englander, a former Senator from a border state, as a committed environmentalist and as a citizen who believes deeply in a strong friendship and partnership between our two countries.

Clearly, the United States and Canada share a concern about the serious harm transboundary air pollution poses to people on both sides of the border. Thus, we also share a compelling interest in collaborating to answer that danger. For on such issues there must be cooperative solutions or there will be no real solution at all. The document we sign today is an interim measure to continue in force while we negotiate a final agreement. At the same time it declares the intent of both nations to take concrete action in the interim to keep the atmosphere we share healthy and clean. In the United States, our principle vehicle for that effort is the Clean Air Act. As we affirm in the Memorandum of Intent, we will continue to enforce this law. At the same time, we are

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anxious to move forward to gather the scientific data needed for negotiations on a permanent agreement. Let me also say, therefore, that the United States is prepared immediately to establish the five work groups called for in the Memorandum of Intent.

In signing this Memorandum, we set our hands to a task which will lift the quality of life for people in Canada and people in the United States. And beyond that, through this practical effort on air pollution, we also reflect to the world a vital principle that our relationship is both a warm friendship and an active partnership -- the kind of inter-action between neighbors that would make our planet a safer place for us all.

It is a pleasure for me today to introduce for appropriate remarks -- and from long acquaintance and friendship with him, I am sure they will be appropriate -- the Ambassador of Canada, Peter Towe. (Applause)

AMBASSADOR TOWE: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I can assure that my remarks at this point in time will be brief indeed. It is a great honor and pleasure for me to participate in this signing ceremony this afternoon.

There is no doubt in my mind and I'm sure no doubt in the minds of any of you present here today that air pollution has become an increasing problem in the United States as well as in my country, Canada. And the problem of trans-boundary air pollution has become one of growing concern to both of our countries. I'd like now to ask Minister Roberts, the Minister of Environment for Canada, to say a few words. (Applause)

MINISTER ROBERTS: Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Towe, Ambassador Curtis, Doug Costle, ladies and gentlemen: It is, of course, a great pleasure for me as Minister of Environment to be here for the signing of this Memorandum of Intent. I want to take the opportunity to commend the United States Government on its initiative in publishing last month the Global 2000 report to the President. That report clearly outlines what the challenges are to us throughout the world in terms of the environment and the consequences to our environment over the next twenty years if we do not take appropriate action. Clearly the problem of airborne pollutants and particularly acid rain, as is clearly indicated in that report, is one of our major environmental concerns -- a concern for what it implies in relation to our lakes and streams and fish life, a concern in relation to our forests, and a concern in relation to human health. This Memorandum of Intent which we are signing today is, we believe in Canada, a very significant step forward -- significant, both because it is placing us in the very near future in the position of signing

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an international agreement on air quality standards. And also, because it includes a present indication in the strong willingness of both of our governments to apply the existing regulations which will control emittant sources as vigorously as possible. And we regard both of those elements of the Memorandum as being of very great importance.

The problems of acid rain, of airborne pollutants, is a common problem to both of our countries and if it is to be resolved, if it is to be tackled successfully, it will require joint efforts on the part of both countries to meet it. The costs will be very high. In Canadian terms, something like \$400-\$500 million a year between now and the end of the century; for the United States, the costs of 5-8 times that order. But the costs of not responding to the problem will be even greater than the costs of meeting it. It's, therefore, with great happiness that we see this significant step forward. We will be continuing to press for a speedy resolution to the international agreement as quickly as possible. We don't intend now simply to stop that process. We regard this as an important step but not the final step in the journey that we must take together. And, it's, therefore, a pleasure for me to be here in what I think is a very important event for both of our countries. I look forward to continuing action on our part for these problems. Thank you very much. (Applause)

ADMINISTRATOR COSTLE: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Minister, we now know each other well enough for me to call the Minister by his first name, John, and vice versa and I can assure the people here that we didn't have to call each other any other names to get to the point where we are, Mr. Ambassador, distinguished Members of Congress who are here: While this Memorandum of Intent covers all forms of transboundary air pollution, it repeatedly and properly calls attention to one form of it -- and that is acid deposition or acid rain. This is a problem which as one scientist recently phrased it to me has gradually snuck up on all of us in the last few years. And though our knowledge of this phenomenon is not perfect, what we know about it coupled with what we suspect about it convinced us that we are faced with a serious environmental threat to our lakes, our forests, our buildings, and our crops. The President shares our concern about the seriousness of the acid rain phenomenon and of the necessity for addressing it now. Because the United States must use larger amounts of coal to ease its dependence on imported oil reducing emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides as the major sources of the problem will be necessary and will not be easy, but it can be done. We can have coal without environmental harm if we are willing to employ adequate environment controls. I strongly believe and have stated consistently that the United States can meet its energy needs while at the same time protecting against environmental degradation. We've already made a significant stride in this direction by adopting stringent emission standards for

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new coal-powered power plants. Acid rain carries with it substantial costs as John Roberts pointed out and though further research on this problem and development of new controls technology must continue, this Memorandum affirms a common determination on the part of Canada and the United States to solve the problem. Our two nations take pride and comfort in the fact that we share in the world's longest undefended border. This is a source of political and military security for both of us. This Memorandum is a necessary and important action towards bringing our mutual defense pact up to date, if you will, in response to a new threat. We must learn a new way to protect a common border as well as our most uncommon friendship. Thank you. (Applause)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 5, 1980
No. 209



US AND CANADA SIGN MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION

The United States and Canada took an important step today toward dealing with acid rain and other forms of air pollution crossing the US-Canada border. They agreed to set in motion a bilateral process to deal more effectively with these problems. The action took the form of a Memorandum of Intent signed for the US by Secretary Muskie and EPA Administrator Costle and for Canada by Ambassador Towe and Environment Minister Roberts.

In signing the Memorandum, Secretary Muskie stated that this action confirms the mutual goal of the US and Canada to take concrete, cooperative steps to combat the problem of transboundary air pollution and to negotiate a bilateral agreement as soon as possible. The Secretary noted that the Memorandum responds to the 1978 Congressional Resolution calling for US-Canadian negotiations to preserve and protect mutual air resources.

The Canadian government welcomed the Memorandum of Intent as a step forward in efforts to develop cooperative measures with the US to combat transboundary air pollution. This includes the already serious problem of acid rain which affects the environment of both countries. Ontario Environment Minister Harry Parrott also attended the Washington signing ceremony.

The Memorandum of Intent establishes five Work Groups to prepare for future negotiation of an agreement on air pollution. The Work Groups will undertake the necessary technical preparations for the negotiations. The US and Canada are moving ahead to name experts and technicians to these work groups. The Memorandum of Intent also creates a United States-Canada Coordinating Committee to oversee the activities of the Work Groups and provides that the Work Groups submit work plans to the Coordinating Committee at an early date. Preparatory US-Canadian discussions on transboundary air pollution will continue and formal negotiations will commence as soon as possible.

The Memorandum of Intent also calls upon both governments to take important interim actions, under current authority, to combat transboundary air pollution, pending conclusion of the agreement. The interim measures include mutual commitments for development of domestic air pollution control policies, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, increased advance notification of proposed actions involving risk of transboundary air pollution and further development of exchanges of scientific studies, cooperative monitoring programs and research on pollution control technologies.

For further information contact:

Robin Porter on 632-3189

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 6, 1980
No. 209A



MEMORANDUM OF INTENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CONCERNING TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada,

Share a concern about actual and potential damage
resulting from transboundary air pollution, (which is the
short and long range transport of air pollutants between
their countries), including the already serious problem of
acid rain;

Recognize this is an important and urgent bilateral
problem as it involves the flow of air pollutants in both
directions across the international boundary, especially
the long range transport of air pollutants;

Share also a common determination to combat
transboundary air pollution in keeping with their existing
international rights, obligations, commitments and
cooperative practices, including those set forth in the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, the 1978 Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, and the 1979 ECE Convention on

Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution;

For Government of the United States of America:

.....

Are convinced also that this common problem requires cooperative action by both countries;

Intend to increase bilateral cooperative action to deal effectively with transboundary air pollution, including acid rain.

In particular, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada intend:

1. to develop a bilateral agreement which will reflect and further the development of effective domestic control programs and other measures to combat transboundary air pollution;
2. to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement as soon as possible; and,
3. pending conclusion of such an agreement, to take interim actions available under current authority to combat transboundary air pollution.

The specific undertakings of both Governments at this time are outlined below.

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- (b) promote vigorous enforcement of existing laws and regulations as they require limitation of emissions from new, substantially modified and existing facilities in a way which is responsive to the problems of transboundary air pollution; and
- (c) share information and consult on actions being taken pursuant to (a) and (b) above.

3. Notification and Consultation

Both Governments shall continue and expand their long-standing practice of advance notification and consultation on proposed actions involving a significant risk or potential risk of causing or increasing transboundary air pollution, including:

- (a) proposed major industrial development or other actions which may cause significant increases in transboundary air pollution; and
- (b) proposed changes of policy, regulations or practices which may significantly affect transboundary air pollution.

4. Scientific Information, Research and Development

In order to improve understanding of their common problem and to increase their capability for controlling transboundary air pollution both Governments shall:

- (a) exchange information generated in research programs being undertaken in both countries on the atmospheric aspects of the transport of air pollutants and on their effects on aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and on human health and property;
- (b) maintain and further develop a coordinated program for monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of transboundary air pollution, including the maintenance of a United States/Canada sampling network and exchange of data on current and projected emissions of major air pollutants; and
- (c) continue to exchange information on research to develop improved technologies for reducing emissions of major air pollutants of concern.

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The Memorandum of Intent will become effective on signature and will remain in effect until revised by mutual agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, this fifth day of August, 1980, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA:

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ANNEX

WORK GROUP STRUCTURE
FOR
NEGOTIATION OF A
TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION AGREEMENT

I. PURPOSE

To establish technical and scientific work groups to assist in preparations for and the conduct of negotiations on a bilateral transboundary air pollution agreement. These groups shall include:

1. Impact Assessment Work Group
2. Atmospheric Modelling Work Group
- 3A. Strategies Development and Implementation Work Group
- 3B. Emissions, Costs and Engineering Assessment Subgroup
4. Legal, Institutional Arrangements and Drafting Work Group

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II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

A. General

1. The Work Groups shall function under the general direction and policy guidance of a United States/Canada Coordinating Committee co-chaired by the Department of External Affairs and the Department of State.
2. The Work Groups shall provide reports assembling and analyzing information and identifying measures as outlined in Part B below, which will provide the basis of proposals for inclusion in a transboundary air pollution agreement. These reports shall be provided by January 1982 and shall be based on available information.
3. Within one month of the establishment of the Work Groups, they shall submit to the United States/Canada Coordinating Committee a work plan to accomplish the specific tasks outlined in Part B, below. Additionally, each Work Group shall submit an interim report by January 15, 1981.
4. During the course of negotiations and under the general direction and policy guidance of the Coordinating Committee, the Work Groups shall assist the Coordinating Committee as required.
5. Nothing in the foregoing shall preclude subsequent alteration of the tasks of the Work Groups or the establishment of additional Work Groups as may be agreed upon by the Governments.

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B. Specific

The specific tasks of the Work Groups are set forth below.

1. Impact Assessment Work Group

The Group will provide information on the current and projected impact of air pollutants on sensitive receptor areas, and prepare proposals for the "Research, Modelling and Monitoring" element of an agreement.

In carrying out this work, the Group will:

- identify and assess physical and biological consequences possibly related to transboundary air pollution;
- determine the present status of physical and biological indicators which characterize the ecological stability of each sensitive area identified;
- review available data bases to establish more accurately historic adverse environmental impacts;
- determine the current adverse environmental impact within identified sensitive areas--annual, seasonal and episodic;
- determine the release of residues potentially related to transboundary air pollution, including possible episodic release from snowpack melt in sensitive areas;
- assess the years remaining before significant ecological changes are sustained within identified sensitive areas;

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- propose reductions in the air pollutant deposition rates--annual, seasonal and episodic--which would be necessary to protect identified sensitive areas; and
- prepare proposals for the "Research, Modelling and Monitoring" element of an agreement.

2. Atmospheric Modelling Work Group

The Group will provide information based on cooperative atmospheric modelling activities leading to an understanding of the transport of air pollutants between source regions and sensitive areas, and prepare proposals for the "Research, Modelling and Monitoring" element of an agreement. As a first priority the Group will by October 1, 1980 provide initial guidance on suitable atmospheric transport models to be used in preliminary assessment activities.

In carrying out its work, the Group will:

- identify source regions and applicable emission data bases;
- evaluate and select atmospheric transport models and data bases to be used;
- relate emissions from the source regions to loadings in each identified sensitive area;
- calculate emission reductions required from source regions to achieve proposed reductions in air pollutant concentration and deposition rates which would be necessary in order to protect sensitive areas;

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- assess historic trends of emissions, ambient concentrations and atmospheric deposition trends to gain further insights into source receptor relationships for air quality, including deposition; and
- prepare proposals for the "Research, Modelling and Monitoring" element of an agreement.

3A. Strategies Development and Implementation Work Group

The Group will identify, assess and propose options for the "Control" element of an agreement. Subject to the overall direction of the Coordinating Committee, it will be responsible also for coordination of the activities of Work Groups I and II. It will have one subgroup.

In carrying out its work, the Group will:

- prepare various strategy packages for the Coordinating Committee designed to achieve proposed emission reductions;
- coordinate with other Work Groups to increase the effectiveness of these packages;
- identify monitoring requirements for the implementation of any tentatively agreed-upon emission-reduction strategy for each country;
- propose additional means to further coordinate the air quality programs of the two countries; and
- prepare proposals relating to the actions each Government would need to take to implement the various strategy options.

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3B. Emissions, Costs and Engineering Assessment Subgroup

This Subgroup will provide support to the development of the "Control" element of an agreement. It will also prepare proposals for the "Applied Research and Development" element of an agreement.

In carrying out its work, the Subgroup will:

- identify control technologies, which are available presently or in the near future, and their associated costs;
- review available data bases in order to establish improved historical emission trends for defined source regions;
- determine current emission rates from defined source regions;
- project future emission rates from defined source regions for most probable economic growth and pollution control conditions;
- project future emission rates resulting from the implementation of proposed strategy packages, and associated costs of implementing the proposed strategy packages; and
- prepare proposals for the "Applied Research and Development" element of an agreement.

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4. Legal, Institutional and Drafting Work Group

The Group will:



- develop the legal elements of an agreement such as notification and consultation, equal access, non-discrimination, liability and compensation;
- propose institutional arrangements needed to give effect to an agreement and monitor its implementation; and
- review proposals of the Work Groups and refine language of draft provisions of an agreement.

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
The Memorandum of Intent will become effective on signature and will remain in effect until revised by mutual agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, this fifth day of August, 1980, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "James Sherk", written over a horizontal line.A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Andrew Cuomo", written in a cursive style.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. T. O'Brien", written in a cursive style.A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John L. H. 5", written in a cursive style.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 7, 1980
No. 210

As Prepared for Delivery

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA
Convention Center
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1980

It is a real pleasure to be here among friends.

And when I call the steelworkers friends, I am not just speaking personally.

I call you that because I am aware of your strong, steadfast support over the past four years on major foreign policy issues --- for a strong defense and for sensible arms control, for vital new initiatives like the Panama Canal Treaty and for enduring goals like strengthening the trade union movement around the world.

So I'm grateful to you, and I'm glad to be here.

Actually, I enjoy going to conventions in August.

I've recently been asked about my purposes at another convention next week in New York.

Let me tell you today that I love my job.

Let me also tell you that I am following the political prescription of our beloved Eleanor Roosevelt. Her advice to herself is not bad advice for me: Always be on time, do as little talking as humanly possible, and remember to lean back in the parade car so everybody can see the President.

But this doesn't mean I will be silent on the issues, for in the weeks to come our country will be engaged in a great national debate, a debate about America's purpose and course in the world.

In my 35 years in public office, I have never doubted that purpose.

We stand for human freedom. It is what unites us as a people. It is what distinguishes us from our adversaries. It is our compass in the world to defend our freedoms at home and to advance human freedom around the world.

There are those who suggest that the freedom of other people is none of our business, that with enough military hardware our freedom can be secure while the freedom of others is stifled, that our purpose in the world is to preserve the status quo.

... ..

I say, and I believe you say, that is an invitation trouble.

It is a narrow vision of ourselves and of the world.

It would be a foreign policy of reaction.

We must, of course, equip ourselves with the arms to defend our vital interests. But that's not enough. We must also arm ourselves with the conviction that our values have increasing power in today's world.

For if America is not the companion of human progress in the world, if we do not work to shape events in progressive directions, the world will pass us by. If we do not promote freedom in the world, there will be less freedom in the future for Americans.

Today, let me describe to you the kinds of freedom we must promote and the tools we need to promote it.

First is the freedom of nations: the freedom of nations, including our own, to be independent, to be free of outside domination. That has been and is the enduring goal of United States foreign policy.

But it cannot be our only goal, for America's national interest, America's national ideals, require that we support other kinds of freedom in the world.

This Administration is committed to a second kind of freedom: the political freedom of people within nations.

And we are committed to a third goal: the freedom from poverty and human misery, conditions that destroy human lives and create unrest in the world.

A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed. For it would ignore the political stirring of humanity, the current of human freedom that is gaining strength in the world. And when peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries.

So when Soviet troops seek to crush the freedom of an independent nation, we will oppose it.

When an adversary threatens our vital interest in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, in the Caribbean, in Asia or elsewhere, we will oppose them.

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When foreign governments allow the seizure of American citizens, as in Iran, we will not give up until they are home safe and free.

And when governments anywhere suppress the freedoms of their own people, when malaria or malnutrition degrade human lives, we will oppose that as well.

We believe, in short, that America can flourish best in a world in which freedom is growing -- freedom in all its aspects: national independence, political liberty, and freedom from hunger, poverty and disease.

To promote these freedoms, we need to maintain a foreign policy that rests on four pillars.

The first is an unwavering commitment to our security through a strong defense, solid alliances and unyielding opposition to aggression.

The second is an unrelenting effort to help resolve the regional disputes that threaten peace.

The third is our foreign assistance programs which support the security and progress of other nations around the world, while providing us with the influence we need to advance our interests.

The fourth is our support for human rights and human dignity.

In each of these four areas, this Administration has been active and it has achieved results. The world is an unruly place. The headlines will always reflect new crises and new challenges.

But I'm tired of hearing the fear merchants who overstate the dangers and undersell America for their own political profit.

Let's listen to the facts and not their fears.

First, this Administration is devoted heart and soul and sinew to a strong national defense. We have undertaken the most sweeping military modernization program in nearly 20 years.

In the eight years before President Carter took office, real defense spending after inflation had declined by more than 35%.

Since taking office, this Administration has increased real defense spending every year by 10% overall.

We are modernizing every element of our strategic nuclear forces with the new MX missile on land with a new Trident submarine and missile at sea and with new cruise missiles in the air.

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We are building a new rapid-deployment force and obtaining new basing rights abroad to strengthen our hand in emergencies.

We have led our NATO allies in several major initiatives: a new long-term modernization of NATO's conventional forces, real increases in allied defense spending and deployment of new missiles in the European theater to meet the Soviet buildup.

Let us be clear. This military modernization program has and will continue to involve heavy costs. Our five-year defense program will put defense spending in fiscal 1985 at a level more than 25% higher than in fiscal 1978.

This is a price we must pay to preserve our strength.

In recent weeks, you and I have heard this effort described as inadequate.

We have heard the call for a military buying binge.

And we have heard demands that we radically alter our fundamental national security objective from a stable military balance to a quest for across-the-board military superiority.

Let there be no mistake. That is a prescription for a dramatic new arms race. For having achieved a position of equivalence, the Soviet Union will not accept military inferiority anymore than we will -- no matter what the price to the people of the Soviet Union.

The costs of a new arms race would be staggering. We would have to cut back significantly on vital human services. And most importantly, we would increase the risk of a nuclear nightmare.

The consequence of a new arms race would not be greater security. It would be greater insecurity at home and abroad.

And there is a further point. In this effort to achieve military superiority, we would destroy the future of arms control. For arms control can only move forward on the basis of genuine equivalence.

That is the basis of the preliminary agreement reached with the Soviets by President Ford in Vladivostok in 1974. It is the basis of the SALT II Treaty. It is the basis on which we have agreed with our allies to pursue further arms control, including limits in Europe.

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Let us have no illusions. If we abandon the quest for arms control now, if we cast aside the Treaty negotiated by three Presidents -- two Republicans and one Democrat -- the threats we face will be greater.

Our knowledge about Soviet military plans will be less certain.

Our own defense will be more difficult.

Today America is strong, and we are growing stronger.

We have already reversed more than a decade of inattention to our national defense.

We are prepared as a nation to spend whatever is needed.

But we must be as hard on overspending on the military as we are on waste in our domestic programs. And we should reject outmoded military doctrines that add danger to an already dangerous world.

Our commitment to the freedom of nations also means that we must be prepared to oppose aggression against the freedom of others.

Every day Afghan people are dying in defense of freedom. Every day the Soviet Union is paying a price for their aggression. Every day the free nations of the world must demonstrate their opposition to this assault on freedom.

Measures like our grain embargo and the Olympic boycott express not only our disapproval; they express the readiness of the American people to sacrifice in the cause of freedom. These sacrifices were necessary. And they have been felt in the Soviet Union.

I am proud of our athletes who did not go to Moscow, and I know you are, too. I am proud of our farmers and our businessmen and workers who have given up exports to send the Soviets a message. And I know you are, too. For the message has been received in an Olympics that was a sham, in declining meat supplies on Soviet shelves and in the stinging rebuke of world opinion.

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The rhetoric of the past few weeks calls for us to be firmer on Soviet aggression, but to reverse the grain embargo, to write-off the Olympic boycott, to conduct business as usual,

There is a short answer. We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by doing less.

We know and the American people know, that we cannot oppose aggression abroad without exerting ourselves at home.

We know, and the American people know, that security cannot be bought without sacrifice. To suggest otherwise in the hope of gaining partisan advantage is not leadership but expediency.

A second element of a foreign policy of freedom is to build peace: to help achieve peaceful, negotiated settlements to dangerous disputes in the world.

You know of President Carter's patient efforts to bring forth an agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. That agreement was a beginning, not an end. It was the beginning of a long and difficult process that is not yet over. Camp David was one of the finest achievements of this or any other Administration. It has already produced peace between Israel and Egypt. And it provides the only practical process yet devised that can lead to a comprehensive peace.

In a similar fashion, the Panama Canal Treaty, which ended fourteen long years of negotiations, healed festering resentments in Latin America and laid the groundwork for sounder relations between the United States and our neighbors in this hemisphere.

To build peace and buttress our strategic position, we have normalized relations with the People's Republic of China.

President Carter's unswerving support for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia helped end a bitter and bloody civil war. It helped bring forth a new nation, Zimbabwe, based on majority rule and minority rights. It helped calm a dispute that could have become a broader conflict in Africa. By working toward a settlement, by refusing to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until a fair settlement was ensured, we emphasized not only our commitment to peace, but our willingness to support abroad the principles of democracy and freedom we espouse at home.

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Lloyd McBride and the Steelworkers stood by the President in that difficult moment. You supported continuing the sanctions until a fair, free election could be held. You can be proud that this Union has contributed in an important way to a solution that fostered peace.

There is a lesson in this experience. The same people who call now for a narrow vision of our foreign policies were bitterly opposed to our approach in southern Africa. Had they prevailed, there would not have been a settlement in Rhodesia. The fighting would have raged on. This would have been bad for the people of Zimbabwe, bad for the region, bad for our allies, bad for us, and good only for the Soviets who stood to profit from conflict.

A third element of a foreign policy of freedom is helping developing nations defend their independence, expand their economies and dispel poverty.

For a good many years, this Union and its members have understood an important fact -- that a generous foreign assistance program is not a giveaway but a gateway: a gateway to new markets and new influence for the United States, and a gateway to greater world stability.

That fact needs to be better understood by the American people.

American foreign assistance dollars are investments we make in others and in ourselves.

These United States investments mean security aid to nations whose independence is threatened by outside intervention.

These investments mean economic development for poorer nations. They help developing countries buy American equipment to build highways and dams, help hire American experts to strengthen their institutions, help them produce the food and the jobs that increase living standards for their people.

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And these investments directly benefit our own people.

Seventy cents of every dollar we commit for country-to-country development programs are spent here in the United States. They purchase American goods and American services, from farm equipment to technical training. Those purchases amounted to nearly \$2 billion last year alone. Our Agency for International Development has spent over \$650 million for goods and services just in California over the past ten years.

Well over another billion dollars last year went to American farmers for grain and other agricultural commodities.

The economic return to the American people goes beyond what is spent here for our investments in development abroad create new markets for United States goods. Every dollar we pay into institutions like the World Bank, for example, generates between \$2 and \$3 of new growth in our own economy. The activities of these development banks mean 50,000 - 100,000 new American jobs each year.

In such transactions everyone gains. The United States gains jobs and markets and the capacity to help shape events in constructive ways. Small, struggling nations gain strength against aggression and subversion; they gain economic and social progress. Millions of people gain the beginnings of a better life.

And the cause of freedom also gains.

So I would urge you to continue to defend these programs and help defeat attacks and cuts recently suffered in the Congress.

Together, we must convince the American people that the defense of freedom requires not only a strong military fist, but also an extended hand.

Finally, let me emphasize a fourth element of a foreign policy of freedom: support for human rights.

Throughout a long history of struggle and success, the trade union movement in general, and the Steelworkers in particular, have supported that cause.

Today, as hundreds of thousands of refugees flee from assaults on human rights around the world, the Steelworkers once again are showing their concern.

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Your effort on behalf of the AFL-CIO Cambodoia Crisis Campaign, which Lloyd McBride unveiled this week, is a dramatic testament to the power of this great Union for good. And it is an eloquent expression of your support for human rights.

Human rights has been a special concern of this Administration.

We stand for the right of people to be free of torture and repression to choose their leaders to participate in the decisions that affect their daily lives to speak and write and travel freely.

There are limits on our capacity to influence affairs in other countries. And we must seek a practical approach that builds the long-term strength of our friends.

But the fact that there are obstacles and risks should not keep us from holding up the banner of human rights; and it will not.

Ultimately, our firm support for human rights, for human freedom, will help build a more stable world. It will help remove the causes of violent and convulsive change.

There is, in various places in the world, a strong tide for human rights. We see the evidence for this in Spain, in Greece, in Portugal, in Ghana, in Nigeria, in Ecuador and in Peru, in other nations which have recently embraced and strengthened democracy.

America cannot claim sole credit for these developments. But we can take pride that we have encouraged abroad the freedoms we enjoy at home, for they run hand in hand.

I have sketched the outlines of the foreign policy of freedom: a strong emphasis on security, a vigorous quest for peace, concrete development for nations and peoples, and practical support for human rights.

This has been our policy for the past four years. And despite the difficulties, despite limits to our influence, it is working.

We must not succumb to the voices which say we should now turn back.

These voices are pessimistic about the possibilities of freedom in the world. They see change abroad, for the most part, as dangerous for America. They are hostile to it. We see in change not only threats to be met, but opportunities to be seized.

Their voices sound a note of fear, rather than hope, when they speak about the world. They have cried out against our efforts to strengthen the center in Nicaragua and to pursue prudent arms limitation agreements.

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Above all, these voices suggest that our defense of freedom should be concentrated almost exclusively in arms.

We do need to revitalize our military. And we are.

America can and will do all that is necessary to maintain its military position, to counter aggression and to deter war.

America is and will remain a global power, second to none.

But I believe the American people understand that a foreign policy premised on a renewed arms race is a foreign policy of folly, not wisdom; of weakness, not strength.

I believe the American people will rightly refuse to write a blank check for belligerence. America's purpose is not a new Cold War, but a realistic peace based on a solid foundation of deterrence.

We must seek security not only in arms but also in a diplomacy that is generous that is willing to cope with inevitable change that is faithful to decent human values.

If we do that, we can be in the nineteen eighties not only as strong as steel, but as resilient and enduring. We can be not only a fortress of arms but a fortress of hope, and freedom as well.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 11, 1980
No. 211

PC#5

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING A SPEECH
TO THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA
Convention Center
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, at the end of your speech just a few moments ago, you asked for the steelworkers to lend their support to you in a broader political arena. Were you confining it to your role as the Secretary of State or perhaps to a broader role like the Presidential campaign, or as the President?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: A very good question. My purpose is simply to enlist their support in responsibilities I now have as Secretary of State into a much broader arena -- the whole world -- and Americans have an influence on that world, which is very similar to the influence they are able to bring to bear upon their domestic problems and domestic issues. I was simply trying to drive that point home.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you feel sort of caught up in the middle? You are Secretary of State, of course, for the Carter Administration. When they talk in terms of an open convention and alternative candidates, your name constantly pops up. Is that a very uncomfortable position for you to be in?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I've been caught up in those kinds of situations for the last 25 years, and nothing has ever come of it, so I don't pay much attention to it.

QUESTION: Since taking over the State Department, have there been any fundamental changes in the operation of the Department and/or in the making of foreign policy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I would not -- If by "fundamental changes" you mean has there been any restructuring of the institutions of government to deal with foreign policy, the answer is no. I think it would be premature to walk in as a very unexpected Secretary of State with a hand-made blueprint of how the structure ought to be adapted to my needs.

For this year, which obviously has its own pressures because it is an election year, I am working with the structure as I find it, undertaking to familiarize myself with it, and in terms of change, at some point in the future, with some developing perceptions of how the policy-making process works, so that when the right time comes, I can make recommendations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your speech at no point do you allude to the resolution for the support of Carter-Mondale that this convention will be taking up shortly. Was that on purpose or were you not aware that they were going to be taking up that endorsement resolution?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think I was vaguely aware that they were going to take up the resolution, or at least made aware upon my arrival; but that is not my role to try to influence that process. Even if I were a Senator, I would regard that decision as being the decision of this convention, and any intervention on my part would have been inappropriate. As Secretary of State, it is even more inappropriate because this is, to the extent that I can maintain its purity in the face of this barrage of questions that seek to divert me, non-political.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the way that Patricia Harris presented it yesterday --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: She is in the Cabinet in a different role. She is in the Cabinet in a different role. State, Defense, and Treasury are traditionally regarded as being more shielded politically than the other Cabinet positions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, for the past couple of days now, you have been asked the question that may seem tiresome and you've given an answer about the matter of the Presidential nomination. Are there any circumstances, any conditions that you can foresee that would lead you to change the position that you have stated?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't foresee any.

QUESTION: Are you doing anything to discourage organized committees to start a "Draft Muskie" movement? Are you saying or doing anything to discourage that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't personally get involved in it, but my good friends have managed to discourage some.

QUESTION: You gave a great deal of attention in your speech to the question of human rights, and this is a question that Mr. Carter has dealt with quite extensively.

There is a man in prison in the South by the name of Gary Tyler whom Amnesty International has identified as a political prisoner in the United States. I'm wondering since there is such concern in the Carter Administration for this question around the nation, what is the position of the Carter Administration on freeing Gary Tyler in this case which has been in the public eye -- and internationally, in fact -- a question of human rights for about the past six years?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've not had occasion to inquire of the Administration what its position is on that specific case. I'll be glad to do it.

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QUESTION: From the perception of people around the world as well as here at home, would it be better to have an open convention as far as that first ballot is concerned, regardless of the fact that it's in the rules, but as far as the popular perception is concerned of the Carter Administration?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the Party, of course, is in the position to shape its rules in accordance with its wishes. I was caught up in the middle of one such change in '71-'72, and the change was made. The change was unfavorable to my candidacy -- I accepted it. And that change now is sought to be changed again in the reverse direction this year. I suppose the Party can set its rules any time and in any way it chooses.

We have tended to place the emphasis on the primaries, and increasingly the point has been made -- at least, whenever I've been involved -- that the elected delegates ought to decide the nominee in terms of the instructions that they have received and the promises they made when they were elected.

It was that philosophy that, you know, came into place when I was running for President. Now there are those who seek to change it. You can make your own judgment here.

QUESTION: What is your judgment? Do you seek to change it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I refuse -- I'm interested in going a certain distance so that you won't think that I'm simply trying to block off questions, but I'm not going to get into any extended discussions of the politics of the convention, of the candidates, or of hypothetical situations.

I know that it is your business to probe, and I don't object to your probing, but I'm just giving you the signal now that you're going to run up against a stone wall.

QUESTION: What do you mean when you say you're a political Secretary of State? You stated you would be that.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: By that I mean the issues which confront the world are political in the sense that they affect people, so it is with the small people, not in the American two-party or three-party system -- whatever it is we now have since -- talking about drafts ---

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the question you said, though, and that you're disavowing any chance of running for the Presidency because you're trying to stop the "Draft Muskie" movement, why, then, are you attending the convention? Why inject yourself into that political arena?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm going for only one purpose, and that is to introduce a biographical film on Hubert Humphrey, who was my running mate in 1968, and I don't think that's offensively political. I don't think he's running for anything wherever he is, although he might be.

{Laughter}

In any case, that's my function at this convention.

QUESTION: What impact do you see the continuing holding of the hostages in Iran having on the American political process?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, obviously, it's a negative factor from the point of view of the President, and I would suspect it is a frustrating issue from the point of view of all the candidates. Finding a magic, simple answer for that problem is not the easiest thing in the world, as I've found over the last 90 days. If there were some way for us to find and touch a responsive chord among those who have authority in Iran and achieve their release, that fact would have a political impact in this country, I would assume.

QUESTION: Related to that, sir, there is a story out of the Middle East today that four nations -- I believe Switzerland, Austria, an Arab country and the United States -- are trying to work out a deal on the hostages that might see a breakthrough in the third week of August. Are you aware of any major effort under way at this time to achieve that end in that time?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If that is the standard of the word "major," there have been a number of such initiatives in the last 90 days -- none of them, obviously, was yet successful involving other nations, involving other individuals. We continue to pursue them, and there have been recent developments, you know, that give us some reason to believe that we ought to try not to raise our expectations too high. But there is the fact of Richard Queen's release, which indicated at least two things: one, that somebody had the authority to make that decision and do it quickly -- there was some doubt on that point prior to his release; and secondly, that it was done apparently on compassionate grounds, if not compassionate motives.

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Then you have the Ramadan Holy Season which ends on August 12, which might release some wellsprings of compassion and humanity that might influence the leaders. And they seem to be trying to distinguish between the Government of the United States in the person of President Carter and any other officials and the people of the United States. They made that distinction quite clear in connection with Mr. Queen's release, so that's something.

And finally, there is the slow emergence of the political institutions of Iran. The parliament is meeting, has elected a speaker, and they seem to be on the verge of agreeing on a prime minister, so that authority is being put in place, authority, presumably, with some ability and capacity to make decisions that will be held accountable not only for the condition of the hostages, but for the welfare of the people of Iran, which is being undermined by this hostage crisis.

It has inhibited normal relations with their natural trading partners; it has reduced the flow of goods into Iran; it has cut down on their oil production and their ability to sell their oil. So, economic conditions within the country, political fragmentation within their country, the rising tide of violence in Kurdistan in northwestern Iran, the pressures on their border as they may perceive them from the Soviets, and the Afghanistan invasion -- all of these pressures are working on the decision-makers within Iran.

They are going to be held accountable for the failure or success in dealing with these problems. And their ability to deal with those problems, we believe, is being affected unfavorably by their preoccupation with the hostage crisis. This point is being made by friends, by interested countries on a constant basis in the hope that we can influence the environment there.

QUESTION: Just to follow on that, there has been a confluence of seemingly favorable developments in the past and they have been disappointing. Is there a special reason to believe that there may be genuine cause for optimism, some kind of breakthrough, in the near future?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I would not be optimistic until I saw the 52 gathered in front of me.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how would you characterize, though, the efforts of the United States in this affair? Are we merely sitting back and waiting for Iran to crack in its demands and to come to us and say, "All right, we're ready to talk and negotiate on a reasonable level"?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I guess I haven't succeeded in the last five minutes. I don't think what I said is a description of inactivity, of sitting back or of indifference or lack of effort. This involves an enormous amount of effort. We have a special Iran Watch in the State Department. It operates on a 24-hour basis with volunteers from hostage families and from others constantly watching developments.

The first report I get every morning delivered to my door is the one- or two-page report on the current status of the current talks, the current contacts that are being followed, the channels of communication, the reports back that we are getting. We are constantly devising messages to send back, ways to try to influence them to influence the people with whom they are in contact.

It's an intensive, full-court press on the diplomatic front that we continue, and we are constantly searching ways for expanding it, messages that might have appeal -- and that's why I mentioned some of the recent developments that we think may enable us to reshape our messages.

The treatment that we gave to these Iranian student demonstrators is a way of contrasting the way they treat our hostages and the way we treated people who have violated our laws. We use every crumb of an idea that we can pick up to impress the leadership. We are considering others.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we realize that the future of the Iranians is a question that we are all very concerned about, but this is also the Steelworkers Convention, and the steelworkers, I think, and a number of us are concerned about the Administration's basically stated policy that it will continue to seek to lower the rate of inflation in shrinking the rate of unemployment; and that, with the number of plant closings, shutdowns, and layoffs, that's something that is of great importance to this convention.

Perhaps you could comment on that and tell us what exactly the Administration has in mind to stop this increasing number of layoffs and get the steelworkers back to work.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, there are talks going on involving officers or committees of this union, the industry, and the Administration. My impression that I perceived on coming here is that the outlines are in agreement for dealing with the problem, which if they aren't already in place are close to being in place, so I don't think it would be particularly helpful for me to speculate on some other formula which may be inconsistent with what they already have agreed upon.

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QUESTION: Well, it's far broader than just the steelworkers because we're not the only ones out of work. The Administration's actions have to go beyond just the steelworkers' union.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That is our position, yes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your speech you devoted quite a bit of time to talking about the policy of reaction, fear merchants, and so forth. You never named them. The implication was this is the Republican Party and its candidates. Is that whom you were talking about?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the gentlemen of the press are in a much better position to identify. (Laughter) You, obviously, are not blind to possible targets, and it's always very interesting to compare your guesses with the facts.

QUESTION: Sir, you talked a few moments ago about the Iranians who were being detained in New York -- they have now, most of them, been released. We occasionally hear from the public such suggestions as to why don't we hold their people until they return ours to us. Can you give us your thoughts on that type of thinking, whether it's useful or not and whether its part of the tactics or not?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you can speculate all over the lot. I'm not sure that those people want to go back there. Our hostages do want to come back here, so whether or not there is a quid pro quo in the making is a question.

Number two, whether or not these demonstrations are somehow orchestrated from Iran is a legitimate question to which I don't have any evidence upon which to base an answer. I thought it ought to be made clear to these Iranian students that if they really dislike this country, they are perfectly free to return to Iran, and that we'll help them in the process. If that is the message you suggest conveying, I will convey it and it will be in the most persuasive ways I can find.

QUESTION: I was wondering if the use of, in effect, hostages on this side of the ocean to put pressure on for the release of the hostages on that side of the ocean, if that had ever been considered as part of the overall --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, we think about it -- we think about options of that kind. In the first place, these students were arrested for disorderly conduct. The time they spent in

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jail was the maximum that would normally be imposed in cases like that, so that when five days passed, holding them on that charge any longer would have been, in a way, going beyond what our own laws would have required.

Secondly, the other issue involved was their unwillingness to identify themselves. Under the Immigration laws that made them subject to deportation, so that was the pressure that we were positioned then to apply.

We shifted them to a facility in New York which was much less like a prison -- much less like the D.C. prison, among other things. In the new environment, they would be with lawyers, they would have lawyers by that time, American lawyers, American Civil Liberty lawyers, and so on, and they began to change their minds and identified themselves. Once they identified themselves, we were able to establish the legality of their status here in the United States, and there was no basis for holding them. So that we couldn't, really, if we were going to enforce our own laws, on some arbitrary charge, hold them as hostages. I mean, we would in effect be justifying in effect what the Iranians are doing.

QUESTION: But you did say you considered the possibility of holding Iranians perhaps to make some kind of --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. I suggested the possibility of generously inviting them to go over to Iran at our own expense, if that's where they really wanted to be. That's just a little different approach to the same problem.

QUESTION: If I could follow up, please, he did ask you directly if you had considered the possibility of holding so-called hostages, to make some sort of exchange?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Whenever you reporters use the word "consider," you know, we have to be very careful about what we answer. "Consider" to some reporters means to seriously consider; to me the word "consider" means that this is among the list of things that someone or other suggested. It doesn't mean we seriously consider it. So if you would drop the word "consider" from your questions, my answers can be more precise.

QUESTION: Do you think that the foreign policy record of this Administration would be a help or a drag on Carter's reelection?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: It depends on how well and how accurately it is presented and what the contrast is. You know, you have a foreign policy on the other side.

QUESTION: Do you think the American people understand your viewpoint?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I hope they will by the time we get to November 4. There is no guarantee of that. Having been involved in elections, I'm sure of that.

Answering your question seriously, I would think that the foreign policy issues, as well as the economic issues, would be the centerpieces of this campaign to date. And as far as I'm concerned, I find the President very knowledgeable about all of his policies in detail, well equipped to debate his policies, good in debate, cool under pressure, and tough.

I've not found him the kind of indecisive person that he is often described as being. I find that when he makes a decision in which I had an input, he has no patience with anybody who comes back asking him to reconsider it, whatever it is. He tends to be tough-minded, cool under pressure, knowledgeable, and I would think he'd hold up well in debate, so that if debating these issues has an effect on the final result, then I think President Carter is in a good position to hold his own.

QUESTION: Are you planning on campaigning for the President at all?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The Secretary of State is non-political.

QUESTION: Considering the SALT talks --

QUESTION: I've heard from a couple of sources that Iran is slipping into the hands of the Soviet Union. Within the next six months this is supposed to happen. Have you heard anything about this?

And also what are you doing to strengthen our position in the Middle East now? What is currently being done?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: By the "Middle East," what do you mean?

QUESTION: Iran, Turkey, Yemen -- to prevent Soviet control of that area and of the oil sources.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We're doing a number of things to deter further Soviet expansion, all of which have a bearing on it. With respect to Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Iran, I think that is an uncertainty that ought to trouble Iran, as well as us and other countries. There is no way of determining Soviet intentions with certainty, but the fact that they have troops on the Iranian border and indulge in military exercises on the border, as well as getting involved in infiltration as they do in any country which they border, we know that creates an air of uncertainty that ought to be of concern.

The fact that our relations with Iran are at such an unfavorable level, minimizes, or makes impossible any influence on our part with respect to the Iranian interests. On the other hand, we are in a position to be of assistance to Turkey, which adjoins Iran, which is having its own economic problems; and we are involved in a consortium led by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and the other NATO Allies in putting together an economic package to help. Turkey pull out of the economic doldrums in which it finds itself at the present time, and that, I think will be of significant assistance. We are doing the same thing with Pakistan in a consortium with other countries.

On the military side, we are building the rapid deployment force, to which I referred in my speech, and getting access rights to bases in that area which gives us more flexibility in emergencies. The NATO defense alliance is being strengthened in such a way as to give us flexibility to deploy forces outside the NATO area, if necessary. So, along the defense line, we are doing a great deal to create a threshold across which the Soviets might be deterred from crossing, with the experience they have had with the world's reaction to Afghanistan.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, recently the Canadian Government had some discussion with regard to the pre-built pipeline running from Alberta into the United States, and there was some question here that they should not go ahead with the pre-built lines unless the American Government was prepared to give some guarantees that the full Alaska-U.S. pipeline would be built. Can you say that these guarantees are forthcoming to the Canadian Government?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I know that as a result of our talks directed at that very point, Congress adopted a resolution -- it doesn't have the force of law, but it gives the support of the Congress to the project; and my impression is that that assurance on the part of Congress may be enough for the Canadians to go forward.

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We are also undertaking to press on the fisheries treaty affecting the eastern provinces and our northeastern states -- another issue which I think affects Canadian perceptions of our commitment to this gas pipeline. So we are working on both and trying to get both.

Then, there was another issue which troubled the Canadians, and that was the question of acid rain from our Midwest. And I just signed an Interim Agreement with Ambassador Towe of Canada and Minister Roberts of Canada committing ourselves to a program which, one, commits us to enforce our present laws, but secondly, to put together a program directed specifically at trans-boundary pollutants, of which acid rain is the most troublesome and most visible at the present time.

We are very concerned about our relations with Canada. Those are three issues that could become very divisive, and it is our intention and our determination to work on all three so that our generally good relations are not disturbed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, just to clarify one answer you gave earlier regarding the hostages: Would it be fair to say that you are ruling out the possibility that they might be released in the coming weeks, and that you know of no such plan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I wouldn't rule out anything, nor would I raise expectations. You have to be very realistic and pragmatic. Release might be the result of what on its face is not a logical act or it might be the result of painful, carefully negotiated arrangements, or anything in between. And to try to predict in advance --

Who predicted Queen's release? An hour before he was released, he didn't even know it was being considered. He said he was given the word, "One hour from now you're being put on a plane to the United States," and so nobody anticipated that.

QUESTION: I think what we're trying to get at is, besides the normal contacts which the State Department and this government has with Iran through third countries, is there something special that is happening regarding the arrangements that you mentioned just a minute ago?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Anything that works would be something special.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The Press Conference concluded at 12:10 Pacific Daylight Time.)

03:10:00

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QUESTION: Thank you.

(The Press Conference concluded at 12:10 Pacific Daylight Time.)

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August 8, 1980
No. 212

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE G.I. FORUM
Anaheim Convention Center
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1980

I'm glad to be here. And I want to begin by saluting some remarkable Americans:

First, Dr. Hector Garcia, one of democracy's freedom fighters -- who not only founded this organization, but forged it into a powerful, creative, insistent voice for a better America.

Second, Lupe Saldana -- a Marine Captain in Vietnam; chairman of the G.I. Forum; and a leader of Hispanic Americans whose counsel is sought -- and heeded -- in the White House.

Third, the entire membership of this remarkable organization. You have always believed that America was good enough to be better. And you have helped assure Hispanic Americans that their cause will have powerful support -- in the armed services, in veterans affairs, in government and in the making of foreign policy.

One of my goals as Secretary of State is to attract more young people to careers in the Foreign Service from groups that are underrepresented there: Hispanic -- and Asian-Americans, Black people and women and others to whom opportunities in the past have too often been closed.

I want to do this not as a favor to them -- but as a favor to our country. I believe that such people -- the son of a Polish tailor, the grandson of a slave, the granddaughter of a migrant worker -- can help enrich our foreign policy and improve our standing in the world. For they bring with them some special qualities: closeness to other cultures, sensitivity to the pain of poverty and injustice -- and a special enthusiasm for the power of democracy to unlock human potential and improve human life.

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And so, Dr. Garcia; Chairman Saldana, members of the G.I. Forum -- my goal is to make affirmative action in the United States Department of State an accomplished reality -- and I invite you to help me meet that goal.

II.

For a few minutes today, I want to talk about America's strength. For I cannot think of any group that better understands how this strength is two-fold. It is found in America's military power. And it is found in the strength of the ideas America stands for -- in our commitment to justice and human rights.

I have a strong sense, as I stand here, that this audience itself says more about that subject than any speech of mine can express. For the story of this G.I. Forum is a story of military valor in war -- and of devotion, in peace and war, to America's best values. You have demanded that America fulfill the dream you have fought for. You have championed the cause of an America that is both strong and decent -- and you have believed that America could be both.

I share that belief. And today, as we enter a season of intense debate about America's purpose in the world, I want to talk about what will be required if we are to keep America strong in her defenses -- and steadfast in her pursuit of decent purposes in the world.

III.

First -- and fundamental -- is a strong military defense.

And let no one whose purpose is political advantage tell you that America is weak, or growing weaker -- for that is not true.

It is true that over the past 20 years, our chief potential adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military forces massively and relentlessly; in every category from nuclear missiles to naval forces, and at tremendous economic cost.

It is true that the Soviet Union has shown itself, over the past few years, eager to assert itself as a global power, and all too willing to disturb the peace -- with Cuban proxy forces in Africa, and with Soviet tanks in Afghanistan.

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But it is not true that President Carter and his administration have neglected our side of the military balance.

Let's look at the record.

When this Administration took office, we inherited a military posture and a defense budget that simply had not kept pace. In the eight years preceding President Carter's inauguration, real defense spending -- after inflation -- had declined by more than 35 percent. In particular, our spending on strategic nuclear weapons had declined by 20 percent.

It was soon clear to President Carter that only by changing course could we prevent the growing Soviet military capability from surpassing our own; only by increasing our efforts could we prevent a dangerous Soviet military superiority in the future.

So this Administration, since taking office, has increased real defense spending every year. Already this has resulted in an overall increase of 10 percent. And under our Five Year Defense Plan, real defense spending will have increased more than 27 percent by 1985.

That is not a story of declining strength; it is a story of growing strength.

And President Carter has devoted his Administration to increasing our strength in every category.

- o To improve the nation's strategic nuclear arsenal, we are developing the MX missile on land; the Trident II system at sea; and the cruise missile for our bomber fleet.
- o To improve our conventional capabilities, we are developing the Rapid Deployment Force and arranging new basing privileges around the world.
- o And to improve the capabilities of our NATO Alliance, we have led our partners to develop a Long Term Defense Plan; to increase real defense spending by at least three percent a year, and to modernize NATO's long-range nuclear missiles in the European theater.

Does this sound like a winding down of America's defense capabilities? Of course not. It is, in fact a buildup -- a buildup of funding and equipment; a buildup of strength. It is a buildup aimed at improving quality, not piling up mere quantity. And President Carter has accomplished this

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buildup without sacrificing this nation's commitment to look after its own people -- to help the poor, to heal the sick, to educate our young people and to care for our old people in retirement.

I think this is a record to be proud of.

And while he has worked to build up our strength, President Carter has also pursued, in the name of increased security for America, a process pursued by Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford: negotiations aimed at prudent, balanced arms control. The SALT II Treaty is in America's interest. It will serve our security interests by preventing an uncontrolled arms race. It deserves your support. And it deserves to be ratified by the United States Senate.

So that is the record of our efforts to protect America's security. It is a record that is clear, consistent, prudent and practical.

It stands in contrast to the rhetoric of those who sow panic about American defenses -- in order to reap political profit.

They ask for a blank check for massive military spending -- but call at the same time for a massive tax cut.

They say that they are for arms control -- but against SALT II.

Well, I say they can't have it both ways. I have been in public life for nearly thirty years -- and I know partisan doubletalk when I hear it.

I prefer -- and I believe you prefer -- a record of achievement to the rhetoric of a campaign. I believe the record I have outlined deserves your confidence.

And you have a basis for confidence beyond our record in building America's military strength. For this Administration has moved to assure that the might of our arms is matched by the power of our ideals; that our arsenals are maintained not simply to buttress America's power, but to defend values which resound all over the world.

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We are defending our values in our strong response to aggression against Afghanistan.

We are defending our values when we promote peace among nations and the human rights of individuals.

Without our strength, our values might be in danger. But without these values, our strength would be empty.

Let me tell you what I mean when I speak of a foreign policy based on values.

To begin with, this Administration believes in dealing with other nations on a basis of mutual respect.

Several years ago, the G.I. Forum gave its support to a vital reflection of this principle -- the new Panama Canal Treaty.

That Treaty -- which acknowledged Panama's right to operate the Panama Canal -- came under fierce attack. There were many in this country who thought it folly to deal with tiny Panama on terms of equality and respect. Some might even try to reverse this step if they were given half a chance.

But President Carter and his Administration stood up for the agreement; he saw it through to ratification. He did it not only because the treaty was important to our future access to the Canal and to our relations with Panama; not just to calm a dispute that threatened the Canal's security; he did it because that treaty said something to the rest of the world about America. It said that America was willing to make -- and abide by -- a fair agreement with Panama that benefited both nations. It said that America was prepared to establish a relationship based on bargaining, not on bullying.

In today's world, we are well served by that message -- in our relations in this Hemisphere and in our ability to work with other nations towards goals we share. And today, our treatment of a smaller neighbor stands in stark contrast to the continuing Soviet assault on the free people of Afghanistan.

Another value we uphold is peace. And so this Administration has worked tenaciously to build peace in troubled regions of the world.

In the Middle East our efforts still have great obstacles to overcome. But we have come a long way. There is peace between Egypt and Israel, an historic accomplishment. And the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt also represent an historic beginning. We must now waver there, in patience nor in persistence.

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In southern Africa, patience and persistence have also been rewarded. The people of Rhodesia -- now the new nation of Zimbabwe -- today enjoy peace, a government based on majority rule, and an authentic chance for a stable future. All this is possible, in part, because the United States worked hard to support a negotiated solution to Rhodesia's racial war. Here again, President Carter did not bend his support for a real settlement -- and the results vindicate his policy.

Another value the United States stands for in the world is economic and social progress for the world's poor nations -- and the world's poor people.

It is a stark fact of our time that millions of people are sick and hungry -- in Africa, in Asia, and close to home in Latin America.

Our economic aid programs -- in the face of these overwhelming human needs and spiraling energy costs -- are at best modest. They deserve your support -- for they work; they are essential if we want a foreign policy that is active and effective. How ironic it is that some of the loudest demands for wider American influence in the world come from the same people who consistently vote against American involvement in the world; who vote against programs to help nations and people break the shackles of poverty.

We will continue to resist those who vote against these programs -- and we need your help. For this Administration believes that the real way to build our influence and to stave off violence in the world is to help people meet their basic human needs: energy, food and agriculture, education and health. We intend to be on the side of helping ordinary people build self-sufficient lives. In the process we will serve our own interest in building a more stable world.

We believe, quite simply, that even in a turbulent world, we must be loyal to our values -- at home and abroad. We must stand for democracy and human dignity; for free speech and free institutions.

American human rights policy does not displace our other international interests. Indeed, it serves those interests. It underscores the contrast between us and our adversaries. It encourages our friends to build stronger, freer societies. And it aligns the United States with the tide in favor of human rights which is running in the world.

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In our own hemisphere, we have seen that tide surge in Ecuador and Peru; in the new human rights emphasis of the Organization of American States and the Andean Pact Nations. We have seen tragic setbacks, as in Bolivia last month. But we believe that the broad trend is in favor of human freedom, and the United States should be on the leading edge of that trend.

Perhaps most important of all, our human rights policy reflects the character of the American nation and the best qualities of the American people.

As the agenda of your meeting here makes clear, we have a great deal left to do. We have a long way to go before all Americans enjoy a fair stake in our economy and our political life.

We intend to make the State Department a part of that process. My predecessor as Secretary of State, Cy Vance, launched a number of wise and hopeful precedents. He called for stepped-up recruitment of Hispanics; he held meetings with Hispanic-American leaders to seek their counsel; the Department held its first Hispanic conference last October. I intend to continue and build on these efforts. And I urge you to give me your insights, your participation, and your advice. For by living up to our best values at home can we strengthen our position abroad.

For years, you have been helping your government do just that. The evidence lies in one of the truly great stories of America's battle against discrimination.

When a funeral home in Texas refused to give Private Felix Longorria a military burial in an "Anglo" cemetery, Dr. Hector Garcia and the G.I. Forum became the champions of this dead soldier's rights. They took their cause to Washington. And on January 11, 1949, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson sent a telegram to Dr. Garcia that included these words:

"This injustice and prejudice is deplorable. I am happy to have a part in seeing that this hero is laid to rest with the honor and dignity his service deserves."

Soon afterward, Private Felix Longorria was buried, with full military honors, on a hillside in Arlington National Cemetery with his brother heroes.

For several decades now, in that spirit, you have championed respect and fair treatment for your fellow citizens -- young and old, the living and the dead.

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You have stood for an America that is powerful -- but whose power always serves decent ends.

What you stand for is what we stand for. So let us work together -- now and in the future.

Thank you.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 11, 1980
No. 213

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
COMMONWEALTH CLUB
San Francisco, California
August 9, 1980

WHEN THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO BECOME THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE, HE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WOULDN'T BE TOO MUCH TRAVELLING.

SINCE THEN I'VE BEEN TO BRUSSELS AND VIENNA; TO VENICE, ANKARA, AND KUALA LUMPUR; AND TO JAPAN -- TWICE.

THE TRAVELLING IS NOT BAD, ACTUALLY.

THERE'S A SIMILARITY, I'VE FOUND, BETWEEN FOREIGN TRAVEL AND THE SENIORITY SYSTEM IN THE SENATE: THEY'RE BOTH TASTES THAT GROW ON YOU.

PARTLY BY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT IN LARGER PART BY CHOICE, I HAVE SPENT A FAIR PORTION OF MY TIME OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF MONTHS -- BOTH IN THESE TRAVELS AND AT HOME -- ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS MAJOR ALLIES.

I HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE I DEEPLY BELIEVE, AS I HAVE THROUGHOUT MY PUBLIC CAREER, THAT THE STRENGTH AND COHESION OF OUR ALLIANCES ARE VITAL TO OUR WELL-BEING AS AMERICANS.

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THIS MORNING, I WANT TO SHARE SOME THOUGHTS WITH YOU ABOUT OUR BASIC ALLIANCES: THEIR CONDITION TODAY AND THEIR DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE.

II.

MY OWN PUBLIC CAREER BEGAN WHEN OUR POSTWAR SECURITY ALLIANCES -- PARTICULARLY NATO AND OUR ALLIANCES WITH JAPAN -- WERE BEING FORMED. FROM THAT TIME TO THIS, THERE HAS SCARCELY BEEN A MOMENT WHEN THE STRENGTH OF THESE PARTNERSHIPS WAS NOT BEING QUESTIONED.

JOURNALISTIC AND OTHER BUILDING-INSPECTORS REGULARLY HAVE EXAMINED OUR ALLIANCES AND FOUND THEM ENDANGERED: BY "HAIRLINE CRACKS" . . . SOMETIMES BY "GAPING HOLES." THEY DESCRIBE THESE PROBLEMS WITH WORDS LIKE "DISARRAY."

THOSE SAME ASSERTIONS ARE WITH US NOW.

IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BASE A RESPONSE SOLELY ON THE VERY REAL AND BROAD AGREEMENT THAT WAS EVIDENT AT THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS IN ANKARA.

BUT I DON'T WANT TO INDULGE IN THE RHETORIC OF BLANKET REASSURANCE.

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THE FACT IS THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AMONG US.

NOR DO I OFFER THE RHETORIC OF RECRIMINATION. FROM TIME TO TIME, TENSION AMONG FREE ALLIES IS UNDERSTANDABLE. WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE NOW CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES AS WELL AS THE OLD . . . CHALLENGES TO OUR INTERESTS OUTSIDE OUR ALLIANCE BOUNDARIES, AND OTHERS THAT ARISE FROM OUR GROWING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE.

OUR COMMON GOALS ARE ENDURING: WE ARE JOINED TO PRESERVE OUR DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE, BY DETERRING WAR AND ALSO BY WORKING TO LESSEN TENSIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND OUR ADVERSARIES.

BUT AS WE PURSUE THOSE ABIDING CENTRAL OBJECTIVES, OUR PATTERNS OF COOPERATION MUST BE BROADENED.

BEYOND OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DESIRABLE FOR US AND OUR ALLIES TO COORDINATE OUR ACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT BROADER COOPERATION IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE; IT IS INDISPENSABLE. FOR WE HAVE REACHED A NEW ERA. WE LIVE IN A TIME WHEN CENTRAL INTERESTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE TOUCHED NOT ONLY BY THREATENING MILITARY POWER ON ADJACENT BORDERS, BUT BY THE REALITY OF MORE DISTANT AGGRESSION. IT IS AN ERA WHEN ECONOMIC POLICY AS WELL AS MILITARY STRATEGY PROFOUNDLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS;

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WHEN WE MUST CONCERN OURSELVES WITH BOTH THE DIRECT THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH BREED TURBULENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. AND IT IS AN ERA IN WHICH THE DEFENSE OF COMMON WESTERN INTERESTS INCREASINGLY REQUIRES A CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE.

THE CHALLENGES OF THIS NEW ERA MUST BE MET. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MUST FASHION A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHALLENGING EVENTS BEYOND OUR ALLIANCE AREAS. IF WE DO NOT, THE CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SEVERE. IN ALL OUR NATIONS, CONFIDENCE IN OUR ALLIANCES AND IN EACH OTHER CAN ERODE. AND IF WE WERE TO LET SHORT-TERM NATIONAL CONCERNS DIVERT US FROM MEETING SHARED STRATEGIC CHALLENGES -- AS IN AFGHANISTAN -- WE WOULD RISK OUR FUTURE SECURITY.

THERE HAVE BEEN TENSIONS, IN RECENT MONTHS, AS WE AND OUR ALLIES PUT TOGETHER NEW RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN AND TERRORISM IN TEHRAN.

BUT THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE HAD SHOULD NOT OBSCURE A CENTRAL FACT., IN THE ACTIONS WE ARE FASHIONING, WE ARE ALSO CREATING NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION. THIS PROCESS HAS GENERATED CONSIDERABLE NOISE. BUT IN LARGE MEASURE, THE SOUNDS WE HEAR ARE THE SOUNDS OF CONSTRUCTION.

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III.

LET US FIRST BE CLEAR ABOUT THE BASIC STRENGTH THAT IS AT THE HARD CORE OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS.

OUR ALLIANCES ARE SUCCEEDING IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE -- THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR COLLECTIVE TERRITORY.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION HAS FOSTERED MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS OF PEACE. BECAUSE IT COULD DEFEAT AGGRESSION AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE, NATO HAS DETERRED THAT AGGRESSION.

IN THE PROCESS NATO HAS SHOWN REMARKABLE RESILIENCE AND GROWTH.

-- WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED FAR-REACHING ADJUSTMENTS IN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, FROM THE ERA OF MASSIVE RETALIATION TO A MORE REALISTIC STRATEGY -- ONE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE FULL RANGE OF DANGERS WE FACE.

-- IN JUNE 1978, NATO ADOPTED THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM TO REMEDY WEAKNESSES IN OUR DEFENSE AND BUILD FOR THE FUTURE.

-- THE NATO ALLIES HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A GOAL OF THREE PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING EACH YEAR.

-- NATO IS RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO THE PRESENCE OF NEW SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, WITH

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NEW SYSTEMS OF OUR OWN AND WITH AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE TRULY EQUAL LIMITS ON THESE WEAPONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

THESE ARE THE EFFORTS OF A DEFENSE ALLIANCE VIGOROUSLY MEETING ITS BASIC PURPOSE: STRONG AND STALWART DEFENSES.

THE SAME IS TRUE IN THE PACIFIC.

OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS GROWING. AND OUR ANZUS RELATIONSHIP -- WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND -- IS STRONG.

SO WE BEGIN WITH THE FACT THAT OUR MAJOR PEACEKEEPING RELATIONSHIPS, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WORLD, ARE WORKING. THEY ARE SOLID. THEY ARE PROGRESSING. THEY ARE DOING WHAT THEY WERE CREATED TO DO: DETERRING AGGRESSION.

IV.

NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO IGNORE THE NEW REALITIES WHICH NOW PRESS US TO SHAPE NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION.

ONE OF THOSE NEW REALITIES IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

IN RECENT YEARS, THE MILITARY REACH OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS EXTENDED TO THE THIRD WORLD. AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST RECENT, AND THE MOST DRAMATIC, EVIDENCE OF GROWING SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVISM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

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BY PROXIMITY AND BY PRECEDENT, THE SOVIET INVASION HAS ESCALATED THE THREAT TO ENERGY SUPPLIES AND TRADE ROUTES VITAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. AND IT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE ARE NEW CHALLENGES TO WESTERN INTERESTS BEYOND IMMEDIATE ALLIANCE BOUNDARIES.

A SECOND NEW REALITY IS THE IMPROVED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATURE OF OUR ALLIES. THE UNITED STATES STILL HOLDS THE STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. BUT GATHERED BENEATH THAT UMBRELLA IS A GROUP OF INCREASINGLY PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL NATIONS.

THE PROBLEMS THIS DEVELOPMENT CREATES ARE A LITTLE LIKE THE TAX PROBLEMS OF A MULTIMILLIONAIRE! THEY ARE DIFFICULT; BUT THEY ARE THE SORT OF PROBLEMS YOU WOULDN'T MIND HAVING.

STRONG PARTNERS DESERVE SERIOUS CONSULTATION; THERE WILL BE NO AUTOMATIC ACQUIESCENCE IN AMERICAN DECISIONS. THAT FACT MAY BE UNSETTLING TO THOSE WHO LONG FOR THE DAYS WHEN AMERICA MIGHT DOMINATE OUR ALLIES. BUT THE CHANGE IS A FACT NONETHELESS.

THAT DECISIONS ARE NOW DEBATED WITH VIGOR IS NOT A SIGN OF AN ALLIANCE GROWN WEAK; IT IS A SIGN OF ALLIES GROWN STRONGER.

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IT IS ALSO A REALITY THAT OUR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS ARE NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL. TO MANY AMERICANS, FOR EXAMPLE, DETENTE MAY BE AN ABSTRACTION -- A COMMONSENSE POLICY, BUT ONE THAT IS REMOTE FROM DAILY LIFE. TO THE PEOPLE OF WEST GERMANY, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DEGREE OF TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON EVERYDAY CONCERNS. THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT LOVED ONES; THE CHANCE FOR GERMANS IN THE EAST TO EMIGRATE; THE DAILY CONDITIONS IN BERLIN -- ALL OF THESE ARE AT STAKE.

AND THERE ARE OTHER DIFFERENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONS OF EUROPE AND JAPAN ON OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES IS HEAVIER THAN OURS.

SUCH DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE MUST BE ACCOMMODATED AS COMMON POSITIONS ARE REACHED.

WE IN THE UNITED STATES NEED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE SPECIAL CONCERNS AND VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ALLIES.

AT THE SAME TIME, OUR ALLIES MUST ACCEPT THE GROWING RESPONSIBILITY THAT COMES WITH GROWING STRENGTH. THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO BEAR THEIR SHARE OF OUR COMMON BURDENS.

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V.

THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM IS TO RECOGNIZE THESE REALITIES FRANKLY -- AND TO USE THEM AS THE BASIS FOR NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION.

LET ME BRIEFLY DESCRIBE HOW I SEE THOSE PATTERNS EVOLVING.

THE FIRST AREA IS OUR COMMON STRATEGY FOR MANAGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

THE FOUNDATION OF THAT STRATEGY, TODAY AS IN THE PAST, MUST BE AN UNQUESTIONED MILITARY DETERRENT. FOR DETERRENCE CONTINUES TO BE THE CORNERSTONE OF THE PEACE WE INTEND TO PRESERVE.

THE CONTRIBUTION OUR NATO PARTNERS MAKE TO OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNIZED HERE AT HOME. OUR PARTNERS PROVIDE NEARLY HALF OF NATO DEFENSE SPENDING; ALMOST 60% OF ITS ARMED FORCES; ABOUT 75% OF ITS TANKS; MORE THAN 90% OF ITS ARMORED DIVISIONS.

BUT IN THE FACE OF STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER, WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE COMPELLED TO MUSTER EVEN GREATER DEFENSE EFFORTS. THESE NEW BURDENS MUST BE SHARED FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY.

AS WE IN THE UNITED STATES SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR OWN DEFENSE SPENDING, WE WILL EXPECT OUR ALLIES TO FULFILL THEIR PLEDGE TO INCREASE THEIR OWN SPENDING BY 3% ANNUALLY.

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AND AS THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE LEAD TO PROTECT SHARED ALLIED INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA, OUR ALLIES WILL SHOULDER A GREATER SHARE OF NATO'S STRENGTH IN EUROPE.

IN SHORT, AS WE DO WHAT IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO CALL UPON OUR ALLIES TO ASSUME DEFENSE BURDENS COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR PROSPERITY, INFLUENCE AND STRENGTH.

A COMMON STRATEGY TOWARD EAST-WEST RELATIONS ALSO REQUIRES A CONCERTED POLITICAL RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MUST MAKE IT UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT ADVENTURES SUCH AS THAT IN AFGHANISTAN CARRY GENUINE COSTS IN OUR DIRECT RELATIONS.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN VENICE, EUROPE CANNOT BE AN "ISLAND OF DETENTE" WHILE AGGRESSION IS CARRIED OUT ELSEWHERE. FOR THAT WOULD SIMPLY INVITE NEW ADVENTURES AND NEW CRISES, IN EUROPE OR ELSEWHERE.

WE MUST BE PREPARED TO HOLD TO OUR COURSE ON AFGHANISTAN FOR AS LONG AS THAT ASSAULT ON NATIONAL FREEDOM CONTINUES. IF ALLIED NATIONS OR THEIR BUSINESS FIRMS STEP IN WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN CORPORATIONS HAVE STOOD ASIDE, THAT BREACH OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION WILL UNDERMINE HERE THE PUBLIC SUPPORT ON WHICH A STRONG ALLIANCE IS BASED.

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SUSTAINED AS WELL AS STRONG ALLIED ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO GAIN SOVIET RESTRAINT. AND THAT RESTRAINT IS NECESSARY TO PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THUS, DETENTE AND DETERRENCE ARE INSEPARABLE PARTS OF THE SAME PARCEL.

FOR THAT REASON, PROGRESS ON ANOTHER FRONT IS ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO ALLIED COHESION. ALONG WITH SUSTAINED FIRMNESS, A COMMON ALLIED STRATEGY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION DEPENDS UPON OUR GENUINE WILLINGNESS TO SEEK CONCRETE AGREEMENTS THAT SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS -- PARTICULARLY SENSIBLE RESTRAINTS ON THE ARMS RACE.

IF WE -- AND HERE I SPEAK PRIMARILY OF THE UNITED STATES -- TURN AWAY FROM OUR COMMITMENT TO STEADY ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS, THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF OUR ALLIANCES GENUINELY WILL BE SHAKEN. INDEED, IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE OF A MORE SERIOUS BLOW.

LET US HAVE NO ILLUSIONS: THE KEY TO FUTURE ARMS CONTROL IS RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY.

UNDER THAT TREATY ALL OF THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WE HAVE PLANNED CAN GO FORWARD.

BUT WITHOUT IT, BY 1985 WE COULD FACE 7-800 MORE SOVIET MISSILES AND BOMBERS THAN WE WOULD IF THE TREATY WERE IN FORCE.

WITHOUT IT, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO STOP THE SOVIETS FROM PLACING 20 OR 30 MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON EACH OF THEIR HEAVY MISSILES, INSTEAD OF 10 UNDER THE TREATY.

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WITHOUT IT, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FREE TO CONCEAL THEIR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS FROM OBSERVATION BY OUR SATELLITES AND OTHER MONITORING DEVICES. WE WOULD KNOW LESS ABOUT THE FUTURE THREATS WE MIGHT FACE.

OF COURSE, WE WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO MEET AN INCREASED THREAT.

BUT THE ARMS RACE WILL NOT STAND STILL DURING MORE PROLONGED TALKS TO CONTROL IT. IT NEVER HAS AND NEVER WILL.

AND ANYONE WHO CLAIMS WE CAN NEGOTIATE A BETTER AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST NAILING DOWN SALT II IS SELLING A BILL OF GOODS.

AFGHANISTAN UNQUESTIONABLY HAS MADE THE TASK OF RATIFICATION HARDER. IT HAS NOT MADE IT ONE IOTA LESS IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, NOT ONE IOTA LESS CRUCIAL TO MAINTAINING A COMMON STRATEGY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES.

A SECOND AND RELATED AREA IN WHICH US-ALLIED COOPERATION MUST GROW IS IN OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING SOME CONSPIRACY OF INDUSTRIAL NATIONS WHERE THE STRONG IMPOSE THEIR WILL UPON THE REST OF THE WORLD. THOSE DAYS ARE OVER. THEY SHOULDN'T BE MOURNED.

BUT IT IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT BEFORE THEY EXPLODE.

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IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS FIGHT POVERTY AND DISEASE AND HOPELESSNESS BEFORE FRUSTRATIONS BUILD TO THE BOILING POINT.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE SENSIBLE LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE WHERE THAT WILL HELP THEM TO DEFEND THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM OUTSIDE THREATS.

AND IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO WORK IN HARMONY AS WE SEEK PRACTICAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO DISPUTES IN TROUBLED REGIONS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST.

FINALLY, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR ALLIES WILL INCREASINGLY BE SHAPED BY ECONOMIC ISSUES. FOR THE ECONOMIC CURRENTS THAT SHAPE OUR DAILY LIVES FLOW THROUGHT THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD.

ON ENERGY, WILL WE ACT AS CUT-THROAT COMPETITORS FOR SCARCE OIL -- OR WILL WE ACT TOGETHER, AS FELLOW CONSUMERS, TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE AND FOSTER STABILITY AND RESTRAINT IN THE MARKET?

ON TRADING, WILL WE SLIDE INTO A NEW PROTECTIONIST SPIRAL -- OR WILL WE CONTINUE TO BUILD PATTERNS OF TRADE THAT ARE BOTH FREE AND FAIR?

ON ECONOMIC POLICY, WILL EACH OF US SIMPLY PURSUE TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE -- OR WILL WE COORDINATE OUR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ACTIONS TO SERVE OUR OVERALL, LONG-TERM INTERESTS?

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THE FUTURE OF ALLIED RELATIONSHIPS WILL BE DETERMINED AS MUCH BY HOW THESE QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED -- BY THE DEGREE OF OUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION -- AS BY THE SHAPE OF OUR MILITARY COOPERATION.

VI.

THAT WE NEED TO DO ALL THESE THINGS IS CLEAR; THAT WE WILL DO THEM, HOWEVER, IS BY NO MEANS ORDAINED.

IT COULD BE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WILL ALLOW OUR DIVERGENT INTERESTS AND OUR INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS DRIVE US APART.

OR WE CAN BUILD ON THE NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION THAT ARE TAKING SHAPE.

-- TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN BEFORE, THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS ARE COORDINATING THEIR DOMESTIC AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES.

-- THE NATO ALLIES HAVE STOOD FIRM AGAINST EXTRAORDINARY SOVIET PRESSURE TO REVERSE OUR COURSE ON THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION.

-- OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES HAVE SHOWN AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF COOPERATION TOWARD RESOLVING DANGEROUS REGIONAL DISPUTES, IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

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-- THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES HAVE JOINED TOGETHER IN A MASSIVE AID PROGRAM FOR TURKEY.

-- WHILE WE SOUGHT BROADER MEASURES, THE FACT IS THAT OUR ALLIES HAVE JOINED US IN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR HOLDING AMERICANS HOSTAGE.

-- AND THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE NATO MEETING IN ANKARA DEMONSTRATED THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE ALLIES IN INSISTING ON A TOTAL -- NOT COSMETIC -- SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISTAKE THAT RESOLVE.

NEW ALLIED PATTERNS OF COOPERATION ARE STILL EMERGING. MORE -- MUCH MORE -- CLEARLY MUST BE DONE. WE MUST AVOID BACKSLIDING ON THE GAINS WE HAVE MADE IN RECENT MONTHS.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFERENCES AND DISAGREEMENTS AMONG US IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES WILL VIGOROUSLY PURSUE ITS POINT OF VIEW AT SUCH TIMES.

BUT WE ALL SHOULD BRING TO SUCH MOMENTS A SENSE OF THE LARGER PROGRESS TO BE MADE.

THOSE WHO DOUBT THAT THIS PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE SHOULD CONTRAST THE PRESENT WITH PAST MOMENTS -- MOMENTS WHEN THE NOISE THE WORLD HEARD WAS NOT THE NOISE OF CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY, BUT THE GEARS OF ALLIED COOPERATION GRINDING TO

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A HALT. CONSIDER THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, WHEN THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF IN OPPOSITION TO ITS PRINCIPAL ALLIES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE; OR THE VIETNAM PERIOD.

WE SHOULD ALSO RECALL SOME FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES:

THE GREAT INDUSTRIAL NATIONS, FOR ALL THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ARE THE WELLSPRINGS OF THE WORLD'S PROSPERITY. THEY ARE THE SOURCE OF THE IDEAS, THE TECHNICAL GENIUS, AND THE ORGANIZING ABILITY THAT NOT ONLY PROVIDE MUCH OF THE WORLD'S GOODS, BUT ALSO HOLD THE GREATEST HOPE FOR HUMANITY'S PROGRESS.

AND WITH ALL THEIR IMPERFECTIONS, OUR NATIONS ARE THE PRINCIPAL GUARDIANS OF THE DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE; OURS ARE SYSTEMS WHICH BELIEVE IN AND SEEK TO PROMOTE THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL, THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS, AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.

POSSESSING SUCH ASSETS AND SUCH VALUES, WE AND OUR ALLIES NEED FEAR NEITHER OUR CURRENT DIFFERENCES -- NOR FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 12, 1980
No. 213A

QUESTION and ANSWER PERIOD

FOLLOWING SPEECH OF
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
COMMONWEALTH CLUB
AND THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
AT
HERBST AUDITORIUM, WAR MEMORIAL BUILDING
CIVIC CENTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
FRIDAY, AUGUST 8, 1980

MR. SHUMAN (President, Commonwealth Club): Your first question, sir: Begin's hard line with regard to Jerusalem threatens to scuttle the Camp David talks and to alienate the United States from Arab friends on which we are critically dependent.

Why doesn't the United States more effectively use its considerable economic leverage over Israel to temper Begin's demands and force resolution of this issue?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The course of action suggested by that question would undoubtedly abort the Camp David process. There is a tendency, when countries are divided by deeply emotional issues as Egypt and Israel obviously are, to act unilaterally, to speak unilaterally, to respond to the emotional pressures of their constituencies, and to complicate the environment in which difficult negotiations are being conducted.

But I think that dealing with a complicated negotiating process of this kind is something like playing golf: You've got to keep your head down, concentrate on the ball, and slow down your backswing. I guess there are no golfers in the audience. (Laughter) And perhaps it's not an apt analogy.

There is a temptation, not only with respect to this international problem but others, that because the United States is a super power, it can, by the application of its power in one form or another, impose settlements, solutions, or policies upon those who are less strong or who are dependent upon us in one way or another. That would not work.

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There are all sorts of efforts to divert the world's attention from the Camp David process and the autonomy negotiations that are under way in accordance with that process.

I regret the unilateral actions that are taken by both sides as these negotiations go forward, and the United States has indicated its concern when such unilateral actions are taken, whether on the Egyptian side or the Israeli side. In recent days, the increasing escalation of such actions creates danger for the process -- and we've said that to both sides privately and we've said it publicly.

I'm also asked from time to time, "Why doesn't the United States, in the negotiations, develop its own plan and impose it on the parties?" Well, there are a number of problems with that: In the first place, summoning up the wisdom to see what that plan should be. In considering that, considering the associated question, how can we be sure that our plan, however wisely perceived and with whatever clarity our crystal ball gives us, will be acceptable not only by the two parties immediately involved in the negotiations, but others who must, at some point, be brought into the negotiations because their rights are also the subject of the negotiation?

I think the problems associated with that approach are obvious. So, what we have tried to do with this negotiating process is to develop the process to the point where the parties are forced to consider the fundamental and difficult issues that must be resolved if an agreement on Palestinian autonomy is to be reached. They are at that point. They have discussed all of the other authorities that a self-governing authority, as it is referred to in the Camp David process, would have to have in dealing with the day-to-day lives of those who are subject to its writ.

With respect to the issues -- such as the nature of the self-governing authority; its powers; the question of how internal as well as external security in the area is to be handled and how the responsibility for it is to be divided; how the relatively scarce water resources of the area are to be shared; what will be the franchise of Arabs living in East Jerusalem, which Arabs regard as being part of the West Bank, and Israelis regard, as is obvious from recent events, as an integral part of the territory of Israel; what is the political status of Arabs living in East Jerusalem -- these very difficult questions, these and one or two others, are the questions that are being considered.

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When the talks resumed following the last pause, which you will remember was triggered by Israeli actions bearing upon the status of Jerusalem, both parties returned to the talks with a very constructive and positive attitude. There was great hope on the part of Ambassador Linowitz, who is conducting the negotiations on our side -- great hope that, finally, progress was being made.

Whether or not there will be another pause, and if so, how long it may continue, and what the impact upon the viability of the Camp David process may be are all appropriate subjects for speculation. And I don't have the answers for that.

But if the talks should collapse, if these negotiations should collapse, then what will we turn to? There is the pre-Sadat Jerusalem visit, with unpredictable impacts upon the treaty already signed by Egypt and Israel, with unpredictable questions about the relationships between Egypt and Israel as well as the rest of the Arab world.

Can one expect that if the Camp David talks collapse the level of violence on the West Bank will be reduced or enhanced? Will mischief-making with respect to the security rights of Israel and the rights of Palestinians be enhanced in the United Nations?

Is it likely that another formula designed in such a way that it will implement itself without negotiations can be devised? Or isn't it a fact, whether or not these negotiations succeed, that negotiations at some point will be essential to resolve the questions raised by this age-old enmity.

We think our best chance is these autonomy talks, and we don't think they can succeed if we use them as a way to impose our notion of what the settlement ought to be. That we ought to contribute to the development of ideas that are considered in the negotiating talks I think goes without saying, and that has happened. But it is not in the form of an imposition of an American view or plan upon the negotiating parties.

MR. SHUMAN: Is the locating of medium-range ballistic missiles in NATO countries mute confirmation that the United States is no longer committed to respond to a Soviet conventional assault in Europe with its nuclear ICBMs?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I would not think that is the case. We always, in our defense arrangements with our NATO allies, included tactical nuclear weapons of one kind or another theater nuclear weapons of one kind or another. But the Soviets have been in the process now of deploying a modern and very effective theater nuclear weapon aimed at Europe, the SS-20, and that program of deployment is well on its way and will be completed in late 1982 if present trends continue. So the question that confronted NATO was whether or not, in the absence of an agreement on the limitation of such theater nuclear weapons, to modernize its own theater nuclear resources.

The allies concluded in December of last year that that was essential, that the growth of the Soviet threat to them, the nuclear threat in that theater, required -- and common sense required -- that we modernize. That decision was taken, but it was in two parts: first, the decision to deploy; and second, the offer to negotiate with the Russians controls on such theater nuclear weapons in order to stabilize the nuclear side of the East-West military confrontation in Europe.

The Russians insistence that the European decision to deploy such weapons must be reversed before they would be willing to engage in talks has been dropped, and we are on the verge of beginning preliminary exchanges with the Russians on talks dealing with theater nuclear weapons which may conceivably broaden in the other areas.

MR. SHUMAN: In Los Angeles yesterday you stated that we won't get into an arms race but we will have a defensive capability second to none. Isn't the commitment to the MX missile a new step in the arms race?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: As I said in my comments today, the build-up of arms continues even in the course of talks designed to stabilize the arms race, and that has been the history of the last ten years or more during which the SALT process has been under way. Until we reach agreements, neither side has been willing to suspend the development of its own technology to put in place in the event the talks should fail. So the momentum that is generated by that ongoing arms competition is a serious block because as the technology race proceeds, the technology of nuclear weapons becomes more complicated and more difficult to reach agreement for stabilizing.

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I can remember, for example, in my Senate career, the debate over whether or not we ought to MIRV our missiles. As you know, MIRVing added multiple, independently targetable warheads on single missiles. That was a breakthrough, and with our decision to deploy it -- which I opposed at the time because I thought that once we deployed it, the Russians would find it necessary then to develop their own MIRVs, which of course they have done -- the arms race escalated, as a result, to a higher level to which we now have to seek stabilization before we can even talk about reduction. So the time it takes to reach agreement and the events which delay implementation of agreements provide time for a continuation of the arms competition.

The arms race I referred to yesterday was that this arms competition -- and I've used that word today -- that is ongoing now will be escalated into an all-out arms race if the objective of each side is to achieve nuclear superiority over the other, because obviously neither of the superpowers is going to be willing to be frozen into a position of nuclear inferiority in some SALT treaty of the future.

Only an agreement that is based upon essential equivalence has any chance of being agreed to by both parties, and only such agreement will avoid the prospect of the kind of unrestrained arms race to which I was referring yesterday.

MR. SHUMAN: How are you and Dr. Brzezinski getting along?

(Laughter)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, as someone said earlier in our relationship, we have a fine bipolar relationship.

(Laughter)

We have no difficulties. I have none, and I'm not aware that he does. Foreign policy making is not a one-person process in this or any other Administration. There are other agencies which impact upon our relationships with other nations, the Department of Defense more than any of them. The press and public don't focus on that very much. But we have ongoing discussions between the defense ministries of the West that have obvious implications for foreign policy in ways that may not be anticipated when discussions are going on at the defense ministerial level.

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The Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, our Trade Representative -- there are a number of agencies and persons who are involved in affecting foreign policy in one way or another, and I think we need to better coordinate all of that. I have that as a very strong impression after 90 days.

My concern with coordinating foreign policy and identifying the principal figures responsible for it has broadened far beyond Dr. Brzezinski and the National Security Council. We've had no confrontations up to this point. It is conceivable that we might because we are both strong-minded individuals; we both have definite ideas; we both seek access to the President; and it's my job to make sure that the Secretary of State doesn't take second place, that's all. It's that simple.

MR. SHUMAN: We have time for but one more question. After it has been asked and answered, this meeting will be adjourned.

Before asking it, I would like to thank you, Honorable Edmund S. Muskie, United States Secretary of State, for your fascinating remarks on the subject of United States foreign policy, given here before a large crowd of members of the World Affairs Council of Northern California and the Commonwealth Club of California in Herbst Theatre, War Memorial Building, Civic Center, San Francisco.

Your remarks will be published in the Commonwealth Club's weekly bulletin, The Commonwealth, read by our 14,000 members and will be heard over the 130 radio stations which broadcast Commonwealth Club events.

Your final question, sir: Now that you are viewing the process from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, do you believe that intense Congressional scrutiny is a constructive factor in the development of foreign policy?

(Laughter)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it can be if their constituents are intensely scrutinizing their decisions on foreign policy. That is one of the reasons that I have engaged on this nation-wide campaign to discuss foreign policy with constituents. Not that I want to end-run Congress, but because I think, as in the case of domestic policy, our policy is more likely to be wise, perceptive, and supported by our people if our people understand it.

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If you understand it, I'm sure from my 22 years of experience in the Senate, Congressmen will find a way to understand it.

MR. SHUMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 13, 1980
No. 214

INFORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE
WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE HILTON INN AIRPORT
FOLLOWING
LUNCHEON WITH HOSTAGE FAMILIES
San Francisco, California
August 8, 1980

QUESTION: (inaudible)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Maybe I can answer your question best by saying this, that I doubt that I told them anything different today than the press has heard me say -- in one place or another, in one form or another -- for the last 90 days.

QUESTION: Which was?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, now, you don't really think I've memorized every conversation I've had for 90 days and can unreel them for you! I mean if I could answer the question, I would be glad to try.

The purpose of coming here is because if you're a member of a hostage family, you've got to understand that they are scattered across the country -- many of them a distance from Washington, feeling lonely -- and it's important that they have the sense, from time to time, of direct contact with their government and especially with that department or agency which has a large part of the responsibility for solving their problem.

I undertook to come here for that purpose, so they could take a look at me, listen to me, and get some feeling as to whether or not there is reason to have some confidence that I am involved in a real effort, a genuine effort, and a meaningful effort to help bring their loved ones back to them.

Now, with respect to the means that we used, those of you who are close to the State Department in your day-to-day work understand that a great deal of this effort takes the form of quiet diplomacy, involving channels of communication available to us or to friends and allies around the globe -- channels of communication which, if revealed, could dry up. So it's not possible for me to answer your questions such as the one or two that have been raised here so explicitly and in such detail. You would know as much about it as those of us who have some responsibility for it.

For further information contact:

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We seek to take advantage of the dynamism of the situation, which is responsive to forces operating within Iran and on the borders of Iran. It is affecting Iran's economy, their potential safety or lack of safety, their political process, the development of government institutions with the authority to deal with this issue, to make decisions on this, as well as other decisions that the Government of Iran will eventually have to make as they are held accountable for the welfare of their own people, as well as for the welfare of the hostages. This is about as detailed a characterization as I can make of my conversations with the hostage families.

In addition to that, I undertook to listen to each one of them, and listen to their own frustrations, their own suggestions about how our policy ought to be applied to the problem -- and that was a very moving experience. I mean the toughest question to answer is, "Why can't my boy come home tomorrow?" or "Why was he held there in the first place?" Questions like that aren't easily answered. But the fact that they had an opportunity to ask it of the Secretary of State and to challenge the Secretary of State to answer it gives them some escape and some relief from the frustrations that they face in their day-to-day lives.

This is why I came here. I didn't come here to make hard news or to unveil a magic new formula for dealing with the problem. I came out here to listen to the hostage families in a way that is helpful and meaningful to them and useful to me, and that's what it's all about. I have no hard news to give to any of your questions.

QUESTION: Did any of the families advocate taking advantage of the current situation with the Iranian students, to use them as trading material, or at least a psychological break in the hostage crisis?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I don't recall that any of them did. Some of them expressed frustration that these demonstrations might have an undesirable and unfavorable impact upon the hostages in Iran.

QUESTION: About the families' morale, how is it holding up after all this time?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it's about what you would expect. Frustrations grow. There were a lot of tears in there, and that is bound to continue.

QUESTION: Do you hold out any more hope now than might have been held out back in November? Has there been any improvement at all, as far as any release at any time in the foreseeable future?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Obviously, what I said just a little while ago, there is a dynamism to this situation which is changing the political situation internally, which is changing the economic situation internally, which is changing the leadership situation internally -- and all those changes may well, after the fact, be seen as improvements in the prospects for resolving the problem. But I think it is difficult to reach such a conclusion at this point. It's like looking at the latest polls bearing upon our own election campaign, and asking the question, "Well, does this poll mean that the President is worse off or better off?" We'll know the answer to that on November 5.

QUESTION: Did they have a lot of criticism for the State Department? There was a lot of frustration. Was it directed towards the Department?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I told them to make me their target. I mean, frustration has got to have a target if you want them to be relieved, but I don't sense that there was specific criticism directed at the State Department as an institution.

There were differences of opinion among the hostage families as to whether a hard line, a diplomatic line, or some other line ought to be used; but this comes, I think, out of the frustrations. So I don't think they gathered in some concerted effort to shoot at us.

QUESTION: Did they make any comments regarding the rescue attempt?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There were a number who expressed the hope that there would not be another one, but there were others who seemed more receptive to another try. There were differences of opinion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you know where all the hostages are?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think I had better answer that question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did any of the families discuss any desire to go to Iran at all, ask your permission?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the accurate answer to that is no, but that ought not to be taken as a reflection of what their response might be if they were directly asked that question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, now that you've brought up the subject of the election, there is a "Draft Muskie" --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Did I, really? (Applause)

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QUESTION: You referred to it in one of your answers. Have you been in communication with this group? Have you asked them to cease and desist in your behalf?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Since I've not been in direct communication with them, there has been no occasion for me to give them that kind of message.

I was taught years ago as a boy that you should not get too close to a draft; you might catch cold.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: However, do you plan to ask them to not pursue this effort?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I did in every way that I could by answering questions of the press and other ways to discourage it, of any such move.

QUESTION: Are you, at least, flattered by it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've long ago given up being flattered by things of that kind. I know what it can lead to.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is your reading today of the pro-Khomeini demonstrations in Washington, New York, and London? Has your assessment of them changed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have examined the suggestion that appeared in the press that it was being orchestrated in some fashion. We have not yet identified any evidence on that point. It's easy to speculate that that may be the case, but we simply haven't got any evidence.

QUESTION: Have you discounted the possibility?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I wouldn't discount it, but in saying that, I can see the headline, "Muskie doesn't discount the possibility" of that (Laughter), so whenever I give that kind of an answer, I'm a little leery.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some of the families feel that the authorities in Washington are being kinder to the protesters because of our hostages in Iran. Do you feel that that is so?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it is obvious that we are giving these protesters the benefit of due process of law -- it isn't a question of kindness -- and that our hostages are not being given the advantages of due process of law, which they should, independent of any feelings of kindness or compassion that they have. I don't think it is a matter of kindness; it is a matter of what is right and what is just.

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We are dealing with these people on the basis of what our laws require us to do in respecting the rights of people, whoever they are. That doesn't spring from kindness, which is an ad hominem kind of virtue that not all people share. But we hope that by our example of recognizing the due process rights of these people, the Iranians might be persuaded to give our people the same kind of consideration.

In addition, if they can find it in their hearts to be kind, I would not reject that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports in the press that the Iranian Government, the Khomeini government, has been financing demonstrations in the United States. Does that reflect the dynamics of the situation at the moment?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I said, in response to an earlier question, that I have seen the speculation to that effect, but we, as far as I know, have no evidence to that effect, as yet.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there an indication that the militants in Tehran might be losing some of their authority or hold on the government? Do you seen any of that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: My impression is that their hold on the hostages is the only authority they've got, and it is a question of another authority taking its place in Iran which is able to assert itself and take over possession of the hostages.

QUESTION: Is the parliament going into the vacuum, at this point?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The parliament is organizing; it has elected a speaker; a prime minister seems about to be designated; and increasingly various factions are pointing to the parliament as the place where authority to deal with the hostage question will eventually occur.

Whether that is the case, we've been building toward that possibility because if in fact a decisive debate takes place there, we would hope, in whatever way we can, to influence the shape of that debate, which could be critical.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Glad to find you so curious on the West Coast.

(Laughter)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 11, 1980
No. 213

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
COMMONWEALTH CLUB
San Francisco, California
August 9, 1980

WHEN THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO BECOME THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE, HE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WOULDN'T BE TOO MUCH TRAVELLING.

SINCE THEN I'VE BEEN TO BRUSSELS AND VIENNA; TO VENICE, ANKARA, AND KUALA LUMPUR; AND TO JAPAN -- TWICE.

THE TRAVELLING IS NOT BAD, ACTUALLY.

THERE'S A SIMILARITY, I'VE FOUND, BETWEEN FOREIGN TRAVEL AND THE SENIORITY SYSTEM IN THE SENATE: THEY'RE BOTH TASTES THAT GROW ON YOU.

PARTLY BY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT IN LARGER PART BY CHOICE, I HAVE SPENT A FAIR PORTION OF MY TIME OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF MONTHS -- BOTH IN THESE TRAVELS AND AT HOME -- ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS MAJOR ALLIES.

I HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE I DEEPLY BELIEVE, AS I HAVE THROUGHOUT MY PUBLIC CAREER, THAT THE STRENGTH AND COHESION OF OUR ALLIANCES ARE VITAL TO OUR WELL-BEING AS AMERICANS.

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THIS MORNING, I WANT TO SHARE SOME THOUGHTS WITH YOU ABOUT OUR BASIC ALLIANCES: THEIR CONDITION TODAY AND THEIR DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE.

II.

MY OWN PUBLIC CAREER BEGAN WHEN OUR POSTWAR SECURITY ALLIANCES -- PARTICULARLY NATO AND OUR ALLIANCES WITH JAPAN -- WERE BEING FORMED. FROM THAT TIME TO THIS, THERE HAS SCARCELY BEEN A MOMENT WHEN THE STRENGTH OF THESE PARTNERSHIPS WAS NOT BEING QUESTIONED.

JOURNALISTIC AND OTHER BUILDING-INSPECTORS REGULARLY HAVE EXAMINED OUR ALLIANCES AND FOUND THEM ENDANGERED: BY "HAIRLINE CRACKS" . . . SOMETIMES BY "GAPING HOLES." THEY DESCRIBE THESE PROBLEMS WITH WORDS LIKE "DISARRAY."

THOSE SAME ASSERTIONS ARE WITH US NOW.

IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BASE A RESPONSE SOLELY ON THE VERY REAL AND BROAD AGREEMENT THAT WAS EVIDENT AT THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE MEETING OF NATO MINISTERS IN ANKARA.

BUT I DON'T WANT TO INDULGE IN THE RHETORIC OF BLANKET REASSURANCE.

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THE FACT IS THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AMONG US.

NOR DO I OFFER THE RHETORIC OF RECRIMINATION. FROM TIME TO TIME, TENSION AMONG FREE ALLIES IS UNDERSTANDABLE. WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE NOW CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES AS WELL AS THE OLD . . . CHALLENGES TO OUR INTERESTS OUTSIDE OUR ALLIANCE BOUNDARIES, AND OTHERS THAT ARISE FROM OUR GROWING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE.

OUR COMMON GOALS ARE ENDURING: WE ARE JOINED TO PRESERVE OUR DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE, BY DETERRING WAR AND ALSO BY WORKING TO LESSEN TENSIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND OUR ADVERSARIES.

BUT AS WE PURSUE THOSE ABIDING CENTRAL OBJECTIVES, OUR PATTERNS OF COOPERATION MUST BE BROADENED.

BEYOND OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DESIRABLE FOR US AND OUR ALLIES TO COORDINATE OUR ACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT BROADER COOPERATION IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE; IT IS INDISPENSABLE. FOR WE HAVE REACHED A NEW ERA. WE LIVE IN A TIME WHEN CENTRAL INTERESTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE TOUCHED NOT ONLY BY THREATENING MILITARY POWER ON ADJACENT BORDERS, BUT BY THE REALITY OF MORE DISTANT AGGRESSION. IT IS AN ERA WHEN ECONOMIC POLICY AS WELL AS MILITARY STRATEGY PROFOUNDLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS;

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WHEN WE MUST CONCERN OURSELVES WITH BOTH THE DIRECT THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH BREED TURBULENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. AND IT IS AN ERA IN WHICH THE DEFENSE OF COMMON WESTERN INTERESTS INCREASINGLY REQUIRES A CONCERTED WESTERN RESPONSE.

THE CHALLENGES OF THIS NEW ERA MUST BE MET. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MUST FASHION A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHALLENGING EVENTS BEYOND OUR ALLIANCE AREAS. IF WE DO NOT, THE CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SEVERE. IN ALL OUR NATIONS, CONFIDENCE IN OUR ALLIANCES AND IN EACH OTHER CAN ERODE. AND IF WE WERE TO LET SHORT-TERM NATIONAL CONCERNS DIVERT US FROM MEETING SHARED STRATEGIC CHALLENGES -- AS IN AFGHANISTAN -- WE WOULD RISK OUR FUTURE SECURITY.

THERE HAVE BEEN TENSIONS, IN RECENT MONTHS, AS WE AND OUR ALLIES PUT TOGETHER NEW RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN AND TERRORISM IN TEHRAN.

BUT THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE HAD SHOULD NOT OBSCURE A CENTRAL FACT., IN THE ACTIONS WE ARE FASHIONING, WE ARE ALSO CREATING NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION. THIS PROCESS HAS GENERATED CONSIDERABLE NOISE. BUT IN LARGE MEASURE, THE SOUNDS WE HEAR ARE THE SOUNDS OF CONSTRUCTION.

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III.

LET US FIRST BE CLEAR ABOUT THE BASIC STRENGTH THAT IS AT THE HARD CORE OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS.

OUR ALLIANCES ARE SUCCEEDING IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE -- THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF THEIR COLLECTIVE TERRITORY.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION HAS FOSTERED MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS OF PEACE. BECAUSE IT COULD DEFEAT AGGRESSION AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE, NATO HAS DETERRED THAT AGGRESSION.

IN THE PROCESS NATO HAS SHOWN REMARKABLE RESILIENCE AND GROWTH.

-- WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED FAR-REACHING ADJUSTMENTS IN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, FROM THE ERA OF MASSIVE RETALIATION TO A MORE REALISTIC STRATEGY -- ONE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE FULL RANGE OF DANGERS WE FACE.

-- IN JUNE 1978, NATO ADOPTED THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM TO REMEDY WEAKNESSES IN OUR DEFENSE AND BUILD FOR THE FUTURE.

-- THE NATO ALLIES HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A GOAL OF THREE PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING EACH YEAR.

-- NATO IS RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO THE PRESENCE OF NEW SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, WITH

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NEW SYSTEMS OF OUR OWN AND WITH AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE TRULY EQUAL LIMITS ON THESE WEAPONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

THESE ARE THE EFFORTS OF A DEFENSE ALLIANCE VIGOROUSLY MEETING ITS BASIC PURPOSE: STRONG AND STALWART DEFENSES.

THE SAME IS TRUE IN THE PACIFIC.

OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS GROWING. AND OUR ANZUS RELATIONSHIP -- WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND -- IS STRONG.

SO WE BEGIN WITH THE FACT THAT OUR MAJOR PEACEKEEPING RELATIONSHIPS, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WORLD, ARE WORKING. THEY ARE SOLID. THEY ARE PROGRESSING. THEY ARE DOING WHAT THEY WERE CREATED TO DO: DETERRING AGGRESSION.

IV.

NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO IGNORE THE NEW REALITIES WHICH NOW PRESS US TO SHAPE NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION.

ONE OF THOSE NEW REALITIES IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

IN RECENT YEARS, THE MILITARY REACH OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS EXTENDED TO THE THIRD WORLD. AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST RECENT, AND THE MOST DRAMATIC, EVIDENCE OF GROWING SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVISM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

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BY PROXIMITY AND BY PRECEDENT, THE SOVIET INVASION HAS ESCALATED THE THREAT TO ENERGY SUPPLIES AND TRADE ROUTES VITAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. AND IT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE ARE NEW CHALLENGES TO WESTERN INTERESTS BEYOND IMMEDIATE ALLIANCE BOUNDARIES.

A SECOND NEW REALITY IS THE IMPROVED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATURE OF OUR ALLIES. THE UNITED STATES STILL HOLDS THE STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. BUT GATHERED BENEATH THAT UMBRELLA IS A GROUP OF INCREASINGLY PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL NATIONS.

THE PROBLEMS THIS DEVELOPMENT CREATES ARE A LITTLE LIKE THE TAX PROBLEMS OF A MULTIMILLIONAIRE: THEY ARE DIFFICULT; BUT THEY ARE THE SORT OF PROBLEMS YOU WOULDN'T MIND HAVING.

STRONG PARTNERS DESERVE SERIOUS CONSULTATION; THERE WILL BE NO AUTOMATIC ACQUIESCENCE IN AMERICAN DECISIONS. THAT FACT MAY BE UNSETTLING TO THOSE WHO LONG FOR THE DAYS WHEN AMERICA MIGHT DOMINATE OUR ALLIES. BUT THE CHANGE IS A FACT NONETHELESS.

THAT DECISIONS ARE NOW DEBATED WITH VIGOR IS NOT A SIGN OF AN ALLIANCE GROWN WEAK; IT IS A SIGN OF ALLIES GROWN STRONGER.

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IT IS ALSO A REALITY THAT OUR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS ARE NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL. TO MANY AMERICANS, FOR EXAMPLE, DETENTE MAY BE CONSIDERED A COMMONSENSE POLICY, BUT TO THE PEOPLE OF WEST GERMANY, THE DEGREE OF TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS BEARING ON EVERYDAY CONCERNS; THE CHANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT; THE DAILY CONDITIONS OF LIFE ARE AT STAKE.

AND THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ON OIL ENERGY SOURCES IS HEAVY.

SUCH DIFFERENCES IN INTERESTS AS COMMON POSITIONS ARE.

WE IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE SPECIAL CONCERNS AND VULNERABILITIES.

AT THE SAME TIME, OUR RESPONSIBILITY THAT COMES FROM OUR POSITION BE PREPARED TO BEAR THEM.

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THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM IS TO RECOGNIZE THESE REALITIES
FRANKLY -- AND TO USE THEM AS THE BASIS FOR NEW PATTERNS OF
COOPERATION.

THE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE THE PATTERNS EVOLVING.
FIRST AREA IS THE STRATEGY FOR MANAGING THE
TIONS.

FOUNDATION OF STRATEGY, TODAY AS IN THE PAST,
AN UNQUESTIONED PRIMARY DETERRENT. FOR DETERRENCE
TO BE THE GUARANTEE OF THE PEACE WE INTEND TO

CONTRIBUTION C PARTNERS MAKE TO OUR COLLECTIVE
S NOT SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNIZED HERE AT HOME. OUR
PROVIDE NEARLY 50% OF NATO DEFENSE SPENDING;
OF ITS ARMED FORCES ABOUT 75% OF ITS TANKS; MORE
OF ITS ARMORED DIVISIONS.

THE FACE OF THE GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY
AND OUR ALLIES COMPELLED TO MUSTER EVEN
DEFENSE EFFORTS THE NEW BURDENS MUST BE SHARED
EQUITABLY.

IN THE UNITED STATES SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR
SPENDING, WE EXPECT OUR ALLIES TO FULFILL
TO INCREASE OWN SPENDING BY 3% ANNUALLY.

A 4x16 dot matrix consisting of four rows and sixteen columns of dots. The dots are arranged in a regular grid pattern, with four rows and sixteen columns.

PROTECTOR
SOUTH
OF N

IN SHORT, AS WE DO WHAT IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO CALL UPON OUR ALLIES TO ASSUME DEFENSE BURDEN MENSURATE WITH THEIR PROSPERITY, INFLUENCE AND STRENGTH.

A COMMON (TES) EAST-WEST RELATIONS
REQUIRES A COMBINED POLITICAL RESPONSE TO BRIVE
AROUND THE W

THE INDUSTRY MUST TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY
CLEAR TO THE FUTURE OF THE NATION
AFGHANISTAN IN THE DIRECT REPLY

AS THE PRINCE SAID IN NICE EUROPEAN
ISLAND OF D... WHILE... SSION IS CARRIED OUT HERE.
FOR THAT WOULD... W ADVENTURES AND...
IN EUROPE OR...

WE MUST ENJOY THE FREEDOM TO OUR COURTS AND TO OUR TANK
AS LONG AS WE ENJOY NATIONAL FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.
ALLIED NATIONS AND FIRMS STEP BY STEP THE
UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS MAY SUFFER A
Breach of COOPERATION WITH ALL NATIONS
THE PUBLIC AND A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF

Figure 1 shows a 4x4 grid of circles representing a 2D lattice. The circles are arranged in a regular pattern, with some circles highlighted in black and others in white. The grid is labeled with 'a' and 'b' at the bottom, indicating the lattice vectors.

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SUSTAINED AS WELL AS STRONG ALLIED ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO GAIN SOVIET RESTRAINT. AND THAT RESTRAINT IS NECESSARY TO PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THUS, DETENTE AND DETERRENCE ARE INSEPARABLE PARTS OF THE SAME PARCEL.

FOR THAT REASON, PROGRESS ON ANOTHER FRONT IS ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO ALLIED COHESION. ALONG WITH SUSTAINED FIRMNESS, A COMMON ALLIED STRATEGY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION DEPENDS UPON OUR GENUINE WILLINGNESS TO SEEK CONCRETE AGREEMENTS THAT SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS -- PARTICULARLY SENSIBLE RESTRAINTS ON THE ARMS RACE.

IF WE -- AND HERE I SPEAK PRIMARILY OF THE UNITED STATES -- TURN AWAY FROM OUR COMMITMENT TO STEADY ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS, THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF OUR ALLIANCES GENUINELY WILL BE SHAKEN. INDEED, IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE OF A MORE SERIOUS BLOW.

LET US HAVE NO ILLUSIONS: THE KEY TO FUTURE ARMS CONTROL IS RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY.

UNDER THAT TREATY ALL OF THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WE HAVE PLANNED CAN GO FORWARD.

BUT WITHOUT IT, BY 1985 WE COULD FACE 7-800 MORE SOVIET MISSILES AND BOMBERS THAN WE WOULD IF THE TREATY WERE IN FORCE.

WITHOUT IT, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO STOP THE SOVIETS FROM PLACING 20 OR 30 MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON EACH OF THEIR HEAVY MISSILES, INSTEAD OF 10 UNDER THE TREATY.

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WITHOUT IT, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FREE TO CONCEAL THEIR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS FROM OBSERVATION BY OUR SATELLITES AND OTHER MONITORING DEVICES. WE WOULD KNOW LESS ABOUT THE FUTURE THREATS WE MIGHT FACE.

OF COURSE, WE WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO MEET AN INCREASED THREAT.

BUT THE ARMS RACE WILL NOT STAND STILL DURING MORE PROLONGED TALKS TO CONTROL IT. IT NEVER HAS AND NEVER WILL.

AND ANYONE WHO CLAIMS WE CAN NEGOTIATE A BETTER AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST NAILING DOWN SALT II IS SELLING A BILL OF GOODS.

AFGHANISTAN UNQUESTIONABLY HAS MADE THE TASK OF RATIFICATION HARDER. IT HAS NOT MADE IT ONE IOTA LESS IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, NOT ONE IOTA LESS CRUCIAL TO MAINTAINING A COMMON STRATEGY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES.

A SECOND AND RELATED AREA IN WHICH US-ALLIED COOPERATION MUST GROW IS IN OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING SOME CONSPIRACY OF INDUSTRIAL NATIONS WHERE THE STRONG IMPOSE THEIR WILL UPON THE REST OF THE WORLD. THOSE DAYS ARE OVER. THEY SHOULDN'T BE MOURNED.

BUT IT IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT BEFORE THEY EXPLODE.

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IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS FIGHT POVERTY AND DISEASE AND HOPELESSNESS BEFORE FRUSTRATIONS BUILD TO THE BOILING POINT.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE SENSIBLE LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE WHERE THAT WILL HELP THEM TO DEFEND THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM OUTSIDE THREATS.

AND IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO WORK IN HARMONY AS WE SEEK PRACTICAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO DISPUTES IN TROUBLED REGIONS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST.

FINALLY, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR ALLIES WILL INCREASINGLY BE SHAPED BY ECONOMIC ISSUES. FOR THE ECONOMIC CURRENTS THAT SHAPE OUR DAILY LIVES FLOW THROUGH THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD.

ON ENERGY, WILL WE ACT AS CUT-THROAT COMPETITORS FOR SCARCE OIL -- OR WILL WE ACT TOGETHER, AS FELLOW CONSUMERS, TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE AND FOSTER STABILITY AND RESTRAINT IN THE MARKET?

ON TRADING, WILL WE SLIDE INTO A NEW PROTECTIONIST SPIRAL -- OR WILL WE CONTINUE TO BUILD PATTERNS OF TRADE THAT ARE BOTH FREE AND FAIR?

ON ECONOMIC POLICY, WILL EACH OF US SIMPLY PURSUE TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE -- OR WILL WE COORDINATE OUR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ACTIONS TO SERVE OUR OVERALL, LONG-TERM INTERESTS?

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• THE FUTURE OF ALLIED RELATIONSHIPS WILL BE DETERMINED AS MUCH BY HOW THESE QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED -- BY THE DEGREE OF OUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION -- AS BY THE SHAPE OF OUR MILITARY COOPERATION.

VI.

THAT WE NEED TO DO ALL THESE THINGS IS CLEAR; THAT WE WILL DO THEM, HOWEVER, IS BY NO MEANS ORDAINED.

IT COULD BE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WILL ALLOW OUR DIVERGENT INTERESTS AND OUR INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS DRIVE US APART.

OR WE CAN BUILD ON THE NEW PATTERNS OF COOPERATION THAT ARE TAKING SHAPE.

-- TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN BEFORE, THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS ARE COORDINATING THEIR DOMESTIC AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES.

-- THE NATO ALLIES HAVE STOOD FIRM AGAINST EXTRAORDINARY SOVIET PRESSURE TO REVERSE OUR COURSE ON THEATER NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION.

-- OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES HAVE SHOWN AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF COOPERATION TOWARD RESOLVING DANGEROUS REGIONAL DISPUTES, IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

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-- THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES HAVE JOINED TOGETHER IN A MASSIVE AID PROGRAM FOR TURKEY.

-- WHILE WE SOUGHT BROADER MEASURES, THE FACT IS THAT OUR ALLIES HAVE JOINED US IN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR HOLDING AMERICANS HOSTAGE.

-- AND THE VENICE SUMMIT AND THE NATO MEETING IN ANKARA DEMONSTRATED THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE ALLIES IN INSISTING ON A TOTAL -- NOT COSMETIC -- SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISTAKE THAT RESOLVE.

NEW ALLIED PATTERNS OF COOPERATION ARE STILL EMERGING. MORE -- MUCH MORE -- CLEARLY MUST BE DONE. WE MUST AVOID BACKSLIDING ON THE GAINS WE HAVE MADE IN RECENT MONTHS.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFERENCES AND DISAGREEMENTS AMONG US IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES WILL VIGOROUSLY PURSUE ITS POINT OF VIEW AT SUCH TIMES.

BUT WE ALL SHOULD BRING TO SUCH MOMENTS A SENSE OF THE LARGER PROGRESS TO BE MADE.

THOSE WHO DOUBT THAT THIS PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE SHOULD CONTRAST THE PRESENT WITH PAST MOMENTS -- MOMENTS WHEN THE NOISE THE WORLD HEARD WAS NOT THE NOISE OF CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY, BUT THE GEARS OF ALLIED COOPERATION GRINDING TO

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A HALT. CONSIDER THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, WHEN THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF IN OPPOSITION TO ITS PRINCIPAL ALLIES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE; OR THE VIETNAM PERIOD.

WE SHOULD ALSO RECALL SOME FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES:

THE GREAT INDUSTRIAL NATIONS, FOR ALL THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ARE THE WELLSPRINGS OF THE WORLD'S PROSPERITY. THEY ARE THE SOURCE OF THE IDEAS, THE TECHNICAL GENIUS, AND THE ORGANIZING ABILITY THAT NOT ONLY PROVIDE MUCH OF THE WORLD'S GOODS, BUT ALSO HOLD THE GREATEST HOPE FOR HUMANITY'S PROGRESS.

AND WITH ALL THEIR IMPERFECTIONS, OUR NATIONS ARE THE PRINCIPAL GUARDIANS OF THE DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE; OURS ARE SYSTEMS WHICH BELIEVE IN AND SEEK TO PROMOTE THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL, THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS, AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.

POSSESSING SUCH ASSETS AND SUCH VALUES, WE AND OUR ALLIES NEED FEAR NEITHER OUR CURRENT DIFFERENCES -- NOR FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE.

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INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
WITH FRENCH RADIO,
CHRISTIAN MOLLARD
New York City, New York
August 13, 1980

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1. What is the purpose of the study?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you've asked -- you have implied a lot of questions. As I perceive Europe I see differences of opinion. I don't see the Alliance countries always agreeing with each other or each other's policies and yet the Alliance is strong and it is strong in part because of confidence demonstrated in President Carter's leadership. It was President Carter's leadership which led to the decision to increase NATO defense spending in real terms by 3 percent a year. It was his leadership that led to the decision to deploy modernized theatre nuclear weapons, at the same time asking for talks on limiting theatre nuclear weapons for the Russians. It was his leadership which prompted the NATO Defense Ministers to begin planning for a more flexible defense of Europe which would enable the United States to deploy its forces elsewhere in the area if needed. Now, these surely are not signs of lack of confidence in President Carter's leadership.

With respect to the decision here on nuclear strategy, it is a fact that the State Department's participation in the development of that strategy has been minimal. That's a fact that I have learned since last week, and I think it should be comprehensive, for the foreign policy implications are obvious and evident in the fact that you asked me the question. And yet our European friends ought not to overlook the fact that after-all it is the President who is constitutionally the foreign policy maker. And he was not excluded from this policymaking. The State Department apparently was to an extent that it shouldn't have been. So the question that was raised really is not a complaint on my part, it's not personal on my part. I just think that the President's ability to deal with that sort of policy would be enhanced if the State Department as well as DOD and the National Security Council were involved. I suspect from now on it may be.

QUESTION: Last May, a few days after your trip to Vienna, you harshly complained about the Europeans and especially about the French political initiatives toward the Soviet Union. How would you qualify today the French foreign policy and its relationship to the United States?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I think that my complaint was very limited and had to do more with consultation than with the fact of the meeting. And I raised the question of consultation somewhat with tongue in cheek because I had been pretty severely lectured in Europe about the lack of American consultation of allies only to learn on my return here that we had not been consulted on that. So we both have something to learn about the importance of consultation and I thought I made the point relatively gently but I think it stuck and I expect that we'll have better consultation in the future.

QUESTION: But how would you qualify the Franco-American relationship today and the exchange of views?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I think that you French are in a better position to qualify that. I think there is a lot of residual goodwill for the French people here going back to the Revolution

SECRETARY MUSKIE

and our historic ties. In my own State, about twenty-five percent of our people are from French extraction, French Canadian mostly. And so there is that. The special French trait of seeking an independent position for the sake of being independent is sometimes frustrating to us but on the other hand there have been evidences of French cooperation that are important. So, the French have captured the knack of getting special attention by acting in a specially different way and I suppose all countries seek to find that way. The United States being a superpower gets attention by virtue of that fact which I suspect is frustrating to our European friends at the same time that they understand and support the value of our collaboration.

QUESTION: How do you view, Mr. Secretary, the attitude of Mr. Brezhnev using France and especially President Giscard d'Estaing very often as a sort of mediator between the Eastern and the Western world? Does it hurt you quite alot?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it all depends upon what the French response is. I think looking at it one way, if as a result of those contacts Mr. Brezhnev comes away impressed with the fact of Alliance unity on a particular issue, then to get it from two or three different countries is a useful kind of thing. If, however, as a result he succeeds in dividing the Alliance on an important issue then the result is negative and I don't think we should prejudge such contacts as being either negative or positive but seek rather by consultation to ensure to the maximum extent possible that we are moving in a common direction.

QUESTION: Do you really believe that during the Venice Summit that the Soviets were withdrawing the ten thousand troops when everybody knows that for three weeks before, they sent ten thousand more?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, we tried to take it at face value because we knew that our friends wanted to show that we weren't totally negative on it, but we really did not find that there was anything more than some redeployment of about five thousand troops from within Afghanistan to the Afghanistan border and it involved units that were not particularly valuable to the kind of fighting that was going on.

QUESTION: Let's come back, Mr. Secretary, to the U.S. hostages in Iran. How do the negotiations go now between Washington and Tehran and do you have any hope to have the hostages freed before next November especially after the nomination of a new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Ali Raja'i?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is no way of setting a date and if one were to do so it could prove very unfortunate in raising expectations. Nevertheless, the development to which you refer, the election of a Prime Minister and a gradual emergence of the formal government in Iran at least moves us closer to the day when there will be somebody in authority, somebody with the authority and Khomeini

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himself has said that the parliament will settle this issue. The hardliners have said that the parliament will settle this issue. And others have said that the parliament will settle this issue. So once the parliament is constituted it is our hope and we'll try to build on that hope through all the diplomatic channels made available to us by our allies and others in order to shape the decision and the terms which will eventually resolve in the release of the hostages.

QUESTION: So you are still very hopeful in spite of the confusion in this Iranian Administration?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, that makes it particularly frustrating. We have never been in that particular kind of a situation before but one can recall the hostages that were seized by North Korea in connection with the Pueblo in 1964. Those hostages were held eleven months before they were released and they were finally released. That was a frustrating period and eleven months is an awfully long time. And there have been other instances. So that patience, especially in a situation such as this where events from time to time escalate emotions there. After all, the economy is in bad shape, there is factionalism, there are those who seek to dethrone the Khomeini and his revolutionary government. So in that kind of a situation it's easy to whip up popular emotions and use the hostages as sort of a scapegoat, the bargaining chip for getting some kinds of political power. They really are a source of political power now more than anything else.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do the -- what we call here in the United States -- the Billygate and other recent declarations of Libyan Colonel Qadhafi saying that he was promised that the White House would adopt a pro-Palestinian policy if Jimmy Carter was reelected next November? Would all these might still be, according to you, a very bad source of nuisance to President Carter?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the President, I think, went a long way to dampen that issue with his appearance -- I've gotten this all across the country. I think he answered to the satisfaction of most Americans the basic questions that have been raised prior to that time. Now whether there may be other questions that may be raised by facts as yet undisclosed, it is very difficult question to answer, that is proving the negative is the toughest kind of case to prove. I'd say as of now that the President has dampened that issue and can go on to the real issues of the campaign.

QUESTION: How do you view the situation in Afghanistan right now? The Russians are still there. What are your plans to make them leave?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, there are two objectives that are important. I don't think that we really entertained any hope that the Russians would leave very soon or that they would withdraw or reverse their policy in response to the pressures that we tried to bring upon them. But nevertheless, we hope to influence that and influence the level of fighting there. But in addition, to deter the Russians from further expansionism beyond Pakistan. So it is important, I think, to maintain the pressure that we sought to

impose. The grain embargo which did not involve Europe very much, because Europe is not a big grain growing area, but with the help of other countries I think we did exact an important price. The Russians did not recapture what they lost in American exports. As a result they were not able to increase their meat supplies which was one of their objectives. In addition they had to draw down their grain reserves and it is very doubtful that their crop this year will enable them to restore those reserves or build up their meat supplies. So there has been a price they have had to pay. Comecon is very important. It is very important that the industrial countries hold the line. This involves high technology related, of course, to military uses. And up to now, I think, the allies have held pretty steady on that policy to build up our defenses, I think, is a fact that the Russians cannot ignore and over time promises to increase their own defense levels with the resulting impact upon their peoples standard of living and so on. So all of these pressures, I think, are important.

I think also the disapproval of the Islamic Conference, a conference within which the Soviet Union had made great headway prior to the Afghanistan invasion, is an important deterrent to the Russians. They have run into more difficulty in Afghanistan than they anticipated which makes it difficult for them to pull out and save face but I think if we hold steady that eventually that problem will perhaps be worked out.

QUESTION: One last question I forgot to ask you previously. In the next coming days the President of the European Council, Mr. Gaston Thorn, is going to the Middle East to try to promote the European initiatives and the negotiation in the Middle East. How do you view that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it is not a very encouraging time. In all of these actions, unilateral actions taken by the parties to the negotiations, these resolutions in the United Nations, the Special Session of the United Nations related to Palestinian Rights, all of these things so exacerbate the emotional climate in both Egypt and Israel as to be counterproductive. I understand the objective of the European initiative. It seeks to play the role of middleman and at some point it may be of help in broadening the negotiative base so that we can include all parties who will be affected. But in the meantime the principal engine, the negotiations have stalled again because of these outside diversions which have prompted the parties to pull back from the talks.

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Secondly, neither side has a first strike capability. So there is no way that either side could eliminate the other side's ability to retaliate given the present posture of both parties. That being so, it would seem to me that the deterrent value is still there. But if the Russians for any reason consider a limited nuclear war possible, the purpose of the countervailing strategy is to discourage them from that notion.

QUESTION: In Europe it is difficult to hold a clear distinction between the deterrence which is war avoidance -- we are coming back to the same question -- and defense, which is a damaging addition, because we feel that if there is a limited war it could be limited from an American point of view and yet in Europe.... Do you rule out completely this possibility?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I am not sure the human mind can comprehend all of the hypothetical possibilities. My own view may be an over-simplistic one but as I said earlier I think nuclear war in any form is unthinkable because I cannot conceive of a limited one. Nevertheless, the argument that we must have an ability to strike selected military targets as well as the urban industrial complex as well as military related industrial targets as well as command and control targets, I think is a possible deterrent, a more sophisticated deterrent added to that one of assured destruction. Our capacity to destroy cities is formidable and I think, one in analyzing the countervailing strategy, ought not to overlook that. We are not abandoning our policy at all, we are simply refining it, as I understand it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have indicated at the beginning of this interview that you were not consulted in the process of elaborating the evolution of this strategy. How could this be possible?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well first of all let me make it clear that I raised the question not in a personal sense but in an institutional sense. And what I have been examining, and I have been examining the records since the question first arose last week -- and I didn't raise it, it was raised in a New York Times article based upon a leak from some agency -- that State did not participate and I have been examining that record. And that comes pretty close to being true. There was some State Department participation a little over a year ago which then terminated. I think this is institutionally wrong, and I have said so, and the President and the Secretary of Defense have agreed with me at this point. So it remains to be seen whether or not this institutional problem will be corrected. Now how long that institutional problem existed I have not yet determined. It has gone back at least to 1977.

QUESTION: Well, this last example seems to confirm what is the common feeling in Europe that there is some difficulty in managing the foreign policy in this country between the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department and other government agencies. What is your feeling about that?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, one ought not to overblow it. Just as I think the question of consultation between the allies and differences between the allies has been escalated this year and indeed since I have been Secretary of Defense under a wide spread conception of disarray in the alliance which I think was overblown, now that I have examined it closely. So this can be overblown. The President, after all, is the supreme foreign policy making authority. The Constitution of the United States makes him so. And he has not been excluded from this policy. He has made it. PD 59 means Presidential Directive 59 and it is for him to organize, so organize his agencies as to enable him to make foreign policy in a way which he finds useful, convenient and comfortable. So one ought not to think of foreign policy being made by anyone but the President of the United States. And how he organizes his assistants is for him to decide and each President will do it in a different way. Nevertheless, even within those limits it seems to me the President would be wise to include in the formulation of doctrines like this, advice from the State Department because of its foreign policy implications which your questions obviously suggest.

QUESTION: Let's stay for awhile in the strategic field. The Republican party and Reagan called for military and nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. What do you think of that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it is unthinkable. It think it is totally inconsistent with the notion of arms control because if we are to achieve, if we were to achieve nuclear superiority and then seek an arms control treaty, it is inconceivable to me that the Russians would sign a treaty that froze them into a position of nuclear inferiority and that proposition seems so obvious on its face that it must have been obvious when that Republican plank was written. And the reverse is also true, we would not sign a treaty which froze us into nuclear inferiority. So that that prescription of nuclear superiority is a prescription for an uncontrolled escalating arms race with enormous costs in terms of greater insecurity for the super powers and others and also enormous costs for the tax payers of both countries.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, 52 Americans...

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I might add incidentally that this concern of mine, it is obvious to me that our NATO allies place a high value on arms control not only with respect to central systems but theatre nuclear systems as well. So it seems to me that that policy on the part of the Republican platform raises an issue of serious concern to the alliance that could weaken our alliance ties.

QUESTION: Since you are talking of the allies, President Carter pointed out...pointed to the unity of the Atlantic Alliance Sunday and quite frankly many observers here or in Europe think also of the why and what kind of basis can you claim unity to the point that it was claimed by President Carter?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, let me turn your question around a little bit. The United States is 50 States and two hundred and twenty million people. Now by unity you mean unanimity? Obviously, in a free society this is not unanimity. Within your own country there is more than one political party and you pursue unity in terms of national goals but there is not unanimity, not at least from my perception of France. And even within Europe excluding

the United States there are differences of opinion and yet you strive for unity in the European community and in other fora. So unity ought not to be overplayed. I mean unity of purpose is an important thing but disagreements as to the ways for achieving those purposes maybe a healthy thing. Now with respect to NATO's primary objective which is the defense of NATO territory, I think, the Alliance has never been in a stronger position. When one looks back to the days of the Mansfield Amendment when I was then a member of the Senate and Senator Mansfield failed by less than a handful of votes in getting the Senate to adopt that proposition which would have involved the total withdrawal of American forces from Europe to the present time when the Alliance is committed among other things to 3 percent real growth each year, in real terms, to modernization of theatre nuclear weapons, to a more flexible NATO defense which will enable the United States to deploy its forces outside the NATO territory if our common interests were jeopardized outside that territory. Now these are, I think, significant improvements in NATO defense and significant commitments to NATO defense. So within that Alliance territory perspective there has been, I think, better performance on the part of all countries including the United States and France and so on than previously. Now, with respect to issues that arise outside the NATO territory. One positive development that has taken place is a growing appreciation of the need to find some way to consult on such issues more effectively. I have heard that expression, that idea expressed by Francois-Poncet, by Genscher, by myself, by other Foreign Ministers, by the Japanese Foreign Minister and so on, and it is important to do so. Afghanistan is such an issue.

QUESTION: Have you any idea at this point how this kind of consultation could work?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think to suggest a framework at this point might destroy the suggestion. I think that at the present time, we do it not as effectively as some would like through the NATO structure, to some extent through the United Nations where there are opportunities for meetings on bilateral and multilateral bases independent of the U.N. So we have ad hoc possibilities for consultation that many of us would like to see institutionalized but no one yet has come up with a suggestion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you still frustrated as you said during your first press conference by the independent voice of France?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, there are frustrations with this job and I have heard other foreign ministers express them. But I say that overall I think that the opportunity to deal with the diverse world on a global basis and to discuss its problems and approaches to it with men of the capabilities that I have encountered in NATO and elsewhere, I think is an intellectually stimulating exercise. Frustrations from time to time, challenges from time to time. Each country has its own interests to protect and I think I have a slightly different perspective on how to take that pursuit of national interests in the context of establishing a common point of view, and struggling with that I think is a stimulating challenge and I enjoy it on the whole. I like my colleagues in the NATO Alliance, I have enjoyed working with them and my instinct is that on the whole they seek positive solutions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, 52 Americans have been held hostage in Iran for more than 9 months now. Can this situation last till the election day, for example? Do you plan any new initiative?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We continue to pursue the option of quiet diplomacy through all of the channels that are made available to us by our friends, by our allies, by non-governmental sources. We have been undertaking in these indirect ways to persuade the emerging powers in Iran that it is in Iran's self-interest to get the hostage situation behind it. We have been waiting for the emergence of effective governmental authority in Iran with out which the decision to release the hostages or even to create a dialogue of negotiation has been very difficult. With the appointment of a new Prime Minister perhaps we are close to that second objective.

With respect to the first, there has been a growing appreciation of the need to get the decision behind us and increasingly various elements in Iran have identified the parliament as the place where the decision will be made. And once the parliament is fully constituted with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet as well as a President, then it seems to me we'll know how soon we can begin to get to grips with the problem finally.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you appeared before the convention yesterday. You have been in the past a presidential delegate yourself. How do you assess the Kennedy candidacy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it was one that improved enormously from the first day to the last day. And I think the result of that is that Senator Kennedy has enormously improved his own viability as a candidate. He obviously has a political future ahead of him. His speech last night was one of the best I have ever heard at a convention and the kind of a speech a convention needs from time to time to electrify the delegates. I don't know of a more difficult audience to speak to than a convention audience, milling around, trading, making deals, deciding how to vote. No one could be less interested in what is being said on the podium most of the time. Well, Senator Kennedy's speech captured their attention and speeches do on occasion and when they do, they are remembered. So I think that with a very fumbling start, Senator Kennedy has once again established himself and his political base.

QUESTION: In other words, he would be a good candidate for 1984 but he should help President Carter in 1980?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, if I was in his position I would realize that it isn't easy to unify a party that's been divided and if it is divided to the point where it is defeated this year it will be difficult to unify it for 1984. If it is united in 1980, it will be stronger in 1984.

QUESTION: Last question, Mr. Secretary. Can we rest assured, can you rest assured that President Carter is going to be reelected?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think he will be reelected. It will be a closely fought, difficult campaign. The President is a formidable campaigner. He is looking forward to the debates especially because he sees the debates as his best opportunity to lay out his record in foreign and domestic policy which he thinks has been poorly presented by the media which has been distorted by his opposition and he looks forward to those debates, to lay out his record. It is the record of a man who has been willing to take on tough challenges, who has faced an unprecedented number of very difficult and intractable problems. There aren't magic answers to most of them, but he is on a steady course, a course that I think a majority of the American people would support as against the course that's presented by the Republican platform. And so I think, given his resources as a campaigner, his ability to handle his case, and to present it to the American people, that when the final poll is taken on November 4th that he will be the winner.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 14, 1980
No. 219

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE CBS-TV NEWS
BY
WALTER CRONKITE
New York City, New York
August 13, 1980

MR. CRONKITE: (Inaudible) of State, a running mate with Hubert Humphrey in 1968, this party's Vice Presidential candidate, and more recently, in the last couple of months, the Secretary of State. Welcome.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's a pleasure to be here in a non-candidate status.

MR. CRONKITE: Yes, that's one thing I didn't mention. You did make a run for the Presidential nomination itself four years ago and didn't quite make it that time.

Tell me, what were your thoughts over the last couple of weeks when the Muskie boom began around here in case Kennedy could open up the convention and they could put a third man forward?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm very upset about it because I think it had the potential for creating doubts as to what my real purpose is and commitments were, and my commitment is to do this job, and my commitment is to support this President, and I never waived in that, and it was a little difficult to discourage some of the old-time Muskie supporters from doubting that.

MR. CRONKITE: Tell me something, Mr. Secretary. Why is it impossible to call off draft movements? I mean, you've had this situation the last couple of weeks; others have had it -- Mondale even, the sitting Vice President, the man who is about to be re-nominated here. And yet he has not put a finish to it. Why is that not possible?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I think people are constantly searching for a better answer to the choices that are available to them, and it's not the first time. It happened in '68, Walter, as you remember, when I was Hubert's running mate. There are people who searched then for another

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answer, and they prolonged that search to the point where ultimately it defeated Hubert Humphrey, and, incidentally, myself. But Hubert was the target. The issue at that time was so emotional, so divisive, that people were never able to close ranks and to elect Hubert. We came within half a million votes of doing so, and there are those who say that another week might have made a difference. But history will have to record that.

But the Democratic party is such a diverse party with so many points of view that it's easy to form hard judgments, especially in the emotion of a convention, that the choices available are not good enough, and they search for another one. And I happen to be in the line of fire somewhat -- I don't think as much as people think (I am). But I happen to be in the line of fire, and I was uncomfortable about it because I was happy doing what I'm doing.

MR. CRONKITE: I guess I didn't quite make my question clear. Why can't a candidate who is a reluctant draftee, would-be draftee, say to the draft movement, "Stop it right now in its tracks. I don't want anything to do with it, and I wouldn't have anything to do with it."

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They refuse to believe it. They think that if they can contrive a situation in which the pressures were strong enough that somehow that preferred candidate would change his mind. The only thing to a real draft that I've ever seen -- and I think maybe it was -- was when Adlai Stevenson was nominated in 1952. My best information is that he resisted it; he didn't turn a hand to get that nomination, but did. But that's (Inaudible) ...

... no issue there as touched with emotion as the Vietnam issue in 1968. I think that there's an impulse for unity, especially in the face of the Reagan challenge, and what that means in terms of the philosophy of most Democrats, and I think there will be a unifying impulse that comes out of this convention. I think Senator Kennedy signalled that the other day. He didn't do it in any ultimate terms because he was still fighting the platform issues. But I'd be surprised if he didn't rally behind the President and that we'd see a good old fight in which Democrats -- diverse as they are, holding different opinions -- will still rally around in determination to win. It'll be a hard fight, but it's the kind of fight Democrats always enjoy, including yours truly.

MR. CRONKITE: You and Senator Kennedy have worked very well together on the Hill when you were heading the Budget Committee and so forth; you got a lot of support from him. Have you been in touch with him about uniting the party in the last couple of days?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I have not. We've talked about fishing off the New England coast, but not about uniting

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the party. But I know him so well, and his brothers, that I think I understand that his basic impulse is to support a positive political program and action, and although this might not be all that he might wish, I think he would perceive that the Democratic Party, with President Carter as its leader, is the most likely instrument for pursuing his goals. And the Kennedys have always been pragmatic as well as idealists.

MR. CRONKITE: Mr. Secretary, do you plan to campaign for the ticket?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Secretaries of State are not supposed to campaign. I'm supposed to discuss foreign policy, and to try to do it in a non-political -- by that I mean non-partisan sense -- but foreign policy obviously is going to be a very important issue in this campaign, Walter, and the Secretary of State, I think inevitably, must be drawn into that because our foreign policy for the four years following this election would be influenced by the judgments that are made by the electorate with respect to the foreign policy issues. I don't see how the Secretary of State can stand apart from that. Now he ought to avoid the purely partisan forums and the purely partisan rhetorics, and that's going to be difficult to do.

MR. CRONKITE: Do you think you might have stepped over the bounds a little bit at the Steelworkers last week?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think I have yet. I don't know that I could restrain my natural political impulses, but I won't try. (Laughter)

MR. CRONKITE: (Laughs) Former Secretary Kissinger thinks it would be very dangerous if you stepped out of that aloof role the Secretary of State should assume.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I wondered, as I listened to Henry's comments on that, whether or not he believes that former Secretaries of State ought to be subject to the same restraints.

MR. CRONKITE: You would recommend that they would?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I think that a restraint as rigid as the one he suggests, that ought to apply to someone who has recently been a Secretary of State as well.

MR. CRONKITE: Mr. Secretary, in a few words, could we possibly clear up the matter of the new targetting directive from the President on our missile program. Secretary

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of Defense Brown was with me just a little while ago this evening, and he said that you did know about that, that he did inform you before, not in detail, but that he mentioned it to you a few days before the announcement.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That is not the important issue. He did mention it to me in a way that could not be considered real participation by State. But he intended to brief me fully before the strategy was unveiled publicly. Unfortunately, a leak in the press pre-empted him in that respect. So I don't challenge Harold's intentions. But the real question is the extent to which, in the formulation of a policy like this, the State Department ought to be involved at every step of the development of that policy. Since so much of that took place before I took office, I am not certain yet what State's role was. The reaction of our Allies in Europe and the reaction of the Russians surely indicate that there are foreign policy implications that ought to be raised in the decision-making process.

I'm not certain at that point that it was done sufficiently, but I think that, as a result of this incident, the attention of the President, of the Secretary of Defense, at this stage, and Mr. Brzezinski, all of them focussed on this question, and I think that'll be worked out.

MR. CRONKITE: Do you feel that the Secretary of State's role was pre-empted in this case by the National Security Adviser, Mr. Brzezinski?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I don't think it was that so much as that there is a tendency to think of nuclear strategy as a targetting strategy, as a military strategy rather than a foreign policy one. I hope that I can effectively inject that balance into the equation.

MR. CRONKITE: Mr. Secretary of State, you've been pre-empted by the First Lady of the Land. Mrs. Rosalyn Carter just came into the hall, and your face was wiped from the screen, and we see her there now as she came into the hall with young Chip Carter and Amy.

Thank you very much Secretary of State Muskie for being with us. I appreciate it.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you, Walter, very much. I enjoyed it.

MR. CRONKITE: My best regards to Mrs. Muskie.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you.

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INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE ABC-TV NEWS
BY
BARBARA WALTERS
New York City, New York
August 13, 1980

Now we just gave him long-range aircraft. There was a lot of controversy over that. And now we have this kind of statement. I asked -- I have to tell you that I asked the Secretary if he had heard this just before we went on the air, and he had not. But can you tell us how you feel about it?

MS. WALTERS: Well, we will come back to some of your own comments on precisely what we are doing here at this convention.

For further information contact:



You have said yourself just this past week that you were not informed about the new nuclear policy. You also said there wasn't enough time given to discussions of really major foreign policy situations. Sometimes, you said, twenty-five different issues are brought up in one hour. This does give the feeling that this present Administration is inept. And you seem to be -- although you didn't say those words -- your statements seem to add credence to that.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to the second point, it is my view that this is in the nature of the institutional process. And it is not my view that it is different now than it was five years ago or ten years ago. I think that (with) the pressures of decision-making in the foreign policy field and in the domestic field -- now that I'm in the Executive Branch for the first time -- time is at a premium. The opportunity for government deliberation -- by the Muskie standard, at least -- is not what it should be. And that is the challenge of government policy-makers; to so discipline their time that they can focus on the really high priority decisions. And that's a challenge. I posed it as a challenge rather than a criticism.

Now, with respect to this nuclear strategy which you are referring to, this strategy, which is now codified under the so-called Presidential Directive 59, is a part of the evolutionary development of that strategy since Defense Secretary Schlesinger's time.

MS. WALTERS: And not something that's brand new and just thrown in right now because it's an election time, which is what some of your critics have said, including former Secretary of State Kissinger?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's not brand new, but my view is that there were many Defense decisions made, and pre-dating the Carter Administration, without proper consideration being given to the foreign policy implications. Now it seems to me that the reaction of the rest of the world to this strategy, which is not new, means that they see it as a new strategy, which justifies my view that it is a foreign policy as well as a Defense policy question.

MS. WALTERS: There is so much going on tonight that we are going to have to go back to Frank right now. We hope to have more time later.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: All right.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 13, 1980
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INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE NBC-TV "TODAY" SHOW
WITH TOM BROKAW
New York, New York
August 13, 1980

TOM BROKAW: One of the speakers at the Democratic National Convention last night, introducing a film about Vice President Humphrey, the late Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, was Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, who has made it clear that he expects to be a very political secretary of state. Senator Muskie as he was known when he was from Maine, was once on a ticket with Vice President Humphrey. Of course, you can see him now as he sits in a hotel suite not too far from here. And we are electronically joined this morning. Mr. Secretary welcome first of all.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you, Tom.

TOM BROKAW: You've made it clear that you intend to be a political secretary of state and yet it seems to many that you may have given the GOP a big opening by publicly complaining that you were not adequately briefed in a major change in United States foreign and nuclear policy. Could you expect the Republicans to make your complaint a major attack in the coming fall campaign?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, my impression is that the Republicans have been complaining about our foreign policy from the beginning of their convention up to the moment. They needed no encouragement from me. Henry Kissinger himself was about as big a political operator at the Republican convention as any that I've ever heard. And he comfortably embraced a Republican foreign policy plank that not only attacked our foreign policy but much of the foreign policy with which he was associated. So its a little difficult to define "political" in the sense that the criticism now occurs. Now what I meant when I said the office of the secretarty of state is political, Tom, is that I regard foreign policy-making the supreme political act in the sense that it



impacts on people. I did not mean to suggest that foreign policy should be a partisan political act, although obviously issues of foreign policy arise in political campaigns and especially presidential campaigns. Now with respect to the other issue which you raised -- and that is the question of whether or not the State Department participated in the development of our countervailing strategy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons -- the fact is that that omission took place before I became secretary of state. Everyone concerned now agrees that it was a regrettable omission, that State ought to be involved in the development of nuclear strategy, and I suspect from now on it will be. I don't know what the situation was when Henry Kissinger was secretary of state.

TOM BROKAW: But Senator Muskie it did occur during President Carter's Administration and does go to the credibility, it seems to me, of the Administration, because the White House was saying the State Department was briefed. State Department people who were there before you were there were saying were saying that they were not briefed. Isn't that true?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: To me the statement is precisely accurate. In the first place there is a difference between briefing and participation in the formation of the policy. Now with respect to this Administration, State did briefly about a year ago become involved in the formation of the policies, not since that time and not in the development of the presidential directive itself. State was kept informed subsequently, and I am being briefed at the present time. But I want to make a distinction between briefing and participation in the formation of the policy. Again I repeat that you assume in your questioning that State was involved during the Kissinger years. I simply don't have the answer to that question. I'll try to get that answer. My feeling is that in many areas of defense planning, not only in this Administration but in prior Administrations, there is inadequate coordination between State, which makes foreign policy, and DOD, which makes defense policy. I think that's a serious question which I intend to pursue. And I don't have any particular target -- a Republican administration or this one. I think it's an institutional problem which ought to be examined, and I intend to, and I have not made it the subject of any particular criticism at this point. I've simply stated publicly that it's an issue that needs to be examined and examined carefully.

TOM BROKAW: And Mr. Secretary, tonight the convention will vote on a plan on the MX missile, the so-called mobile missile. If this convention votes down the MX missile as it very likely could, given the way these votes have been going, will the President defy the wishes of the convention and continue to run in behalf of an MX missile nonetheless?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, of course you are putting a question to me that you should put to the President. I haven't discussed ...

TOM BROKAW: But you are one of his principle advisors on this matter.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you've asked me a hypothetical question which I have not had an opportunity to raise with the President in the few seconds between your question and my answer. Now the president has devised with his Administration the MX missile strategy. He is for it. He has supported it. I would expect he would continue to do so. But if the convention takes a different position, I don't know what his response to that would be, and couldn't know without talking to him.

TOM BROKAW: You were the Vice Presidential candidate on that 1968 ticket with Hubert Humphrey. It was a badly splintered party coming out of Chicago we all remember. How can Jimmy Carter in your judgement best heal the wounds that have developed during the course of this convention?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, he might get some lessons from the Reagan-Bush ticket. If they find a magic answer to healing their wounds, maybe we can learn some lessons from them. But I've been involved in these so-called split ticket situations in the past. I've seen parties heal them over and come through to victory. But I've also seen them defeated. Division is another word for diversity, and the democratic party is a party with great diversity. And indeed I've even heard moderate Republicans make the same point with respect to their party. So with diversity, you come through primaries and conventions with some division. Sometimes that division is fatal; sometimes it is not. I think it is possible to accommodate the divisions that have emerged during the democratic primaries. I may be wrong, but Reagan and Bush may also be wrong. So it's going to be an interesting political year.

TOM BROKAW: Mr. Secretary we are about to have a division of time here. Far more accurately put, we are about to have a station break.

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August 14, 1980
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INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE ABC-TV PROGRAM, "GOOD MORNING, AMERICA"
WITH
DAVID HARTMAN
New York City, New York
August 13, 1980

DAVID HARTMAN: Edmund Muskie is the Secretary of State. He's also a man with enormous political experience. He's been Governor of Maine, a United States senator for more than 20 years, a vice presidential nominee, a presidential candidate as well. And we're pleased to have Edmund Muskie join us this morning from the Barclay Hotel in New York City, and Steve Bell and I have this opportunity, from Madison Square Garden, to chat with him.

Mr. Secretary, good morning. Nice having you with us this morning.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Good morning, David. It's good to be with you.

MR. HARTMAN: Thank you. You said recently -- you've said that you felt you were bypassed when the President made that announcement regarding a change in our nuclear policy. How big a problem was this really for you?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the problem might best be put in this way. What is involved is a strategic nuclear doctrine, which, of course, is at the heart of our ability to enforce the doctrine of deterrence in hope of avoiding nuclear war. Now that has obvious foreign policy implications. And it seems to me, and now everybody seems to agree with me, that because of those foreign policy implications, the State Department ought to be involved in the formation of the policy.

As I've inquired into the evolution of this policy, it began, of course, before I became Secretary of State in early May of this year and has evolved, really, since about 1977. And it has been restated, or stated in one form or another, on at least a couple of previous occasions.

But the quality and the quantity of the participation of the State Department over that period, predating, I emphasize, my service as Secretary of State, was, in my judgment, inadequate. I've communicated that to the other agencies involved. There is agreement, I think, that that is the case.



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Now the recent emergence of this doctrine in what is called PD-59, which is Presidential Directive 59, was more a codification rather than a restatement of any doctrine. And the last public statement of the doctrine took place in January or February of this year in Secretary Brown's defense posture statement. But since that time there's been no State Department involvement, and there was no State Department involvement in the issuance of the presidential directive. That, I think, from an institutional point of view, is a mistake. It's not from a personal point of view. I find I've got plenty of work to do. But nevertheless, I think that that is so central that it should involve not only State Department participation and Defense, but other agencies as well.

MR. HARTMAN: You said when you got the job, "I thought if I had any value, it would only be if I had the significant, substantive role as the President's foreign policy spokesman." Do you feel in any way that your role here, your substantive role, has been diminished? Are you satisfied that it hasn't been diminished as a result of this experience?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think as a result of this experience, David, my role will be enhanced from now on.

STEVE BELL: In fact, this story has been played as if the Administration is now shifting toward a policy or, in fact, shifting our nuclear targets from the population centers of the Soviet Union to their military and political centers, which many say would make us more likely to get involved in what might be a limited nuclear war. Are you comfortable with this policy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it does not involve that drastic a shift. What we now have is a policy which represents a mix. There still is the assured deterrent side of the policy. That still is the central focus of the policy.

But nevertheless, because there are indications that the Soviet Union perceives of a nuclear war as being conceivably a drawn-out confrontation rather than a short one, we have to target other targets as well -- military targets, military support targets, industrial-military targets. But the emphasis still is on deterrence, and deterrence is the prospect of striking the industrial urban complex. And that's cities.

So that's still a part of our targetting. Targetting, of course, is a very classified, highly classified exercise. And it's not possible for me to discuss the precise mix, which changes from time to time as the dynamism of the Soviet defense posture and our mutual weapons postures change from time to time. So targetting is an ongoing process which takes considerable lead time and which takes considerable evaluation before you finally

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STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF STATE EDMUND MUSKIE
AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM
AUGUST 20, 1980

Mr. President:

I come here today out of my deep respect for the United Nations and all it has represented for 35 years. It is a force for peace and reason in the world. It is a forum where nations may air their differences and seek out the common ground. We should all be grateful that this institution has worked so well, on so many issues, in its relatively short span of time.

Therefore I also come here today with a feeling of sorrow. For I believe that in its work on the Middle East over the past five months the United Nations has been the focus of attempts not to advance the cause of peace, but to restrain it, contrary to the ideals and purposes of this institution.

The succession of resolutions before this Council and the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly has neither aided the Camp David process nor offered a single alternative with the slightest chance of success. Eight times in these five months resolutions on the Middle East have come before us. For our part, the United States has joined the debate and the voting. We have done that because we respect this institution, and we honor those who have labored hard for a positive approach.

But eight times, those resolutions have failed the critical tests of reason, of balance, of accounting for the concerns of both sides, of genuinely serving the objective of peace.

The resolution before us today is illustrative of a preoccupation which has produced this series of unbalanced and unrealistic resolutions on Middle East issues. It fails to serve the goal of all faiths that look to Jerusalem as holy.

We must share a common vision of this ancient city's future -- an undivided Jerusalem, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths.

For Your Officer's Information: _____

But how can that vision be realized? Certainly it cannot be realized by unilateral actions, nor by narrow resolutions in this forum. Rather the question of Jerusalem must be addressed in the context of negotiations for a comprehensive, just and lasting Middle East peace.

That is the position of my Government. But it is more. The status of Jerusalem cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed to by the parties. That is a practical reality. It will remain so despite this resolution or a hundred more like it.

We have encouraged all parties to refrain from unilateral actions which seek to change the character or status of Jerusalem. In line with this position we will not vote against the resolution as presently written.

So there can be no mistake, let me note that we will continue firmly and forcefully to resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII. That step is contained in a draft resolution to be presented here but not to be voted upon. We are unalterably opposed to it. We will vote against any such resolution.

But if we do not vote against the version before us today, neither can we find cause to support it. For the resolution is still fundamentally flawed.

It fails even to reaffirm Resolution 242 as the basis for a comprehensive peace. Israel, for example, is to be censured -- yet there is no censure, indeed no mention at all, of violence against Israel or of efforts that undermine Israel's legitimate security needs.

Further, the resolution before us calls upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the holy city. In our judgment this provision is not binding. It is without force. And we reject it as a disruptive attempt to dictate to other nations. It does nothing to promote a resolution of the difficult problems facing Israel and her neighbors. It does nothing to advance the cause of peace.

On these specific grounds, we abstain on the resolution.

And on broader grounds, we ask that the United Nations return to first principles in addressing the Middle East. Let us resist useless pronouncements, and resume the practical search for results -- on Jerusalem, and on all other issues.

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There are few problems in the world today as much in need of resolution -- and of patient, constructive effort to achieve it. Four cruel wars in thirty years -- and the peril and suffering that remain -- underscore the urgency of this task. And it is underscored again by recent fighting in Lebanon, renewing that violent cycle.

For all those thirty years there was no peace. Plans were tried and abandoned. Partial solutions came apart. Modest, stabilizing steps were the very most to be achieved -- and they were all too fragile.

Then in November 1977, President Sadat of Egypt took the courageous step of going to Jerusalem in an inspired act of statesmanship to break the deadlock. With equal statesmanship the Israeli Government responded.

At Camp David the next September, for 13 days, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter joined to create a framework for peace in the Middle East. Thus was born the first real chance to bring the goals of Resolution 242 into being. Then, following President Carter's trip to the Middle East in February 1979, peace between Israel and Egypt -- the first real peace was achieved.

Even so, it was only a beginning. Camp David was designed not just for a limited settlement between Israel and one of its neighbors, but as a framework for a truly comprehensive and final peace among all parties to the conflict.

A year ago last May, the second stage of the Camp David process began -- negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with the United States as full partner, to provide full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. This is to be a transitional arrangement of five years. Not later than the third year after the start of that period, negotiations to settle the final status of the territories would begin.

This may be an imperfect process. But let me remind you of this. It is also the first time the twin issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli security -- issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- have been at the top of the agenda together. It is the first time there has been real hope -- not a mirage or a wish -- that a comprehensive settlement could be attained.

My Government has stated many times in the past, and I will restate it again today: we are absolutely and firmly committed to the success of the process begun at Camp David and its ultimate goal of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. There is no issue on which President Carter has spent more time and effort than this great cause. And that will continue to be the case until the job is done.

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This is difficult and painstaking work. It is precisely the kind of effort that inspired the creation of the United Nations. It is precisely the work to which the United Nations should now rededicate itself. We desire to work closely with the Islamic states in order that their legitimate goals set out in Resolution 242 may be attained in peace and honor.

It is vital that a political climate be preserved within which the hard work of peace can succeed. That is why we have urged all the parties not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. That is why we have counseled patience and sought wider support for our efforts. And it is why events here in the last several months have been so profoundly disturbing. We do not expect everyone to support the Camp David process. We do, however, seek an end to efforts that work in the contrary direction -- not just to undermine the Camp David process, but to disrupt the search for peace itself.

Let me therefore repeat our belief that this constant recourse to debates and resolutions that are not germane to the peace process -- and even harmful to it -- should stop. Elsewhere in Southwest Asia, and in Southeast Asia, warfare is a present reality. The aggressor nations make no effort to find peace. Yet this Council is continuously drawn to the Middle East, where authentic work for peace is under way.

The United States will not be deterred from this historic enterprise. Indeed, I would like to reiterate our firm determination to finish what has so well begun. At Camp David, as a result of statesmanship and courage, the two parties with the help of the United States designed a framework for comprehensive peace. They agreed to start with a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel. This was a goal which many thought to be utterly unattainable but which was achieved through negotiation and on the basis of Resolution 242.

As a further step toward a comprehensive peace, the parties agreed to launch serious negotiations aimed at providing autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period. The final objective is clear: resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and ultimately, peace treaties between Israel and all of its other neighbors -- Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Mr. President, we intend to persevere in this effort regardless of all distractions, diversions and difficulties.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 230
August 25, 1980

As Prepared



STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE 11TH SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, New York
August 25, 1980

I welcome this opportunity to address the United Nations Special Session on Economic Development.

I intend to speak frankly. And I will suggest some specific obligations of the world's nations -- including my own -- to secure our common future on a fragile planet.

We meet because we are in the midst of a world economic crisis. We cannot escape it. We must respond to it.

Millions of our fellow humans are starving, and millions more are malnourished, on what can be a bountiful planet. Soaring oil prices have crippled the developing world; even the strongest industrial economies are struggling. Infectious recession and inflation touch us all. Nations in desperate need of growth and development instead face worsening trade deficits, deeper debt, and diminishing prospects for meeting the needs of their people.

The work ahead is substantial. The time is short. But if we take an ambitious view, seasoned with realism, we can accomplish our main purposes at this special session. We can adopt a realistic International Development Strategy that will help improve development prospects. And we can agree on procedures and an agenda for a new round of global economic negotiations -- serious work aimed at concrete progress where the need is urgent and consensus appears within reach.

My country will participate constructively in these proceedings. Progress is essential, for the world's interest and also our own.

We are encouraged that progress is possible -- because progress has been made. The fact is that over the past decade many people in developing nations have attained better lives.

Per capita income in the Third World has risen by some 3 percent per year. Exports have increased by 8.7 percent annually. Manufacturing output is higher. Life expectancies and literacy rates have improved. Infant mortality rates have declined.

For further information contact:

Striking progress has been made, much of it recently, in adjusting the system to improve Third World prospects.

-- The flow of aid to poorer nations has steadily increased. More than \$100 billion in replenishments for the multilateral development banks and their affiliates have been agreed.

-- Access to International Monetary Fund resources has been sharply increased. Terms are more flexible. New facilities are in operation. A major quota increase is in process. The World Bank has also launched an innovative program of lending for structural adjustment.

-- The Common Fund negotiations have been completed. We have moved ahead on individual commodity agreements.

-- On trade, last year's multilateral trade agreement will mean an average cut of 25 percent in tariffs on principal developing country exports. Preferential tariff systems have been adopted by all Western industrial countries.

-- Use by developing countries of world capital markets has increased four-fold -- from \$11 billion in 1970 to \$44 billion in 1978.

-- The effort to increase world food supplies has been advanced through the International Fund for Agricultural Development and through the concentration of World Bank resources. In the past five years the World Bank committed some \$11.6 billion to agricultural projects.

-- And in another urgent priority area -- energy -- the World Bank will be lending well over \$10 billion for energy projects between now and 1985.

This partial listing is not the record of a world community frozen in shortsighted self-interest, rigidly divided by ideology, or stalemated on methods. Those tendencies do afflict us. Yet in recent years we have also found the common sense and good will to move forward.

But our accomplishments are still far short of our needs.

My government has just completed a major study of the world's population, resource, and environmental prospects for the year 2000 -- just twenty years away. Its conclusions remind us again why these debates must move from rhetoric to reality.

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Our Global 2000 study begins with a harsh truth. In the year 2000, the world population will be more than half again higher than in 1975. Over the last quarter of this century, more than two billion people will be added -- two billion more mouths to feed, bodies to clothe, individual hopes to be fulfilled.

Given this fact, the study tells us what could happen if nations fail to act in time and with reason.

Based on current trends, food production should nearly double. Still, the number of people going hungry will rise by millions.

Many nations already hungry see their croplands and grasslands drying to desert -- a loss each year equal to the size of my home state of Maine.

On energy, from the vantage of a precarious present, we could face a punishing future. Unless trends are changed, oil supplies will be insufficient and, for many, unaffordable. Wood, the main household fuel for over one billion people, will be found only at ever greater distances and in dwindling amounts.

We have become accustomed to warnings about the need to conserve non-renewable resources such as oil. But the Global 2000 study also points up serious stresses on renewable resources -- croplands and forests, fisheries, air, water and land -- resources we have taken for granted as endless.

Another central observation of the study is that protecting the environment and succeeding in economic development are not competing goals, but complementary paths. Poverty worsens the most acute environmental dangers, such as the loss of forests and soil. Thus we will not save the environment unless we also solve the problems of the poor and move the global economy forward.

Global 2000 is not a forecast. It is a projection of present trends.

But it is another chilling reminder that our common future depends on our common success, here and throughout the complex of relations known as the North-South dialogue. We must work together to raise food production, to diversify energy sources and to use energy and other resources more

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efficiently, to protect our common environment, to restrain population growth, to deal effectively and equitably with mounting deficits, and to keep an open system of trade.

It falls to us to rewrite the future. It is within our power to do so. But it will require a change not only in the quantity but in the character of our effort. For as fast as we have run in recent years, the challenges still outpace us. Too often, as the Brandt Commission reminds us, we have engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf", in which "we judge ourselves by our good points and the other side by their failings. The result is frustration and deadlock."

That deadlock must be broken. The demands of our common future require it. They compel a new inquiry. We must ask not only what individual nations can take from the global system, but what each nation must bring to it.

Without exception, we must recognize that assigning responsibility for the future to others is not an answer but an abdication. Such excuses will not feed, nor clothe, nor heal, nor comfort our successors if we fail. And fail we will, unless all nations are fully engaged.

I do not by any means exclude my own country from this prescription. In suggesting what different societies, differently situated, should offer, let me begin with the industrial countries.

-- First, we must reduce the rate of our domestic inflation. Spiraling prices restrain growth and make the world economy more vulnerable and less fair.

-- Second, we should keep our markets open, particularly to products from developing countries.

-- Third, the industrial nations must use energy more efficiently, increase domestic production, spur the development of new energy sources, and cut our reliance on imported oil.

-- Fourth, despite the need for budget restraint to control inflation, we should increase our aid to the developing nations. This Administration has said many times to the American Congress and the American people that our present levels of assistance to lower income countries are not enough. I intend to keep doing all in my power to change that condition.

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-- Fifth, developed countries should continue to accept an increasing role for developing countries in international economic decision-making -- a role commensurate with their growing importance in the world economy and their willingness to share international obligations.

-- Sixth, we must increase the capacity of developing countries to apply science and technology for development. We must accelerate the transfer of information, technology, pollution control strategies and other skills.

Most of these steps will entail short-term sacrifice for the sake of long-term returns. I believe the American people will support those investments.

But as a former practicing politician, let me speak frankly. The American people will insist that their contributions have an effect -- that people's lives must actually be changed for the better. And we can assure that only if other nations are also prepared to do their part.

The oil exporting nations have a unique responsibility. In recent years rising oil prices have been a ponderous drag on development and growth, and a major cause of inflation. This year the oil-importing developing countries will have to spend -- for that single commodity -- almost double the amount they will receive from all sources in aid.

Thus steps such as these by oil exporting nations will be vital to our common goals:

-- First, they must adopt stable price and supply policies to avoid further trauma to the international economy.

-- Second, the oil exporting countries must increase their aid and recycle more of their surpluses directly to developing countries.

-- Third, oil exporting countries should join with consuming nations in working for rational global energy arrangements.

Whatever the level, external assistance will always be a secondary factor. The major determinants are internal -- the ability to use resources effectively, to encourage innovation, and to share broadly the benefits of growth. Thus, there are responsibilities that developing countries must shoulder.

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-- First, domestic and external resources must be used efficiently and fairly, with concentration on such priority areas as energy and food.

-- Second, serious family planning efforts are vital. Nine-tenths of the world's population increase in the next 20 years will be in developing countries. No other single factor does more to darken their future.

-- Third, as their economic strength grows, individual developing nations should accept more responsibility for the common management of international economic problems.

-- And fourth, as their development proceeds, they must open their own economies to free flows of world trade.

The market economy countries have received dominant attention in the North-South dialogue. But the centrally planned countries have global responsibilities as well. Empty bellies will not be filled by polemics. No nation or group of nations has grounds to remain aloof from this struggle. World opinion looks to the centrally planned countries:

-- First, to increase their assistance to developing countries;

-- Second, to increase their unconditioned purchases of LDC products;

-- And third, to cooperate in international efforts to stabilize commodity markets.

For all of us, the principles I have outlined must be the basis for practical action. For our part the United States is prepared to join with others to meet the global challenge.

-- Our most urgent task is to confront the spectre of imminent famine haunting Africa. This summer alone the United States has provided an additional 235,000 tons for emergency African food relief. We strongly urge that all nations able to contribute foodstuffs or funds join under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization to coordinate relief to drought afflicted regions. I am happy to note that the Director General will convene a meeting of

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concerned governments and international organizations in the coming weeks.

-- Targets have been set for annual food assistance in the new Food Aid Convention and for emergency food aid through the International Emergency Food Reserve. We encourage others to join us in the effort to reach those targets, to guarantee that food will be available to those in need. Further, we should develop reserves that are adequate to back-up donor commitments and assure that food emergencies can be met. My government is working toward a four million ton reserve of wheat to assure our food aid commitments.

-- Despite efforts to produce more food, many poor developing countries will still have to import substantial quantities over the next decade. We should consider new arrangements to assist those developing countries that are improving their own food production.

-- We should explore ways to channel more international funds, both concessional and nonconcessional, into food production. We therefore support rapid agreement on an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. We would also consider further measures to strengthen IFAD.

-- To help developing countries adjust to oil-driven balance of payments deficits, we favor continued improvements in International Monetary Fund facilities, including subsidizing the Supplementary Financing Facility. Such arrangements should receive strong support from those who prosper as oil prices climb. Private capital flows also will continue to play a critical role. We look forward to the Development Committee's report on proposals for increasing nonconcessional flows to developing countries.

-- We are committed to the stimulation of energy production worldwide, and to the increased use of renewable fuels. The United States strongly supports an expansion of World Bank energy programs, to permit Bank participation in multinational risk-sharing ventures to discover and develop new energy sources. Here, too, as we agreed at the Venice Summit, we are open to new institutional and financial arrangements. We will participate positively in the UN conference on new and renewable energy sources. We urge the UN Secretariat and member nations to make every effort to insure its success.

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-- Coal is an attractive alternative to high priced oil. We will expand our capacity to produce and ship coal, and we are ready to help developing countries establish coal burning facilities and increase their use of coal.

-- We support discussions between oil exporting and oil importing nations on ways to ensure orderly market conditions and on further assistance for non-oil developing countries.

--- Requests for population program assistance have outpaced the international community's ability to respond. We are ready to join an international commitment to double, in this decade, the availability and use of family planning and related health services.

-- On trade, my country would support a pledge by all countries to restrain protectionism and ease adjustment. Such a commitment would provide more assured market access to developing countries. Also, beyond the sharp reductions in tariffs already agreed, we are prepared to increase the benefits of our Generalized System of Preferences for poorer developing countries.

These proposals reflect the positive approach we believe our common problems demand -- and this Special Session deserves.

Let me conclude with this observation.

I am persuaded, to the depth of my being, that the challenges ahead are not beyond us.

The Global 2000 report has been described as a reconnaissance of the future. It describes the possibility. I believe it will not be the reality. The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace.

It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision. The resources do exist. The solutions can be found. Together we can summon the will.

Knowing what is at stake, we must not fail.

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September 8, 1980
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INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE CBS-TV SHOW "FACE THE NATION"
WITH
DON OBERDORFER OF THE WASHINGTON POST,
ROBERT PIERPOINT OF CBS AND
GEORGE HERMAN OF CBS NEWS

MR. HERMAN: Secretary Muskie, is the new government of Poland a step towards some kind of Kremlin suppression of the workers' gains in Poland?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, not if one is to take the first statements of the new First Secretary, Mr. Kania. He has said that he will honor those commitments to the full. And he of course has gotten a pretty generous endorsement from Mr. Brezhnev so that on the whole, I think a description I read in either the Times or the Post this morning describing him as a conservative but a pragmatist suggests that he may give comfort to the Soviets, but at the same time determine to keep the commitments that Mr. Gierak made to the workers.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News Washington a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on "Face the Nation," with Secretary of State Edmund Muskie.

Secretary Muskie will be questioned by CBS News State Department Correspondent Robert Pierpoint, by Don Oberdorfer, Diplomatic Correspondent for The Washington Post, and by the Moderator, CBS News Correspondent George Herman.

"Face the Nation" is produced by CBS News which is solely responsible for the selection of today's guest and panel.

MR. HERMAN: Secretary Muskie, if you think the new government of Poland is likely to continue to agree to the gains won by the workers in their strikes -- I guess the question that comes to mind next is why bother to change it, why get rid of Mr. Gierek? And his name disappeared from the press in the Soviet Union three or four days before he had the "heart attack." Why get rid of it if you're only going to have someone else that's going to continue with this policy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, of course, in any system of government there comes a time when leaders outwear their welcome or their usefulness, and I would suspect that Mr. Gierak had expended a great deal of his political capital not only vis a vis the Soviets but also internally and at that point, maybe his health was such as to provide a rational explanation for change in leadership. I don't have any information to suggest otherwise.

For further information contact:

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MR. OBERDORFER: Mr. Secretary, you and others in the Administration were very cautious in what you said about the Polish strikes while they were going on. And we understand that you privately pointed out to the head of the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland, the possible dangers of broad-scale and open American labor movement contributions to the workers. Now, the labor federation has gone ahead; do you think this is going to complicate the situation over there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That depends, I think, on: 1) how it's perceived by the Poles and the Russians; 2) upon it's nature. Mr. Frazier has described it as a humanitarian effort to assist the families of the strikers, and he, in the same breath, indicated that we have to be careful that the problem -- basic problem is left to the Poles and their government and so it's a sensitive kind and delicate kind of situation. Up to this point, it has not been yet a destabilizing factor in the relationships between the Poles and the Russians, and I think that if, with this new leadership, both sides within Poland develop a healthy understanding of their new relationship that it will probably last. It's not over by any means.

MR. PIERPOINT: Mr. Secretary, you are aware, of course, that there was a delegation of Polish bankers and financial experts here this past week asking for agricultural credits. I think that the total they asked for was \$670 million. This is not anything new. They have done it for the past several years, but this is a larger amount of money than they have ever asked for before. And some of our allies reportedly are suggesting that we wait a while before granting those credits and see whether the new Polish Government is going to live up to its promises to the workers. What is the attitude of the Carter Administration about that loan? Are they going to grant it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it's been under consideration in roughly that magnitude before the recent events in Poland. I think we had been considering seriously about \$550 million. The \$650 or \$670 million is somewhat more, but we've had that program with the Poles now for, I think, at least three years, and we understand the economic difficulties of Poland. We've had a long-time economic relationship with Poland, and I think we ought not to indicate that that is doubtful at this point. They are going through a very difficult period, and their economic situation would impose strains upon these new arrangements that they have worked out with their workers. And, I think that's basically the attitude of our allies as well. I don't think there's been any formal request that we suspend any particular decisions. I think they also understand that there may be need for strengthening the economic ties between ourselves and Poland.

MR. HERMAN: Mr. Secretary --

MR. PIERPOINT: Excuse me. I was just going to say -- so you're indicating, if I read you correctly, that we are going to go ahead and grant that \$670 million loan.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We've not made that decision yet. The other factor in it is that those resources are limited. There are other demands upon them and it is in that context that we will make the decision.

MR. HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, before we leave the subject of Poland, I think probably the question I'd like to ask is: whether it is too early, whether you have in your own mind assessed what the meaning of the workers' gains -- the licensing, in the sense of free trade unions -- whether this means beginning of a really fundamental change in the satellite countries around the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It could well be. On the other hand, it may be that Poland will be a different sort of arrangement within the Soviet bloc than others. The Poles have had --

MR. HERMAN: Do you think it will be isolated in Poland?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well the Poles have had a greater degree of religious freedom, for example. They've had greater freedom in dealing with their agricultural problems. One of their problems there is that the average farming unit, for example, is under 10 acres which makes it inefficient. But nevertheless, there has been very careful treatment of that problem of enlarging those units in order to make the agriculture more efficient. So there have been a number of ways in which the Poles have been allowed -- perhaps because of their history, because of what they are -- a greater measure of liberalization than some of the other Eastern bloc countries. That obviously has triggered some dissatisfaction, not very visible, I don't think, on their part, but it may, at some point, trigger greater dissatisfaction and lead to pressures for similar liberalizations within their own countries. That is clearly possible.

MR. HERMAN: We have a new government now appointed by the Prime Minister or Premier in Iran being submitted to the Parliament. Do you see signs that this is going, in any immediate future, to forward the question of the hostages and their release?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are signs that they are beginning to think of actually debating the hostage issue. There are signs of increasing awareness on the part of leaders in various factions that the hostage issue ought to be settled in Iran's interests. There are, of course, signs that there will be responses to initiatives taken on our side from members of Congress, my own letter to the Prime Minister. Perhaps in other ways, there are signs that also they are listening to urgings -- from other sources, other countries -- to settle the hostage issue in their own interest. So it may be that as governmental authorities put together that they will begin to debate the issue, consider the terms on which they are willing to resolve it, and we may find ourselves engaged in a debate or dialogue with them on those terms.

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MR. OBERDORFER: One of the initiatives which you referred to a minute ago was the letter from 187 members of Congress. They are drafting a reply and as published, at least in the Iranian press, the draft reply suggests a kind of Congressional inquiry into the past history of Iranian-American relations and into the question of Iran's legitimate claims, as they put it, for redress on the financial side. Sometime ago, you remember, the Congressional inquiry was discussed when Congressman Hansen was out there. The Administration, at that time, was very negative about it. Do you have a view now as to whether such a Congressional inquiry could be useful in this process?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it would depend upon its timing and nature as related to the timing for the release of the hostages and other possible terms that might be raised. I think standing by itself, its value might be lost. I think that when this hostage crisis is over that there will be Congressional hearings whether as part of an agreement with the Iranians or not, I can't imagine Congress being insensitive to the usefulness of such an inquiry when it's behind us, but its timing within the time-frame when the question of the release of the hostages is involved, has to be very carefully identified.

MR. OBERDORFER: Well, I guess my real point is: if the Iranian Parliament as is now indicated suggests this to the U.S. Congress as a means as paving the way for the settlement of the hostage problem, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it would depend upon what else is part of that initiative.

MR. PIERPOINT: Secretary Muskie, you yourself wrote a letter as you mentioned to the new Iranian Prime Minister. There have been rumors that in that letter you proposed that you might meet with some representative of their government. Did you, in fact, do that? And what can you tell us about that letter?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the letter was consistent with positions that we had taken previously and which were known publicly. That particular subject was not in it. I refer to that only to make it clear that it was not in the letter. But I am not inclined to otherwise characterize the contents of the letter because I think I want to maximize the possibility that the Iranians will respond to that letter on its merits and perhaps initiate a dialogue, and it's conceivable that if I were to release the text or characterize it, even though I don't think there are many surprises, if any, in it that they would regard that as being an affront and I see no point in risking that.

MR. HERMAN: Let me ask you a question about you, Mr. Muskie, and Iran. The last time you were sitting in this chair as a Senator, I think, before you were even invited to become Secretary of State, you said ~~that in the case of American relations with Iran,~~ you would see ~~nothing wrong with admitting things that America had~~

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done to Iran because that was part of history and we might as well admit it, there would be no problem. You were not saying we should take blame or say mea culpa but that you saw nothing wrong with admitting American actions to Iran which were part of past history. Is that still your attitude now that you are Secretary of State or --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not sure that you have correctly and accurately characterized what I said then, but I remember it quite clearly and I see nothing wrong with it as I remember it.

MR. HERMAN: You would still be willing to put on the record America's past actions --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think they were part of history.

MR. PIERPOINT: Mr. Secretary, can I switch to another area of the Middle East and ask you about the recent trip of Ambassador Linowitz to Israel and Egypt? There have been reports that in order to get the Palestinian autonomy talks going, Prime Minister Begin is willing to forego the moving of his office into East Jerusalem. He may also release some Palestinian prisoners. Are those reports accurate?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've read the transcript of Mr. Linowitz' press conference yesterday, and his statement is consistent with my own understanding that what he did was discuss all those issues with both Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat. And that out of his conversations with Mr. Begin and members of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, he got very strong impressions which he conveyed to Mr. Sadat and he also conveyed to Mr. Begin some very strong impressions about issues that troubled Mr. Sadat. And on the basis of that and on the basis of the apprehension of both of those statesmen that the situation might be slipping into a time of great threat to peace in the Middle East, that they were prompted to move forward. I am not under the impression that there were specific quid pro quos discussed.

MR. PIERPOINT: There were not?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Not. There were very strong impressions conveyed to both sides.

MR. PIERPOINT: Well, why then would Mr. Sadat have changed his mind and put himself further out on the limb vis à vis his Arab brethren by agreeing to return to the talks when in fact he had said he would not do so unless some of these things did take place?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well again, Mr. Linowitz made this point about as clearly as anyone could. First of all, both Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin took the opportunity in the statement to which they jointly agreed to as a commitment to the Camp David process as the only viable road to peace. Now, that's a very strong statement for

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, first of all, they seem to have been tempted by two points that I've made about the nature of my incumbency as Secretary of State and distorted it beyond what I intended, and I think distorted it beyond what their own common sense should have suggested. I've described myself as a political Secretary of State. I've done so for two reasons. One, I'm the first politician in a long time to hold the office. That makes me a Secretary of State with a political background. Secondly, I've said over and over again that foreign policy-making is a political act in that it must rest upon the will and the support of the people, and there is not way for making it an effective political act without debating it in a political campaign. Now, that's something different than to say that I intend to campaign on a partisan basis, ~~and if one needs to make a distinction between~~

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what I mean and what I mean by partisan political basis then I suggest that you compare the speeches that Mr. Reagan has made, for example, and the speeches that I have made. I have talked about foreign policy. I've done so before non-partisan audiences and I think for the incumbent Secretary of State not to discuss the foreign policy issue which will be the basis for the foreign policy for the four years following the election would be a breach of the service that the government ought to provide.

The challengers to the President are raising foreign policy issues. The Secretary of State is involved in implementing them. What better voice can the Administration have in explaining that foreign policy so that the criticisms of it can be put in proper perspective than for the Secretary of State? But I've been very careful to avoid doing on an ad hominem basis. I've not attacked Mr. Reagan. I've not attacked Mr. Bush. I've not attacked Mr. Anderson. I don't intend to.

But I do intend to state very clearly and definitely my view of what our foreign policy is and to make corrections when I think it is being inaccurately described.

MR. HERMAN: You have been personally attacked by Mr. Reagan. In a speech, he calls you a Secretary of State who as a Senator consistently voted against a strong national defense.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's not an accurate statement, and my record will disclose that. I did not respond to him because if I'd responded to him, I'd then have given him a basis for suggesting I'm involved in the politics of this campaign.

MR. PIERPOINT: Secretary Muskie, you're going up to the United Nations General Assembly meeting this fall, and we understand that you're going to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on, I believe, it is the 25th of this month.

There have been reports that you are going to discuss with Mr. Gromyko the subject that they -- the Soviets -- are very anxious to discuss and that we have avoided in the recent past, and that is the reduction of nuclear forces in Europe, the theatre nuclear forces issue.

Is it true? And my second question and relevant to that is does that mean that we have decided to go ahead with detente and arms control despite the Soviet presence in Afghanistan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, first of all, we from the beginning have indicated a desire to discuss theatre nuclear weapons limitations with the Russians, and that was the second part of a two-part decision that NATO made last December. NATO decided to deploy the Pershing II missile but at the very same time offered to discuss limitations with the Russians.

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The Russians delayed for six months by imposing a precondition upon discussion, and that is a reversal of the decision to deploy. It was when the Russians dropped that precondition that we agreed to go forward, and they know we have agreed to go forward. It's a question of agreeing on the time and the character of the initial talks which have to be certainly technical and preparatory, and I expect to discuss that with Mr. Gromyko in New York. That may be the only positive development that comes out of that meeting, but is this inconsistent with our policy on Afghanistan? I think not.

I think that both pursuit of arms control and our policies in Afghanistan are designed to impose restraint upon Soviet aggressive intentions. And so they are consistent.

MR. OBERDORFER: On that point, Mr. Secretary, are you ready to suggest a time as suggested by some news reports for going ahead with these technical preparatory talks, and will it be before November as these reports suggest?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that's possible. I don't like to try to pre-empt the question of time from the Soviets, and I don't know what would be convenient for them, but we're willing to go forward as early as possible.

MR. HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, you made quite a splash around the time of the Democratic National Convention by saying that you had not been in on the development of our new nuclear targeting strategic system. Presumably by now you're fairly well acquainted with it. I hope you've been briefed on it.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Up to my ears.

MR. HERMAN: Now that you know about it, are you for it or against it? Do you think it was a good idea? What is your feeling about it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes, I am for it. I think it makes sense. As a matter of fact, as I examine my own record with respect to this issue, going back to 1974, I found myself gradually coming around to an awareness that this kind of flexibility was necessary. And the policy was in place before I took office as Secretary of State.

MR. HERMAN: Thank you very much, Secretary Muskie, for being our guest today on "Face the Nation."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



September 15, 1980

No. 254

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PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
LOY HENDERSON CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
September 15, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have two opening statements.

The first statement is this: The Senate is considering the Foreign Service Act this afternoon, and I take this opportunity to urge my former colleagues to enact it.

The Bill is a response to the mandate of Congress in 1976 for a comprehensive review of the personnel system of the Foreign Service. It is designed to simplify the system and to link advancement more closely with performance. It is also designed to establish a more equitable relationship between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service.

Our diplomatic service is the best in the world. The men and women who run it are capable and dedicated. Increasingly they serve under difficult or dangerous conditions abroad. The Foreign Service Act is designed to recognize their work and their working conditions and to codify their treatment. It deserves enactment, which I hope it will receive.

The second statement is this: The Congress will soon be voting on the President's decision to supply fuel and equipment for India's Tarapur reactors. I have reviewed the arguments carefully on both sides of this issue. I approached that review from the perspective of a committed advocate of nuclear non-proliferation. Our non-proliferation policy is one I helped shape as a Senator and one I support without reservation. I understand and share the seriousness with which the Senate and House view this policy. I am convinced our interests are served by going ahead with the Tarapur shipments.

Indeed, the President based his decision on his own deep commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. We have a responsibility to make our non-proliferation policy work in the real world, to obtain tangible progress and to gain the cooperation of other nations to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The heart of the issue is how best to accomplish these objectives.

For further information contact:

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In 1963 we agreed to provide all the nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactors. In return, India agreed to use only U.S. fuel in these reactors.

India also agreed to accept international safeguards on the Tarapur fuel and to obtain United States consent before transferring the spent fuel to third parties or reprocessing the spent fuel to extract its plutonium.

If the Congress blocks our decision, India might well claim that we have breached the 1963 agreement and that India is therefore no longer bound by its non-proliferation commitments. Fuel for Tarapur is available elsewhere. Indeed, in the longer run, the Indians may reprocess the spent fuel and use the resulting plutonium for fuel. I need not remind you that plutonium is a weapons-usable material. The spent fuel is being stored at Tarapur. If it is removed from the agreed-upon international safeguards, inspection would be impossible and a precedent would be set that would strike at the very heart of our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Other nations which support strong nuclear safeguards have told us they understand the President's decision and our desire to maintain a dialogue with India on this critical issue. And they understand the importance of living up to an existing commitment.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act permits the supply of fuel to India. These two shipments fall under a grace period designed to assure that lines of communication remain open with countries which have not yet accepted full-scope safeguards. The Administration's proposal does not contravene the law; it is intended to maintain non-proliferation controls over the Tarapur facility while we seek broader application of the goals of our policy.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Iran, do you see any signs of any hope that the hostage crisis is closer to resolution today than last week?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it is very important to be cautious in our reaction to statements coming out of Iran. We have read them before. As a matter of fact, we have been reading them over a period of weeks and months. I think it would be a mistake to raise expectations based upon any specific statements which are now the subject of speculation in the press.

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QUESTION: Well, the public statement attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini the other day, has that been reflected in any other direct or indirect communications with the United States? In other words, the dropping, apparently, of one condition -- for an apology?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Different statements coming out of Iran over a period of several weeks have focused upon some combination of the totality of ideas that have been advanced by Iranian spokesman of one kind or another.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, a couple of questions. The Saudi Report reports today that the Administration authorized a study by the Rand Corporation of security implications of Israel's giving up the West Bank, and that it concluded Israel's security would not be hurt if it yielded the West Bank. I'm not even aware of such a report, so if there is one, I wonder if you would tell about it and tell us about your feelings.

And, while you are at it, U.S. officials over the last several weeks have been quoted as saying that they thought the internationalization of Jerusalem might not be a bad idea, and I wondered if you thought it was a good idea or a bad idea.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the first part of your question, I'm not aware of the report -- that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Secondly, it has been our policy not to characterize the ultimate decision with respect to Jerusalem beyond saying that our position is supportive of an undivided Jerusalem, open to all religions. And for us to go beyond that formulation at this point I think would have the effect or be perceived as having the effect of undertaking to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, against the background of your opening remark warning against raising expectations, I wonder how you can reconcile that with what President Carter has said today, "statements by Iranian authorities" -- if I am quoting it precisely -- "might very well lead to a resolution of the hostage question in the future." And another report says "in the near future."

Two questions, Mr. Secretary: How do you reconcile what the President has said against your own warning about building expectations? And, secondly, Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about whatever negotiations, or whatever the President is hinting at, to avert the possibility that what the President has said will be seen by many as Presidential politicking?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no reason to conclude that the President is hinting at anything. I think his statement is perfectly consistent with statements I've made, pointing out that we have been looking to as many channels of communication as we could find, private and governmental, over the last several months, with the view to ultimately establishing official contact that might lead to negotiations. It is our constant hope that one or more of these channels might hold promise for the kind of result that the President suggested this morning.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can I follow that? Shortly after you took office, you spoke about the possibility of economic incentives to encourage Iran to release the hostages. Would the United States, if there is a satisfactory conclusion of the hostage crisis and they come home safely, be willing to consider economic aid to Iran to address what you have described many times as "the real problems that confront the nation"?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: What I have had reference to in the past is the fact that in my judgment -- and I think this is borne out by the events in Iran in the last four months -- it is in Iran's economic self-interest, as well as political self-interest, and in the interest of normalization of relations with her normal trading partners, to get the hostage problem behind her.

In that sense it has an economic dimension. Now, precisely what may be the ultimate basis for the release of the hostages is something I don't think could be advanced by public discussion.

QUESTION: Would you be willing, for example, to consider either a partial lifting of the sanctions against Iran or unfreezing of some of the Iranian assets prior to the actual release of all the hostages?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: To answer your question would be to appear to be opening a negotiation process publicly. I don't think that's the way to advance the objective.

QUESTION: You're not ruling it out?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not ruling it out or ruling it in.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a week ago you made public the text of a letter to the new Iranian Prime Minister asking for the opening of direct channels of communication. Have you received any reply from him, either directly or indirectly?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have received the oral reply in the sense that he read the letter to an audience in Iran. I look forward to a written reply, although I have had no clear signal on that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the same subject: There is a report today that the State Department has been negotiating for the last three months on some document with former Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh. This creates the impression that there have been some very active negotiations going on. Is that accurate?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That story is inaccurate.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Poland, can you tell us whether you believe that the recent labor troubles and the drive for freedom in that country is over and the Soviet Union has decided not to intervene, or whether this infectious disease of freedom is liable to spread further and be a continuing problem for the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Obviously, the questions you've raised are questions we all speculate about, without really knowing the hard answers. I think that the Soviet attitude toward developments in Poland will emerge over time. The fact that they've received Polish representatives since those agreements were concluded and that the result has been some step up in Soviet economic assistance suggests that the Soviets are going to be supportive with respect to the economic problems that may have been generated.

Beyond that we can only speculate. I would like to believe that the workers in Poland have achieved an important gain to themselves and that it will prove to be a constructive contribution to their national life.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Ronald Reagan said over the weekend that he felt we should accept three of the Ayatollah's demands, unfreezing the assets and dropping claims and promising not to intervene. Can you go that far?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It was useful to have that guidance.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Do you endorse his guidance? Do you agree with his guidance?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Again, they are questions the answer to which would imply that we are in some kind of negotiating posture, which I think would be premature. I think it may represent an over-reaction to the news coming out of Iran, and I just found it useful in these past few months to be as cautious in public reaction to developments in Iran as possible.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, just to follow that up, could you say whether it is helpful or not helpful for statements such as this to be made by a person who is seeking the Presidency in a few weeks?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I don't find it unhelpful.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you meet with the liaison board of hostages' wives when they met here about a week or ten days ago, and did they show their letter to you before they sent it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes. We've been in touch.

QUESTION: Did you promise them, at that time, any part of the assets of Iran for the hostages or their families?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. That question was not discussed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, last week the President announced commodities aid to Poland. Is any other aid possible under the existing laws should the Poles request it? Are you studying the matter? Do you have any thoughts on what else the United States could provide?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Resources, as I think those of you who attend these conferences regularly know, are very limited at the present time because of the failure of Congress to enact a Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill in Fiscal Year '80 and the generally negative climate on Capitol Hill to such programs. If the Poles decide to place their problem before us and to seek our assistance, we certainly will consider their request. But I must say at the moment our resources are limited except for the CCC grants that we approved. And, incidentally, those were approved at a higher level than we've ever approved before.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, going back to a question that came up earlier, there seems to be a slight difference in the mood, at least, of what you have said here and what President Carter said earlier today. Let me ask the question in a slightly different way:

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The President was quoted as saying, "They are making statements" -- meaning people in Iran -- "that might very well lead to the resolution of this problem in the near future."

My question is: Do you agree with that statement by the President?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I could, I think, if my memory were precise enough, identify maybe a half dozen statements that have been made by one Iranian leader or another over the last month which might very well lead. But that isn't, I don't think, phraseology to suggest either optimism or pessimism. It's a rather obvious conclusion. It might, but the reverse is also true: it might not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend a trilateral meeting between the Egyptians, the Israelis and Americans while Ali and Shamir are in Washington this week?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Would I recommend what?

QUESTION: Trilateral talks between the Americans, the Israelis and the Egyptians this week in Washington. And what, in your opinion, can be the outcome of such talks?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We would hope that the bilateral talks, with which the present initiative will begin, will lead to trilateral talks and then to the formal reopening of negotiations somewhat later. The pace of that movement, I think, will depend upon the first talks, then the second talks, and then the third; and I don't think it would be particularly helpful for me to identify which talks ought to then lead to the trilaterals. That's part of the objective.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, at the World Energy Conference meeting in Munich that just concluded, European and Third World leaders were extremely critical of Administration policy towards nuclear energy, saying that it had foreign policy implications, that the Carter Administration's explicit stand against aggressive nuclear energy development in this country and around the world had implications that went very far. The people who made these statements included Chancellor Schmidt.

I have a kind of two-pronged question for you: Are they wrong to see the Administration's policy towards nuclear energy as reflecting a broader anti-growth policy of this Administration? That is, do you disagree with their charges or will you try to convince Europe of your policies?

And secondly because the Third World leaders made a very direct connection between the anti-growth policies of this Administration and the deterioration of the situation in the Third World, I'd like to ask you at this point what the United States is going to recommend or what we will vote on in terms of the seating of Pol Pot at the United Nations?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not sure your question was addressed to just one subject.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: Definitely two.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it's a little difficult to sort them out. Number one, with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the meeting which is just concluded, may I point out the positive side of that. The meeting concluded with all parties in support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its objectives, including the United States.

When you referred to our anti-growth policy, I'm not sure whether you were referring to anti-non-proliferation policy or anti-economic growth policy. Economic growth was not involved in negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

With respect to some of the issues that were discussed in the treaty -- and there were a number of them -- some of them were raised for the purpose of advancing the cause of non-proliferation; some of them I would describe as being more political in motivation. But in any case it was not possible, after an extensive effort, to reach agreement, and opposition did not stem only from the United States; there were opponents to some of the specific proposals from other sources. I regret that more was not done. We made an effort and we made a last-minute effort to try to move the conference toward a declaration which all nations could join.

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With respect to the concern of the non-nuclear states that the major powers had not moved as they committed themselves to move in the Non-Proliferation Treaty toward a comprehensive test ban and toward the reduction of nuclear arms, I sympathize altogether with their concern that we haven't moved in those directions. We know that in our country the SALT II treaty has not been advanced and is awaiting ratification suggests that we perhaps are not as committed as we ought to be to the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I can only assure those who are interested in knowing that that is this Administration's commitment as soon as it is feasible.

I'm not sure what you meant with your non-growth question, so maybe you'll get another chance.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a two-part question on Iran: Is the United States now in the early stages of a negotiation with Iran to seek the release of the hostages?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

QUESTION: We're not yet there? Because for so many months, it had been stated here that you were looking for the formation of an Iranian Government with which you could then negotiate.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me say this: After the fact, one is able to identify the roots of a negotiating process which may have been laid, say, two months ago prior to this date. I have not yet recognized it as such. I mean, when we have a number of channels opened and are trying to communicate messages of one kind or another, one never knows when one of those suggestions takes root and blossoms out into the kind of contact that results in negotiations. But that link has not yet been made.

The question that was raised earlier about a three-month negotiation having been under way seems to have originated in one of those indirect channels that, from somebody's perception, looked like a negotiation. Well, it was not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the other part here, if I might: The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament is quoted as saying that it is now America's turn, ". . . if it has the good will vis-a-vis the hostages, to prove its sincerity in action." Does the United States now believe that there is any action that it could take to advance the cause of getting the hostages released?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think action to get the hostages released involves mutuality. Unilateral action is not likely to do it. We learned something of that earlier this year.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I have several questions that flow from your opening statement with regard to the Indian reactor Tarapur. Before I get to those, though, the question that was left on the table back here was about Pol Pot, whether you have made up your mind yet what to do about that? I'd like to just pose that to you.

And regarding the Indian matter, have the Indians told the United States that they will take any of the actions that you suggest they might take if the United States does not ship the fuel -- that is to say, abandon the safeguards previously agreed to, reprocess the fuel which is available, and so on? Does your statement that they might do so tend to legitimize the possibility that they could take some action if Congress does not agree to ship the fuel? And what would the United States position be if Congress refuses to do as you and the President suggest, and the Indians then think about abandoning the agreement they made in 1963?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, first, "if they abandon the treaty," your question presupposes that we would have abandoned it first, so the word "abandonment," with respect to India's response to such abandonment on our part, I don't think is a very fair definition of the proposition.

With respect to what the Indians might do, they have not uttered any threats but the Indian options which the '63 agreement foreclosed are clear. And if the agreement is no longer binding on us, it is surely a fair assumption that they might consider it no longer binding on them. And if it is no longer binding on them, then the specific provisions to which my statement refers could well be aborted; and we ought to assume that.

The opponents of the shipments make speculative arguments about Indian behavior or performance, but the argument I make is not a speculative one. I'm making an argument based on a very simple proposition: If one party to an agreement abandons it, the other party surely is free not to feel bound by it.

Does that answer your Tarapur question?

QUESTION: Yes, it does.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the Kampuchean credentials question, anticipating that I might just conceivably be asked this question, I have the following statement to make.

In the event that the credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean regime are challenged at the United Nations General Assembly, the United States will again vote to support the Association of South East Asian Nations position in favor of the continued seating of that regime.

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Our decision on this question was reached after careful consultation with our friends and allies, particularly those Southeast Asian countries most concerned about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. We support the ASEAN position on the grounds that the Democratic Kampuchean regime has been seated by all General Assemblies since 1975 and there still is no superior claimant for the seat.

The seating of the current regime in Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin administration, which was installed and is maintained by 200,000 Vietnamese troops, would indicate international acceptance of a government imposed by foreign aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter.

This decision is also based on our conclusion, based on careful diplomatic soundings, that Vietnam has not shown a willingness to negotiate concerning the central issues of the Kampuchean question, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, and self-determination for the Khmer as called for by the United Nations General Assembly last year.

Our position on the U.N. credentials issue is consistent with our objective of working actively with the ASEAN nations and with all U.N. member states to seek a permanent settlement in Cambodia which satisfies the aspirations of the Khmer people as well as the interests of all countries in the region.

This position on the technical question of U.N. credentials in no way implies any support or recognition of the Democratic Kampuchean regime. We abhor and condemn the regime's human rights record and would never support its return to power in Phnom Penh. Our policy is to work for the termination of all forms of foreign intervention in Cambodia and for the emergence of a genuinely neutral government in Phnom Penh.

Our position on this issue cannot and will not restore the Democratic Kampuchean regime to power, but our vote can prevent legitimization of a government installed by aggression and maintained by the presence of an invading army.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Vietnam, is it correct to assume that, in the light of the latest statement as well as other pronouncements earlier, a pre-condition for any progress in normalization or negotiations with Vietnam is withdrawal from Kampuchea, or is there any other linked issue which would first have to be resolved before you can progress in the normalization process with Vietnam which was begun sometime ago?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We think the objective, consistent with the position of the ASEAN countries, is a political settlement in Kampuchea; and the terms of that settlement, obviously, must emerge out of negotiations which the Vietnamese have been unwilling to undertake.

QUESTION: May I take advantage of you and sneak a second question? We probably will not see you before you see Foreign Minister Gromyko. Could you tell us, please, what you expect to accomplish out of that meeting? And is there a disagreement now with the Soviet Union over whether forward-based systems are a fit agenda item in TNF negotiations, and what are the prospect for those negotiations getting started, either before or after November?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it's a short time frame, at best. It seems longer to some than to others.

With respect to my meeting with Mr. Gromyko on the TNF issue, I would expect that we would reach agreement on the time for beginning the talks on that subject, a place, the date -- and my staff urge me not to use this word, but I will just to indicate that I'm slowly becoming a diplomat -- the modalities of the meeting. So I would expect that we will reach agreement on those points.

With respect to what each side would be free to discuss in those talks, I think it is premature to anticipate what that may be. And the difference of view that you expressed in your question, I presume would be a part of that discussion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up? Can you conceive of any basis for improving relations with the Soviet Union without negotiations beginning with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that is critical, as it has been from the beginning and will continue to be.

QUESTION: Do you have any reason to believe that Foreign Minister Gromyko will bring any willingness to begin such negotiations to New York?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If I had a positive response to that, I would be standing here with much greater enthusiasm than I am.

QUESTION: May I follow that to make sure I understand what you just said to John? You're not saying that we're unwilling to talk to the Soviets in face-to-face negotiations about theater nuclear forces in Europe until their troops are out of Afghanistan, are you?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. I was talking about Afghanistan.

QUESTION: But he was saying can you envision improved relations with the Soviets unless they make some progress --

QUESTION: -- beyond TNF, can you envisage -- ?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: One never knows when one is in a trap. (Laughter) Number one, we did not, in our Afghanistan policy, undertake -- and you've heard this phraseology before -- dismantle the framework of East-West relations which includes arms control, arms control talks, and arms control agreements. We've made it clear that we are still going to press for ratification of SALT II when it is feasible, and that's still our commitment.

With respect to TNF, we and our NATO allies last December linked two things: One, the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe; and two, the beginning of talks on theater nuclear weapons. When the Soviets dropped their pre-condition about a reversal of the decision on deployment of the weapons and indicated a willingness to talk without that pre-condition, we responded and we are willing to go forward with those talks.

We don't think that is inconsistent with our policy toward the Soviet Union's unacceptable action in Afghanistan. Indeed, the objective of our policy there as well as the objective of our arms control policy is Soviet restraint, and both policies work to that end -- if that clarifies your confusion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I can follow that up, on SALT, you mentioned earlier that you thought SALT should be ratified when it's feasible. I think the question is when it would ever be feasible so long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan. A group, including former Ambassador Kennan, have published documents and letters urging that the Administration take up, or push for, the SALT treaty even as early as the special session in November. Others have said the first thing next year.

Do you think it would be helpful, feeling the way toward feasibility, if President Carter in this campaign made SALT a major issue so that you could, in effect, have a plebiscite of the popular will on this question?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's exactly our objective.

QUESTION: What?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: To develop the issue in this campaign in such a way that the American people can come to grips with the issues, and hopefully create a constituency for SALT II ratification. There are a couple of points involved: Number one, the one you very appropriately raised, the question that this is a Presidential campaign and it's highly appropriate that an issue of this magnitude be discussed in it.

Mr. Reagan's position is opposed to SALT II. The President's is clearly supportive of SALT II, and debate between the two conceivably could help bring that issue to the fore and give the public the benefit of both points of view.

Secondly, there is, among the military, and I suspect among thoughtful citizens, a growing apprehension about the prospect of a SALT-free world, or a SALT-less world, and what that can mean in terms of our security interests, in terms of budgetary burdens, the cost of an arms race. And as those perceptions grow, I would expect the constituency for SALT II may grow.

What the odds are that that would happen is a question that one may legitimately raise. But I am simply indicating that so far as I'm concerned -- and I have the full support of the President with respect to my role in this debate -- I hope to press it and hope to change the climate of public opinion with respect to SALT.

QUESTION: Is it possible to have a vote this November, do you think?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are problems not necessarily associated with the SALT II issues. I gather that the post-election scenario for the Congress is likely to be limited to about 30 days -- November 15 to December 15. I don't know whether that is fixed or are just dates that I've heard tossed around. That time frame is going to be pretty much filled with budgetary issues and appropriations bills, and the time that may be necessary to really debate SALT II would not be available in that period. I would not exclude anything at this point; it just doesn't seem likely at this point.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could we close this off with a footnote question? What is the significance of that yellow ribbon in your lapel?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It says "Free the Hostages."

QUESTION: Can we draw anything from that?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: This is a very useful reminder that was prepared by the committee representing the hostage families and presented to me just this last week with a kiss on both cheeks as a reminder to me. I wear it every day, and it is a daily reminder to me that this is the first order of business.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you.

(The Press Conference was concluded at 2:42 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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No. 259



THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Washington, D.C.
September 16, 1980

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to join Harold Brown to discuss our nuclear targeting strategy with you. When I was a member of this Committee, I strongly believed we had a responsibility to concern ourselves with issues of strategic nuclear policy. Over the years, I probed a series of Administration officials and outside experts on how changes in our nuclear doctrine, forces, and strategy affected our security and international stability.

I did not leave those concerns behind when I became Secretary of State. Indeed, it is a central part of my responsibilities to ensure that foreign policy considerations -- in the broadest sense -- are taken into account in decisions about defense programs and doctrine.

As Secretary of State, I am particularly concerned with the ways in which our strategic doctrine bears on our overall foreign policy toward our allies and adversaries. To support our basic foreign policy and national security objectives, our nuclear strategy should satisfy the following conditions:

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- It should ensure that potential adversaries are fully convinced of our determination to resist nuclear aggression on any scale, at all times and in all circumstances.
- It should avoid stimulating a cycle of superpower misperception and miscalculation that could undermine strategic stability.
- It should be fully consistent with our arms control objectives, so that we preserve the opportunities to strengthen security and stability by means of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.
- It should encourage and justify the willingness of our friends and allies to link their security with our own.

I believe the countervailing strategy meets these tests.

The countervailing strategy underscores and unmistakably communicates to the Soviets two fundamental truths. First, they could derive no conceivable benefit from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or extensive the attack and no matter at what stage in a conflict they might be launched. Second, nuclear conflict cannot be an instrument for achieving national policy goals, either for us or the Soviet Union; there surely will be no victor in a nuclear war.

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Our strategy, and our capability to inflict massive destruction in retaliation, provide the bases for convincing the Soviets of both propositions. The countervailing strategy builds on and complements this traditional doctrine. It enhances our ability to launch selective as well as massive retaliatory attacks, and to cover the full range of targets the Soviets value. It makes clear our capacity to respond to any Soviet nuclear attack -- whatever its magnitude and form -- at an appropriate scale, intensity and focus. We have moved in this direction in order to ensure that the Soviets -- whatever their notions about nuclear war or the utility of nuclear weapons -- do not mistakenly conclude they could achieve some advantage by initiating the use of nuclear weapons or by launching limited strikes.

As such, the countervailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy. It is rather the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in response to changing conditions and new knowledge. The credible capacity to devastate the Soviet Union under any circumstances remains its cornerstone. Thus, we will continue to include the full spectrum of political and military, as well as urban-industrial, targets in our planning. PD-59 does not signify a shift to a warfighting strategy nor to a first-strike doctrine. It does underscore -- and I believe

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strengthen -- the credibility of our capability to retaliate against any nuclear attack under any circumstances, be it a massive strike against the US, or a more limited one against our forces or our allies.

The public reaction of the Soviets is what one would expect. They claim the countervailing strategy is a warfighting strategy, and a US effort to achieve a first strike capability that would undermine strategic stability. They also charge that PD-59 is the real explanation for NATO's decision on TNF modernization and reflects a US intent to confine any nuclear war to Europe while the US remains immune from attack. These claims are neither surprising nor true.

But we should expect the Soviets to try to use PD-59 to split us from our Allies and deprive us of European support for our post-Afghanistan efforts. We can expect the Soviets to focus their energies on undermining the NATO consensus in favor of TNF modernization.

These Soviet accusations, in fact, ring hollow in view of their own doctrine, their attention to nuclear warfighting, and the size and character of their strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, they have never been particularly comfortable with what they regard as our "city-killing" philosophy of nuclear deterrence. I do not believe they genuinely regard this evolution in our nuclear strategy as a move to a first-strike,

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warfighting doctrine. The central purpose of our deterrence policy is to underscore the consequences for the Soviets if they should ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

We want to make sure the Soviets get that message. But we also want to ensure that they get the message right. We need to remain fully alert to the risks of misperception and miscalculation, to the danger that the Soviets may see provocation where we intend none. I do not want anyone to wrongly conclude that we suddenly have become confident about our ability to orchestrate nuclear exchanges and control escalation, or that we have become complacent about the use of nuclear weapons.

We will continue to emphasize to the Soviets that our intentions are peaceful and that we pose no threat to their legitimate security interests. At the same time, we will continue to insist that they respect the interests and rights of others and remind them of the consequences if they resort to nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I need hardly add that we do not regard the countervailing strategy as in any way a substitute for arms control or as a symptom of disenchantment with the arms control process. On the contrary, the countervailing strategy is fully consistent with the SALT II Treaty and our longer term arms control objectives. Nothing in the counter-

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vailing strategy changes or challenges our belief that nuclear arms control can make a significant contribution to our security and to international stability. Nothing in the evolution of our nuclear doctrine has led us to reassess the benefits of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with our chief adversary. In particular, I continue to believe strongly that SALT II would make a crucial contribution to our national security. We will ask the Senate to act on ratification at the earliest feasible time..

The Allies share our concern about the need to deter the full range of Soviet nuclear threats, as well as our continued commitment to arms control and to the maintenance of strategic stability. By reinforcing Allied confidence in the credibility of our nuclear guarantee, the countervailing strategy will strengthen alliance cohesion and solidarity as well as directly reduce the likelihood of conflict. The countervailing strategy reflects and supports the NATO strategy of flexible response by underscoring the availability of a full spectrum of nuclear responses.

We have discussed the evolution of our nuclear strategy and its relationship to flexible response in the normal course of consultations with our Allies. The detailed discussion of the countervailing strategy in Secretary Brown's annual report to the Congress last January provided an excellent basis

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for our dialogue this year. Secretary Brown also gave an extensive briefing to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group this past June.

In the course of these consultations and in the aftermath of press reports about PD-59, the Allies have indicated they understand the countervailing strategy and appreciate the ways in which it strengthens the US strategic linkage to their security. I do not want to leave the impression that we take their support for granted: it has to be earned and then protected in the face of Soviet efforts to undermine Alliance solidarity. I do want to emphasize, however, that the Allied leaders appreciate the rationale behind the countervailing strategy. I am confident that, in the course of our continuing consultations, their support will be sustained.

Nuclear strategy and doctrine are properly sober subjects. This should not, however, obscure the important positive contribution that the countervailing strategy makes to our most basic foreign policy objectives.

I am confident that the countervailing strategy not only strengthens deterrence, but also establishes a firmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlines our determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests, at the same time it confirms that we pose no threat to the legitimate

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interests of other states. As such, it leaves the Soviets no room for doubt about our will or our peaceful intentions.

The countervailing strategy, of course, will not transform the basically adversarial relationship we have with the Soviets. But it reduces the chances for superpower miscalculation and increases Soviet incentives to cooperate on managing and containing the competition between us. It therefore contributes to the prospects for reaching arms control agreements that limit the dangers of war.

For like reasons, the countervailing strategy reaffirms to our Allies and friends that the United States is committed -- in equal measure -- to protecting our mutual security interests and to international stability. I expect it will serve to solidify our relationship with them and to strengthen our role as leader of the Western Alliance.

Let me conclude my opening statement by briefly addressing the question of the involvement of the State Department and the Secretary of State in the formulation of the countervailing strategy. I have carefully reviewed the record. I have concluded that Secretary Vance and the State Department were involved as the major concepts of the policy were being developed and were in a position to make their views known.

The development of the main lines of the strategy was substantially completed well before I took office, and it had

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already been outlined in public statements, especially in Secretary Brown's January 1980 Report to the Congress. Given my Senate responsibilities, I was of course aware of the direction of the Administration's strategic thinking. In fact, I had addressed some of the same concerns and concepts in a speech I delivered last year.

That said, the preparation and issuance of a Presidential Directive that codifies our nuclear strategy is itself an important action that has a significant foreign policy dimension. It therefore is clear that I, as Secretary of State, and the State Department should have been appropriately involved in the action.

I consider the situation that developed here to be an unintended exception to this Administration's record of substantially increased State Department involvement in national security issues. I have discussed this episode with the President as well as with Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski. The President has assured me that I and others at the Department as needed will be fully consulted on the foreign policy implications of such major national security policy decisions.

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I am here today to take sharp issue with the evangelists of American weakness -- to affirm that America today is strong and growing stronger.

If our nation truly were neglecting its defenses, it would be the duty of all informed people to sound the alarm. But false declarations of weakness only intensify the dangers we face. They can cause our friends to doubt us and our enemies to discount us. They can distract us from other work necessary to make our society stronger and our world more secure.

So let us evaluate the defense record, but let us evaluate it fairly. Let us weigh the East-West balance realistically. And let us give due regard to our own strength as well as that of our opposition.

Our allies are stronger, our alliances sturdier than those of the Soviet Union. In economic power, the United States and our NATO allies outstrip the Warsaw Pact more than two to one. Taken together, we devote more to defense than the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union.

Our alliances have the added dependability that is derived when values and purposes are truly shared. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO members and Japan are allies by choice. The purpose of our alliances is not to camouflage

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the ambitions of one member, but to defend the freedom of all.

At least one-fourth of the Soviet Union's ground combat forces are tied down on the long common border with China. The nations on our borders are friends.

Technology is another American advantage. "Faster," "more accurate," "more advanced," -- these generally are terms that apply to American weapons and American systems. Soviet technology has lagged behind.

And our security is also advanced by the content of our foreign policy -- by the international principles we support.

On a global basis, we stand for essential precepts of national sovereignty and human rights. Certainly we live in a tumultuous world, characterized by the unrelenting nationalism and surging human aspirations of more than 100 new nations. But if such an environment is unsettling to us, it will prove to be even more perilous for nations seeking to dominate others and dictate their systems. Such imperial concepts are the wave of the past. They collide head-on with the historic trends now underway virtually everywhere in the world -- from the patriots in Afghanistan to the nationalists in every nation of the

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The question facing Americans is not whether we should respond to these developments. All agree that we must.

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The real question is whether we will continue with a well-conceived and measured response tailored to the actual threats we face -- or whether we will run off wildly in all directions at once, spending vastly greater sums to little, if any, effect.

Let me briefly survey what the response thus far has been.

In overall terms our arms spending is no longer dropping. It is growing.

Our defense spending declined in seven of the eight years just before President Carter took office -- a total drop of more than 37 percent.

Since President Carter's inauguration, however, defense spending has increased four years in a row -- for overall growth of 10 percent, after inflation. And if the President's five year plan is carried out, the increase by 1985 will exceed 27 percent.

To make it absolutely clear that we are not proposing to squeeze our armed forces, let me just note here that this five year defense program calls for

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appropriations of over one trillion dollars between now and 1985.

Even so, there are those who pronounce that effort insufficient. They insist upon a still larger arms budget.

They will not tell us what it would contain. They leave those decisions for later. They simply want "more" -- of whatever, as if shoveling out the taxpayer's money is a desirable end in itself.

That is a formula not for greater security, but for guaranteed waste -- a failing to avoid in defense just as much as in any other part of the budget.

Instead we need a carefully structured defense program that responds effectively to specific dangers. And that is what we have.

In conventional forces, the Carter Administration began promptly in 1977 to address the military deficiencies of NATO -- matters which previously had received abundant discussion . . . and precious little concrete attention.

Today the NATO Long Term Defense Program, an American initiative, is in its third year. Problems ranging from readiness and prompt reinforcement to integrating air defenses are no longer simply being studied; they are being solved.

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These NATO improvements are underwritten by an Alliance agreement to increase defense spending by at least 3 percent each year -- another initiative of the United States.

We are engaged in a broad modernization of the Army's weapons and equipment. We have begun the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the Vietnam War. And our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships over the next five years, building toward a newer and more capable fleet of 550 ships, in contrast to 476 in 1977.

With these programs moving forward, we have also begun bolstering our ability to respond to emergencies outside the major alliance regions -- including the vital Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Our naval presence there today is the strongest ever. We have negotiated new agreements for access to ports and airfields. We are prepositioning equipment and supplies in the Indian Ocean area. A new cargo aircraft is being developed. The elements of a Rapid Deployment Force have been designated and exercises are underway.

Our programs in the area of nuclear weapons reflect this same commitment to the deterrence of war through the assurance of strength.

Last year, NATO adopted our recommendations for modernizing theater nuclear forces in Europe.

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On intercontinental or strategic nuclear forces, the hard decisions have been made. A sweeping modernization of all three parts of our nuclear triad -- land, sea and air -- is moving ahead.

-- For the strategic bomber forces, President Carter took the soundest course, even though it meant also taking some political heat. Instead of sinking billions of dollars in a B-1 bomber with a doubtful future, he decided to equip our existing bombers with air launched cruise missiles. In place of an old concept highly vulnerable to Soviet countermoves, he selected an array of advanced technologies that can surmount foreseeable Soviet defenses.

-- At sea, the Trident submarine program was put back on track. The first of those modern submarines will join the fleet next year. Portions of the existing fleet already have the Trident I missile, with major improvements in range and power.

-- And on the land, the new MX missile, with mobile basing, will overcome the chief source of potential nuclear instability -- the growing vulnerability of missiles fixed in silos. As with our bomber forces, President Carter rejected second best suggestions and made sure we had the best plan before construction began -- so we would not have to waste time and money later fixing the mistakes.

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Along with these programs -- cruise missiles, Trident, the MX -- there is a fourth program I want to mention . . . a "secret weapon", if you will. Let me list some of its capabilities.

By itself, this secret weapon would knock out about a fourth of all long range Soviet missiles and bombers that we project for 1985. It would do that without launching a nuclear war; indeed, without even firing a shot.

In the process, it would eliminate thousands of individual warheads and bombs that the Soviet arsenal could otherwise have aimed at our country.

The secret weapon has surveillance capabilities. With it, we will be able to keep better track of Soviet forces and programs.

For all of its military effectiveness, there is no incompatibility whatsoever between this secret weapon and our other strategic programs. M-X, Trident and air launched cruise missiles can all go ahead as planned.

Adding this weapon will not require massive new appropriations. In fact, in the long run, money will be saved.

Nor does it worry our allies. On the contrary, they know about it and they strongly support it. Their only concern is that we might not adopt it.

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Of course the weapon I am referring to is not a weapon at all. It is an agreement -- the SALT II Treaty.

But it nonetheless will make all the contributions to our security I have just described. There is nothing soft or innocent about it. It is an integral part of a hardheaded strategy of American defense. And it should be recognized as such.

Indeed, it may well be that some of those who oppose SALT II would support it -- even insist on it -- if it were a defense expenditure that could buy the same results.

The contribution of SALT to our defense underscores the second of two messages I want to leave here today.

The first, as I have suggested, is that our defenses -- alone and in combination with our allies -- are second to none. We are determined to see that they remain so. That determination is not just stated in words; it is backed up in the budget.

The second message is that simply spending more money and building more arms -- even accumulating vast military power -- will not be enough to assure our security in today's world.

Even our defense posture itself depends upon other international assets and skills. Recall NATO's Long Term

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Defense Program . . . its agreement on greater defense efforts . . . the decision on theater nuclear forces . . . our access to facilities in the Indian Ocean. Actions such as these cannot be manufactured out of either unilateral announcements or unspecified new spending. They are the products of careful negotiation and steady leadership -- endeavors every bit as vital to our defense as arms.

And those endeavors have other applications indispensable to our security.

True security in a nuclear age demands steps that lessen the risk that war will happen. That is the mandate of arms control -- in combination with a strong defense, to help achieve a stable balance, and to avoid miscalculation by either side. For we know that nuclear war would mean catastrophe for every side. In such times it would only jeopardize our security to reject arms control and embrace doctrines -- including the chimera of nuclear superiority -- that invite a nuclear arms race.

Our security is also advanced by a vigorous diplomacy -- fashioning a mature, stable basis of cooperation even with countries, such as China, that have different systems from ours. We must not retreat from those efforts -- confuse them -- or be confused by them.

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Our security has been enhanced by the success of peace-making in Zimbabwe. That effort deprived our adversaries of a conflict to exploit. Some Americans wanted to disrupt the peace process by prematurely ending our participation in international sanctions. We can all be grateful they did not prevail.

Our security is still more deeply involved in the Middle East, where the Camp David process has produced the first real peace agreement since Israel came into being. Only patient, persistent and imaginative diplomacy can reconcile the remaining issues -- the same kind of diplomacy that hammered out the accords at Camp David. Bellicose pronouncements . . . or assaults on the negotiating process that offer no concrete alternatives . . . neither advance that enterprise nor serve the cause of peace.

And our security is affected by a broad range of economic issues that arms cannot touch. We could never have blasted a new trade agreement into being. We cannot threaten stagnating economies to make them prosper or intimidate hungry people into health.

Yet our fate ultimately turns on such questions, even as it rests on the balance of power. If we neglect

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such challenges, our fate may be to slide into oblivion, rather than being blown there. But we will get there all the same.

In short, our security in the future requires the same priorities that have marked our foreign policy in the recent past.

On defense, we must continue the steady, prudent improvement of our armed forces. We must specifically repudiate the false message that ours is a frail nation.

And our security requires something more. It requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the world we share . . . a commitment to peace as well as power . . . a capacity to work constructively with others to advance common purposes and meet the full range of challenges ahead.

I am convinced that the American people understand the need for such a balanced American approach to the world.

I believe they support a defense posture of strength and confidence -- and a foreign policy of construction and hope.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 19, 1980
No. 262A

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
FOLLOWING THE STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PITTSBURGH
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
September 18, 1980

(Applause)

PRESIDENT OEHMELER: Secretary Muskie has agreed to take questions from the floor. We have some floor microphones set up throughout the room. When you have a question, please ask your question in a loud, clear voice so we can all hear. We are going to cut off the questions at 1:50 promptly because the Secretary's schedule is very tight today.

Now, may we have the first question?

QUESTION: Secretary Muskie, you mentioned that in the next five years our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships, bringing the fleet to 550 ships in contrast to 476 in 1977.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes, those are the numbers.

QUESTION: How does the Navy plan to provide manpower for the extra 97 new ships when they cannot now not get enough people to operate and maintain the present 475 ships?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the Congress, with the support of the Administration, has acted, or is in the process of acting -- I haven't followed the appropriations process that closely -- to increase and increase the compensation and benefits of people in the military.

Our lack has been in the skilled areas, those who have been in the service a while and the Warrant Officer grades -- people whose skills are highly desired and salable in the private sector -- and there has been a tendency for us to lose those skills. The Congress has recognized that it is terribly important that we improve the attractions, the benefits, and the prerequisites for those jobs. I hope we can turn that one around. It is a problem, a serious problem, but it is not being neglected.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you see the U.S. stockpiling of military hardware in Norway to strengthen the northern flank of NATO -- (inaudible)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm afraid that microphone isn't working.

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QUESTION: Do you see the stockpiling of U.S. military hardware in Norway to strengthen the northern flank of NATO to counter any possible Soviet expansion into this area for the oil-rich North Sea?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You're referring to the stockpiling of military supplies and equipment in Norway? That is part of the pre-positioning exercise that I described in my formal presentation, that is to equipment the Rapid Deployment Force to move quickly into action in the event of difficulties in the Persian Gulf-Middle East area.

We have adopted the policy of stockpiling, and Norway has indicated its willingness to participate in that program.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if the "Swiss Connection" is not successful in communicating with the Iranian Government, what avenue would the United States investigate? And would the Vatican through Archbishop Capucci be an acceptable alternative?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have not been limited to any one channel in the four months that I've been Secretary of State. There are a number of channels, and it is not useful for me to try to identify them. Only recently, of course, have we supplemented the indirect channels that we've used to get information, to communicate views to the various Iranian leaders as they emerge in their developing political institutions. But recently on the election of a Prime Minister I sent a letter of my own, which is the first direct contact between our government and theirs, in the hope that with their political institutions falling into place, that we might be approaching the time when direct contact and negotiations might emerge.

You've mentioned two channels of communication, possible communication, and there are several, if not many, others.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Jimmy Carter is seeking to be reelected President this year. Do you see any alterations of the policy on the security of Israel?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think the election will make any difference. Events may.

As you know, the Camp David process has been under assault from a number of quarters -- those who wish to see it fail and those who might wish to see it succeed, but doubt that it will -- so that the process is constantly under pressure and attack, and there is an inclination on the part of both Israel and Egypt to respond to these outside pressures and attacks in ways that can undermine the continuing nature of the negotiations.

It has been our effort to keep both parties focused on the process and to continue with it. You know, the important point to remember that I've made all over the world is that it is the only negotiation that has ever been put in place with respect to the Middle East since the creation of the state of Israel, and more than that, it's the only negotiation with both Palestinian rights and Israel's security at the top of the agenda.

A great deal of work has been accomplished by these negotiations. The obvious one, of course, is the treaty of peace with Egypt which three years ago would have been regarded as an impossibility. And in addition, with respect to the autonomy talks for the West Bank and Gaza, which started about 16 or 18 months ago, a lot of the work, a lot of the authorities with respect to the self-governing authority contemplated for the West Bank and Gaza, have been agreed upon.

They are now down to the really tough issues, involving land, water, security, the powers of the self-governing authority and so on, and it has been agreed that the talks will be resumed. Therefore, we think that the process that has already demonstrated that it can achieve results should be continued to be supported and will be, whatever happens in the election, so far as I know.

QUESTION: Secretary Muskie, to set my question in context, I would like to tell you that I'm a resident of Hawaii, studying at Pitt. Recently, a number of people who are representatives of the emerging countries of the South Pacific met in Honolulu because of the overriding concern about the American desire to store nuclear waste in the Pacific.

I would like to know what the present posture is of our country regarding this issue, one. And secondly, what is the current Administration's posture regarding the development or involvement in the development efforts of the emerging countries of the South Pacific?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to the disposal of nuclear waste, I guess we're going to have to find another planet. Nobody wants it. None of the fifty states do; other countries do not, so I guess the honest answer to your question is that we don't know what the answer is at this point. We continue to search for it.

(Loud buzzing sound on public address system.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't know whether that was NBC or CBS.
(Laughter and applause)

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The second part of your question had to do with development and what role we are playing. Let me say that your question touches upon one of my great frustrations as Secretary of State, and before that as a member of Congress for 22 years, and that has to do with the failure of the American people to understand -- largely because nobody has tried really effectively to give them the facts -- and the failure of the Congress to adequately support assistance programs aimed at helping southern hemisphere countries largely in their development efforts.

I have been making these kinds of speeches, that is foreign aid speeches. I try to find a different phrase than "foreign aid." One of my table partners reminded me that I had said something about it that was picked up in The Economist, to the effect that 80 percent of our foreign aid dollars are spent in this country and produce American jobs -- and that is a correct fact.

Although that is correct and perhaps an inducement to people to support foreign aid, the importance of foreign aid to me is as a tool in influencing the future direction of human affairs on this planet. And it's the kind of investment we should be making in our own interest. Our own defense, our own security, our own prospects for a better future are enhanced to the extent that we can contribute to a meeting of those problems of the world's disadvantaged people that create instability.

We can't expect to be prosperous, peaceful, strong and free of fears in an unstable world; and the entire southern hemisphere of this planet is a potential powder keg in the sense that disadvantaged people will not take their situation permanently. Disadvantaged people can be, and are, exploited by those who seek power for that purpose. So that when we concentrate wholly upon -- The speech should have been modified, to have added that secret weapon because I think it is an important one.

With respect to the countries of Southeast Asia, those in the Indo-China peninsula are not all poor, of course. Indonesia and Malaysia have some of the prime resources of this planet available for their own development, but other countries do not.

Africa perhaps is the poorest in terms of resources, and development there and resources of the kind I am describing are important. Let's take Zimbabwe. I've mentioned Zimbabwe here in this speech. Zimbabwe, if it is to continue on its moderate course -- its moderate racial course, its moderate internal political course -- has got to meet the aspirations and the problems of its people. Zimbabwe is a rich nation in

resources, so the potential is there. It is a country that has been torn by war for all these years. They need outside help to get started, investment to get started, and frankly, there isn't a nickel in our foreign aid program available for that purpose. If they succeed, their success may well moderate the whole racial issue in the southern half of Africa.

To me, that is an investment worth consideration by the United States and by our people. There are other examples: Poland. We've all, I'm sure, unless you're different than the people I've run into up to now, have been cheered by the success of the Polish workers. Now, Poland has horrendous economic problems which have been exacerbated by that event.

We have announced some CCC credits, \$660 million -- which is an addition of only \$110 million over what we were going to provide anyway -- but we don't have another penny available in our foreign aid program to be of assistance when they put together their economic plans, and turn to us and other western nations for help. These kinds of situations are situations which we cannot afford to ignore in our own interest, and yet, we tie our own hands by failing to respond to the opportunities. That's the best question I've been asked today.

(Applause)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as one conservationist, an environmental student and a long-time supporter of yours, I have a two-pronged question: The first one: Why is it every time I come to a meeting in this ballroom, I go home with pneumonia? We have an energy crisis. Do you think you might be able to convince all these hotels and meeting rooms to turn their air-conditioning down a little bit?

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, if they don't respond to you, I don't know how I could expect them to respond to me.

(Applause)

QUESTION: We'd make a great team!

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My serious question: I have been doing a great deal of reading and have a great concern about the acceleration of new, modern airplanes and equipment, and yet not having the people power -- I dare not say manpower or I'll be run out of town -- the people power to operate the highly-technical airplanes, where sometimes the less complicated, older vintage planes are becoming more effective.

What are we going to do when we keep on accelerating, developing and exploring highly-sophisticated planes with nobody to operate them? I think the attempt of the rescue mission in Iran is an exemplary, unfortunate experience. Would you address that, sir?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Are you speaking about civil aviation or military?

QUESTION: I'm talking about war planes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: War Planes. Well, the breakdown in Iran was not really due to an inability of the crew to operate the craft. It was just that they were extended to the outer limits of their capability, and there were not enough back-up helicopters assigned to that mission, so I don't think that incident gets at the first point that you made.

Secondly, I don't know of any way to stop the momentum of technological development.

QUESTION: Sir, I think you misunderstood me. I will rephrase that. Who is going to operate the sophisticated planes if it appears we don't have enough people trained to do it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But we are operating these sophisticated planes and we can train them. I mean, to the extent that the manpower isn't being attracted into the military, you've got a point; but that has nothing to do with the complexity of the technology. It has to do with our failure to provide the inducements to attract people into the service, and we intend to do something about that, if that's your point.

It is the same point that was raised earlier with respect to our ships, and it is a very appropriate and valid point. If that's your point, I finally got it.

PRESIDENT OEHMELER: There is time for one more question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: One more question.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I read recently in the newspaper that you had sent a message to the Iranian Foreign Minister concerning the hostages, and you had received a reply back. Could you kind of outline what that message said or if it was particularly optimistic?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You're not talking about my letter?

QUESTION: I mean, would you say that tone was optimistic?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I haven't received a reply yet?

QUESTION: You haven't?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

QUESTION: The newspapers said that you had.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

Let me describe what has happened with respect to my letter. Number one: I sent it upon the election of the Prime Minister. It was delivered, through one of the channels that I referred to earlier, to the Prime Minister. He disclosed that he had received a letter from me; did not immediately disclose its contents, but obviously regarded it as a serious matter, and he said that he would consider it and reply in due course.

Subsequent to that time, in what appeared to have been an impromptu speech, he read the contents of my letter, embroidered it with some of the usual rhetoric that we get in Iranian reactions to anything the United States does, but in such a way to suggest, to me at least, that in due course I may get a formal written response.

We have gotten indications from other Iranian sources that they regard the letter as a serious contact and one to be dealt with seriously. Whether or not that will produce at some point a contact and the start of our negotiations, or talks, you know we will have to be patient and wait and see. I hope so.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you all very much. I wish I had more time for questions.

(Applause)

(The luncheon program concluded at 1:55 p.m.)

As prepared for delivery

Mr. President, delegates to this Assembly:

I come also to express our hopes for its future -- at a moment when the world is deeply troubled by tension and uncertainty. Peace is threatened by smoldering regional conflicts, by assaults of the strong upon the weak. Nations large and small are buffeted by steeply rising oil prices and serious economic strains. Within many countries, poverty and oppression form an explosive combination.

A few weeks ago, I spoke to this Assembly about the international economy. I stressed the obligation of nations to cooperate in facing world economic problems: payments imbalances, energy inflation, slowed growth in many developing countries, the spectres of environmental decay and even famine.

Our inability to reach a consensus on procedures for global negotiations is a pause in the process, not a failure in our objectives. I do not mean to say that the differences that have kept us from finding a formula for global negotiations can be glossed over. They are real. They are substantive. But we are prepared to use the span of this General Assembly to continue discussions that can lead to procedures, to an agenda, and to a negotiating structure that will foster broad agreement among all the nations here represented.

Today I want to look beyond economic problems to the one condition that is a prerequisite to all material progress; peace. If we truly care about building a world in which peace and justice prevail, the world's nations -- and this organization -- cannot ignore certain political and legal obligations also: obligations every bit as compelling as the economic obligations I spoke of earlier.

For further information, contact:

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These responsibilities are not new. They are proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. But dangerous new circumstances require that we stress them anew -- lest we betray the very purpose the United Nations is designed to serve.

Our first obligation is to refrain from aggression and to deal with it vigorously.

The first article of the UN Charter provides for "the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace." The second article prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state..."

Accordingly, the United Nations must confront the continuing assault upon Afghanistan. I raise this issue not to set off a rhetorical exchange; not in the interests of polemics, but in the interest of peace.

Today, more than one million refugees attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan. And more is at stake than the independence of one country. If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question.

Last January an Emergency Special Session of this Assembly condemned, by a large majority, the assault upon Afghanistan. We strongly believe that the 15th General Assembly also must work under the Charter to reinforce the principles of the United Nations. We must work for a total withdrawal of Soviet troops and a political settlement. We must support the principles of non-intervention, self-determination, and non-alignment for Afghanistan.

In Kampuchea as well, armed aggression continues. We welcome reports of some progress made under the leadership of the United Nations Secretary-General and international organizations in relieving the conditions of deprivation and disease so prevalent a year ago. The threat of renewed starvation requires significant further contributions from the international community.

Despite some improvement in Kampuchea's desperate human situation, no progress whatsoever has been made towards securing the withdrawal of occupying Vietnamese forces and the restoration of self-determination to the Kampuchean people, as called for by last year's resolution on Kampuchea sponsored by the non-aligned nations. We strongly support the basis for a settlement -- including the concept of an international conference -- contained in that resolution, which was passed by a large majority.

Above all, let us keep in mind two basic purposes for which this body exists: to oppose armed aggression and to assuage its consequences. No achievements can be more important to the future influence and effectiveness of the United Nations; no failure could be more damaging than a failure to deal firmly with these issues.

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Achieving this goal remains urgently important in two key regions: the Middle East and southern Africa.

In the Middle East, the United States is committed to a comprehensive peace -- an enduring peace based on the principles of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. We are determined to pursue to a successful conclusion the peace process begun at Camp David two years ago this month. Already that process has achieved something once thought impossible: peace between Egypt and Israel. Now the negotiations are focused upon a second goal: taking a significant first step toward resolving the Palestinian problem. The current autonomy talks have as their goal arriving at interim arrangements to establish full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza. After that, the process will proceed to negotiations which will determine the final status of those areas.

As we seek to resolve this conflict, we are committed to finding a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and at the same time to permanent security for the State of Israel. We have no illusions about the difficulties of this quest. We are dealing with a conflict of long duration and intense feelings. There can be no shortcuts.

So today I call on all members of this Assembly to lend their support to these negotiations. Camp David has proved so far, and remains for the future, the most hopeful and productive avenue to peace in the Middle East. There is no alternative to negotiations except further conflict. Let us remember that differences are rivers to be crossed, not reasons to turn back.

That persistence can bear fruit -- that negotiations can yield peace -- has been reaffirmed in recent months in southern Africa. Through arduous negotiations, the new nation of Zimbabwe has been born in peace. Today we have reason to celebrate not only this accomplishment, but also the way in which nations worked together to achieve it. And for the future, the Zimbabwe settlement offers hope -- and a model -- for peaceful settlements in southern Africa and elsewhere.

The United States will continue its strong efforts to advance the United Nations plan for Namibia. There are no major substantive issues left to be resolved. I am convinced that the United Nations plan would be implemented fairly. All that remains is for South Africa to act in its own interest, in the interest of peace in the region, and in the interest of the Namibian people: to accept implementation of the United Nations settlement.

If that does not happen soon, this chance for peace could be lost -- and we would face a better future of protracted conflict and tragic human suffering. . . .

The settlement in Zimbabwe can also provide a precedent for peaceful change in South Africa. We will continue to urge the Government of South Africa to abandon the repugnant policy of apartheid. We consider it urgent that talks among representative leaders begin on the issue of peaceful, orderly change in South Africa -- while there is still time.

We must continue our search for peace and restoration of respect for international law in other parts of the world as well. In Lebanon, in Cyprus and elsewhere, we will lend our full support to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations.

And although the holding of American hostages in Iran is not an item on the agenda of this Assembly, it remains a matter of extreme urgency that this tragic impasse be resolved -- resolved in a way that strengthens peace, and restores respect for international law.

The continuing situation in Iran contributes to uncertainty about security and stability in Southwest Asia. The security of Iran itself and the stability of the area depend on a united, strong, and independent Iran living at peace with its neighbors.

With the end of the former regime and the death of the late Shah, a chapter in Iran's history has closed. As a new chapter opens, we emphasize that we recognize the reality of the Iranian Revolution, and we respect the right of the Iranian people to choose their own form of government without intervention of any kind. With the emergence of a new constitution and governmental structure and the gradual consolidation of authority, the Islamic Republic of Iran can assume its obligations and independent role in this community of nations.

An indispensable step will be the safe return to their families of the American hostages in Iran. Throughout the 324 days of their captivity, the members and institutions of the United Nations have expressed their concern for the hostages in numberless ways and channels. With their safe release, as repeatedly called for by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, Iran could end its isolation from those nations that live in accordance with international law, and sanctions would be terminated.

Today I urge the nation of Iran, its parliament, and its people also to consider the human face of the hostage problem. These innocent people and their families have experienced acute suffering. I ask this community of nations to join us in urging that their ordeal be brought to a safe, honorable, and prompt end.

We also know that in Iran, as in the United States, there are deep feelings as a result of grievances and suffering perceived in the past. We are prepared to do our part in resolving fairly the issues between us.

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First: It is President Carter's intention to move forward as speedily as possible toward ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Accordingly, the President intends to consult with the leadership of the United States Senate soon after the election with a view to resuming the ratification process as soon as feasible.

We consider it of cardinal importance to ratify SALT II and move forward with the SALT process. The Soviet Union, however, must recognize that for many Americans recent Soviet actions have called into question the Soviet Union's commitment to international peace and cooperation.

Accordingly, we call upon the Soviet Union to act in ways that will enhance, not damage, the prospects for SALT II and for other arms control efforts.

Second: We are committed to the pursuit of meaningful and equal limitations on theater nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. We are ready to begin talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister this week to discuss this subject and to seek agreement on the arrangements for beginning these talks promptly.

Third: We are committed to seeking an effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. Substantial progress has been made toward this goal, and we are determined to continue pursuing these efforts vigorously.

Fourth: The United States is committed in the Vienna talks to achieving mutual and balanced force reductions and limitations to diminish the risks inherent in the massive presence of military forces in Central Europe.

Fifth: We are prepared to develop further the security aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. If the international situation permits and if there is balanced progress in all areas at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid -- including the human rights area -- we are prepared to consider a post-Madrid European Conference of the CSCE signatory states on developing militarily significant Confidence Building Measures.

Sixth: We support the effort of the newly expanded Committee on Disarmament to develop the provisions of an international convention on radiological weapons. We also support its work toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and we continue to pursue our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on an effective prohibition against chemical weapons.

Finally, the further spread of nuclear weapons would constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. We firmly support efforts, therefore, to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. The non-proliferation treaty is a cornerstone of these efforts; we strongly urge non-parties to embrace the treaty -- for it enhances the security of all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike. At the recently concluded NPT Review Conference, there was unanimous agreement on the fundamental soundness of the treaty and the desirability of universal adherence to it. For those non-nuclear weapon states that have not joined the treaty, we attach particular importance to the goal of achieving comprehensive, full-scope international safeguards coverage.

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We believe that acceptance of such coverage should become a condition of new nuclear supply commitments to such states. We will continue to work for a world in which all nations can share in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, without the danger of spreading nuclear weapons.

Before I leave this subject, let me emphasize our deep concern over another arms control matter. If arms control is to be successful, agreements must be fully honored. Questions such as those raised by persistent reports that chemical weapons have been used in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea cannot be ignored by the international community. To do so would undermine both arms control and international law. The United States, therefore, welcomes the emphasis placed by the Committee on Disarmament at its most recent session on the need for international efforts to determine the facts behind these reports. We believe that an impartial investigation into these reports could most appropriately be launched under the auspices of the United Nations.

Important as they are, the obligations I have mentioned by no means exhaust the responsibilities which rest upon us as nations, and as a community of nations, if we are to secure peace. By peace, I mean not the fragile, artificial stability that comes with repression of a people by their government. I mean the true stability of societies that are at peace with themselves because the rights of their citizens are protected and nurtured.

So, Mr. President, let me close by underscoring another obligation of nations: our obligation to uphold human rights and to concern ourselves compassionately with fundamental human needs.

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the community of nations has nobly defined the concepts of human rights and human dignity -- just as in the United Nations Charter we have outlined the precepts of peaceful cooperation.

The failure of nations to live up to these human rights obligations is a continuing tragedy -- made painfully manifest in the waves of refugees now sweeping across the world.

These suffering people present a dramatic challenge to the international community represented by this Assembly. Over the past five years, the United States has welcomed more than 600,000 refugees -- from Africa, from Asia, from Europe, from the Middle East and the western hemisphere. In the past five months alone, we have received more than 120,000 people driven from Cuba to our shores: an influx which has presented extraordinary challenges to our resources.

In recognition of the human need implicit in this worldwide wave of refugees, President Carter has made known the intention of the United States to accept an additional 217,000 refugees over the next year.

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Our country, of course, is only one of many which have welcomed and helped refugees. More than one million Afghani refugees have fled to Pakistan; 400,000 Indochinese are in Thailand. More than three million are homeless in Sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly this is a global problem; it requires a global response.

The refugee resettlement efforts agreed upon at Geneva last year demand our energy and our generosity.

We must strengthen the UNHCR.

The humanitarian programs of the United Nations and of other agencies require a renewed commitment from all of us -- to their support and to their strengthening.

But ultimately, this human tragedy can be dealt with only by removing its root causes: by overcoming poverty, by ending the abuse of human rights within nations, and by establishing peace among nations so that no person need be forced to flee from home and country.

This is why my nation supports the growth of democracy and personal freedom, in the Americas and in Africa and in every region of the world.

Achieving these ultimate purposes remains a supreme challenge for the United Nations. Making progress toward them must be the work of this 35th General Assembly.

Mr. President, let us not ignore facts. Ours is a moment of worldwide economic difficulty -- and a time of tension between great powers.

At such moments, peaceful cooperation becomes even more difficult than usual. At such moments, our obligations as members of this Assembly of nations take on new importance.

At such times, when a cloud of troubling events darkens our aspirations for ultimate peace, we can light our path by adhering faithfully to our charter; to the international law that binds us; to the standards of international conduct that protect us.

Let us hope, Mr. President that the light we generate by doing so will dispel the clouds of tension and discord that darken the world today.

The United States will do its part. We will live up to our obligations to oppose aggression . . . to build peace . . . to limit arms . . . to support human rights and foster economic justice. For us and for other nations, these endeavors can immeasurably improve life on earth -- and build the just and lasting peace for which all our peoples yearn.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
U.N. PLAZA HOTEL
New York, New York
September 25, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I assume you have distributed the announcement we have on the TNF talks.

Let me say with respect to the Gromyko meeting that Mr. Gromyko emphasized the importance of complete confidentiality, of being able to speak freely, and I don't want to prejudice the dialogue which ought to continue. So I am going to have to be cagier than I usually am about that and I may even be non-communicative. We did not cover as many subjects as I thought we might which suggests that we discussed some of them more comprehensively than I had expected we might. It was, I think -- both sides were relaxed -- a hard-hitting discussion. One recalls the two speeches we made to the General Assembly. One would expect them to be hard-hitting, but not abusive in any sense, verbally abusive or physically. I think it was a chance for both of us to get points before the other that we found disturbing, and we did so, both using frankness and candor to make clear the depth of our concerns about the other's policies and actions.

That's enough hard news for one day, isn't it?

QUESTION: Can you address yourself more than you did in the statement outside the Soviet Mission this morning about we're both neutral to how the two of you approached the Iraqi-Iranian problem and where either our individual efforts, or their individual efforts, or our collaborative efforts stand at trying to defuse that fighting?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, since I did open up that subject that much --

QUESTION: Sorry, Mr. Secretary, we can't hear you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm sorry. I'm a soft-voiced guy.

Since I opened up that subject that much, I ought to say this much more about it lest there be some confusion. We really each stated what we said publicly about our positions. Ours is clear that we are neutral in this matter, that we think urgently that the hostilities should cease and that the parties take their differences to the

negotiating table. We welcome a meeting of the Security Council to support such for the purpose of calling for ceasefire negotiations and also to pursue our respective diplomatic channels to seek to influence both Iraq and Iran in any way we can -- our influence in Iran is obviously limited -- to influence them to implement a ceasefire. Mr. Gromyko stated their position which is similar: it did not respond to or reject the Security Council or the diplomatic offensive idea. Whether as events unfold, we do pursue parallel lines, only time will tell.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on that point. Since the Soviet Union is the largest supplier of arms to Iraq and since therefore presumably it would have some leverage by stating its neutrality, in effect, the Soviets are allowing the fighting to continue. They're not exerting a positive influence and therefore in effect they are taking sides on the side of Iraq. Is that a correct analysis?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think there are competing analyses, but I don't think it is useful for me to get into them. I think you ought to take that up with Mr. Gromyko.

QUESTION: Well, let me put it another way. Would you have preferred that the Soviets become less neutral and fall in behind the UN effort?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The problem of undertaking to influence the course of action other countries may take in this situation, given the pressures they may feel in this situation, can be a counterproductive proposition.

I stated my view to Mr. Gromyko as I did my government's view, which is my view, because I regarded that as representing the maximum that I should do in trying to influence his actions. His actions he'll decide. I don't think it is useful for me to try to speculate beyond what he said to me.

QUESTION: Trying to conceive, trying to imagine what advantage the Soviets would gain from the war ending, if we can assume there's a lot we have to lose -- or the West has to lose -- in the war continuing, from your point of view what possible interest do they have in helping to end the war? Why should they? Where do they stand to lose if the war continues? We stand to lose, the West stands to lose oil supplies. What do they stand to lose?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The whole world stands to lose in this area, which is such an unstable area, so potentially explosive. Hostilities erupt which could escalate. It could even escalate to the point where the ultimate, unthinkable hostilities may take place.

We have discussed the Middle East in these terms since the invention of the nuclear weapon and we have always

regarded the Middle East as the most sensitive and the most unstable area, therefore the most dangerous. I doubt that the Russians have lost that perception. I am sure we haven't. And the whole Middle East conflict has been put in this context. Nobody gains. That's the way in which it ought to be viewed. Nobody gains. I don't believe even the Iraqis and the Iranians have gained from the outbreak of hostilities of this kind. If that isn't the perception, then I don't understand why there appears to be widespread understanding in this institution that action ought to be taken, although there is reluctance about taking the initiative. Nevertheless, there is widespread understanding. It must be there's widespread appreciation of the fact that nobody, including the Soviet Union, gains from the continuation of these hostilities.

QUESTION: Can't the Soviet gain by fragmentation of Iran? Isn't there some dividend in that for them that, of course, isn't there for us?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't believe they've gained very much at this point from their intervention in Afghanistan. And, if the situation that has developed is tempting them into a similar situation, you know they have already had a world reaction to their Afghanistan intervention. Now, would it be in their interest -- I doubt it -- to confirm that the world's interpretation of their intervention in Afghanistan is justified?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if the premise is that the Soviet Union sees the danger of escalation in that part of the world as clearly as we do and that their views of non-intervention and neutrality are parallel with our own, why shouldn't it be comparatively easy to achieve a joint statement to that effect which would have considerable effect, a joint Soviet-American statement that neither side will intervene and that there should be no other intervention in Iran, that a cease-fire should take place, should be encouraged between Iran and Iraq? We seem to be operating through a pane of glass.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, that's true. I'm learning, as perhaps you are, that that's the nature of this institution. It operates through panes of plate glass. But, with respect to your suggestion, in the first place our position in this conflict is a very delicate and sensitive one given our problem in Iran. Their perception, at least as they have announced it, of our involvement in it is totally false and unfounded. Nevertheless, for us to be perceived as taking an initiative, which if executed at a given moment would find them at a disadvantage, surely would not be helpful to our interests. How the Soviets might interpret the impact of their joining in such an initiative I would not undertake to define. But there is that problem. We are not in a position to take the lead here at this point. That's not misunderstood around here. So we're undertaking to move as we have for so long now in the Iranian situation, quietly, through diplomatic channels and private consultations, to achieve our objectives. We can't do it by beating the drum or shouting from the rooftops.

QUESTION: Will you be meeting Mr. Gromyko again or will he be going to Washington to discuss this with the President?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. This morning's meeting went beyond the time that was scheduled so that each of us could raise what we regarded as the highest priority items. If there had been others, I think we would have continued longer. There was the possibility that we might have adjourned to come back this afternoon if we hadn't finished.

QUESTION: You've now had two meetings with Mr. Gromyko over several months' period. How would you now describe the state of relations?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think our two speeches to the General Assembly do that. We each find fault, serious fault, with the other's policies to the point where we each question the other's intentions and have doubts about it. Yet I think it's important that we are able to express those questions and doubts to each other face-to-face, to do it in a reasonable, if hardened, way. We've slipped back from the days of maximum accommodation as a result of Afghanistan from our point of view, and as a result of U.S. actions which they identify as a cause of their disillusionment. And it's going to be a slow process to climb out of it, to climb back up to a more normal relationship. We both, I think, indicated today that that is our objective. Each of us would prefer normal relationships. But we see problem A, B, C, stand in the way of acquiring action by the other, and this is basically the nature of the discussion. We cannot influence changes in policy on the other side in one discussion or two. That has never been the nature of the discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States even in the most halcyon days.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, sorry I did not understand you well. Is it correct that the United States wanted and would like to see an urgent Security Council meeting, and is it correct that the Soviet Union doesn't want it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't believe either of those formulations is a precise statement.

QUESTION: How would you answer it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: By asking me to respond to your formulation of our position would put me in one of two uncomfortable positions. If I were to say yes, I can see the headlines now putting us out front. If I was to say no, then I can see the headlines saying the United States doesn't want a Security Council meeting. There's no way for me to answer that question.

QUESTION: What is the difficulty...

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have already stated what our position is. I said that we cannot be out front at this point. We are supporting the idea of a Security Council meeting. We are working hard at undertaking to encourage it. But we think the initiative has to come as a result of what I think is a wide-spread consensus here in the General Assembly that that's what ought to come. And I do not believe from the reports I get that the Soviets are resisting it. It's when you put adjectives in front of these things that I have trouble with your questions.

QUESTION: Did Gromyko lay down any circumstances, ground rules or conditions under which the Soviet Union would participate in the Security Council action or resolution?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We didn't go beyond what I've already told you.

QUESTION: Did you get in any discussion at all of contingencies should the Gulf be closed to tanker traffic?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We did not.

QUESTION: Then the subject didn't come up? Either from you or --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In our general discussion we stated conditions here in this area of the world in general. We identified the sensitive areas in an overview sort of way, including this one. Obviously, in the two discussions I have had with him, Afghanistan, because of its geography related to the Gulf, is the reason why we're concerned. So that point was repeated and I don't think the repetition necessarily related to this, but obviously it had a connection with the present hostilities.

QUESTION: Actually, what I'm trying to find is whether you attempted to make clear to him the seriousness with which the United States regards keeping open the free navigation.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, yes. Well...

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you reporters ask code questions, too, as well as we give code answers. But obviously this is a sensitive area of the world and was in May in Vienna, not only because there's oil here but because there are sea lanes that carry it to the outside world. That is the geo-political fact in this area. But if what you are trying to get out of me with that question is whether or not we specifically discussed particular threats involved in these hostilities to the Gulf, then no.

QUESTION: Can you describe what you and Prince Sa'ud talked about and why the meeting was moved up? I mean, did they have an obvious concern about the hostilities that are going on? Did he want us to do something or did you want him to do something, or did you just discuss the general state of affairs out there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I assume he came here because there was action here that affects his country. And his previously scheduled visit was scheduled at a time when that action hadn't occurred. But we didn't discuss why he came. I rather understood why, and he rather understood that he didn't have to explain. But with respect to what we discussed, that's confidential. He asked me to keep it confidential. It is confidential.

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QUESTION: Did the Saudi king today endorse Iraq? Did you two discuss that? The wires are reporting that King Khalid said that Saudi Arabia is fully supportive of Iraq.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Having said that the conversation was confidential, there's no way I could answer your question.

QUESTION: Is there any other way you can verify that for us, Mr. Secretary, outside of this channel?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

QUESTION: Well, maybe we can ask about a New York Times article that says here that most Arabs at the UN favor an Iraqi victory? That's the headline. Do you get that impression?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I find it very misleading to draw my intelligence from newspaper headlines.

QUESTION: No, I'm trying to make it convenient for you to share your intelligence with us.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: And if my intelligence were shareable with the New York Times headlines, it wouldn't be intelligence.

QUESTION: Can I put it another way? Are we concerned that the Arabs are going to get themselves lined up behind Iraq and thereby make it more difficult to resolve the Iraqi-Iranian issue because the potential -- at least Islamic mediators are all lined up behind Iraq -- and is there any hope for some kind of Islamic peacekeeping effort out there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's never useful to assume the worst. People can be for one side or another in a conflict -- and still the conflict is a bad thing in and of itself -- and seek to end it. It's different in a football game. A football game is fun to watch whether you are for one side or the other, but not a war.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what you have talked about with your Western colleagues in connection with assuring the security, the best you can, of the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf and traffic through it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We've shared our perception of the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact, the EC Nine communique clearly identifies their concern and matches our own.

QUESTION: What about doing something about it? I mean, there has been a lot of talk of contingency plans, on consultations on contingencies for defense and international naval forces and the rest. What is there to all this, if anythir ?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are at least three levels of which obviously anyone in a position of responsibility needs to consider a problem of this kind. One, what are the possible options? At that level one considers -- sometimes considers -- ideas that are viable and ideas that are not. It's not particularly useful if one wants constructive, creative dialogue to reveal necessarily the range of ideas that are discussed at that level.

The next level of discussion involves a narrow list of options usually, but on an as-if basis. In other words, I think it's inappropriate and negative to be talking in many cases about possible actions that might be taken in situations which have not yet occurred.

And then finally there's the decision-making level of which circumstances may have evolved to the point where some action is needed. I just really don't think it's useful to speculate on the first two levels.

QUESTION: Can you talk about the TNF business? Is there something more than just that announcement? Is there an agreement on what weapons systems can be discussed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think what will happen, as you know, the U.S. position is that the subject of discussion ought to be long-range theater nuclear missiles. The Soviet position is that we ought to discuss medium-range theater nuclear weapons in organic connection with FBS. I think this announcement indicates that each side will present its view of what the scope of the discussions ought to be.

QUESTION: Has presented it already...

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, will. This is not a substantive discussion.

QUESTION: Was there an occasion at today's meeting where these two well-known positions were restated?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course. It was on that basis that this formulation was agreed to so that it's clearly open to each side to press whatever case it wishes to press. In other words there's no point in trying to achieve a partial agreement in advance as a precondition. The talks wouldn't have started. So what we've said to each other is, look, we can make our arguments after the talks start; and that's what will happen. What progress will be made remains to be seen. We both thought it was important to get the talks started, to begin to get the tires gripping, and to see where we go. This is an important agreement in my judgment. I think it identifies the fact that both sides, even at a time of relatively deteriorated relationships, agree on the importance of arms control. That's a very

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important point to make. Just how far we move from this is a question. How this might affect SALT II ratification is a question. And you ought not to forget that both sides in their formulations of the issue that ought to be discussed here have related it in different ways to the ratification of SALT II. So that even if we should reach agreement in this area on limitations on some systems, implementation of that agreement will rest on ratification of SALT II.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a while ago you referred to the possibility that if this conflict in the Persian Gulf continued it might eventually get to the final unthinkable. Looking back on what you learned in the past few days and in your discussion today, do you feel that at least at this point things between the two of us -- the two sides that have the power of this final unthinkable -- are going along about as can be expected at this stage, and do you see a tangible danger rather than a general philosophical danger of this crisis moving toward that kind of a final point?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I do not at this point see any tangible danger. I don't know whether I would want to use that particular phraseology. But your thought I would agree with; that is that we must always worry, especially in this kind of area, that a minor -- this isn't minor -- that a conflict of this kind might escalate to a war. I don't think that's going to happen on the basis of my present perceptions of the attitudes of the member nations and my perception of attitudes of the Soviet Union and ourselves, and on the perception that I gather that all nations see a need for a ceasefire and/or limitation of this war. So I think that at this moment, at this point, I do not see that danger as materializing. If that changes, then we have different --

QUESTION: May I ask a qualifying question, Mr. Secretary? You mentioned the three levels of responsibility. Did you mean suggest that the -- you said that the first two weren't proper subjects for speculation. Do you mean to say that what is operating now in those two levels are not in the third level of decision?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: All we've had in the Gulf up to this point -- and on this I'm not up to speed on the latest intelligence; I may not be -- is, first, that Iran declared the waters within its 12-mile limit a war zone, with the result of a dramatic escalation of insurance rates which itself is an inhibition on shipping. Secondly, the Iranians have gone so far as to hail a couple of ships to ascertain their destination and cargo, seeking presumably to create uncertainty that would inhibit other shipping. Those two actions which are known, if no more, would operate as a restraint on shipping. Obviously that's not sufficient to generate, to trigger a military

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response. So you have to watch what happens. The Iranians may go no further than they have gone. That's what I'm saying. And so we're watching carefully their ability to go beyond that. One ought not to escalate the expectations of what might happen or what the response ought to be, because to indulge in that speculation sometimes has the force of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

QUESTION: Do you mean to leave us with the impression that out of this meeting today there was no kind of agreement by the two of us to work together on any sort of effort to make peace between Iraq and Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: One never knows. By sharing views, sometimes two people follow parallel courses of action without reaching agreement; that is one of the possible benefits of ongoing dialogue. But in the present state of relations between us, reaching explicit agreements involves a lot of it and requires time-consuming discussions that may not be productive, so you do the best you can. But here, at this point, I'm not going to try to prejudge what the Soviet's position is -- or what ours is with respect to whatever actions may or may not be taken by the Security Council. I'm simply indicating that both have started out so far as I know from similar positions. And what particular tactics or means each uses to implement positions taken we'll have to wait to see.

QUESTION: Can I just nail that down in this conversation? Are you ruling out the possibility that the Soviets were behind what is happening, that in fact they were the incitement behind the Iraqis?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no evidence to suggest that they're behind the Iraqis.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: You want to nail that other thing down that I mentioned?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If we nail everything down, there's no basis for another news conference.

QUESTION: There's an Iraqi thing floating around that Bazargan -- that the Iranians, through Bazargan are offering to release the hostages for spare parts...The Iraqis are putting that out. And I wondered if you wanted...I have got John nailing it down, and wanted to know if you wanted to escalate it to a Secretary of State denial? Have you got a message from Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No such message has been received and no answer to a non-message has been given.

QUESTION: On Poland, Mr. Secretary?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I had a meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister today. At this point it's only an outline of the situation in Poland, their economic situation and the things they're trying to do to deal with it. But at this point they expressed appreciation for CCC credits but made no supplementary request at this point. Obviously they are going to do so at some point, when they've got their own plans in place. I indicated we would look on with sympathy to the idea of being of help. Resources are limited as I've been saying publicly now for some time. But it was a very good meeting and I thought he was very clear and forthcoming and practical on what they need to do.

QUESTION: Did he give you any assurance that the accords would be carried out?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We discussed the legislation -- I guess it's been passed now -- the court processes that were being used and the standards that are being applied.

QUESTION: Do you have any reason to believe that the Iraqis decided to launch this whole effort because they felt after Khomeini's letter that we and the Iranians might be on the verge of somehow working something out and that now was a good time to do it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've no reason to believe that.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 2, 1980
No. 271

PC#8

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
UN Plaza
New York, New York
October 2, 1980, 2:30 p.m.

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No. 271
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PRESS CONFERENCE
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THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
U.S. MISSION, UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
October 2, 1980, 2:30 p.m.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Just a few observations: I am completing what has for me been a most valuable nine days of meetings with heads of governments and foreign ministers from countries on every continent. Many of them I have met for the first time. Such meetings have given me valuable insights into their personal and official points of view.

Through larger sessions with the foreign ministers of ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America, I have gained a glimpse of the strength and importance of regional cooperation in each of these areas. The war between Iraq and Iran has been at the forefront of concern in many of these conversations.

My being here was fortuitous in that it enabled us to meet directly with countries of the immediate area. I valued particularly my two meetings with His Highness Prince Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, and my meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and the representatives of Oman. My meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iraq was probably only possible because we both happened to be here in New York.

I regret that I did not have a response from my offer to meet a representative of Iran.

The meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko enabled us to continue our periodic sessions and to advance the talks on theater nuclear forces and arms limitations in Europe. I was able to have a series of meetings with our principle European allies. The various conversations gave me an opportunity not only to reiterate our interest in sound, bilateral relations with each of these countries, but also to stress the continuing interest of the United States in maintaining a firm international stand against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in furthering the process of peace in the Middle East.

I come away from this, my first extensive series of meetings with foreign ministers, impressed by the degree to which the role of the United States is important to each one, even when we

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, among oil analysts, some are saying now that there has been tremendous damage heaped upon Iraq and Iran by their bombing in the oil facilities. They are also suggesting that there is no end in sight perhaps to this war. They are also suggesting that unless Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi come in with maybe 2,000,000 barrels of oil a day in extra production, that in 9 months to a year, the Western allies or the United States could begin to experience shortfalls in oil, higher prices, and greater inflation.

Has the Administration begun to put into effect any kind of plan that would offset or prepare us for the eventuality of oil shortfalls?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Obviously, in a situation of this kind, with all the uncertainties as to the future -- and your question is made up of an exposition of uncertainties -- it is difficult to project what the need for planning would be or what the goal of the planning should be.

I don't have any personal assessment or any assessment made by any authoritative person or body as to the extent of the damage that is being imposed upon the oil facilities of the two combatants, nor do I have any crystal ball as to how long the infliction of damage on each other's facilities will continue. Unless one has answers to those questions and to the additional question of what the production elsewhere in the world is likely to be in this period, it is very difficult to come up with hard and fast answers to questions like that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it was reported by the State Department that in your talks with Foreign Minister Hammadi he brought up the issue of the hostages. There have been reports that he brought it up in the context of Iraqi fears of some potential exchange of the hostages for military equipment. Do you confirm or deny that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Do I confirm or deny what, that the subject was raised?

QUESTION: The subject was raised. We know that because the State Department said it, but in what context was it raised? Why did the Iraqi raise the subject of the hostages?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They can characterize their concern better than I can. As far as I'm concerned, we have not indulged in speculation as to the basis upon which the hostages might be released. If and when the time comes that we are involved in negotiations on that subject in Iran -- we are not

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involved in negotiations on that subject -- one might speculate on a long list of possible requirements that might be presented by representatives of Iran. I don't think it is useful to do so here or with Mr. Hammadi, and I said the same thing to him.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Iranian Charge characterized the AWACS presence as provocation and a demonstration that this country, the United States, is not really neutral. Today Saudi Arabia is quoted as boosting its production of oil for shipment to the West.

Was there any negotiating going on between those two factors, the presence of the AWACS and the subsequent boost in oil production by Saudi Arabia?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, after this enormous series of bilateral meetings, do you share the view of the President of the 35th Session that this Session might bring a contribution to disarmament and detente?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, that, obviously, is a goal which fits within the Charter of the United Nations, and I would hope that the United Nations might be affected. One is not always reassured by actions taken here, but at least the existence of the institution with that objective always holds out hope, as far as I'm concerned.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Governor Reagan has been very precise about what he is prepared to do were he in power, concerning the Islamic nations' attempt to expel Israel from the United Nations. What precisely are you prepared to recommend? A veto, if such an attempt is made?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, when one is out of power, it is easy to be precise; when one is in power, one must consider not only public, but private, initiatives that one might take to avoid that result. We are just as strong in our conviction that Israel has a right to be a member of this body as Mr. Reagan is.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your talks with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, was there any progress made for the reintegration of Greece into NATO? Are the prospects now better than they were before your talks with the two Foreign Ministers?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Those discussions and negotiations are going on within the military structure of NATO. I am not a party to those negotiations, nor would it be appropriate for me to try to characterize them. As a matter of fact, I have deliberately stayed uninformed as to the details so that there be no question that what the issue involves a military question rather than a political one.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union has been asking that no country interfere in the Iraqi-Iranian crisis. Would you be able to shed some light for us about what deals the Soviet Union might take, what sort of steps might they take, if the war continues or was escalated? What is the USSR's position, in your estimate?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the USSR position, as stated to me by Mr. Gromyko, is consistent with what I perceive its public position to be, and that is to stand off and away from the conflict in a neutral posture. That was his position as stated to me, and as far as I can see, their actions have been consistent with that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you comment please, on reports from Tehran that the Iranian Parliament has formed a commission on the hostages and they are also refusing to address deals with the United States on Israel.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the commission idea was raised, I think, two or three weeks ago. I commented on it at that time as potentially a constructive step forward in that it appears to put in place an institution with authority to recommend, maybe to decide, the Iranian position on returning the hostages.

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QUESTION: What about the composition of that commission? We're told that they're all hardliners.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think it is useful for me to speculate, to try to characterize persons as to views and positions and records. I am not fully informed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your discussions with the foreign ministers, there has been a lot of talk about the United States being weak. Do you get that perception? Do they have that perception of the United States? Do they still believe that we are a world power?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I can't recall anyone raising any question about that.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do they have any fears that we are not maintaining our position as a world power, as a voice of democracy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. They expressed no such fears. I must say that I had no difficulty in arranging meetings with all those who came to meet with me; indeed, we were not able to fit in all those who wished. So I do not detect in their attitude for the prospects of meeting with the United States Secretary of State any lack of interest in our influence or power. As a matter of fact, from time to time I got the notion that they exaggerate our ability to influence the actions of other nations and especially to deal with the internal affairs of other nations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, sir, there have been rather interesting changes in the text of the address by President Zia of Pakistan, between the prepared text and the delivered text, particularly in relation to the remarks concerning the Soviet Union. Have you been made aware of these changes? Have you made any inquiries why they introduced these changes, and how do you assess these changes?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The ever-helpful press has brought those changes to my attention.

QUESTION: Since the President goes to Washington tomorrow, do you feel that there is any connection between that visit and the changes?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it is better to try to make that determination after we have met with President Zia and his

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representatives than to speculate about it before I meet with them. He should be the best authority.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are we any closer to having a meeting with other countries on the problem of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, as President Carter mentioned last week in his messages to other countries? And on the same point, do you think it is more or less likely that you would need some kind of international naval force to keep the Strait open?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the first part of your question, discussions at the technical level and on a contingency basis are under way. With respect to the possibilities of such a contingency arising, they seem to have diminished in the last couple of days, and there has been no interruption of shipping and no apparent effort in this period to interrupt, and, indeed, some evidence of deliberate restraint with respect to that. So it may well be that the risk of that exact contingency arising has diminished.

QUESTION: What about his task force question?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you rule out any military intervention, American military intervention, or American military presence in the Persian Gulf if the Hormuz Strait is blockaded by Iran or if any of the oil countries in the region are bombed by Iranian aircraft?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think I've just answered that question, in effect; the question was directed at the same point.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the United States has a military presence in the Middle East crisis area. Is Turkey expected to contribute to these efforts of the United States with its armed forces or with its bases on its soil?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have heard no such expectations.

QUESTION: You have no expectations.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I said I heard no such expectations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I said I heard no such expectations.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if Iran this afternoon accepted the ceasefire, what would be the next step? Would there be a United Nations peacekeeping force, along that line?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, of course the initiative that has been taken, which triggered the Iraqi proposal of the ceasefire, was taken by the Islamic Conference; and I would expect that the Iranian response might be to that initiative. If so, it could well be that the negotiations still might be taken under the same initiative. That is not inconsistent, of course, with the action taken by the Security Council, but it may well unfold in a parallel way.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Radio Oman reported yesterday that a top-level Soviet military mission had completed several days of conferences with Jordanian leaders and had met directly with the King. Radio Oman went on to say that the meeting was directed towards better bilateral relations between Moscow and Oman and might lead the way towards Soviet munitions being supplied to King Hussein's forces. If that takes place, wouldn't that be a major setback for the United States in that region?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: King Hussein was in the United States recently for similar discussions at some length, and no such developments followed. I think to speculate along the lines of your question, or to suggest that I speculate, would be counter-productive, counter-influential.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your meeting with Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia, how do you describe his country's security needs at the moment?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: My discussions with Prince Saud were on a confidential basis, so I feel that you would have to put that question to him if you have an opportune time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you in any way, or has the United States Government in any way asked the Saudis and Abu Dhabi to increase their oil production to the West?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. Obviously, the question would occur to them as it has to us, and this is evidently in the public press. There have been no direct discussions.

QUESTION: Were you informed that the Saudis were going to increase the oil, or is there any other confirmation of that report which, as far as I can tell, just comes from the Japanese news stories?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: That is a question to be put to the Saudis. It is their decision, not mine, and I'm not in a position to answer.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did the last event show that the opening of negotiations, among other things and energy, are even more important after your bilateral meeting? Is there any chance that the United States would change its position toward global negotiations?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to global negotiations, I, myself, discussed that in my speech to the General Assembly, and I refer you to that for a complete answer. May I say that we are interested in contributing to a constructive resolution of the issues raised in that debate. But we are also rather concerned that the integrity of the specialized agencies be preserved. We think it ought to be possible to achieve both objectives.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, suppose Iran releases the hostages very soon. Is the United States ready to negotiate supplying Iran with spare parts and ammunition for the fighters and the American-made machine guns, or whatever?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no way of knowing what may be on the Iranian agenda for negotiations dealing with the release of the hostages. I have not found it useful in the last four months to try to speculate about such agenda items publicly and I see no reason to change that position now.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you meet the foreign minister of Poland?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I did not. *

QUESTION: Was there a reason why it did not take place? Was there no request from the Polish, or no request from you?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have met with the representatives of Poland in Washington before I came to New York. This isn't the only place the Secretary of State meets with representatives of other countries. It may just seem that way this week.

* The Secretary corrected this, stating that he did, in fact, meet with the Foreign Minister of Poland during his New York visit.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with the way that the Security Council has proceeded on the Mid East war question? Do you think that it looks as though they've got any handle on it at all?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Do you mean the Iraqi-Iranian war?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There has been a lot of discussion. Members have not been inactive. It has been difficult to find a handle in all of the considerations that affect the interests of various members, and they finally chose to pursue an Islamic initiative before the Security Council really acted. It is a difficult one to get a handle on, but I would like to emphasize that the effort over all of those days was constant as members sought a way to get a handle on the problem.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a top-level Iranian diplomat this morning linked the Iraqi plan of what he called "aggression on Iran" with a United States plan to invade Iran. He referred to recent articles that were banned by the Carter Administration, including Jack Anderson's article, about an American plan to invade Iran. He says that, indeed, that plan of aggression by Iraq against Iran is linked generally to the American plan of aggression of invading Iran. And, therefore, he said that the United States is involved in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. What is your comment on that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, that I couldn't detect much logic in your question. And, number two, I would say that the United States does not have, has not had, and will not have any intention of invading Iran. Our concern is the release of the hostages. We respect the right of the Iranian people to establish their Islamic Republic. We recognize the fact that they have done so, and we are perfectly willing to discuss our future relationships on any basis that they wish.

So all of those reports are false. There is absolutely no substance to any accusation that we were involved in collusion with Iraq in connection with this current fighting. There never has been; no basis for it; and, as a matter of fact, there is a lot of basis for the opposite conclusion.

QUESTION: When you met Mr. Gromyko, did you discuss Poland?

QUESTION: Did you receive any response from the Iranian --

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: May I answer his question?

QUESTION: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, we did not. May I say that with respect to the talks with Mr. Gromyko, we did not cover all of the items in an informal way that we had indicated that it would be desirable for us to discuss. Time did run out on us. The fact that Poland was not discussed did not reflect a lack of interest on both sides in discussing it.

QUESTION: I am sorry for not hearing the question, sir. That's why I asked. Second, did you receive any answer from Iran for your offer to give them equal time like you gave the Iraqis to hear their position in the Iranian-Iraqi crisis?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: As I said in my opening comments this afternoon, I have not heard.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, through any intermediaries have you been in touch with Iran and received any assurances that they will not move to try and attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have had no contact with Iran. As I say, I made observations earlier of the fact that there has been no attempt by Iran to block that shipping or to harass the shipping. The closest they came to it was to hail one or two ships to determine their cargo and destination, and that was several days ago. So I have no evidence to indicate that they intend to try to interrupt those shipping lanes.

MR. TRATTNER: One final question.

QUESTION: Do you have intention to meet with Mr. Gromyko before he leaves? Is there any specific date for another meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. There is no specific date, but we did agree that these meetings from time to time could be useful, and that the two we have had were useful. We have only one agreement out of it at this point, but at least I think we used the time frankly and even bluntly with each other to explain our respective points of view on the issues which have created problems for us.

(The press conference concluded at 2:47 p.m.)

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Now, there seems to be a misunderstanding among members of the press as to the character of the foreign policy decisionmaking in the Executive Branch. We are not all of the same opinion about particular issues. If we were, there would only be a need for one of us -- not for several of us.

Now there are several agencies which have foreign policy implications: The Department of Defense, National Security Council, State Department, Department of Commerce, Treasury Department -- there are many of them.

It is the role of the National Security Council to serve as a coordinating agency, which gives the National Security Advisor an influence on foreign policy across the board, and one has to understand that when one is involved in the process.

The President is a man who likes to be challenged by ideas and differences of opinion, and I can assure you that he is challenged and he makes up his own mind. The Constitution makes him "the" foreign policymaker. I have found myself comfortable in that role. I have found myself given every opportunity to express my views, and I have found the President supportive when he thought I was right. He often seeks to balance views. So it's a living kind of process into which many people have an input, and my role is no less than the President said it would be. I like to work with him, I find him knowledgeable and I find him prudent and careful but I find him tough.

He makes up his own mind about what course this nation ought to follow, and I like people like that. I like leadership like that. So he has my support now, as he did then; and as I said a few moments ago, I am willing to serve as long as he wants me to.

QUESTION: I am Janet Morris from WMC TV.

About the relocation of Cuban refugees in Puerto Rico, I understand that they don't want the refugees there. They have filed suit in a hearing today in Federal Court about it.

Where would those refugees come -- If there's any chance -- where would the relief come as far as overcrowding refugees here? Do you have any idea?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't know of any plans to bring them here.

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QUESTION: No, but what I mean is is this to relocate refugees from this country to Puerto Rico?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, what we are trying to do is to consolidate the refugee centers and also to disperse them as widely as possible so that the burden doesn't fall too heavily on one community or on one state -- which I think is reasonable. We must find someplace for them.

It's a burden, I suppose, for any place if that is the way they perceive it in the first instance. But you know, I am an immigrant. My father, in a sense, was a refugee and he found a place in this country for himself -- and for me -- and I think it is in this spirit that Americans generally, I think, will recognize that although there are practical problems in receiving and resettling these refugees, doing so is in the American tradition. I think we have to share the burden and share the load, and that is what we are trying to do in locating these resettlement centers.

May I point out also that it is not simply an American responsibility. It is an international responsibility. There are some 15 million refugees around this planet and we are not bearing the total load of that responsibility. But somebody is and the international community is responding and must continue to respond. These people are fleeing repression, they are fleeing hunger, they are fleeing all sorts of conditions that cause people to leave their homes and their nations ever since the world began. That's why 40 million Europeans came to this country, including my father and others at the turn of the century -- fleeing oppression, fleeing lack of opportunity and so on -- and they continue to do so and we must find a way.

Our means are not unlimited and we cannot ask intolerable burdens of our people in dealing with the problem. But surely we can find a way to deal with it.

The wave of Cuban refugees was unexpected. It was the result of a deliberate decision on the part of Cuba, and as a result it suddenly hit one state with a flood of people. We have resettled 105,000 out of some 120,000 who came; but there are still some for whom, because they lack the skills to fit into our job market or because they can't speak English or have other limitations, it has been more difficult to find places to resettle. But it's the kind of job that Americans have found possible to do over the years.

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QUESTION: Claudia Barr of WHBQ TV. Sir, when it was first announced that we were going to -- that we were having a situation because of the Iranian and Iraqi war -- can you tell us anything more about that now or whether what we are hearing in the national press is --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, it seems to have settled down into a more prolonged kind of struggle than was originally anticipated -- certainly longer than was anticipated by the President of Iraq. The Iranians have found a capability for resisting and sustaining that resistance that many people did not credit them with. So it looks as though we have got a longer struggle ahead of us there than we expected.

Secondly, the risks for a widening war, beyond the territory of the two combatants, do not seem to be as high as they were a week or two ago. But we must never overlook the possibility that that may happen, that the war could spread to Iran's neighbors, or to Iraq's neighbors. Then we would truly have an explosive possibility, for the obvious reason that the Western world's pipeline goes through the area.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Joey Ladford, UPI.

How much of an influence did the Americans, did the United States, have in the Saudi decision to up production of oil?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, we are happy to see that happen. But I think in all candor it was a Saudi initiative, from my perspective.

They are really pretty responsible about their use of this resource. They understand that the rate of production, as well as the price of oil, affects their own economy as well as that of the consuming nations of the world, and they seek to use it in ways that will contribute to a stable supply and a stable price. I think that is what their motivation is in this situation.

They recognize that this war in that area creates high risks for them and their resource and that this resource is a means for them to contribute to stability which is in their interest as well as ours.

QUESTION: Sir, if I could go back to my original question, how would you describe your relationship with Mr. Brzezinski? Would you say that it was strained like it was under your predecessor?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is no strain at all in our personal relationship. We are both Poles, you know -- we are not poles apart. (Laughter.)

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We get along fine on a personal basis and you know he has a background in foreign policy. He is a very energetic, idea man and the President likes to be exposed to that kind of thinking. He has a different slant on things than I do, from time to time, but our differences of opinion are discussed and debated in a civilized way. Sometimes I win, sometimes I persuade him and sometimes he persuades me. That's his job, really, as coordinator.

The differences of opinion are not the result of personal strains in the relationship. They tend to be made to look that way in the media for obvious reasons -- you people enjoy a fight more than you do a debate -- so it has been made into a personal kind of thing. But it isn't as far as I am concerned. I can't speak for what it was with Mr. Vance and Mr. Brzezinski.

But to say that our personal relations are cordial -- and they are -- is not to say that we always agree. And the fact that we don't always agree doesn't generate any bitterness on his part or on mine -- and it certainly doesn't generate any bitterness toward the President. We are both doing our respective jobs as best we can, as the President wants us to do, and I find that his decisions often are a balance of the two points of view: mine and Mr. Brzezinski. Often Mr. Brzezinski and I agree more often than perhaps the press believes.

QUESTION: Do you think that that is the best way to handle foreign affairs in the United States -- two separate advisers to the President having authority? Or shouldn't the Secretary of State have the total authority?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, foreign policy advice comes to the President from many sources. The President's foreign policy breakfast every Friday morning is made up of anywhere from six to eight people depending upon the particular issues we expect to deal with that morning and depending upon the inputs from the various areas concerned.

If the International Bank happens to be involved in the problem that comes to our attention then the Secretary of the Treasury may well be present. The President's General Counsel may be present. Or the Vice President may be present. The Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State are usually present.

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So there are a number of people, depending upon the issue and the problems, who may be gathered with the President on Friday morning to discuss foreign policy issues.

Now with respect to the National Security Council, that was created in the late '40s, I believe, because during the war the Defense Department had grown enormously into a world-wide organization because of the nature of the war. And with obvious foreign policy implications, sometimes running at odds with the State Department, the NSC was created. I am told -- I was just coming out of the war at that point but -- I am told the NSC was created for the purpose of coordinating foreign policy. And that is still a very important part of its role.

Well, it's understandable, since the National Security Advisor is in the White House, that if the President wants a quick perspective on a foreign policy problem that crosses his desk, or some background in the course of the day, for him to turn to his National Security Advisor who obviously has a lot of background in foreign policy. That has been happening for thirty years.

The job began to grow to its present dimensions, I am told, when George Bundy served as National Security Advisor to President Kennedy. Then it grew under Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kissinger expanded it to its present dimensions -- and then Mr. Brzezinski.

But I have found with this President that it doesn't matter what seat you are holding. What he is interested in is what your advice is and how useful it is in dealing with a particular problem.

But to form a role of the role of the State Department as the foreign policy department -- with 10,000 people spread all over this planet in consular offices and embassies all around the planet -- that is the source of the President's foreign policy information. The source of information as to what problems are arising at any part of the globe on a 24-hour basis is the State Department, and it's the State Department analysts and it's the Secretary of State who are his channel of information and channel of analysis with bodies.

That is not to say that he doesn't consult Mr. Brzezinski, because obviously, he does.

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QUESTION: Sir, would you say that earlier -- I believe it was when some new weapons policy -- when that mention of that new nuclear weapons policy was released by Mr. Brzezinski.

And the press, as you said, reported that you acted rather violently against it -- you didn't know that they were going to move ahead and release the information on the nuclear weapons policy. And I believe that was when, more recently, you had -- they seemed to say that you had a violent reaction to Mr. Brzezinski's revealing that information. Was that much ado about nothing?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You see your very question reveals that the press did not tell you the story accurately.

I did not react in any way that could be described as violent, or even angry. I remember the incident very clearly.

I was traveling, I think, to the West Coast on an Air Force plane and the story had come out that morning, which was written by a reporter named Burt of the New York Times revealing that the PD 59 was about to be released, involving strategic nuclear policy. And I was asked whether I had been informed of it.

I'll tell you, my answer was: "No." Now is that a violent word?

QUESTION: Was that all you had to say about it at the time?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's all I had to say about it at the time.

QUESTION: I see.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Now since that time, the whole sequence of events has been described, and I have testified with Harold Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the development of the PD 59.

And it was not the intention to exclude the Secretary of State, Mr. Vance or myself, but the development of PD 59, which was a document codifying the strategic nuclear policy which had previously been agreed to with the involvement of the State Department -- that was supposed to have been

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taken up with Mr. Vance and then with me at the time that Mr. Vance left the Department and I came into the Department, so our involvement sort of fell through the cracks.

I came in, and immediately I was off to Europe with the NATO Defense Ministers, then at the Austrian State Ceremony when I met with Mr. Gromyko, and then the Venice Summit, and the ASEAN Ministers Conference in Indochina. In that period when I would otherwise have been consulted about the PD 59, it sort of fell through the cracks.

Now I have been assured that it is not the policy to ignore the State Department. The President personally assured me that the Secretary of State, obviously, should be involved in such decisions involving strategic nuclear policy.

So the whole thing has been perfectly explained.

But when I was asked whether I had been involved, I had to give the honest answer -- which was, no. It came as a complete surprise to me, but my reaction was not violent.

Of course there are people who say, that I have only to look at somebody to look violent -- but I am not sure that is so. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Linda Page of WMPS. Mr. Secretary, the hostages have been in Iran for nearly a year. What is going on now? Is the Administration just kind of waiting to see what this Iranian-Iraqi thing is going to do?

Are there any plans in the works?

Are we talking to them more, are we talking to them less?

What is being done?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, we are not waiting for anything. We haven't waited for a year. We have been trying through indirect and direct means -- increasingly direct means when the opportunity arises -- to influence the gradually evolving Iranian leadership and political institutions to come to grips with the issue and to make a decision with respect to this.

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We were hoping that as their political institutions form, as they had been, that someone with authority would finally be created who could come to grips with the issue.

As the Parliament has been put in place, we have tried more and more directly to get into touch directly with the emerging leaders.

When the Prime Minister was selected, for example, I wrote him directly. He read my letter publicly, and we had some reason to believe we would get a formal, written response in due course.

Members of Congress have written to the Speaker of the Majlis, the Parliament.

The hostage families have communicated on a compassionate basis.

In addition to that, we have communicated through the Swiss Embassy, which protects our interests there in Iran in the absence of our own Embassy.

We have communicated indirectly through friends from many countries -- some of them official and some of them unofficial -- who had any possible access to people with influence in Iran.

The whole objective was designed to make increasingly clear to the Iranians that the hostage crisis was a problem to them and not an opportunity. And increasingly, they seem to be aware of that.

Until this war struck, we thought that they were beginning to move toward a position in the Majlis where they would take it up.

Well, they have continued, they have named a commission specifically charged to examine the question and to make recommendations to the Majlis, and they did this after the war began, so conceivably they may continue to debate it and discuss it and in due course respond to my letter.

Or if they prefer not to deal with our government directly, they might deal with the Congressional letters. They seem to think the Congress isn't part of our government -- I don't know why.

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Or they might simply broadcast through the public media their terms, the basis for negotiation, or whatever.

But increasingly for the last couple of months or more, all of them have been saying -- the hardliners, the moderates, the clerics and others -- that the Parliament is now charged with dealing with the hostage question, and will. We had thought that they were beginning to move toward that, so that we could at least begin to know on what basis we might be able to talk.

Whether the war has delayed that, we will know in due course.

QUESTION: Before we leave the hostage situation I would like your reaction to this:

Maybe about a month ago Democratic Presidential (inaudible) and he said that he felt the Ayatolla Khomeini didn't like President Carter, to put it mildly -- in other words, this is what was holding up the release of the hostages.

Do you think that is the case? Do you think it's a personal situation, the way the Ayatollah Khomeini feels about President Carter?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no way of knowing.

We may be as uninformed as to his motives as the press seems to be about my attitude toward my job.
(Laughter.)

I mean, it's just not productive, I don't think, to try to speculate out loud about the motives of Khomeini or others. We don't know. There is no way of reading their minds. If you were to try to read his mind you would have to try to read his mind about Mr. Carter, about Mr. Regan, about Mr. Anderson -- because after all, one of those three might be the person he has to deal with. So I think that is unproductive.

I think that even those who are using the hardest rhetoric publicly against us are considering how to get this crisis behind them.

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They are obviously far more isolated from the world and they surely must feel isolated in the course of this war. And they would resent my saying that.

But nevertheless, by their own account the sanctions we have imposed have added 25 percent to the cost of things which they import when they can get them.

They see sentiment in the area turning against them and toward Iraq, for whatever reason.

They find problems in replenishing their military supply and equipment and maintenance. So even in war, they must feel the isolation that this crisis has visited upon them. We believe now, and we think time will support this belief, that in due course they will decide that their own interests are better served to get this hostage crisis behind them.

And when they do, and when they find somebody in a position to make that decision and not lose his job doing so, they will make that decision; and we will know what the terms are and we can negotiate those terms perhaps and finally reach that objective we have all been agonizing about for almost a year.

QUESTION: In light of that, though, do you think because of the economic penalties being put on Iran by the United States and also the loss of all their oil fields during the war -- do you think that that Government can withstand? Or do you foresee a revolution there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They have withstood a great deal. They are people motivated by religious fervor -- a belief that they are doing something ordained from on high -- and when people have that kind of motivation they can withstand a great deal.

Already, they have done much better in this war in sustaining their effort than a lot of outside observers and impartial observers thought them capable of doing.

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QUESTION: What were you doing in Memphis when you said that you got the call here earlier, to serve President -- to serve as Secreary of State?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I came here, as I recall, to speak to a water conference of some kind -- water pollution conference.

QUESTION: A water pollution conference?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes.

QUESTION: Was that in last Spring -- or was that in May?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It was in May.

QUESTION: Thank you.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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October 6, 1980

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

OCTOBER 6, 1980

For further information contact:

8315587330

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD'S REFUGEES

I

I want to talk today about refugees: about the new tidal wave of refugees that is sweeping across the world, impelled by war, famine and by ruthless suppressions of the human spirit.

That wave of refugees has especially touched America -- for our nation, as an historic haven of refuge, has traditionally been a beacon for the homeless and persecuted. But today, the influx of refugees to the United States has become so heavy and constant that we face serious questions of refugee policy: questions that challenge both heart and head. These questions concern you -- because you have, to your eternal credit, chosen to play a leading role in helping refugees.

II.

Very accurately, and very sadly, ours can be called an era of refugees.

In recent years, more than 15 million people worldwide have fled their homes as refugees -- of war, civil unrest, persecution and hunger.

Roughly six million are victims of war in Indochina -- boat people from Vietnam and refugees from war-ravaged Kampuchea.

More than one million Afghan refugees are estimated to be in Pakistan, their numbers swelled by the Soviet aggression against that country.

In Africa, the refugee population exceeds three million; the figure for the Middle East is roughly two million.

And closest to home, we find that more than one million people in the western hemisphere have left their homes in recent years in search of asylum from strife or oppression.

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Of all the world's people, these may be the most pitiable. For these migrant millions -- most of them women and children -- are cruelly cut off from home and country, their families often divided or destroyed.

It has become commonplace, when discussing immigrants or refugees, to cite the words of Emma Lazarus carved on the base of the Statue of Liberty:

"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me;
I lift my lamp beside the golden door."

However commonplace they may have become, these words describe precisely the refugees of today. These helpless people are quite literally tired and poor; quite literally huddled -- in crowded camps and holding centers around the world; quite literally wretched, quite literally homeless. And in the case of the boat people of Indochina and Cuba, they have been quite literally tempest-tossed -- in rotting junks and leaking boats: vessels both of hope and of despair.

In a few cases, the sojourns of refugees have ended with their return home. The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict this year, for example, made it possible for nearly 200,000 refugees to return home. And in our own hemisphere, a similar number of Nicaraguans returned home when the civil war there came to an end. But such reconciliations are all too rare.

More typically, the odyssey of a refugee is painful and protracted. And the impact of large refugee migrations on the world community and on individual countries is tremendous.

- o Last year, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees collected more than \$343 million for refugee relief and resettlement. The great bulk of these funds came from the industrial democracies of the West and Japan; the United States alone contributed more than \$90 million. Yet these funds are inadequate to the task at hand.
- o Countries of first asylum like Thailand, Pakistan and Somalia, are increasingly hard-put to stretch their resources to accommodate refugees.

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- o Today, as large refugee populations swamp the inadequate machinery for dealing with them, more than a million refugees worldwide languish in camps and holding centers. They live under conditions that range from desperate to barely adequate.

And the United States especially has felt the impact of these recent refugee waves.

- o In the past five years, our nation has received more than 600,000 refugees for resettlement -- a number that dwarfs the figure for any other country.
- o This year alone, we have received some 125,000 unexpected Cuban entrants in a swift and sudden influx between May and September.

Let me say here that the role of institutions like the American Lutheran Church in this effort is not simply worthwhile -- it is crucial. In the past few years your church and its individual congregations have sponsored more than 35,000 refugees for resettlement. No one can compile statistics to quantify the endless compassion, the numberless acts of love and generosity that mark this effort; they are beyond all counting. It is part of my purpose today to thank you personally -- you, and all those like you across America who have done this service to your nation and to these people in need.

I also want to thank the citizens of Minnesota and the six Midwestern states who have extended their hospitality, their patience and their resources to settle thousands of refugees over the past few years.

III.

The practical burdens of helping refugees establish new lives in the United States are, as you know, enormous.

The sheer numbers of recent years, and the unpredictability of recent refugee waves, have made careful planning difficult. They have given our national refugee programs an air of permanent emergency.

The arrival of unorganized boat flotillas from Cuba over a short span of weeks last spring made it necessary, for example, to press widely scattered military reservations into sudden service as receiving centers.

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Our social service programs -- national, state, and local -- have been hard pressed by this sudden surge of refugees. In the fiscal year which ended last month, the Department of Health and Human Services devoted more than \$600 million to refugee activities -- \$36 million of which had to be requested in emergency supplemental legislation.

And the state and local social-service machinery of Florida -- to name the most affected state -- has been severely tested by the influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants.

You who have served in refugee sponsorship programs know the challenge of finding jobs in stressful economic times for refugees who may not speak English and whose skills may not be readily transferable to our job market.

Perhaps because of such problems, public opinion is not always receptive to large waves of refugees and immigrants. This was true earlier in this century, and it is true today: For all too many of our citizens, the first impulse upon facing such problems is to pull up the bridge and lock the gates. I was disturbed, for example, to read the results of a recent poll, mentioned in the current issue of Foreign Affairs: It showed only 19 percent of respondents in favor of increasing the number of refugees received by the United States; 80 percent favored actually reducing the number of legal immigrants who can enter our country each year.

I find it easy to understand such frustration. But we must keep in mind that this question of refugees is one whose moral dimension is as compelling as its practical aspect. It is a question which penetrates to the heart of our history as a nation of immigrants -- and to the heart of our purpose as a nation which cherishes and upholds human rights.

We are a nation of immigrants and and their sons and daughters: No nation with such a history can turn its back on its own traditions without losing something of its soul.

And no nation which sees itself as a champion of human rights can keep its credibility unless it is willing to welcome -- in the name of human rights -- those who have been oppressed and persecuted.

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For these reasons, I would argue that the difficulties we have encountered in receiving and resettling refugees are difficulties we must face and overcome -- without reversing our long tradition of hospitality to refugees.

I would argue also what is apparent in our national life: that we are richer, stronger, more talented and vibrant as a society because we welcome refugees and immigrants.

Earlier waves of refugees and immigrants brought figures like Einstein and Toscanini, with their great gifts, to America. I have no doubt that recent arrivals, like the Indochinese and the Cubans, will make similar contributions -- contributions that will richly justify our nation's generosity.

IV.

To agree that we should be open and generous, however, is not to say that the United States can accept -- or should accept -- unlimited numbers of refugees and immigrants, or bear unlimited burdens.

In fact, we cannot. And one of the most serious national debates of the next few years will be about refugee and immigration policy. What limits should we set, and how? What shall we do about the problem of massive unlawful entry into the United States? How can we balance our traditions of openness with practical limits -- and how can we enforce these limits fairly and equitably? How can we assure that our refugee and immigration policies are free of the taint of racial bias -- and equitable to people of all origins?

Finding answers to such questions will not be easy. But I have no doubt that our nation, which is both generous and practical, can find answers -- and devise laws -- which bring into balance our ideals, our interests and our capabilities. A National Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, chaired by Father Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame University, is working toward this end.

Meanwhile, our government is working overtime to deal with refugee problems at home and abroad:

- o We have worked closely with state and local governments, as well as private voluntary organizations, to minimize the disruption to communities and to the lives of the refugees themselves. I am proud that we have successfully resettled from temporary camps some 105,000 of the nearly 125,000 Cubans who have fled to the U.S. since April.

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- o We are working to prevent heavy concentrations of refugees in already hard-pressed communities. To this end, the Federal government has established refugee receiving centers at widely dispersed locations over the country, so that no one state or community need bear too heavy a burden.
- o The Department of Health and Human Services and its Office of Refugee Resettlement have launched a massive effort to help states and communities with the costs of resettling refugees. In this fiscal year, for example, the Department has channeled more than \$20 million to the state of Minnesota for cash assistance, medical care and social services to refugee families. And the six Midwestern states of this region -- Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and Indiana -- have received \$52 million in Federal assistance for refugee programs. This is a national challenge to which the nation's government is responding.
- o More needs to be done, however, to help areas which have borne the brunt of refugee emergencies. For that reason, the Administration has supported the Stone-Fascell proposal before the Congress to reimburse states and communities for up to 100 percent of the cost of their refugee relief efforts.
- o Diplomatically, through the United Nations and elsewhere, we continue to stress the need for broad international efforts to deal with refugee problems. We have stressed as well the responsibility of all nations to help in the search for long-term solutions to the political problems which lie behind the global refugee crisis.
- o Here I would also mention the importance of strong and generous foreign assistance efforts. Especially in Africa and Latin America, our efforts to help solve human problems and build strong economies can help alleviate the conditions which create refugees. We can either export more of our assistance -- or import more refugees.

Which brings me to my final point. Ultimately, we -- and the world -- can deal with the human tragedy of refugee migrations only by removing their root causes: by overcoming poverty, by ending abuses of human rights within nations, by resisting military aggression and by building peace among nations.

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We are a long way from having a world that is so just, so humane, so prosperous and stable that no person is forced to flee from home and country. But surely the effort to build such a world deserves your contribution and mine -- and deserves the work of all people who cherish human dignity and the sanctity of human life.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 11, 1980
No. 273A



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
AFTER THE SPEECH
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE --
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE
THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF MEMPHIS
AND
MEMPHIS IN MAY INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL, INC.
Memphis, Tennessee
October 10, 1980

QUESTION: I have a question grew out of a news conference that you held back in June. You indicated that one of your greatest concerns was the lack of passage for the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill, and you indicated that you felt this was a significant alternative to increased defense spending.

I would like to know what the current status is of many of the problems that you brought up at that time in terms of Nicaragua, the Cambodian refugees, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, Disaster Relief etc -- have those been dealt with, or is that still a real problem?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you have touched upon one of my favorite subjects and objectives. Let me cite two rather current situations in which America could use its resources in the pursuit of our own national interest and stability in the world: One is Zimbabwe and the second is Poland.

In Zimbabwe we have seen years of war converted into peace and the responsibility for maintaining that peace placed in the hands of a government which, a few months ago might have been regarded as extreme, but which has proven in practice to be moderate. But the challenge of this government is to justify its policies of moderation with its success or failure in dealing with the needs of the people of a war-ravaged country, for economic development and opportunity.

Zimbabwe is a country of great resources; but the infrastructure has been largely destroyed and so investment is needed -- capital from the world's private sector and also government. The unfortunate fact is that in terms of our budget for foreign assistance, the resources which we

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have available to be of assistance are largely in the form of a prayer at the present time. If we could help make the Zimbabwe experience work, we might then be able to move on to convert the South Africa problem into one of peaceful change for justice and equality.

The Libya problem: The whole southern area of Africa could be converted peacefully rather than in a violent, revolutionary way, but the importance of the investment should be clear.

Poland: I suppose most Americans have cheered at the courage and the persistence and the willingness to take risks on the part of the Polish workers in seeking to change their system sufficiently to give them a voice and an influence. The government is struggling with enormous economic problems, and whether or not they are dealt with effectively could well make the difference in the struggle of the Polish workers for a greater measure of freedom and influence over their own lives or slipping back into the period from which they have tried to emerge.

There are examples of this all over the world. I see them as doors of opportunity, opportunity to help influence the course of human events in those areas, those countries and others, toward the kind of world that measures up to the American view of what brings stability and peace to a people.

If you were to sit in my seat in the State Department on a day-to-day basis you would be as frustrated as I, at the number of times we have to turn away from similar doors of opportunity. We have not had a Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill since 1979. We have been operating throughout this fiscal year with a continuing resolution which means that we are permitted the amounts that were provided in the '79 appropriation, or the amount requested by the Administration for 1980 -- whichever is the smaller figure.

We never did get a 1980 Appropriations Bill, and there is a question as to whether or not we will get a 1981 Appropriations Bill.

Now the Congress and the American people find it relatively easy to support tens of billions of dollars of increases in defense spending. Some of this, of course, is necessary. But we completely overlook this much cheaper route to bringing stability and order to the world.

I see I have given a little longer answer to that question than others. I will try to avoid similar length; otherwise, very few of you will get a chance to ask questions. But that is one of my favorite cases, and I think the American people have to understand what is at stake.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I understand we still have deployed in Europe roughly 225,000 men in the forward areas as part of the overall NATO force.

My question is: How long will this deployment be required?

Now it's my understanding that the original Bill passed by the Congress in 1951 called initially for a United States SACEUR who would, at the end of five years turn the command over to either a German or a Frenchman, or a Turk or an Italian. And of course I think we have a dynasty of 31 years of American SACEURs and these troops have remained in place for about the same length of time.

Also, the German deployments now are about 490,000 to 500,000 troops.

I think there is a lot of comment, country-wide -- or criticism of that fact at least, to have to continue to maintain those troops in Europe. I wonder if you would comment on that, sir.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the number of troops in Europe is closer to 300,000, and the figure which you mentioned is lower. They are an essential part of our common defense in Europe.

There was a point, which you will recall -- I know you will because your hair is white -- at which there was considerable pressure to withdraw our troops from Europe. Senator Mansfield sponsored an amendment that I think came within one or two votes of passing, one year to that effect.

But then we began to develop a different perception of the Soviet Union, the nature of its threat and the importance of restraint upon the Soviet Union. So our common effort as a NATO Alliance has grown and strengthened in recent years -- especially the last 3½ to 4 years -- so the presence of American troops is now --

I am not sure that it wouldn't be sufficient if they had been at 150,000 to 200,000 at the beginning, and were still at those figures. But to sharply reduce American troops in Europe would be a signal -- not only to our European friends but to the Soviet Union -- that we were becoming less interested, less concerned about defense of Europe than we were. That kind of shift, I think, would have a very negative effect upon our own security interests.

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Now we are undertaking, through the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks to bring about a reduction of both Soviet and Allied troops in Europe -- and that means principally Americans. We have been stalled on a couple of issues that are somewhat technical; and I won't take the time, unless further questions seek the information, to discuss those technical points.

Our view at the moment is that the best chance, due to the tensions in Europe and the risks of war with the Soviet Union in Europe, is to work toward a mutual reduction of forces and not a unilateral reduction of forces by the United States.

And our European Allies have committed themselves, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, to a strengthening and modernizing of our defense, so that it can truly match the Soviet military presence in Europe and establish a stability which will insure deterrence and at least a nonwar climate.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since the first questions set a responsive chord, I would like to give you one to expand on a little bit:

Many citizens in Memphis are concerned for the nearly one-quarter of the world's population that are desperately hungry.

The President's Commission on World Hunger recently brought forward their final report and identified this as a crucial national security issue. They also recommended that the United States place as its primary focus the elimination of hunger in developing nations.

In view of what you said about our great difficulty in providing foreign assistance at this time, I think a situation which places us in a place behind ten or twelve other nations in the world in the percentage of gross national product who are devoted to that aid would be (inaudible)

In view of the Commission's recommendations about the seriousness of the situation do you have some specific proposals, or dreams perhaps, of what you would like to see happen?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are three main objectives that we seek to pursue with our foreign aid programs:

One of them is food. Not only the direct provision of food through the PL 480 Program and other means but also that technical assistance to enable or to help

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countries to develop their own food production and to become self-sufficient. And those programs, the latter ones, have been enormously successful.

India is one of the most successful examples of that. With the so-called "miracle rice" we have enabled India to reach the point where she can provide for her own food needs -- not at our standard of consumption, but at a standard which avoids the kind of starvation that other countries are faced with and she even, from time to time, exports food.

So there are ways that we emphasize in our foreign assistance programs to help countries produce their own food. That is a very important part of it.

The same is true with education. We see education as the way of increasing the ability of these countries to govern themselves.

I was interested in one of my meetings with the foreign ministers -- well, I shouldn't mention a country because I don't want to be too negative in my public comments about them -- but it's a young black country in Africa and the issue I raised with him was this:

We are about to accredit an American Ambassador to his country and our Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate takes the position that if we are going to send an Ambassador to his country, his country ought to accredit an Ambassador to ours.

And do you know what his answer was? They didn't have enough young people, college educated, in order to staff an Embassy in Washington D.C. They were a slave country until they achieved independence, so they do not have the trained personnel in order to provide the leadership, the technical know-how and expertise to govern their domestic agencies and at the same time send trained representatives and competent staff to represent their interests abroad. That is just a little, I think, down-to-earth and moving example of what these emerging countries are struggling with, and we need to be able to help them.

He was not apologizing. He said, "Given the level of your concern and your interest, we will try next year to find somebody and it will be somebody young, recently educated, to send to Washington as our Ambassador." But he said, "If we send somebody as Ambassador, we want to be able to send him sufficient staff to represent our country effectively."

And so you have that kind of situation.

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So food, education, the ability to produce their own food -- these are among the highest objectives of our Foreign Assistance Program.

QUESTION: In your remarks before, you spoke about a world that is changing, and a challenge for peace -- and that calls to mind the United Nations. You know, you spoke of, as I said a challenge and a change, and a peace -- and this calls to my mind the United Nations.

Would you comment, please on what you think, or what you see as the future of the United Nations in the light of their many difficulties in settling international disputes?

And would you comment, please, on what if anything the United States can or should be doing to strengthen the United Nations and to insure that they carry out the mandate in their original Charter?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I will repeat the question. It is worth repeating. I'm not sure the answer will be, but the question is:

The terms of the objectives which I outlined tonight and what do I think about the United Nations and its prospects. What recommendations might I have to change it so that it might more effectively advance the objectives of the United Nations Charter.

Well, the United Nations, to many, has been a disappointment because it has not developed as the peace-making and peacekeeping organization that many hoped it might become. I suspect that the public support in this country for the United Nations is at a low point compared to the high point of our expectations.

But let me say this: The United Nations is a forum -- and perhaps the only forum -- available to many of these small, developing countries to express their frustration, not only about the kind of world in which they find themselves struggling to advance the objectives of economic and political developments of their own peoples but also it's the only place where they can be heard. If the United Nations forum did not exist, where would countries like Belize or some of the other 150-odd countries -- where else would they be heard? Where could their voices be raised? Where could their problems and their frustrations be spelled out?

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Now the diversity in this world, especially on the North-South axis -- the Northern Hemisphere being by and large the industrialized part of the world and the Southern Hemisphere being the developing part of the world -- the issues as between these two hemispheres are now becoming increasingly the focus of attention, not only of the developing countries but of the industrialized North as well.

The United Nations has been engaged this year, in a Special Session just a few weeks ago, in an effort to create what is called "global negotiations" -- i.e. a mechanism within the United Nations framework which makes it possible for the developing nations and the industrialized nations to work out an accommodation of their objectives, which takes into account the limitation of the planet's resources, the desperate circumstances in which so many of the world's people live and ways of accommodating and closing that gap.

The United Nations is beginning now an evolutionary process which may be its most significant development, if we look back on this period ten years from now, because this is at the heart of it.

As I said earlier, in 20 years four of every five persons on this planet will live in those developing countries and if we haven't by that time put in place institutions that will enable them to deal with the human problems of their people, then our own will be in jeopardy.

So the United Nations, although it has been a disappointment in a sense, is on an evolutionary path -- beginning with the high hopes following World War II which never fully materialized for some of the reasons that I outlined as taking place on this planet since then through this period where these emerging nations are beginning to take advantage of this forum, express their concerns and their opinions and their views, and to vote in the United Nations -- often in ways that give us frustrations and run counter to our own objectives -- to perhaps a new era in which a better balance of view, of resources and opportunities will emerge.

Now I am not going to be living in that world. You are, and others are, but that is what we must be pointing toward.

I think of energy, air, water -- all of these, the precious and limited resources, opportunities -- freedom -- all of this is what everybody born on this planet strives for; and I think the United Nations is the only means available to us with all of its shortcomings, you know, to harness our energies and our ideals and move in that direction. So I hope we will stick with it, but I must say, I get frustrated when I see the United Nations doing some of the things it does. But what it is doing is not that much different from our own national Legislature. It doesn't always make sense either. (Laughter and applause.)

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that Israel will never be secure until the Palestinians have a homeland too, why isn't the United States Government working with a large number of Israelis and a large number of Palestinians who have formed a peace movement and are ready to live side by side in peace -- this instead of continuing military support of Israeli settlements which we admit are a deterrent to peace?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I am not sure I accept the assumptions that underlie your question.

What we undertook to do -- and when I say "we" I was not a part of that process, it began in previous Administrations and was continued by President Carter -- is to create a negotiation and a negotiating process in which these opposing sides might find a way to accommodate their conflicting interests.

Now unfortunately that process is opposed by moderate and radical Arab countries, and it is attacked by others.

Interestingly enough, it is the only negotiation that has ever been created in that part of the world with respect to the Israel-Arab conflict since Israel became a state.

It's the only negotiation going in which both Palestinian rights and Israel's security are at the top of the agenda.

It is the only negotiation going which, by its terms in the Camp David Accords, invites all other interested parties to be participants.

The Palestinians are not excluded from this negotiation. They are specifically invited to be part of it, as well as other Arab states in the area -- Jordan and so on.

And so what we are trying to do with the Camp David process is:

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First of all, to work out as much by way of agreement between the three parties to it -- i.e., Egypt, Israel, and the United States -- and to accomplish enough to attract the other parties to it, and at some point to thrash out its provisions for Palestinian rights.

I don't know of any other way to do it. I've had to deal these last five months with United Nations resolutions -- I think eight of them in all -- the aim of which has been to frustrate the Camp David process, if not destroy it, by offering simplistic resolutions which offered no substitutes. I mean, these resolutions are not self-implementing or self-executing; they offered no solutions.

If they succeeded in killing the Camp David process, I don't know who else, or where, another negotiation could be created. And without that kind of a negotiation, I could foresee simply an escalation of the emotions in the conflicts of the Middle East.

You have to begin somewhere. Camp David was such a beginning. That doesn't mean that it's ordained to be successful. It's an uphill struggle, and it may go down to defeat. If it does, somebody is going to face very difficult problems.

As far as the settlements are concerned, this Administration is opposed to the settlements. We have said so clearly and for the reasons that you suggest.

QUESTION: Sir, on behalf of the Egyptian community in Memphis and the Egyptian Students Association, I would like to welcome the Secretary of State Edmund Muskie on his visit here to Memphis.

My question now, really, I believe many people share with me in my confusion about the place of the SALT II Treaty that's signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Does it agree and meet with the interests and security of the United States and the world or not?

If it is wise? It's not approved. And if it is not wise, and we don't say it gladly, we will not approve it.

In such a case we can find some other peaceful alternative rather than this (inaudible) waste.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I am not sure I understood all of your question, but I gather that, First of all, you are confused and you say you are joined by others who are equally confused about the SALT II treaty and whether it's good or bad in terms of our national security interest.

QUESTION: Yes, and what is the fate of this treaty? Is it going to be approved, or not?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: And so the second question is whether or not the treaty is going to be approved or not.

First of all, with respect to the treaty, one must see it as part of the process which began with the SALT I Treaty and is seen as part of a process which will culminate in a SALT III Treaty.

The objective of the entire process is to stabilize the arms race, preferably at some lower level of armament than the two superpowers are now building with respect to nuclear arms.

The SALT II is a complicated treaty, and I can't dispose of it in two or three minutes. But let me give you three or four specific benefits.

It imposes restraints upon the Soviet Union which are important to our national security interests. Number one, it forces them to dismantle, I think 150 or more, systems that are now in place. Number two, it limits the number of warheads that they can place on a given launcher.

Why is that important? Through almost an accident of the decisionmaking process in both countries, the Russians have built much bigger missiles than we and as a result they could place upon their launchers many more warheads than we can on ours -- and it might be the difference between 10 and 30 -- so that without building more launchers, without the restraint of SALT II, they could add warheads. And it's warheads that kill, not launchers.

So by 1985 without a SALT treaty, they could double the number of warheads on their launchers. Now this Treaty limits them to 10 and it limits us to 10. That is a very important restraint.

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Thirdly, this treaty requires, that for the purpose of enabling each side to verify the nuclear weapons of the other side and their development and capabilities, that encryption be limited.

What do I mean by "encryption?" That is, as these missiles are tested on each side, the other side can read the signals that are transmitted back from the missile to their launch points so that the launching country can read its capabilities and performance. These signals can also be picked up by the other side and thus we are able to read when they launch their weapons what performance capabilities they are testing and maybe achieving. And they can do the same with us. Encryption scrambles those signals so the other side can't read them.

This treaty limits and restricts the ability of each side to use encryption with respect to those signals. Thus this treaty protects our ability to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing in developing new weapons and new capabilities in existing weapons -- an important protection for us.

Fourthly, this treaty does not limit any ongoing program that we have under way, so that our programs like MX, Cruise Missiles and the more advanced technologies that we have under way would not be limited.

In fact, this treaty would enable us to improve our capabilities within margins. We are interested only in survivable weapons; we are interested in increasing the lethal nature or character in total of our weapons. So that this treaty has a way of imposing restraints upon the Russians, stabilizing the arms race, and preparing the ground for SALT III and the final negotiations.

I was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and as such I had to study this treaty carefully, and that is the conclusion I reached. I know that other Senators have reached other conclusions; but the point is from my point of view, if we were to reject the SALT II Treaty on the ground that we should have gotten more than we got out of the negotiations for this treaty, we then face the formidable task of going back to the Russians and asking them to give up more than they have already yielded -- but at the same time we retain what we got out of the treaty. Now that is a tough negotiation to try to get, even better two businessmen in this country, let alone between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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Rejection of the treaty, especially in the present climate created following the invasion of Afghanistan, could well mean the end of the SALT process; and the cost to us in terms of an arms race would be horrendous.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to preface my comment -- my question -- by saying that my initial experience in the political process in the U.S. was in your Presidential campaign, nominal as it was, I was in St Louis, Missouri -- I was twelve years old, then. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I hope you are as wise today. (Laughter and applause.)

QUESTION: As I said, I was twelve, and all I did was hand out pamphlets and things, but I have always counted your loss to be ours too, and I just wanted you to know that.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you very much. I am supposed to be nonpolitical now, but I thank you anyway. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: My question has to do with the balance as you see it between our commitment to human rights and our commitment to avoid Soviet expansionism, especially as we find it in Africa.

My specific question would be what the State Department policy would be if the security of South Africa were threatened at the present time, taking into account the possible Soviet interest that might be involved as well as the repressive nature of the present government of South Africa.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't see any conceivable circumstances in which South Africa's security would be threatened, except by her failure to open up her society to her own people.

She is a very self-sufficient nation with tremendous resources. She has developed them and industrialized. And indeed, one of the frustrations of the situation is that the strength of the South African economy is of importance to the Front Line States adjoining, which are all black and which are a part of the movement of black majority rule in the countries north of South Africa. They feel that sanctions on South Africa would hurt them because they are so tied into the South African economy.

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Now South Africa has seen this coming a long time and she is pretty self-sufficient economically. She is well able to defend herself against any foreseeable threats, and I can't see the Soviet Union targeting South Africa as a high priority target from the Soviet's point of view.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, according to newspaper accounts since the taking of our hostages in Iran almost a year ago, in addition to several thousand Iranian students and illegal aliens that have been deported from this country newspaper accounts indicate that some 11,079 Iranian political exiles have been admitted to the United States since that time.

At the same time, the newspaper account indicates that there are an estimated 100 Iranian Jews who have asked for political exile to the United States who are being held in limbo in Paris and in London.

According to this newspaper report, the State Department says that it is not in the interest of the United States and the human rights interest to let them in. It is not part of our national interest as we do not want to offend Khomeini's government.

Well, I wonder how we can allow 11,079 Iranian refugees into the United States but cannot allow these 100 Jewish Iranian refugees in at the same time -- if you would care to comment.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, there are implications in your question, and I don't have the background of that particular figure or an analysis of what went into it.

I find it very difficult to believe that the fact that those Iranians are Jewish is the reason why they are being denied -- if they are in fact being denied -- entrance into the United States.

QUESTION: But this was a published article in the Memphis newspaper and it's very clear.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, occasionally, I have read published articles in newspapers that I knew personally were not accurate. (Laughter and applause.)

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But I will take your question seriously and pursue it and if you will leave your name and address I will personally try to dig into that particular issue and find out what there is to the newspaper story and if it reflects State Department policy accurately, why that policy was adopted.

I will be glad to do that. (Applause.)

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that our government has any real plans to develop credibility in the Arab world, in view of the fact that, well, to them what we seem to be worrying about is Soviet aggression to Afghanistan and what the Arabs are worried about, from their perception, is an Israeli aggression -- and not deferring -- hanging onto these lands taken in the 1967 war, and the annexing of East Jerusalem.

They seem to have no success in extricating the Israelis from the West Bank or doing anything to reconcile the differences between Israel and Palestine.

And I am just wondering, do you think that there is any chance -- since they regard one section is bad enough -- that we could ever count on any support of the Arab world in resisting Soviet expansion?

And perhaps then to Iraq -- Iraq, or Iran.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to our general relations with the moderate Arab states, I think they are in a very healthy state at the present time and I say that following two weeks which I spent at the United Nations, meeting some 47 foreign ministers over that period of time. This is an occasion which American Secretaries of State take to meet, within a short time, the Foreign Ministers of many countries who come for the General Assembly. And I have had the opportunity to talk to the Foreign Ministers and in some cases to Prime Ministers of the moderate Arab states, and some which are not so moderate.

But in any case, their interest in our views, their interest in being supportive, their interest and their concern about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are all at a high level.

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They will all say frankly that they think we ought to be more effective in dealing with the Israeli-Arab issues and all of them except Egypt are pessimistic -- I think that is the accurate word to use -- about the prospects of the Camp David process.

But nevertheless, they support us.

Some of you may have seen Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia on "Face the Nation" Sunday. I had two good talks with Prince Saud, and he represents the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia. There are aspects of our policy that they do criticize and they do criticize some aspects of our Mid-East policies, but nevertheless they have a strong identification with us in many other areas including their very deep concern about the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

If you will just look at your maps again, you will find that Afghanistan is not far removed from Iran as a threat to the Persian Gulf -- and it is the Persian Gulf which is the heart of the oil resources of these moderate Arab states.

So they are very much with us on that policy, and they are frank with us and critical of us with regard to the Palestinian issues.

There is no question -- and I say this as an American as well as Secretary of State -- that a resolution of the Israeli-Arab issues is critical, not only from Israel's point of view and that of the neighbor states but that of the United States as well.

It is a block in some ways to the kind of rallying to our policies that we might otherwise get from nations which are concerned about this. Yes, that is true.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some of us with gray hair can still remember the Kellogg Treaty of the '20s; and its consequences in this country are notably many carriers in Japan as a result of our agreeing not to increase the number of battleships that we had -- and regrettably -- with friends who are dead as a result thereof.

Not that we are opposed to such treaties, but that we find, as I think some of the Senators, your former colleagues, are saying, that we haven't taken proper precautions.

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And I know you have talked about SALT II before this evening, but it bothers us very severely that we aren't taking these precautions to prevent the Russians from spreading into new and novel fields where they can do what they intended to do outside the scope of the treaty. And that really seriously bothers us, those of us who have been through these periods, you see?

And then, not as a second question but just as an observation: How do you drill these young men, or who drills them, or what do you do to them -- these men that are looking after your best interests this evening, so that when you have these very fine-honed jokes that we can't even get a smile out of them?

They look like the British Horse Guards.
(Laughter)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Maybe they have heard my jokes before. (Laughter.)

With respect to your first point, there are two Kellogg Treaties that I remember. My hair isn't quite as white as yours, but I guess that is only something to do with my physical chemistry -- I don't know -- or my inheritance.

But in any case, there was a Kellogg Treaty which undertook to limit naval ships -- and I don't know that that had much to do, one way or another, with the outbreak of World War II, or whether it existed or had not existed.

I think it had as much to do with the outbreak of World War II as the other, Kellogg-Brian Treaty, which undertook to outlaw war. That was signed about 1928 or 1929; and we have had more wars since that time, and more people killed in wars, than in all the previous history of mankind.

So treaties do not necessarily achieve their objectives any more than some of the legislation that we enact.

But nevertheless, we are dealing, in the case of nuclear armaments, with a destructive force that man has never had to deal with before; and to do nothing about restraining that force and to open the door to unlimited competition in developing nuclear technology for weapons -- is simply to doom mankind to a hopeless future.

There are many difficulties involved:

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One, is that the defense requirements of the Soviet Union and the United States are not the same. We don't have a long China border to defend. They do.

Our NATO allies are next door to them. They have no allies except Cuba, which is not comparable, next door to us.

So undertaking to restrain American nuclear weapons that are located in Europe, which they fear are aimed at them just as much as our central systems located in this country, is a difficult negotiating problem and we never did negotiate it. We sort of bypassed it on both sides. Now we are in the middle of it as we have agreed to negotiate those weapons in separate talks at this point.

So the question of weighing the relative benefits or shortcomings of the treaty from our point of view is not an easy judgment to make. But I can say this to you:

Now that the prospects of SALT II are diminished so greatly because of the failure of the Senate to ratify it last year and because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, our military Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly supportive of the treaty because they see the consequences of a world in which there is no SALT treaty. So there is that problem to be concerned about.

In addition, there is the cost of escalation. These weapons cost in the billions of dollars. If we now unleash the scientists on each side -- you know they constantly advance nuclear technology, make it more complicated, more sophisticated -- then the problem of controlling such weapons becomes more complicated and more sophisticated and maybe impossible.

I can remember in 1969 or 1970 making a speech on the Senate floor urging that we not deploy the MIRV. To those who don't know what the MIRV is, it is that launcher which can throw a multiple number of targets and individually target them when they arrive over targets. They are independently targeted warheads, so you can send a launcher with 10 warheads and it could be put on ten different targets, each precisely targeted.

We launched that before the Soviets had developed it. We deployed it before the Soviets had deployed it -- before, indeed, they had tested it and achieved it.

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I urged at the time that we not deploy it, on the grounds that once we deployed it we would never be able to persuade the Russians to do without it and so we would have escalated the arms race to a new level.

And that is what happened. The MIRV has done more to complicate negotiations over arms control than any other single technological advance.

Now if we suspend the SALT process for reasons that I have indicated and permit the technology to go forward, each side is going to go full speed. And if there is no control, we are going to put tens of billions of dollars into nuclear arms -- more sophisticated, more advanced -- so controlling it would be even more difficult.

Now as between the choices, I take the SALT II Treaty.

-- Given the restraints it imposes on the Soviet Union, the relatively less restraint it imposes on us.

-- We can still go forward with the Cruise missiles which we have developed.

-- The Trident submarine which we have developed.

-- We are now working on a new bomber, the Stealth Bomber, which we have developed.

-- We can go forward with all of those things, which may be a bad thing in the long run but at least it does not put us behind the 8-Ball so far as new technology is concerned.

And so you have got to strike that balance. It's a judgment call, and it may not work because frankly, if SALT II were to be ratified, each of us could still destroy the other.

So SALT II is justified:

One, as a restraint.

Secondly, as a step that would lead to the third step, SALT III, which hopefully would reduce the level of nuclear arms and thus reduce the danger. SALT II doesn't really reduce the ability of either side to destroy the other.

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QUESTIONER: Thank you, Mr. Secreary.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Too bad the answers are not more brief.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wish to ask of you if you feel that there is a possibility that the nations of the world will ever come to trust each other so much that they will stop completely the race for armaments; that they will believe in the treaty of the people of the other country; that you feel that you can have a dream that you can build a future world where the people of all the nations can live happily and freely, can live with complete brotherly love, where all the people of the world can grow and develop themselves in complete freedom without being attacked for their personal liberty or their personal beliefs.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I am not sure I understand what you are asking.

QUESTIONER: My question is: Do you feel that we can -- that you can believe that we can build a future world where all the people of the world can live --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Happily together?

QUESTIONER: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, let me make one observation -- the tremendous obstacle that stands between us, where we are, and that world:

There are 15 million refugees in the world today. 15 million are scattered over this globe -- all of them people who have fled their homes and their country for one reason or another:

Oppression, lack of liberty, lack of opportunity, hunger, persecution -- what else?

From Cambodia, to Somalia, to Pakistan, to Latin America, to Africa -- millions of people on the march away from home, away from conditions they find unacceptable.

It's those marching feet that tell us more about the disturbed nature of this planet and the lack of circumstances which human beings find acceptable than anything else I could say. I spell out that as one number. That, to me, is the most dramatic answer to your question.

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If we can find a way to create circumstances all over this planet from which people do not find it necessary to flee, then we may be approaching the ideal state which you describe.

That doesn't mean that all people must live in the kind of style that Americans have gotten used to. Many of them can be happy with much, much less; but they cannot live in circumstances:

-- Where children have hunger.

-- Where the life span is less than 40.

-- Where most people do not get a full meal as much as once a day.

-- Where their children have no better prospects for the future than themselves.

Human beings are not going to accept life at that level. Not only will they flee from it, but there are always those who seek to exploit that dissatisfaction and mobilize them behind violent movements to bring change -- mobilize them behind wrong-headed policies to bring change.

So, it's a very, very challenging task that lies ahead of us.

But on the other hand, my optimism at the age of 66 tells me that we have made enough progress in enough places toward alleviating circumstances like that -- so that if we simply, by our will, add a prayer, use our resources wisely, we can make more progress.

We are not going to achieve it in my lifetime. The great religious leaders didn't in their lifetime, but they left behind them a legacy of ideals and objectives, and practical suggestions for every day living that still work when we practice them -- and I think they can work again.

Well, I didn't intend to end this meeting being a man of the cloth, and I am not.

But let me say that I have thoroughly enjoyed this evening with my good friends from Tennessee. Some people in my part of the country say, "How can you go down South to find anybody who listens to you?" (Laughter.)

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Well, I have found in all my political life that I have felt very much at home in the South, because your people are very much like my people in Maine.

Even the foliage, especially in the mountainous areas, is very much like our foliage in Maine -- so I have always felt at home here, and I feel at home tonight.

And I think you so very much for making me feel welcome.

(Applause)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 11, 1980
No. 273

As Delivered

Address
by
The Honorable Edmund S. Muskie
Secretary of State
before
The Economic Club of Memphis
and
Memphis in May International Festival, Inc.
Memphis, Tennessee

I thank all of my introducers for their generous and warm comments.

You know, it's rather a coincidence that I should be here in Memphis tonight -- which is the city where I was offered my present job. You may be amused by a brief recitation of the circumstances.

That weekend I had been traveling in Arizona and Colorado making political speeches on behalf of colleagues of mine in both Houses of Congress, and I was returning home via St Louis to come to Memphis to make a nonpolitical speech on the subject of water pollution. As I arrived in St Louis on the way, there was a message for me to call the White House, to call the President.

I tried to reach him, and I couldn't get through the White House switchboard. (Laughter.)

So I got back on the plane and arrived here in Memphis, and there was a message at the airport to call the President. And again, I couldn't get through the White House switchboard.

But behind the scenes, Mrs. Muskie was home getting these requests from the White House as to where I was, so that the President could reach me, and before the White House finally reached me she heard the news announcement that evening that Secretary Vance had resigned.

Well, at that moment she had one of her favorite blue plates in her hand -- she was washing the dishes after dinner -- and she said, "Oh, my God!" (Laughter.)

So she knew, or sensed, what the President wanted to talk to me about before I had a chance to talk to him.

For Further Information, contact:

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When he offered me the job, I was silent for a noticeable span of time. So he said, "Are you still there?"

And I said, "Yes."

And he said, "Well, I would like for you to be Secretary of State."

That's an assignment I never contemplated, never expected, and for which I would never have considered myself qualified if I had to be perfectly candid about it.

But I have thoroughly enjoyed it. It's the kind of challenge that ought to appeal to anyone. I had rarely realized before what kind of a job it was. It's a 24-hour job because somewhere on this planet every 24 hours there is somebody dreaming up a problem for the United States Secretary of State. (Laughter.)

We have what is called an Operations Center which controls the cable traffic which flows into the State Department from all our Consular Offices and Embassies and other sources of information around the world -- piling it up for the Secretary's morning reading -- and I get up at 5:00 every morning -- so it's morning reading which never stops all day long. It gives one a perception of this planet and its people that is unusual. It's stimulating.

One knows that there is no way for one man, or one President, or one government to solve all these problems. It's a dynamic process, the unfolding of human life in all the varied circumstances under which human beings have to face life on this planet and from time to time their circumstances create problems for us which we must judge in the context of our own national interests, our values as a people, our ideals and our objectives, in order to make judgments that would helpfully and hopefully influence the course of human events.

Now how anyone could be insensitive to that kind of opportunity I couldn't conceivably imagine. So I am grateful to President Carter for having entrusted this responsibility to me. I thoroughly enjoy it, although "enjoy" isn't quite the word to use for this experience. And I look forward to whatever time is left to me in this responsibility.

Now this meeting tonight is called a town Meeting, the kind of institution with which we are very familiar in my area of New England. I look forward to the exchange out of my own experience with that institution, every bit as questioning and lively as the town meetings I know.

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Before we get to the most interesting part of this meeting, which will be the questions you wish to raise, let me make a few remarks about a basic question before us -- how our nation will deal with the world of rapid change and new challenge.

For more than 200 years America has thrived and prospered, not by recoiling from change in the world, but by working to shape it. We have known that change is the necessary companion of human progress.

We have moved ahead by seeing the world as it is and as it can be, not by looking back to a simpler world we remember.

The beginning of wisdom is understanding -- understanding that we are living today at a time of the most extensive change in human history.

Let me begin by mentioning some of these changes and challenges.

-- The Soviet Union has become, and intends to remain, a military superpower. Soviet use of its military power, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, has created new risks to world peace.

-- In less than half a generation, we have seen the birth of more than 100 new nations. Each is struggling to meet growing, sometimes violent, demands by its people for rapid economic and political progress.

-- Regional rivalries have taken on new danger with the spread of sophisticated weapons and the willingness of the Soviets, the Cubans and others to exploit them.

-- Our domestic economy, to a greater extent than ever before, is part of a global economy. Nations with new economic power are exerting new influence on our daily lives.

-- And while the prosperity of our traditional allies in West Europe and Japan adds tremendously to our collective strength, it also has increased the potential for strains among us.

Some of these new realities are threatening. Others have the potential for good or for harm, depending in no small measure on how we seek to shape their direction.

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But all of them are realities. We cannot wish them away. We cannot reverse them with rhetoric. We must address them -- all of them -- creatively and without illusion.

For a few moments this evening, I would like to talk about how the United States is dealing with these new realities -- about where we are and where we are headed.

First, we are building our military strength. For nearly two decades the Soviet Union has been building its military strength by 4 percent or more each year. Meanwhile, our underlying military base declined.

Today, the United States is engaged in the most far-reaching military modernization since the early 1960s. We are upgrading each arm of our strategic nuclear forces -- land, sea, and air. The President has ordered full development of a powerful new land-based missile -- the MX. The first of our sophisticated new Trident submarines was launched this year. We will start equipping our B-52's with new Cruise missiles in 1982.

At the same time, we are building the defense forces of our alliances.

-- In 1978, at American initiative, we and our NATO partners launched a long-term military improvement program. That program is well underway.

-- In late 1979, we and our NATO allies agreed to a program for modernizing our nuclear weapons in Europe in order to meet a decade-long Soviet build-up. We will proceed with that program while we seek fair and verifiable negotiable limits with the Soviet Union, a negotiation which was initiated at my meeting with Mr. Gromyko last week.

We are building our military capacity to respond swiftly to serious crisis wherever it might arise, including the vital Persian Gulf area.

There should be no mistake. This modernization program involves heavy costs. In the past four fiscal years, the United States has increased defense expenditures in real terms after inflation by 10 percent. The President's defense program will increase expenditures by another 17 percent over the next 4 years.

This modernization program is necessary to assure that we maintain a military balance with the Soviet Union in the years ahead. It is a steady and reliable American defense program, not a wasteful and wanton effort to achieve an unachievable "superiority" -- an effort that would only produce the dangers of a massive new arms race.

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Secondly, the United States today is exercising its leadership to strengthen the international stand against Soviet aggression.

The Soviet effort to destroy the national independence of Afghanistan through military force must be sternly resisted by the international community.

It is an attempt to use naked military power to deny a people and a nation their freedom. By precedent and by proximity, it increases the Soviet threat in a region of the world vitally important to the United States, to the industrialized democracies, and to the entire world.

By the stands we have taken on grain, on the sale of technology, on the Olympics, we have conveyed, clearly and concretely, the seriousness of the American people. Most Americans support the steps we have taken for they understand that we cannot express our national resolve without individual sacrifice -- from farmers, from businessmen, from athletes, from all of us.

Yet we see, in the Senate and elsewhere, efforts to reverse the grain embargo. There is a short answer: We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by doing less.

The firm actions the United States has taken in recent months are intended, not to provoke confrontation but to avoid confrontation by discouraging future Soviet adventures. These actions are taken to preserve the only basis on which a relaxation of tensions can proceed -- demonstrated Soviet restraint.

As the President has said, we must be prepared to sustain those measures as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. We must also seek Soviet restraint through balanced and enforceable agreements that limit the growth of arms.

Now that the Soviets have dropped their preconditions, we will move ahead this month with preliminary talks to limit long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe. And we will work for ratification of the SALT II treaty -- an agreement that is strongly in our national interest -- and we will seek to do so when it is feasible early next year.

Rising tensions do not weaken the case for SALT; instead, they remind us why arms control is essential -- to reduce the arsenal aimed at us, to avert a futile arms race, to lessen the chance that a fatal miscalculation will reduce both nations to rubble.

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For we strengthen our long-term security, not through rhetoric, but through a clear and lasting demonstration that we have the national will to oppose aggression. And we also strengthen our security through a willingness to seek concrete agreements that limit the nuclear threats we face.

Third, the United States today is deeply engaged in the search for peaceful, negotiated solutions to potentially explosive regional disputes.

For the first time since its creation, Israel and Egypt, its most powerful Arab neighbor, live not in fragile truce but in solid peace, in a large part because of the initiative taken by President Sadat.

For the first time, negotiations are under way on the basic issues that must be resolved to achieve a broader peace in this part of the Middle East.

The agreement we reached with Panama, after 14 years of negotiation, has provided a sounder future for the Canal and has improved our position throughout Latin America.

Our unwavering support for negotiations in Rhodesia helped bring an end to a bloody civil war there, a majority rule government, and a decent hope for peace free from outside interference and a demonstration that it's possible to resolve potentially violent racial conflict by moderate and peaceful methods.

Each step we take today toward easing these international tensions is a step toward preventing broader conflict tomorrow.

Fourth, the United States today is working to strengthen our economic position in the world for the sake of our consumers and businessmen, our farmers, and our workers.

We have reached a major international trade agreement that makes sure we can compete fairly.

We are pursuing a program for increased American productivity.

More than ever before, through summits and constant consultations, we are coordinating our economic policies with our major allies, for the benefit of all.

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And perhaps most important, we have improved our energy position. U.S. oil imports are down 25 percent since 1977 and our domestic energy production is up; and with our allies we have improved energy-sharing arrangements in case of serious world shortages.

We must go further down the road of conservation and increased production. But the thin margin of safety we have achieved and need during the present Iran-Iraqi conflict shows that we are on the right road.

Fifth, the United States today has a foreign policy that is asserting our national commitment to human rights.

America's strength in the world depends not only upon our military power; it rests more on what we stand for as a nation.

We stand for human freedom. Human freedom unites us as a people. Human freedom distinguishes us from our adversaries, and standing for human freedom is deeply in our national interest.

As we Americans know, freedom and stability strengthen each other. Repression can break the ties between a government and its people, increasing the potential for violent change.

We have seen how the turmoil of convulsive change, as in Iran, can directly affect our own nation. We will not rest until all our people are home from Iran, safe and free. This has been a dark chapter for those throughout the world who value human rights. But as we look at the world clearly, we also see a resurgence of the democratic values we support. In Portugal, in Spain, in Greece, in Nigeria and Ghana and Zimbabwe, in Ecuador and Peru, democracy has restored to the people control of their own destinies.

We should find in this movement renewed confidence that the current of democracy and human freedom continues to run strong in the world and that it is in our interest to support it and to be a part of it.

Sixth, and finally -- and I am almost through -- the United States today is building stronger relationships with countries of growing importance on the world scene.

One out of four of the world's people live in China, and today we are building a new relationship with their government based upon normalized relations.

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In less than 20 years four out of five people in the world will live in the developing world. The economic progress and long-term stability of developing nations is increasingly important to our own daily lives.

We cannot expect to have their support on matters important to us if we are not prepared to provide practical support to issues of importance to them -- defending their national independence and building their economies and societies.

Thus, in our own interest, the next several years must be a time when we move ahead -- not slide backward -- in developing our relations with the nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.

These policies and these accomplishments are helping to shape a world of change.

There inevitably will be debate about specific decisions that have been made; but I am firmly convinced that, for all the frustrations in dealing with this new world, America is on the right road -- the road of engagement and progress, not isolation and reaction. Our course makes sense. We need to continue, not turn back.

As an American novelist once put it, "We cannot walk backward into the future." If we try, the future will belong to others.

With a steady increase in American strength -- with American pragmatism harnessed to American ideals, we will continue to move forward into a future we helped to create.

That was a longer speech than the first one but now you can have your chance. (Laughter and applause.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 11, 1980
No. 282

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OCTOBER 11, 1980. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED
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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY

SOUTH BEND, INDIANA

OCTOBER 11, 1980

For further information contact:

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REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE

NOTRE DAME
OCTOBER 11, 1980

FRAGILITY OF PEACE

Before we all celebrate the glories of football, I would like this morning to celebrate peace.

It is appropriate that I do so here, for no Americans have worked harder for peace, in its fullest sense, than Father Hesburgh and John Brademas.

Peace is the absence of war among nations. But it is much more. Nations are composed of people. Meaningful peace must also be found in their lives. A nation whose government lives peacefully with its neighbors, but wars on its own people, is not a nation at peace.

Preserving and working for peace is thus a challenge of extraordinary complexity.

Alexander Hamilton once wrote that hostility among nations is caused by their love of power or their desire for pre-eminence and dominion . . . the competitions of commerce . . . or the personal attachments, enmities, interests, hopes and fears of national leaders.

Human nature has changed little in the two hundred years since. But human technology has changed dramatically. And today, peace has never been more fragile. It can be destroyed, and with it our collective future, in the miscalculation of a single moment.

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To preserve peace, and to expand it, requires more than our best efforts. We need also to understand the ways in which a peace is built and the ways in which it can be shattered.

There is no doubt that in a dangerous world, the first requirement of peace is military strength -- the strength to assure our allies and deter our adversaries . . . the strength to prevent attack or, if necessary, to defeat it . . . the strength to resist coercion.

But too many voices would have us believe that military power in itself can protect our interests and bring order to an unruly world.

So much more is needed.

Peace also requires prudence.

It is gained through patient and persistent diplomatic efforts.

And it is secured through human progress.

Let me tell you why each is so important.

American Military Preparedness

The bedrock of our security is most certainly our military strength and the strength of our alliances.

We live in a hard world which requires hard measures.

For almost two decades, our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military strength by four percent or more every year. Yet for much of that period, American defense expenditures decreased.

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President Carter has reversed that decline.

We are now carrying out the most comprehensive military modernization program since the early 1960's.

Each element of our strategic nuclear forces is being sharply improved to make sure that we can deter any level or kind of nuclear attack.

The new Trident submarine and Trident missile will dramatically increase the firepower of our underwater nuclear forces. The area of the ocean in which they can hide will expand tenfold.

The new mobile MX missile will render any plan for a disabling first strike against the United States even more hopeless than it already is.

Our bomber forces, with new air launched cruise missiles, will be able to remain safely beyond the range of Soviet defenses and deliver massive explosive force with extraordinary accuracy.

We are strengthening our other capabilities, as well. We are enhancing the preparedness of our ground forces; modernizing our tactical air forces; building a larger and more capable navy; increasing our sea and airlift capabilities so we can respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise. And with the leadership of Birch Bayh as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on intelligence, America's intelligence resources are being strengthened.

Our alliances are growing stronger. Through American leadership the NATO Alliance is committed to a new defense improvement program . . . to an annual three percent increase in defense expenditures . . . to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe.

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Plainly, any notion that we are neglecting our defense posture is absurd.

American and allied military forces -- today -- are a match for any adversary or combination of adversaries. And through these new programs, our forces will remain that way, despite the Soviet build-up. Our defenses will remain the foundation of peace.

But as we do what is necessary to protect ourselves, let us not be so blinded by the importance of power that we forget what else is necessary to build a more peaceful world.

Prudent Policies

First, we need the perspective of prudence.

It is prudent to make sure that our purposes are clear.

We are determined to defend our vital interests -- in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, in this Hemisphere. But we must be clear -- to ourselves and to others -- that we seek no dominion, no control over the affairs of other peoples.

Nor must we pretend that we can recapture the military superiority we once held over the Soviet Union. Such superiority may sound grand in speeches. But the Soviets will no more allow us to gain such a position than we will allow it to them. A search for superiority would simply create a massive, dangerous new arms race. Peace lies in maintaining a prudent balance.

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It is this sense of prudence that should also lead us to ratify the SALT II treaty and pursue further balanced arms control agreements.

What prudent person would want a world without SALT?

. . . A world in which the Soviets can deploy 750 more nuclear weapons systems than allowed under the treaty;

. . . A world without restraints on the number of nuclear weapons each of those missiles and bombers carries;

. . . A world where we have to spend tens of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons that could go to our conventional forces . . . or to the needs of human beings in this country and abroad;

. . . A world of greater tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I think the answer is clear. That is why we will seek ratification of the SALT II treaty as soon as possible next year.

And that is why we must always make it clear to the Soviet Union that while we will continue to oppose aggression in Afghanistan or elsewhere -- and we will -- our purpose is to help establish patterns of mutual restraint that allow an improved relationship between us.

We and the Soviets, as the two superpowers, have a responsibility to all humankind: even as we compete, we must always be willing to pursue, as well, the works of peace.

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Peace also depends on the prudence of statesmen when conflicts erupt . . . when crises require cool thinking as well as strength. At such times, we need to understand that the use of force is a last resort. Our first recourse must be to the instruments of diplomacy.

And we need to be clear on the difference between threats to our vital interests and foreign internal strife that may affect our interests but is not susceptible to the use of American force. American forces are in the Persian Gulf, for example, to defend vital interests of the U.S. and our allies in the region. They are not there to interfere in the domestic affairs of any nation.

I raise this point because the air is now filled with after-the-fact prescriptions of belligerence. We are told that greater American military might could have prevented the course of events in Iran . . . or in Nicaragua. But the fact is that in the world as it is, American military forces cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the internal problems of other nations. If we tried to order the affairs of other nations by force, we would be endlessly at war all over the globe. And how would we then differ from the Soviet Union and its actions in Afghanistan or Ethiopia?

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In dealing with disputes both among and within nations, our wisest course is to work to resolve crises before they erupt -- through patient and persistent diplomacy and through support for human progress.

Peace Among Nations

Today, the people of Israel and Egypt live in greater security than at any point in a generation. Certainly, both face threats from beyond their borders. But they live at peace with each other.

The Camp David accord that produced this historic peace treaty was an act of courage and statesmanship by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And especially, it was the product of President Carter's determined, persistent efforts to find a formula that could encompass the concerns of both sides.

Now, we are engaged in the next step -- negotiations on the fundamental issues of a comprehensive peace in the area.

Progress has been slow. It will continue to be. But there is progress. The talks continue. There can be more progress, if we persist.

In this region, and in others, we must recall the words of John F. Kennedy. "We can push a button to start the next war," he reminded us, "but there is no push-button magic to bring a just and lasting peace."

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That peace will only come if we are as patient as we are determined . . . if we are steady in our course, because it is the only course that offers practical progress.

Peace Within Nations

We must also recognize the unbreakable connection between peace and human progress.

A nation cannot be at peace if its people are not at peace -- if their political, economic and social rights are not protected and advanced.

No person who cherishes his or her own rights can rest comfortably when the cancer of discrimination persists, or spreads as we have seen recently with an alarming increase in ugly incidents of anti-Semitism in various countries. This is a development that all people of decency deplore. It is a denial of the most fundamental human rights.

There is a very practical connection between human rights and our own security.

People around the world are demanding that they see in their own lives the benefits of national economic growth. In many countries, they are insisting on greater participation in the affairs of their governments. These are facts. We welcome them, for they match our own national traditions.

These demands for progress are demands for change . . . demands that can create instability. But when they go unmet, governments can lose legitimacy in the eyes of

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their people. Vicious cycles of violence and repression and radicalism are too often the result.

This is why no one should automatically equate stability and the status quo. We must come to grips with the currents of change in the world.

Contrast, for a moment, the peace within such democratic nations as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Nigeria and Ghana, to the events we have seen in Iran and Nicaragua, where repression and economic inequities led to an agony of violence.

It is therefore in our national interest to support human rights and democracy.

Nowhere, in recent years, has the wisdom of this approach -- the direct connection between peace and progress -- been better demonstrated than in our policies toward Rhodesia.

Despite the pressures in this country to support the minority regime there, President Carter held firm for a settlement based on free elections and racial justice.

Because of the efforts of many nations, such a settlement was achieved. And today, after free elections, the new nation of Zimbabwe knows more peace than anyone had imagined possible. Our challenge now is to support the economic, human progress there that can preserve this peace in the years to come.

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Conclusion

Every American cherishes peace. In such difficult and complex times, it is not surprising that there are different views on how peace is to be nurtured and preserved.

Here is what I believe.

Peace is hard. It will require great sacrifice and courage in the years ahead ... the strength to deter aggression and the will to tend to our defenses.

Peace is also fragile. Without prudence it can easily be shattered. Without care and patience and steadiness, its web cannot be spun.

And peace is a human condition, not merely the technical absence of war among nations. So long as injustice exists peace will only hold if there is constant ... visible ... tangible human progress.

I believe that on our understanding and application of these points will depend our nation's contribution to peace in the difficult decade ahead -- and thus our own future safety and success.

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

PEACE CORPS REDEDICATION CEREMONY

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

OCTOBER 14, 1980

SPEECH BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
20th ANNIVERSARY - PEACE CORPS

October 14, 1980

I am delighted to share this celebration with you.

And I'm honored to stand where John Kennedy stood twenty years ago this evening and gave life to the Peace Corps idea: that the energy and the idealism of individual Americans could be harnessed in a practical way to the needs of those living in the deepest poverty around the world . . . and that in the process, both we and they could benefit.

The idea of a Peace Corps was not new. It had been germinating in the fertile minds of people like Hubert Humphrey and Henry Reuss for some time.

But John Kennedy ignited that idea, and the spark was set here that evening.

There were a number of early skeptics.

But they were quickly tamed -- if not by the extraordinary public response, then eventually by the determination of Sarge Shriver.

The Peace Corps idea seized us for a number of reasons.

Clearly, there was an element of East-West competition involved. It has been said that the Peace Corps "took root between the horizons of hope and of fear."

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But hope was far the stronger force. For the Peace Corps struck a chord of compassion and decency deep within the American character . . . a core of human values that has been -- that still is -- among our most powerful national assets.-

And the Peace Corps captured the spirit that John Kennedy helped awaken -- the energy . . . the dedication . . . the faith in our purpose . . . the confidence of success.

It was a powerful vision that enlisted the commitment of thousands, including many former volunteers here today -- a vision of poverty eased, of hunger tamed, of disease alleviated, of human potential more fully realized.

The buoyant optimism of that time has been tempered in the years since -- by our experiences and by tides of change that have swept the world -- both developing and developed.

-- Some fifty nations that were colonies in 1960 have become independent nations, determined to preserve that independence and to chart their own course;

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-- A growing sense of common
among developing nations. It has
regional and international groupings
non-aligned movement, in the OAU
and elsewhere.

-- At the same time, we have
among developing nations. The border
and "developed" itself has eroded
understand that there is no single
that the past and the future must
local blend.

-- New problems have emerged
shocks of energy inflation ... the
the surge of population ... the impact
the ecological balance -- on tropical
and available water.

-- And over this same period
recognize the scope of our own challenge
to build a growing, competitive United States
our own costly and dangerous energy
new opportunities for Americans while
while we maintain the promise of
Americans.

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...like many Peace ... in the ... some face-to-face with the enormity and complexity of the challenge. ... have been sobered by our ...

... experience has ... birth to despair. "We ... difference on ... even if we ... of some.

... energy should ... spent here, not in ... around the world is the refuge of ...

... for one purpose ... to you, and ... these words: ... subject that

... for that ... difference.

... as well as ... we must ... -- against w...

... spoken to a ...

... not believe that ...

... -- however ...

...

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And that remains

-- In Malaysia, a new law is helping small cattle farmers increase milk production through better veterinary practices and new marketing approaches.

-- On the small island-nation of Montserrat in the Caribbean, which now grows half of all its food, the U.S. is helping the island to increase its food production.

-- In Upper Volta farmers are being helped to increase their production of food and fuel timber for the next twenty years. Peace Corps volunteers there are helping rural villagers plant new forests which will need for the future.

-- In Malawi, where one of 10 children do not live before the age of five, the U.S. is helping rural villagers to increase local food production and improve their lives.

-- We just a few of the many ways that the U.S. is helping the world. Peace Corps volunteers are helping the world in many ways that matter. The daily lives of those whose daily lives are improved.

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The jobs of the American Bureau of Commerce are to help our exporters to develop new markets for their products, to help our fastest growing industries to grow with others, to help our materials that turn out to be the most important in the world, to help our manufacturers to demonstrate, in the eyes of the world, the quality of their products, to help our business to the needs and desires of the world.

Finally, what happens in the developi is important to the quality of our own lives by our government, A recent study/ called "Global 2000" carries some stern warnings about what our world could look like in just 20 years if we fail to see our state in the progress of others.

We could see an increase in the world's population in the next twenty years that equals the entire population of the globe in 1950. Will there be a square food and shelter and education for world of a billion people? Or we see hunger and disease, brutal competition for resources, more violent disturbances multiplied many times over?

These statements are not predictions for either time or place. They will shape our lives just as certainly as they shape the lives of others.

For all of these reasons, our efforts to help other nations solve their problems are not "diversionary" as they are not international charity.

They are investments we make in the future of our world. They are investments in the future of our lives. They are investments in the future of our security. Governments are meeting the obligation of the future. Investments in the future of our national security. They are new opportunities for our people;

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... investments in growing cooperation on long-range global problems that can be solved only through common action.

This new reality -- this growing together of our future with the futures of peoples in the developing world -- needs to be made clearer to the American people.

Their support for the human and material resources we need to help shape the currents of change in the developing world depends upon that growing public understanding.

I am committed to do all in my power as Secretary of State to help build that understanding ... and to enlist that support. For unless the American people better understand how important these efforts are, the plain fact is that Congress will not fund our requests.

Those of you who have served with Peace Corps around the world have a first-hand appreciation -- of the histories that separate the world's peoples ... and the destiny that binds us.

You have a continuing responsibility to build and maintain that understanding in your own communities.

And so today I ask you to volunteer again, for a task that sends you home, not abroad: to build a broad national constituency for an active and constructive American engagement in the developing world and for the resources to support it.

* * * *

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The past twenty years have made us more sober, perhaps, in our views of what can be accomplished -- and how soon. But we have also learned that much can be accomplished.

We have learned, in the past twenty years, that our resources are limited. We have also learned that we must therefore use our resources with greater sensitivity and effectiveness.

We have learned that the developing world may not always welcome the enthusiasm of crusaders. But it does want the expertise -- and the cooperation -- of partners.

Twenty years ago, John Kennedy proclaimed a New Frontier. By doing so, he reminded us of something unique in our American view of the world. In other, older cultures the word "frontier" means a boundary -- a place to stop. But for us, the word has meant ever-beckoning horizons, new challenges, new obstacles to overcome.

That is one thing that has not changed in the past twenty years.

Today, as then, the frontier of development beckons. Today, more than ever, that frontier must be explored.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 16, 1980
No. 284

PC#9

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Pryor Airport, Buffalo, New York
October 14, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I am at your service.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Fidel Castro has said that within a matter of hours you can expect him to release the Americans now. Do you care to comment on that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, the State Department heard that today, it looks like a forward step. The State Department has consulted with the Justice Department on handling these cases. I have not been in Washington today. I don't know the outcome of those consultations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, George Bush was in Buffalo this weekend and he suggested that you were taking, in his words, "the low road" in criticizing the foreign policy goals of a Reagan Administration. He was particularly critical of suggestions by you and other members of the Carter Administration that the foreign policy goals of a Reagan Administration could lead us into a lot of small, nasty, little wars.

I wonder if you would respond to George Bush's comments about you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I never made that statement.

QUESTION: He was referring to your Notre Dame speech, in which you --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There was no such reference in the Notre Dame speech. I did not make the --

QUESTION: That is not what was on the wires.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I mean, you people write the stories. I give the speeches.

QUESTION: He didn't mention --

For further information contact:

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I would be happy to send you a copy of that speech. I didn't mention Mr. Reagan, I didn't mention his policies, and I was very upset when I picked up the paper the next morning and read the wire service attributing such references to that speech.

I hold these press conferences for the purpose of making clear what I say, and I would hope that the press would carefully report what I do say.

I never made the statement which Mr. Bush criticized, and I would not comment upon his statement.

QUESTION: Mr. Muskie, there are reports that Russians are building up a large area along the borders of Poland. Are you worried about this military buildup along those borders? Are you prepared to --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes, first of all, we do watch Russian military activities along the Polish border. There has been nothing up to now to suggest that they have in mind any military intervention. You know, one can never be sure in that situation whether they change their mind; but up to this point there seems to be no indication of that.

The situation in Poland internally, of course, is a difficult one. It's a difficult time for the Polish people and it's a difficult time, I am sure, in their relations with their government as they seek to implement the gains which they believe they made not a long time ago. Their internal economic situations are very difficult and apparently call for some reforms -- actions by the government -- and I would hope and pray (and I am sure that is true of all Poles in the Buffalo area as well) that they are able to resolve those problems without triggering the kind of intervention which some fear.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, with ever-increasing tensions in the Middle East, especially now with the war between Iraq and Iran, I think nearly everyone wonders how long the U.S. Government is going to sit back and let the hostages, the Americans in Iran, remain in that situation. Or is there anything that can be done at this point?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I assure you that our efforts in behalf of the hostages have been conducted on a 24-hour basis each day since I have been in office -- and prior to that time as well.

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The kinds of efforts that are under way cannot be visible. If they were, they might be less than effective.

We are pursuing all diplomatic channels and even non-diplomatic channels in an effort to establish contact and persuade the Iranians that the hostages are not in their own interest and that they are more of a problem for Iran than they are an opportunity. There are some indications that Iranians are beginning to be aware of that. So we persist in our efforts, and we hope that they will bring success.

QUESTION: Do you have this feeling that it will end diplomatically? Do you have any feeling in your heart, in your mind -- any predictions you wanted to make?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I happen to believe that the hostages are an Iranian problem and that as such, in due course, the hostages will be released. But don't ask me to give a time frame. I don't have a crystal ball that is that precise.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Iranian Prime Minister said yesterday that the only way the hostages could be released would be for the United States to meet Iran's previously-stated demands. And he then followed that comment up by saying he didn't feel the United States would be prepared to meet those demands.

Is that an accurate statement?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you would have to tell me which set of demands, made by which Iranians -- the set of demands to which you made reference.

Secondly, you ought to make the assumption, having observed American politicians in action, that sometimes what they say publicly doesn't coincide with what they do privately -- and if it were simply a matter of exchanging statements through the public media, we might never reach agreement with the Iranians.

But as I said to the young lady, we are pursuing quieter, less visible channels, in order to reach a meeting of minds -- and that is what I have reference to, and that is what has some prospects of being productive at some point. Nothing seems imminent at this point, and it means that we must continue our efforts.

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QUESTION: Have you received confirmation about the safety of the hostages during the fighting between Iran and Iraq?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, we have not.

QUESTION: Are you concerned about their safety?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well of course I am concerned. I am concerned about their health, too.

But up to this point Iran and the Iranian leaders appear to be aware of the fact that we hold them accountable for the safety of the hostages and they have not, up to this point, done anything (to our knowledge.) We don't know precisely where they are, but up to this point they have done nothing to undermine the safety of the hostages.

Of course in a war zone, one would wish -- but obviously, there is some prospect for escalating.

But we simply do not know where they are and whether or not they are in the danger zone.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been criticism from the Republicans that the Carter Administration is very blatant in its use of Cabinet Members to campaign during this election season, Cabinet Members such as yourself. How do you respond to that? That "it is an improper use of the Presidency and of the Cabinet Members to send them out on political expeditions?"

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I challenge your assumption that I have been involved in political campaigning. I have not addressed a political audience, a partisan political audience, I have not made a partisan political speech.

I have spoken of foreign policy issues, and I would assume that foreign policy ought to be as much a subject of discussion among voters and citizens as any others -- I think foreign policy is a proper subject for discussion among our citizens -- so why should the Secretary of State be excluded? He may, after all, be required to preside over the foreign policies that are developed in the campaign. So I am not participating in partisan political activities -- not that I see anything wrong in those -- after all, both Presidential candidates are involved in partisan political activities so there must be something right about it since we choose presidents from among such candidates.

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The kinds of efforts that are under way cannot be visible. If they were, they might be less than effective.

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QUESTION: Do you have this feeling that it will end diplomatically? Do you have any feeling in your heart, in your mind -- any predictions you wanted to make?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I happen to believe that the hostages are an Iranian problem and that as such, in due course, the hostages will be released. But don't ask me to give a time frame. I don't have a crystal ball that is that precise.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Iranian Prime Minister said yesterday that the only way the hostages could be released would be for the United States to meet Iran's previously-stated demands. And he then followed that comment up by saying he didn't feel the United States would be prepared to meet those demands.

Is that an accurate statement?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you would have to tell me which set of demands, made by which Iranians -- the set of demands to which you made reference.

Secondly, you ought to make the assumption, having observed American politicians in action, that sometimes what they say publicly doesn't coincide with what they do privately -- and if it were simply a matter of exchanging statements through the public media, we might never reach agreement with the Iranians.

But as I said to the young lady, we are pursuing quieter, less visible channels, in order to reach a meeting of minds -- and that is what I have reference to, and that is what has some prospects of being productive at some point. Nothing seems imminent at this point, and it means that we must continue our efforts.

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QUESTION: Have you received confirmation about the safety of the hostages during the fighting between Iran and Iraq?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, we have not.

QUESTION: Are you concerned about their safety?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well of course I am concerned. I am concerned about their health, too.

But up to this point Iran and the Iranian leaders appear to be aware of the fact that we hold them accountable for the safety of the hostages and they have not, up to this point, done anything (to our knowledge.) We don't know precisely where they are, but up to this point they have done nothing to undermine the safety of the hostages.

Of course in a war zone, one would wish -- but obviously, there is some prospect for escalating.

But we simply do not know where they are and whether or not they are in the danger zone.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been criticism from the Republicans that the Carter Administration is very blatant in its use of Cabinet Members to campaign during this election season, Cabinet Members such as yourself. How do you respond to that? That "it is an improper use of the Presidency and of the Cabinet Members to send them out on political expeditions?"

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I challenge your assumption that I have been involved in political campaigning. I have not addressed a political audience, a partisan political audience, I have not made a partisan political speech.

I have spoken of foreign policy issues, and I would assume that foreign policy ought to be as much a subject of discussion among voters and citizens as any others -- I think foreign policy is a proper subject for discussion among our citizens -- so why should the Secretary of State be excluded? He may, after all, be required to preside over the foreign policies that are developed in the campaign. So I am not participating in partisan political activities -- not that I see anything wrong in those -- after all, both Presidential candidates are involved in partisan political activities so there must be something right about it since we choose presidents from among such candidates.

DECLASSIFIED

The kinds of efforts that are under way cannot be visible. If they were, they might be less than effective.

We are pursuing all diplomatic channels and even non-diplomatic channels in an effort to establish contact and persuade the Iranians that the hostages are not in their own interest and that they are more of a problem for Iran than they are an opportunity. There are some indications that Iranians are beginning to be aware of that. So we persist in our efforts, and we hope that they will bring success.

QUESTION: Do you have this feeling that it will end diplomatically? Do you have any feeling in your heart, in your mind -- any predictions you wanted to make?

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DECLASSIFIED

But with respect to foreign policy, I appreciate and really support the practice that Secretaries of State ought not to participate in partisan political activities. But in terms of discussing foreign policy issues -- I think we do have the responsibility.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we forever read that there is a disagreement between you and Dr. Brzezinski. Is there any truth to those rumors, or is it just a fabricated story?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I remember when I started practicing law and was interviewed by the senior partner of a large law firm and he said to me, "You know, if we should happen to take you on," and they didn't, he said, "If we should ever take you on, we want you to understand that if all of us agree all of the time, only one of us is necessary."

Now the President obviously has more than one foreign policy advisor, and he should have. He ought to have differing points of view, and Mr. Brzezinski and I do not always agree -- but neither do we always disagree. We each have a role to play, established by law, and we each undertake to play that role to the best of our ability.

Now the press chooses to regard that as a "constant battle" and I assure you, it is not.

QUESTION: Would you choose, then, to stay on as Secretary of State if asked, as I am sure you would be if Mr. Carter wins the election?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well I think it depends first on the voters; and then it depends upon Mr. Carter. But I would be perfectly willing.

QUESTION: Will you be spending time with your family -- the members of your family living in this area -- other than -- while you are here?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, I expect to see them later.

QUESTION: Are there any Brzezinskis in town?
(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, there are (inaudible).

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QUESTION: Will you be hitting on any particular points in your address tonight? Anything in particular that you wish to address --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, I expect to be covering the Persian Gulf area and the problems that poses for us. Don't ask me to repeat the speech here. Once, is enough. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Are you as concerned as, say you were a couple of weeks ago, about the oil situation in the Persian Gulf -- after this war cools or isn't that --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Whenever you have this kind of a war with no definite end in sight, with national interests beyond those immediately involved in the fighting -- when you know there is a risk that the war will spread and I am sure that other nations are aware of this -- it is better not to be fighting, to reduce the risk.

QUESTION: Do you think the aid the Americans have given to the Saudis -- well, they are perhaps not that great I don't think -- but do you think that it served as a deterrent, that it served its purpose?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, its purpose is to enable the Saudis to defend themselves more effectively -- it's purely defensive. There is no offensive capability involved whatsoever.

It's a flying radar, really, which enables the Saudis, you know, to be warned earlier in advance of any potential attack from any source. That's all that we have provided them with, and I think that does give the Saudis some reassurance and it may act as some deterrent; but in any case, although we are neutral in the war between Iran and Iraq, we are not neutral in terms of defending, or helping our friends defend themselves.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Jordan has already indicated its support for the Iraqi Government. Are you concerned that as the war continues, other Middle Eastern states may feel the necessity to begin to choose sides in the dispute?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think it serves any nation's interest to widen this war.

QUESTION: Yes, but are you afraid that other nations will begin to take up sides as the dispute lingers on?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I thought I had answered your question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it in the interest of our government if Iraq pursues this war and knocks the so-and-so out of Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I don't think that it serves any nation's interest for this war to continue -- including our own.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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No. 285

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

GENERAL PULASKI ASSOCIATION
OF THE NIAGARA FRONTIER

BUFFALO, NEW YORK

OCTOBER 14, 1980

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For further information, contact:

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
BEFORE
GENERAL PULASKI ASSOCIATION
BUFFALO, NEW YORK
OCTOBER 14, 1980

PRESIDENT PELCZYNSKI, VICE PRESIDENT SOLECKI, CONGRESSMAN
NOWAK, CONGRESSMAN DULSKI, MAYOR GRIFFIN, MR. RUTKOWSKI,
AND DISTINGUISHED GUESTS:

OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS, I HAVE MADE IT ONE OF MY
PRIME PURPOSES TO SPEAK TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ABOUT OUR
NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. EVERYWHERE IN MY TRAVELS I HAVE FOUND
PEOPLE EAGER TO BE INFORMED -- AND WARMLY HOSPITABLE. BUT THIS
OCCASION, FOR ME, IS SPECIAL.

YOU AND I SHARE A COMMON HERITAGE. WE ARE, FIRST OF ALL,
AMERICANS. BUT WE ARE AMERICANS WHO TRACE OUR ROOTS BACK TO
THE SAME LAND -- ANOTHER LAND WHOSE PEOPLE WORK HARD, REVERE
GOD AND CHERISH HUMAN FREEDOM.

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- 2 -

FOR YOU AND ME -- AND FOR OTHER PEOPLE OF POLISH ANCESTRY -- THE PAST YEAR HAS BROUGHT SOME STIRRING MOMENTS.

POPE JOHN PAUL THE SECOND HAS INSPIRED THE WHOLE WORLD WITH HIS RADIANT CHARACTER -- AND WITH HIS SIMPLE BUT COMPELLING MESSAGE OF HUMAN BROTHERHOOD AND PEACE.

THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR LITERATURE HAS BEEN AWARDED TO CZESLAW MILOSZ, WHOSE WRITINGS HAVE VOICED WHAT LIVES IN SO MANY POLISH HEARTS.

AND MOST OF ALL, IN RECENT WEEKS, OUR HEARTS HAVE GONE OUT TO THE BRAVE PEOPLE OF POLAND, AS THEY HAVE CONFRONTED ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT -- AND PERHAPS MOST PIVOTAL -- MOMENTS IN THEIR RECENT HISTORY.

POLAND'S ENTIRE HISTORY HAS BEEN A HISTORY OF CHALLENGE. THE LAND OF OUR FOREFATHERS WAS PARTITIONED THREE TIMES. INDEED, FOR OVER A CENTURY, WHILE AMERICA WAS BECOMING THE GREAT NATION THAT IT IS, THERE WAS NO POLAND ON THE MAP.

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BUT THE POLES ARE MORE THAN A BRAVE AND A CIVILIZED PEOPLE: THEY ARE A RESILIENT PEOPLE. THEY CAME BACK FROM PARTITION TO INDEPENDENCE. THEY ARE TRYING NOW TO COME BACK FROM A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TROUBLES THAT WOULD TEST THE WILL AND THE SKILLS OF ANY NATION -- EVEN A NATION OF 35 MILLION PEOPLE OCCUPYING A KEY POSITION IN EUROPE.

IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR POLAND TO RESOLVE ITS PROBLEMS. AND IT WILL TAKE TIME. WE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN POLAND -- AND NEITHER SHOULD OTHERS. BUT POLAND'S PEOPLE AND POLAND'S LEADERS CAN BE ASSURED, AS THEY FACE THE FORMIDABLE TASKS THAT LIE AHEAD, THAT OUR OWN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO OFFER THEM BOTH OUR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING AND, WHERE THIS IS FEASIBLE AND PROPER, OUR ASSISTANCE.

ON THIS PULASKI DAY, WHEN WE CELEBRATE THE MEMORY OF A MAN WHO HELPED US GAIN OUR OWN INDEPENDENCE, I WANT TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT ANOTHER REGION OF THE WORLD IN WHICH THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS ... OUR INTERESTS ... AND PEACE ITSELF ARE AT STAKE. I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO SECURE PEACE, TO GUARD OUR INTERESTS AND THUS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THE VALUES WE CHERISH WILL SURVIVE AND PROSPER IN THE WORLD.

I AM SPEAKING ABOUT THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ -- AND MORE GENERALLY ABOUT OUR POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA.

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II.

THE WAR BETWEEN THESE TWO PERSIAN GULF STATES IS IN ITS FOURTH WEEK NOW. BEHIND THIS BRIEF CONFLICT LIE YEARS OF BITTERNESS AND RIVALRY. BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO VIEW THIS CONFLICT ONLY AS A LOCAL FLAREUP BETWEEN TWO RIVAL STATES. ITS IMPLICATIONS ARE FAR BROADER. IF NOT CONTAINED... AND RESOLVED... IT COULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE TO OUR NATION'S VITAL INTERESTS.

SEVERAL THINGS ARE AT STAKE -- FIRST AMONG THEM THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF. IN THE TENSIONS AND INSTABILITIES OF THAT AREA, EVEN SMALL WARS THREATEN TO BECOME LARGER ONES.

ALSO AFFECTED ARE THE SAFETY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO LOOK TO US FOR SUPPORT AND HELP TO SAFEGUARD THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE.

AND POTENTIALLY AT STAKE IN THIS CONFLICT ARE VITAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

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WE BUY LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF OUR OIL FROM IRAQ, AND NONE FROM IRAN. BUT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, JAPAN, AND MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE MAJOR BUYERS OF OIL FROM IRAQ: IRAQ IS THE WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER OF OIL AFTER SAUDI ARABIA. CLEARLY, IF THE ECONOMIES OF OUR ALLIES ARE DISRUPTED, OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS WILL SUFFER.

MOREOVER, THE WAR COULD SPREAD TO INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. AND IT IS THROUGH THIS VITAL CHOKEPOINT THAT 16 MILLION BARRELS OF THE WORLD'S OIL MUST PASS EACH DAY.-- NOT ONLY OIL FROM IRAQ AND IRAN, BUT ALSO OIL FROM KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER PRODUCERS IN THE GULF; A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE WORLD'S DAILY OIL SUPPLY.

FINALLY, IN THE LIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN, WE MUST BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW INTERVENTION PRESENTED BY ANY SUCH INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

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THE UNITED STATES HAS NOTHING TO GAIN BY TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT, AND WE HAVE REFUSED TO DO SO. BUT TO BE IMPARTIAL IS NOT TO BE INACTIVE; TO DECLARE THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE SIDES IS NOT TO DECLARE THAT WE HAVE NO INTERESTS AT STAKE. IN FACT, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN WORKING STEADILY, SINCE THE WAR BROKE OUT, IN PURSUIT OF THREE GOALS:

FIRST, WE ARE WORKING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

WE HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE, TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO BRING IRAN AND IRAQ TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH FOREIGN LEADERS AND I HAVE WORKED WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM OF THE UN AND WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS TO PURSUE AN EARLY END TO THIS CONFLICT.

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SECOND, WE ARE WORKING TO KEEP THE CONFLICT FROM
SPREADING BEYOND IRAN AND IRAQ.

TO THIS END, FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE HELPING OUR NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO ARE THREATENED BY THIS CONFLICT. THE PRESIDENT'S PROMPT DECISION TO SEND ADVANCE WARNING-AND-CONTROL AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA UNDERSCORES OUR DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSES OF SUCH FRIENDS -- SO THAT THEY CAN GUARD THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

WE ARE ALSO URGING ALL OTHER NATIONS - IN THE REGION AND BEYOND - TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT AND TO WORK TO LIMIT AND RESOLVE THE FIGHTING. IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST TO SEE THE HOSTILITIES WIDEN.

WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. EACH OF US HAS ASSURED THE OTHER OF IMPARTIALITY IN THE CONFLICT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT -- AND EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE.

AND THIRD, WE HAVE PLEDGED TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY
TO PROTECT FREE SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ FROM
ANY INTERFERENCE.

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WE BELIEVE THAT THE OIL PRODUCING NATIONS MUST BE FREE FROM EXTERNAL COERCION OR CONTROL -- AND FREE TO SHIP THEIR OIL SAFELY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE AND OUR ALLIES DO NOT SEEK TO DOMINATE THE OIL PRODUCTION DECISIONS OF THE OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS. BUT ALL NATIONS -- NOT ONLY INDUSTRIAL BUT THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS AS WELL -- HAVE A PROFOUND INTEREST IN THE FLOW OF OIL FROM THE PERSIAN GULF.

III.

TODAY, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PURSUE THIS POLICY OF FIRM BUT PRUDENT ACTION.

OUR CAPACITY TO PURSUE OUR GOALS -- AND OUR CAPACITY IN PARTICULAR, TO MAKE A CREDIBLE PLEDGE TO PROTECT FREE SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ -- ARE NO ACCIDENT. OUR POSITION IS THE RESULT OF CAREFUL, DELIBERATE STEPS BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION.

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AS THE PRESIDENT SAID LAST JANUARY IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, "WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ... TO SHARE A COOPERATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK THAT RESPECTS DIFFERING VALUES AND POLITICAL BELIEFS, YET ... ENHANCES THE INDEPENDENCE, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF ALL."

THAT 'S A TALL ORDER. BUT NO ONE SHOULD DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION OR OUR ABILITY TO FULFILL IT. WE, AND OUR ALLIES, HAVE BOTH THE POWER AND THE WILL TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND TO SUSTAIN OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. OUR ALLIES ARE PLAYING AN ESSENTIAL ROLE -- IN STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSES OF EUROPE ITSELF AND THROUGH THEIR OWN MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

LET ME REVIEW WITH YOU SOME OF THE SPECIFIC STEPS WE HAVE BEEN TAKING -- SINGLY AND WITH OTHERS -- TO BUILD AND STRENGTHEN THAT VITAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT SPOKE.

OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THREE BROAD FRONTS: MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC.

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I WILL MENTION OUR MILITARY ACTIONS FIRST -- BECAUSE OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, IF THEY ARE ASSAULTED, IS ABSOLUTELY BASIC.

WE HAVE MOVED TO STRENGTHEN OUR PEACETIME MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF.

SINCE EARLY 1979, THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD ON STATION THE MOST POWERFUL NAVAL FORCE EVER DEPLOYED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. AND OUR MIDEAST NAVAL FORCE INSIDE THE PERSIAN GULF ITSELF HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM THREE TO FIVE SHIPS. WE WILL MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA, COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF OFF-SHORE NAVAL FORCES BUT INCLUDING ALSO PERIODIC DEPLOYMENT OF AIR AND GROUND UNITS FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES.

WE ARE IMPROVING OUR ABILITY TO ADD QUICKLY, DURING A CRISIS, TO THAT CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE.

WE HAVE ORGANIZED AND ARE DEVELOPING A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DISPATCH WORLDWIDE ON SHORT NOTICE. AND WE ARE INCREASING OUR ABILITY TO MOVE GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO POTENTIAL TROUBLE-SPOTS. THIS EFFORT INCLUDES PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE THE REACH, MOBILITY AND STRENGTH OF OUR AIRPLANES, AND TO PROCURE NEW, FAST, SEALIFT SHIPS.

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WE ARE WORKING WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS IN THE AREA TO IMPROVE THEIR SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MILITARY FACILITIES. AND WE HAVE EXPANDED OUR ACCESS TO NEEDED FACILITIES IN THE REGION.

ALL THESE STEPS, LET ME EMPHASIZE, ARE TAKEN IN THE INTERESTS OF DEFENSE AND PEACE. THEY THREATEN NO ONE WHOSE PURPOSE IS PEACE. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO BUTTRESS THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGION AND RIGHTS OF FREE PASSAGE IN ITS WATERWAYS. OUR ACTIONS WILL REMAIN CAREFULLY CALIBRATED TO THESE GOALS, SO WE NEITHER CREATE NEW, NEEDLESS TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION NOR APPEAR TO THREATEN THE FREEDOM OF DECISION OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, TWO SPECIFIC EFFORTS ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT:

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THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS STAND AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IS NOW A REALITY. AND THE ULTIMATE AIM OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER OTHER ARAB NEIGHBORS -- WILL, IF WE CAN ACHIEVE IT, SERVE ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTERESTS, THE STRATEGIC INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, AND INDEED THE INTEREST OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IT WILL NOT ASSURE STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THE ABSENCE OF A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THIS PEACE WILL ASSURE CONTINUED DANGER.

THE SANCTIONS LEVIED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN ARE ALSO HIGHLY IMPORTANT -- FOR THEY ARE A STRONG SIGNAL THAT WE WILL FIRMLY OPPOSE ARMED AGGRESSION; THAT WE SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS IN THIS REGION AND ELSEWHERE.

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OUR OTHER MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE BEEN IN PURSUIT OF BETTER TIES WITH NATIONS IN THE REGION WITH WHOM WE HAVE SHARED INTERESTS. IN SEVERAL CASES, NOTABLY EGYPT AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. IN OTHER CASES, SUCH AS IRAN, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE WILL NEVER YIELD ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, WE STAND READY TO COMPOSE OUR DIFFERENCES. BUT WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL ALL OUR CAPTIVE CITIZENS ARE HOME AND FREE. WE ARE CONTINUING, THROUGH EVERY AVENUE AVAILABLE, TO SEEK THEIR RELEASE.

THE THIRD FRONT ON WHICH WE HAVE MOVED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IS THE ECONOMIC FRONT. AND HERE THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TO GUARD OUR ENERGY SECURITY ASSUME KEY IMPORTANCE.

THESE ENERGY-SECURITY STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN TWO DIRECTIONS -- TOWARD CONSERVATION AND TOWARD INCREASED PRODUCTION OF ENERGY HERE AT HOME. THEY ARE WORKING.

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

IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE REDUCED OUR CONSUMPTION OF OIL, WE ARE WEATHERING THE WORLD MARKET LOSS OF OIL FROM IRAN AND IRAQ. AND OUR CAREFUL COOPERATION AND PLANNING WITH OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE AND JAPAN GIVE US REASON TO HOPE THAT TOGETHER, WE CAN FACE FUTURE EMERGENCIES -- EVEN SERIOUS SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS -- WITH A MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE AND A MINIMUM OF DISRUPTION AND PANIC.

SINCE PRESIDENT CARTER SIGNED THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT OF 1978 -- THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY LAW IN OUR NATIONAL HISTORY -- OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY CUT. OIL CONSUMPTION HAS DECREASED IN BOTH OF THE LAST TWO YEARS. OUR NET OIL IMPORTS HAVE DECLINED STEADILY: DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THIS YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR IMPORTS DECLINED BY 25 PERCENT FROM THE SAME PERIOD IN 1977.

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AND AS A MAJOR AGGRESSOR
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PROCESS -- A SETTLEMENT
NEIGHBORS --
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WE CAN WITHSTAND ANY SERIOUS SUPPLY
DISRUPTIONS -- WITH THE SUPPORT OF CONFIDENCE AND
ALERTNESS OF DISRUPTIONS.

SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN SIGNED THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT
OF 1978 -- THE FIRST MAJOR ENERGY LAW IN OUR
NATIONAL HISTORY -- OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL HAS
BEEN DRAMATICALLY REDUCED. CONSUMPTION HAS DECREASED
IN BOTH OF THE LAST YEARS. NET OIL IMPORTS
HAVE INCREASED STEADILY SINCE THE FIRST NINE MONTHS
OF THIS YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR OIL CONSUMPTION IS DECLINED BY 25
PERCENT FROM THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR.

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PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY POLICY -- WHICH INCLUDES A WINDFALL TAX ON OIL PROFITS TO PAY FOR NEW FUEL DEVELOPMENT -- WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE STEPPED-UP ENERGY PRODUCTION HERE AT HOME. THE EVIDENCE IS ALREADY APPARENT: COAL PRODUCTION IS UP 16 PERCENT OVER LAST YEAR. A NEW SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. AND WE ARE AGGRESSIVELY PROMOTING SOLAR ENERGY AND OTHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES.

WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO. BUT THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT OVERCOMING OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL SUPPLIES -- AND ABOUT DEALING SKILLFULLY WITH POTENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS OF SUPPLY. THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE EFFORTS.

IV.

MY PURPOSE IN CITING ALL THESE EFFORTS -- MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC -- IS TO UNDERSCORE OUR PROGRESS, NOT TO CLAIM THAT THE JOB IS DONE. IT IS TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT ROAD -- NOT THAT WE RELAX OUR EFFORTS TO FOSTER PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS CRUCIAL REGION OF THE WORLD.

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ACHIEVING OUR PURPOSES WILL NEVER BE EASY. THE REGION IS A TANGLE OF ANCIENT HOSTILITY... OF RELIGIOUS RIVALRY... OF COMPETITION FOR TERRITORY AND INFLUENCE. ITS WEALTH AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE HAVE LONG MADE IT AN ARENA OF COMPETITION AMONG OUTSIDE POWERS.

OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THE REGION ARE COMPLEX AND MAY SOMETIMES SEEM CONTRADICTORY. WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH SEVERAL NATIONS WHICH ARE ADVERSARIES TO ONE ANOTHER. THE VARIETY OF OUR INTERESTS GUARANTEES COMPLEXITY AND DIFFICULTY IN SHAPING OUR POLICIES.

AND WE MUST BE AWARE THAT THE NATIONS OF THIS REGION ARE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT. THIS SENSE OF INDEPENDENCE IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST. THEY ADAMANTLY RESIST DOMINATION BY ANYONE -- BUT THEIR STRONG FEELINGS MAY CAUSE THEM TO MISINTERPRET EVEN FRIENDLY GESTURES AS INTERFERENCE.

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FACED WITH SUCH INTRICATE CHALLENGES, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO RELY SOLELY ON OUR MILITARY FORCES, IMPRESSIVE AS THEY MAY BE, OR ON DIPLOMACY ALONE. BECAUSE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE ARE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT OUR RESPONSES MUST BE EQUALLY VARIED. I CANNOT WARN STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST ONE DIMENSIONAL APPROACHES TO THIS OR ANY OTHER AREA OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

GREAT AS THE DANGERS AND UNCERTAINTIES ARE IN IRAN AND IRAQ -- IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA -- I BELIEVE OUR POLICIES ARE WISE AND PRUDENT.

I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. AND WHILE THE TIMES MAY NOT PERMIT AN EASY OPTIMISM, I DO HAVE FAITH -- FAITH THAT WITH TIME AND PATIENCE AND WISDOM, WE CAN ACHIEVE A COMPELLING AMERICAN OBJECTIVE: TO HELP BUILD PEACE IN THIS TROUBLED REGION -- AND A GREATER MEASURE OF PEACE IN THE WORLD.

THANK YOU.

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03:15:58:10:30

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

P35

October 14, 1980
No. 289

PRESS BRIEFING BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Inglis House, Ann Arbor, Michigan
October 14, 1980

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a fairly broad-based question and get your response to it. Soviet policy-makers' perceptions of American society could be to their perception of American foreign policy intentions. I'm wondering if you could elaborate to us on what you view the Soviet leaders' perceptions of our society, of its values, and the American citizens' regard to its own political system.

Could you elaborate and tell us how that might have its effect in such subtle negotiations as, say, SALT II?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thirty minutes isn't enough to answer that question.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: It was broad-based.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that I could not do justice to the full implications of your question, especially if I was to preserve any time at all for the others in the room.

I'm more concerned immediately with the Soviet perception of American policy, and especially its status, their perception as I took office as Secretary of State, and what may or may not have happened to it since.

There is no question but that the Soviet perception of American policy has something to do with their invasion of Afghanistan. I doubt very much that it was the principal motivating force; but each time that I have discussed their Afghanistan policy with Mr. Gromyko or others, they returned to the theme that our relationship was hardening, largely because of American Government attitudes and policies.

They refer, for example, to what they persist in saying was the President's deliberate rejection of the SALT II Treaty, the Senate's rejection of the SALT II Treaty, as signaling to them a tougher American policy.

For further information contact:

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They referred also to the substantial escalation in U.S. defense expenditures which began a year ago last spring, and which escalated this year, as signaling a harder Soviet line. Those are the two principal points.

With respect to Afghanistan, itself, they justified that invasion as having taken place on the invitation of the Afghanistan Government because of incursions across the Pakistan and Iranian border, and instability within Afghanistan, stimulated by those incursions.

This may be an over-simplified statement of their rationale, but it rests in part, at least, upon their perception of a hardening U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union; and, in that environment, then, they were free to pursue their security interests as they saw them in Afghanistan. That's basically it.

Since that time, we, of course, persisted in the hard lines of our Afghanistan policy, recognizing the limitations, but, nevertheless, with full conviction that we have imposed a cost of them and we are continuing to impose a cost on them. But, at the same time, I've undertaken to persuade them and to lay the ground work for an effort to ratify SALT II.

In other words, from our own perception, we see SALT II as being consistent with our Afghanistan policy, in that both are designed to impose restraints upon the Soviet Union; and the possibility of Soviet adventurism, going beyond Afghanistan, toward the Gulf or elsewhere.

They indicated considerable skepticism about that until fairly recently. I think following my second discussions with Mr. Gromyko in New York two or three weeks ago, and my discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin, and the emergency of SALT II as a campaign issue, they are beginning to accept our statements that we are going to push for SALT II ratification as soon as feasible next year. Of course, time is pressing in terms of the provisions of the Treaty.

I think that's as much of your question as I ought to try to answer. I'm not really an expert on their perception of our society as a whole.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I just returned last night from Belgrade, and much of the discussion there was concerning the UNESCO conference that is going on now. I would like to raise another matter. It appears pertinent to Eastern

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Europe. There is a lot of discussion in Yugoslav circles about their interests and, I think, pleasure with the events that have taken place recently in Poland. I wondered whether you would be able to comment on your expectations of the effect those events might have on other Soviet bloc countries in East Europe, in particular, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: First of all, I should preface my answer with our standing policy with respect to events in Poland, and that is that they are for the Polish people and the Polish Government to deal with and to resolve.

Obviously, you pose the question, as others do, as we pose it to ourselves, because it appears to all of us that there must be a balance between what the Polish Communist Government may be willing to accept by way of liberalization and tolerate within the constraints of their system, and their need to respond to their people's requirements for reform.

That is a difficult balance for outsiders to judge. And with respect to someone in my position, to the extent that I have a judgment, I have to be very circumspect about stating it, because we made it clear to the Soviet Union that we regard this as a problem between the people of Poland and their government, and that we would expect all other outside powers to take the same view.

With respect to what the events in Poland symbolize, they symbolize man's constant striving for freedom, for independence, for liberty, and those ideas never die. At least I don't believe they do, and usually Americans don't believe they do. And that striving, that effort to move toward those values, is evident all over this planet, so it's not strange that it should surface in Poland.

But I have no judgment as to what the balance is which would tip that situation one way or another.

QUESTION: Could I just follow on that point? The Yugoslavs, for example, mentioned that they are seeing quite a lot of reporting coming in on Italian television about what's going on in Poland; and, certainly, the communications systems in Europe are not watertight from country to country. What would our policy be in case of similar sorts of development in other Soviet-block countries in East Europe? Would it be identical to that we are proclaiming in Poland?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've found it never very useful to make policy on the basis of hypotheses. The answers may well be different because the circumstances may be different. I would think that our policy would be the same.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to follow up briefly on --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: May I say, some of us still remember with respect to Hungary, that expectations with respect to possible U.S. involvement at that time may well have exacerbated that tragedy. We ought to be very careful about doing that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could look back on the domestic front with regard to the SALT Treaty. You mentioned the Soviets, your efforts to persuade the Soviets that it was not a lost cause, and that the Administration does intend to get back to the Senate on the Treaty and on the Senate consent to the Treaty next year.

Realizing that we are, of course, in the final stages of the Presidential campaign, and that may to some extent inhibit your answers, I can think of no one better able to tell us what the prospects are for Senate approval by the necessary two-thirds than yourself.

I wonder how you would assess those prospects, then, early next year, assuming the reelection of President Carter and the continuation --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I hope that the prospects will be better early next year than they are now, but I think that they're better now, probably, potentially at least, than they were in January. But maybe not as good as they were, and they were not too good in December of last year.

But, number one, we happen to believe with deepening conviction that it is in our national interests to achieve ratification of SALT II; and, number two, time is running out on us in terms of the provisions of SALT II, some of which are time-constrained. To lose the opportunity of ratifying SALT II, and to take the chances of nevertheless a continuance of the SALT process given that failure, is too serious in terms of our national security interests.

We have to, I think, make the effort for three reasons. We think that we may be in a better position next January.

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Number one, there is a growing perception among our military of the consequences of a SALT-less world, in terms of our national security, in terms of budgetary costs, in terms of the prospects of an escalating and endless arms race. These consequences, I think, have grown with the passage of this year since the invasion of Afghanistan.

Number two, I think there's a growing appreciation and awareness on the part of our people of that fact, and we hope to make use of that and build upon it and to build public support for it in this campaign.

Thirdly, I think few people are aware that time is running out on the Treaty, and as that point is made people will begin to focus on it more sharply, begin to evaluate it more clearly, and we think that when they balance out the pros and cons -- and there will be debate, just as there would have been a year ago -- that they will come down on the side of the SALT II Treaty.

So it's an uphill fight. The President made the decision to make this a campaign issue. Harold Brown and I, as well as the President, have been speaking to it. As a matter of fact, I will make another speech on SALT II this Thursday before the Women's Democratic National Press Club. So that we hope on that side of the campaign -- that is, the issue side, which hasn't been all that strong up to now -- that we can make that clear and that it will carry through beyond November 4, the rest of this year. Perhaps we can have hearings in the post-election period. But we think it is critical that we make the effort.

I think we have persuaded the Russians that we are going to try, and we are, whatever the odds against it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I know that you've probably answered this question a lot in the past couple of weeks so I'm going to ask you --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If I have, then it's an answer that I know.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Would you discuss your feelings of working within the Carter Administration and if you would choose or not choose to work with another Administration again if he is reelected?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: With President Carter?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'll work for him as long as he wants me to. I've found him a comfortable man to work with. I like his approach to his job and to the issues. He's knowledgeable, he's cool, he's prudent, his judgments are valid, but at the same time he's tough. I've never seen him under all the pressures of this campaign -- which has now impacted on him for a year -- I've never seen him anything but relaxed and on top of whatever issue we might be discussing, about foreign policy discussions. His instincts are sound and I like his feelings for the job.

With respect to our personal relationship, it's congenial, he's supportive in every way. He lets me run the Department in my own way and even lets me get out and speak around the country on my own terms. I find it a very comfortable relationship. And the job: There is nobody who has been exposed to this job who wouldn't find it one of the most stimulating and challenging one can imagine.

QUESTION: What about your statement a couple weeks ago that said you were unhappy with your job?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you see, I didn't make those statements. The press put those words into my mouth. I never made those statements to myself, to my wife, let alone to the friends that the newspaper referred to. I mean, it's simply a complete piece of fabrication and fiction.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, taking that question a little further, do you see, if you did choose to reassume your position as Secretary of State, a change in the way the present Administration relates to the State Department as opposed to the National Security Council?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You know, I've just about made up my mind not to answer that question any more, because my answer's always taken out of the context in which I put it and converted into the press's confrontation view of my relationship with Mr. Brzezinski.

I've been in public life for 35 years and I've never found a political institution or government institution that couldn't stand improvement; and, in that context, I would expect I would develop some ideas in the area to which you referred. That's as far as I am going to go, because every

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time I speak to it, then I see the headlines, "Muskie's Going to Cut Down NSC," "Muskie's Going to Get Rid of Brzezinski," Muskie's going to do this or that.

My relationships with Brzezinski are friendly, cordial. You know, there are days when I don't think of him, and there are days he doesn't think of me, unless we happen to pick up the morning papers.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I mean, he has a role to play. It is established by statute, and I recognize that role and I recognize that the President values Zbig's advice and experience and knowledge, and why shouldn't he? He's got every right to.

With respect to institutional arrangements which involve not only State and NSC but State and Defense, State and Commerce, State and Treasury, State and the Special Trade Representatives; and there are foreign policy implications in all of these relationships that I've just ticked off. But I never see a headline to the effect that "Muskie's About to Take Secretary Miller's Job," or "He's Going to Cut Down on Commerce."

I just don't like this confrontational approach when the question is raised. Now you see, I've gone and answered the question more fully than I should have.

QUESTION: Getting beyond the personality part of it, I'm just wondering, say looking back -- not even thinking of today, but looking back, say over the last 15 years of the State Department -- do you think there has been a diminution of the role that the State Department has played in the last 15 years in foreign policy, or do you think it has maintained its position?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There have been some changes that have been made by statute. There are some changes that were made by reorganization. I haven't made that kind of a careful analysis of State's role. I do have some specific ideas that I'm not going to discuss before November 4. After November 4, I'm going to discuss them. Before November 4 they will only be interpreted in one way and I don't think that's helpful.

QUESTION: As you know, Mr. Secretary, there are a lot of unemployed people around here who want to know why we can't do something about the Japanese auto exports. What

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would be the effect on this country if we did what almost all of the other countries -- and certainly the European countries -- in imposing some sort of limitations?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Do you mean on autos?

QUESTION: On our policy. Would it affect the State Department seriously if those restrictions were imposed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If you would define the restrictions you have in mind more clearly, I might be able to answer.

QUESTION: 1976 level.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Import level.

QUESTION: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: For all countries?

QUESTION: Yes, but primarily the Japanese would be affected because of their share of the market.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Why should it be limited to autos? We have shoes and textiles in my part of the country that are import sensitive. The steel industry is import sensitive. Should we, then, abrogate the trade agreement that we ratified and which we passed into many legislations of support?

Remember, with respect to that trade agreement, that there are a number of very positive things. It opens up markets in which we are very competitive. It imposes controls with respect to dumping, subsidies, and other ways that other countries have found to undercut our competitiveness.

It opens up government procurement within the GATT countries, and that involves about \$22 billion of business each year. It opens up that to international competition, and we would be very competitive in that respect. So you have to balance, and there is no international agreement that can conceivably be negotiated in the field of trade or any other that doesn't carry mutual benefits.

There's no way for us to impose our own economic objectives upon other countries. Obviously, if we were to do that sort of thing: Number one, if we were to do it with respect to one in an import sensitive area, I would assume politically you would have to apply it across the board to others in their import sensitive areas.

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Secondly, we would have to expect retaliation against those items as to which we are competitive and have an advantage in foreign markets. You can't have it one way; it has to be two ways.

With respect to the Japanese question, in the automobile issue, there are a number of things that one ought to consider. Number one, as a result of discussions between President Carter and Japanese Foreign Minister Ito, the Japanese have made a decision not to extend their capacity to build automobiles that are competitive with ours.

Number two, they are now making decisions in order to build facilities to manufacture automobiles in this country, which I think is a positive step.

With respect to the question of whether or not Japanese auto imports trigger relief under those provisions of our trade laws that give relief if there is direct injury -- I forget the words of art now -- a domestic injury as a result of imports, that case is before the International Trade Commission, a case brought by the industry and by industry labor. Public hearings are about to start on that question.

With respect to voluntary restrictions of Japanese imports, those could be subject to our own anti-trust laws. So that there are constraints in all of this.

I must say the Japanese understand our problem, they're sympathetic to it, and they're exploring every way that they can to deal with it.

There are other problems that the American automobile industry faces, of course. There's the question of regulation with respect to environmental values, and you find people on both sides of that one in this campaign.

It's a question that the American people can affect and influence, so there are other approaches. Then, of course, there is the final question of whether or not the industry has produced an automobile that the American people want now. There must be a reason why import sales are climbing. There may be more than one reason. We've always been competitive before, and there's no reason why we can't be competitive now.

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We are competitive in other high-technology areas in this country, because we have stayed ahead of our competition. Have we done so in the auto industry? I doubt very much that the answer that your questions suggests would overnight solve the problems in the auto industry. There is a temptation, of course, to resort to that kind of remedy.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am curious to know whether you plan to continue to play a surrogate's role in the election campaign and, if you are concerned about the criticism that that kind of role might diminish the credibility of the Secretary of State on other issues?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, obviously, you have some conception of what role I'm playing. I don't consider that I'm playing a partisan political role in this campaign. Yet I see some of my speeches reported as though -- I made a speech at Notre Dame University on Saturday. I would be glad to give you a copy if I had one. There's nothing political in it. I didn't mention Mr. Reagan's name, except in the opening I said I didn't come to Notre Dame to ask them to win another one for the Gipper.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: To the extent that made it a political speech, why, it's a political speech. Then I read the report on this speech, and in The Washington Post, "Muskie Attacks Reagan's Policies." I didn't refer to a policy as a Reagan policy, I didn't refer to Mr. Reagan by name; yet it was described as a political speech.

You may hear the one I'm going to make here this morning. I don't think you could fairly judge it to be a political speech.

The second point I would make is this: I mean, our foreign policy is being attacked in this campaign. It's being criticized, it's being taken issue with, and I may be presiding over foreign policy in the next Presidential term. And I may be presiding over foreign policies that are shaped and influenced by this campaign.

Now, should the Secretary of State not be involved? Let's take the SALT II issue. Should I not be involved in the discussion of SALT II? Should I not debate our national security interests in the context of SALT II? Not as a partisan political subject, but as an issue?

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Of the 56 persons who have been Secretaries of State, exactly half have been Senators, most of them in the first hundred years of our nation because the job of Secretary of State was regarded as one of the serious political posts in our government, making foreign policy.

Thomas Jefferson was the first, James Madison was Secretary of State, James Monroe was Secretary of State, James G. Blaine from Maine. In that first century the post was held by the top political figures of their time because it was an important political position. Not in a partisan sense. I don't think foreign policy ought to be discussed by a Secretary of State as a political partisan.

Discussing foreign policy, I think, is a vital matter, and I think perhaps we have tended to sanctify the job of Secretary of State to the point where he doesn't actually get down where the people are and understand what moves them and what influences them and what affects them.

So in the sense that the Secretary of State ought to be involved in discussing foreign policy, that's my role. If I go beyond that, I don't attend any partisan functions, I don't attend fund-raisers, even my old friends in the Senate. I stay away from activities that directly promote their candidacies.

But in terms of talking about foreign policy, as I am here, what's the difference? Here I am talking to you. Is this a partisan political gathering? Have you got a right to ask me questions about foreign policy? You're going to print my answers in your media. Does that make this a political event? Does this make my comments political comments?

You judge. If I were to take that standard, then I should hold no press conferences, I should run away from every reporter who accosts me in the street with a microphone. I should say nothing, do nothing, go off on a vacation for the period of the election campaign.

I don't believe that's what the American people expect.

QUESTION: Very broadly speaking, the subject that he's asking really is the character and role of the Secretary of Stateship; and some of your predecessors have been described as, very broadly speaking, non-political and are characterized as perceiving the job of Secretary of State as essentially a non-political job.

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An alternative characterization would be that the Secretary of Stateship is, at heart, a political job; not in the partisan sense as you suggest, but, broadly speaking, it is a political job and its effectiveness in being carried out is, very broadly speaking, a political matter.

Would you ascribe to one or the other or both points of view?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I doubt that any Secretary of State, that I can think of, did not recognize that it was a political job in the odd sense that I refer to. I am sure that Henry Kissinger understood its political implications. I am sure that Dean Acheson did. Of course, it's a political job, but I think it was misstated. I think that when I took this job, I said it was political in two senses.

One, that I was from politics. I was a politician, so that made it political in that respect.

Number two, in the broad sense that your question refers to, it's political; and I think that every Secretary of State really understands that. But may we refer to bipartisan foreign policies, too, as though they were real. Do you see anything bipartisan about any foreign policy in this political campaign? There isn't a damn thing that's bipartisan about it.

There are two very clear-cut views of what foreign policy ought to be. I think it's as clear a distinction as I've ever seen in a Presidential campaign, if one examines it. I don't think the press has done a very good job in identifying the substantive differences in foreign policy, legitimate differences.

Mr. Reagan has a point of view that's shared by millions of Americans about foreign policy. So in that sense it's a point of view that has every right to be expressed, and he's expressing it; not always as clearly as he might, but then I'm not always as clear as I'd like to be. President Carter represents a different one.

There are two very different views of what our foreign policy ought to be, and they ought to be discussed.

MR. TRATTNER: Can we have one final question?

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QUESTION: How do foreign people and governments perceive the American election process and how is that affecting your job?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They're always a little puzzled about us Americans, just as we're always a little puzzled about them. They're very conscious of this election campaign, and they all assume that our policy-making functions are somewhat atrophied during the political campaign; that there are things that we can't do, there are things that have to be delayed.

Yes, I have a very strong impression how they regard the campaign and its outcome, but I don't think I'd better get into that.

MR. TRATTNER: Let's get one very last question.

QUESTION: I think we really should ask what your current assessment is of the Iran and Iraq situation, and what the U.S. goal would be there, if it is to return to the ante-bellum status quo? Also, how can we help influence that, the fighting to return to that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, our policy is, as you know, one of neutrality as between the two combatants.

Number two, hostilities ought to be somehow brought to an end as soon as possible, and we support all efforts to do that -- the Islamic Conference, the UN, the non-aligned countries -- in any way that we can influence them.

We have made our views very clear to the Soviet Union in my meetings with Mr. Gromyko, and he has stated Soviet policy to be the same. But, of course, we watch each other carefully to see whether or not that is the case.

We are not, of course, oblivious to the threat of the oil pipeline and the potential risk for our friends in the area, notably Saudi Arabia and some of the oil-producing countries. So we are not neutral to the importance of defending their interests, as we've done in sending the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, defensively; it has no offensive capability.

Of course, we are concerned about keeping the sea lanes through the Persian Gulf open. We will continue to do so. We don't see any present threat to them, but if the war is prolonged and, if it threatens to tilt precipitously against

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Iran, one never knows what Iran's reaction might be, and that concerns us.

What we are trying to do is contain the conflict, end it, get to the negotiating table, by indirect and direct means. The longer it proceeds, and if it widens, we're concerned about the possibility of a widening war, either by accident because of the Iranian reaction or Iraqi reaction. Or we're concerned about the possibility of an Iran so undermined as to constitute a temptation to others.

There are all sorts of risks that one can spell out, and it's not particularly useful to spell them out too explicitly.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you feel you have any restraining power on the Iraqi policy in this situation?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Do we have any restraining power?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the prospects of a widening war have the possibility of super-power intervention is the restraint. I don't think the Iraqis, of course, would like to emerge as a dominant power in the area; that's quite clear. We would like to replace the Iran of the Shah's day as the dominant power in the area. But I think their objectives, with respect to this particular war, were very limited at the outset. They simply wanted to reestablish their control over the disputed territory. The Foreign Minister of Iraq told me they did not want a piece of Iranian territory. Of course, what is Iranian or not is disputed, but, inevitably, it was limited and it was their desire to achieve a quick victory and end the hostilities. But things don't always work out in that well planned a way.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The press conference concluded at 10:47 a.m.)

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PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 16, 1980
No. 290

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
WOMAN'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB
Washington, D.C.
October 16, 1980

I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH AN ORGANIZATION I HAVE LONG RESPECTED -- THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB.

GIVEN THE SENSITIVITIES THESE DAYS ABOUT POLITICAL SECRETARIES OF STATE, I WAS TEMPTED TO REFER TO YOU SIMPLY AS THE "WOMEN'S NATIONAL CLUB."

IT'S A TEMPTATION, YOU'LL NOTICE, I RESISTED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPENDING MOST OF THE TIME WE HAVE TOGETHER DISCUSSING THE QUESTIONS YOU HAVE ON YOUR MIND.

BUT I WANT TO SPEND A FEW MINUTES AT THE OUTSET TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING THAT IS VERY MUCH ON MY MIND: THE FUTURE OF THE SALT II TREATY AND, INDEED, OF ARMS CONTROL ITSELF.

AS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, I LISTENED CAREFULLY TO THE DEBATE OVER THE TREATY.

I REACHED A CLEAR AND FIRM CONCLUSION: THAT RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY, IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IS STRONGLY IN THE INTEREST OF THIS NATION.

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NONETHELESS, AS A PROPONENT OF THE TREATY, I SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEEK A POSTPONEMENT OF FULL SENATE DEBATE ON THE TREATY IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN LAST DECEMBER.

IT WAS CLEAR THAT OUR ATTENTION -- AS A GOVERNMENT AND A PEOPLE -- NEEDED TO BE FOCUSED ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET ACTION, AND ON A STRONG US AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE.

AND IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET INVASION MADE THE ROAD TO RATIFICATION EVEN STEEPER.

THE SOVIETS REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. THAT IS A FACT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO IGNORE.

AS A NATION THAT CHERISHES OUR FREEDOM, WE MUST BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE FROM MILITARY AGGRESSION.

AND WE CANNOT IGNORE THE THREAT THAT THE SOVIET INVASION POSES TO A REGION VITAL NOT ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO THE WORLD. WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED TO PROTECT THOSE VITAL INTERESTS.

SO LONG AS SOVIET FORCES REMAIN THERE, AFGHANISTAN CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO RECEDE FROM OUR ATTENTION -- OR FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA.

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THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AGGRESSION WILL BE RESISTED -- AND THAT THE ONLY BASIS UPON WHICH AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS CAN PROCEED IS ONE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE SALT II ASSURES AN APPRECIABLE MEASURE OF RESTRAINT ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES -- RESTRAINT THAT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE LACKING WITHOUT THE TREATY -- THAT WE SHOULD RATIFY THE SALT II TREATY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE SHOULD DO FOR THE SOVIETS; IT IS SOMETHING WE MUST DO FOR OURSELVES. FOR THE TREATY REDUCES THE THREATS WE WOULD OTHERWISE FACE OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

LET ME VERY BRIEFLY GIVE YOU SOME EXAMPLES OF WHAT I MEAN BY THAT.

-- WITHOUT THE TREATY, THE SOVIETS CAN DEPLOY 25% MORE STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND MISSILES BY 1985 THAN THEY CAN IF THE TREATY IS IN FORCE.

-- WITHOUT THE TREATY, WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY WILL HAVE SEVERAL THOUSAND MORE INDIVIDUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THOSE BOMBERS AND MISSILES BY 1985 THAN THEY COULD UNDER THE TREATY.

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EACH OF THEIR HEAVY MISSILES ALONE COULD CARRY 20-30 NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSTEAD OF THE 10 PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY.

-- WITHOUT THE TREATY, THERE IS NO PROHIBITION ON EITHER PARTY CONCEALING THEIR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS ... FROM PUTTING THE SIGNALS FROM THEIR MISSILE TESTS IN CODE, OR SIMPLY HIDING THEIR PROGRAMS FROM OUR SATELLITES AND OTHER TECHNICAL MONITORING.

-- WITHOUT THE TREATY, WE WOULD, IN EFFECT, KNOW LESS ABOUT MORE. OUR ABILITY TO OBSERVE SOVIET MILITARY EFFORTS COULD BE SEVERELY IMPAIRED AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO AGREED LIMITS ON WHAT THEY COULD DO. IN SUCH AN UNRESTRAINED ENVIRONMENT, OUR OWN DEFENSE PLANNING BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT ... LESS CERTAIN ... MORE COSTLY.

-- WITHOUT THE TREATY WE COULD BE FORCED TO SPEND MORE OF OUR DOLLARS ON STRATEGIC PROGRAMS THAN NOW PLANNED, AT THE EXPENSE OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND OUR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES, OR THROUGH NEW TAX BURDENS.

THE TREATY ACHIEVES THESE RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY INTERFERING WITH OUR OWN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

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THE MX MISSILE ... CRUISE MISSILES ... OUR NEW TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND MISSILE -- ALL OF THE PROGRAMS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS TO ASSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN A STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN THE 1980s CAN AND WILL PROCEED ON SCHEDULE UNDER THE SALT AGREEMENT.

CLEARLY, THIS TREATY DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO THE ARMS RACE ... OR THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. THE DANGERS INHERENT IN TWO, MASSIVELY ARMED NUCLEAR STATES, WILL PERSIST.

BUT THE TREATY REDUCES THOSE DANGERS -- BY MAKING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE MORE STABLE ... BY REDUCING THE UNCERTAINTIES THAT CAN LEAD TO A FATAL MISCALCULATION BY EITHER SIDE ... BY AVOIDING THE RISK OF POURING NEW BILLIONS INTO A STEPPED-UP ARMS RACE THAT WILL BUY US LESS, NOT MORE, SECURITY.

THAT IS WHY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORT EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY. THAT IS WHY ALL OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES STRONGLY URGE US TO RATIFY IT PROMPTLY.

THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT WHEN THE SENATE RECONVENES, HE WILL CONSULT WITH THE LEADERSHIP WITH A VIEW TOWARD RESUMING SENATE CONSIDERATION AND BRINGING THE TREATY TO A VOTE AS SOON AS THAT IS PRACTICAL. FOR WE MUST UNDERSTAND A CRITICAL FACT ABOUT THIS TREATY: WE CAN LOSE ITS BENEFITS NOT ONLY THROUGH REJECTION BUT ALSO THROUGH INACTION.

IN THE MONTHS SINCE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED,

BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE AVOIDED ACTIONS THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE TREATY. AS TIME GOES ON, HOWEVER, SUCH VOLUNTARY SELF-RESTRAINT MAY BECOME LESS TENABLE.

THE AGREEMENTS INVOLVE TIMETABLES -- SCHEDULES THAT WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE BARGAIN. THOSE TIMETABLES ARE RUNNING. THERE ARE SPECIFIC ACTIONS CALLED FOR IN 1981; THE SOVIETS, FOR EXAMPLE, MUST DISMANTLE SYSTEMS THAT WOULD PLACE THEM ABOVE THE NEW LIMITS. AND WHILE THE TREATY ITSELF DOES NOT EXPIRE UNTIL 1985, THERE IS A SEPARATE PROTOCOL THAT EXPIRES AT THE END OF 1981. AS THE PROTOCOL SHRINKS, THE BARGAIN COULD UNRAVEL.

IN SHORT, AS LAWYERS LIKE TO SAY, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. AND TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

WE MUST MAKE OUR DECISION OR IT WILL BE MADE FOR US -- BY DEFAULT.

* * *

I HAVE STRESSED THE CONCRETE, IMMEDIATE BENEFITS TO US OF THE SALT II TREATY, BECAUSE I BELIEVE THEY CONSTITUTE AN OVERWHELMING CASE FOR RATIFYING THE TREATY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

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BUT THERE IS SOMETHING EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING AT
STAKE IN OUR DECISION ON THIS TREATY: IT IS
THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL ITSELF.

SEVEN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAVE PURSUED,
WITH THE DEEPEST CONVICTION, THE EFFORT TO CONTROL
HUMANKIND'S MOST TERRIFYING CREATIONS. THAT
PROCESS HAS BEEN PAINFULLY SLOW, FAILING TO KEEP
PACE WITH THE TECHNOLOGY WE SEEK TO LIMIT.

BUT IT HAS PRODUCED A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS
THAT HAVE MADE A DANGEROUS WORLD LESS DANGEROUS:

-- THE BAN ON POISONOUS NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN
THE ATMOSPHERE;

... THE 'ABM' TREATY WHICH HEADED OFF A PERILOUS
AND COSTLY RACE IN THESE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS;

... THE SALT I AGREEMENT WHICH FROZE THE
LEVEL OF STRATEGIC MISSILES AT A TIME WHEN THE
SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP AND WE WERE NOT;

... AND NOW THIS SALT II AGREEMENT.

IF WE TURN OUR BACK ON THIS TREATY, WE
WILL NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE PROGRESS WE HAVE
MADE; WE WILL ENTER AN UNCERTAIN NEW WORLD -- AN
INDEFINITE PERIOD WITHOUT THE BINDING RESTRAINTS
OF SALT II, OR EVEN THE EXPIRED SALT I AGREEMENT.

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AND WHILE WE TRY TO PICK UP THE PIECES AND START AGAIN, THE TECHNOLOGY OF MODERN STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL NOT STAND STILL. IT WILL MOVE AHEAD. WE WILL HAVE TO REACH EVEN FURTHER TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE, WITHOUT THE FOUNDATION WE HAVE ALREADY BUILT.

WHAT IS ALREADY HARD COULD BECOME HOPELESS: TO GAIN CONTROL OVER AN ARMS RACE THAT IMPERILS THE FUTURE OF ALL HUMANITY.

OUR ALLIES UNDERSTAND THIS REALITY. EACH OF THEM STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE TREATY ... BECAUSE THEY SEE THEIR STAKE IN A STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND BECAUSE THEY SEE SALT II AS A NECESSARY STEP ON THE PATH TO FURTHER LIMITS AND FURTHER REDUCTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY SEE RATIFICATION OF SALT II AS A PREREQUISITE TO FULL-SCALE NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN SALT III. WITHDRAWAL OF THIS TREATY WOULD BE A PROFOUND BLOW TO THE ALLIANCE.

AND IT WOULD SEVERELY UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO WORK FOR ARMS CONTROL ELSEWHERE. OUR ABILITY TO SEEK RESTRAINT FROM NATIONS ON THE VERGE OF ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BADLY SUFFER IF

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OUR OWN COMMITMENT TO MUTUAL RESTRAINT IS CALLED INTO QUESTION.

FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BE SEEN AS THE OPPONENT OF ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE A PROPAGANDA COUP OF ENORMOUS VALUE TO OUR ADVERSARIES. OUR CREDIBILITY... OUR STANDING IN THE WORLD AS A NATION OF PEACE ... ALSO RESTS ON THE FATE OF THIS TREATY.

* * *

SOME SUGGEST THAT WE CAN PRESERVE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS -- AND OBTAIN A BETTER TREATY -- BY REOPENING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I AM CONVINCED THAT IS A PRESCRIPTION NOT FOR PROGRESS, BUT FOR BREAK-DOWN.

THIS TREATY IS A PRODUCT OF SEVEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATION, BY PRESIDENTS NIXON, FORD AND CARTER. LIKE ALL COMPLEX AGREEMENTS, IT IS A SERIES OF SMALLER BARGAINS TIED TOGETHER IN AN OVERALL BALANCE BOTH SIDES SEE TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST.

CAN WE REASONABLY EXPECT TO EXTRACT GREATER CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIETS WHILE GIVING NO CONCESSIONS IN RETURN? THAT WOULD NOT BE A FORMULA FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT FOR STALEMATE -- WHILE THE SOVIETS ACQUIRED ARMS THIS TREATY WOULD DENY THEM.

AND IF AT THE SAME TIME, OUR NATION WERE PROCLAIMING A NEW STRATEGIC DOCTRINE -- A DOCTRINE OF "SUPERIORITY" -- THE PROSPECTS OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVAPORATE.

WHETHER IT IS CALLED "SUPERIORITY" OR "MARGIN OF SAFETY," THIS DOCTRINE REJECTS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF THIS TREATY -- THAT THE GREATEST SAFETY COMES FROM AN OVERALL BALANCE IN OUR FORCES. IT PROCLAIMS, IN EFFECT, THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT NO TREATY UNLESS IT IS UNBALANCED -- UNLESS AN EDGE FOR THE UNITED STATES IS LOCKED IN.

THAT IS THE UNMISTAKABLE MEANING OF THE TERMS. IF ONE PARTY REQUIRES "SUPERIORITY", THE OTHER MUST ACCEPT INFERIORITY; IF ONE DEMANDS A MARGIN OF SAFETY, THE OTHER MUST ACCEPT A MARGIN OF PERIL.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE -- OR RENEGOTIATE -- ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ON THAT BASIS, FOR THEY WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIABLE.

* * *

OUR NATION FACES A BASIC CHOICE: WHETHER WE WILL SECURE THE BENEFITS OF THIS TREATY AND MOVE ON TO FURTHER LIMITS IN SALT III, OR WHETHER WE WILL TEAR UP THIS AGREEMENT AND TRY TO START OVER AT SQUARE ONE.

IN MY THIRTY-FIVE YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, I CAN THINK OF FEW NATIONAL DECISIONS WITH MORE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES.

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THE PATH WE TAKE ON THIS FATEFUL QUESTION
WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE FOR YEARS TO COME.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE INVENTION OF MAN.
THEY CANNOT BE UN-INVENTED. BUT JUST AS WE MET THE
EARLIER CHALLENGE OF SPLITTING THE ATOM, WE MUST SUMMON
THE SAME DETERMINATION, THE SAME UNFALTERING
COMMITMENT TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THESE INSTRUMENTS
OF SELF-DESTRUCTION UNDER SENSIBLE CONTROL.

SALT II IS AT THE HEART OF THAT QUEST.

I KNOW THAT RATIFICATION WILL BE DIFFICULT.

BUT I ALSO KNOW THAT IT IS NECESSARY.

* * *

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THIS IS A POLITICAL GROUP. THE COUNTRY IS INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. AND THE ISSUE I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING -- THE FUTURE OF SALT II AND THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS -- IS ALSO A POLITICAL ISSUE.

IT IS NOT A PARTISAN ISSUE. THE DEBATE LAST YEAR DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE ARE PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE.

BUT IT IS AN ISSUE THAT IS CLEARLY AND STARKLY JOINED IN THIS CAMPAIGN FOR PRESIDENT.

PRESIDENT CARTER ... HIS SECRETARY OF STATE... AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ARE COMMITTED WITH EVERY OUNCE OF OUR ENERGY TO GAIN RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY, AND TO PRESS FORWARD WITH THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF A STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE PRESIDENT'S OPPONENT WOULD TEAR UP THIS TREATY AND EMBARK UPON A QUEST FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY THAT WOULD NOT ONLY HEAT UP THE ARMS RACE BUT FREEZE THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL.

THIS IS A CLEAR ISSUE ... A MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE ... A CHOICE WHICH THIS CAMPAIGN SHOULD HELP CLARIFY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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AND I WOULD FAIL IN MY DUTY TO HELP DEFINE
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IF
I FAILED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE NOW ... AND MAKE THIS
FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE CLEAR.

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PRESS

(P37)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 17, 1980
No. 290A



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE
ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
WOMENS' NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB
Washington, D.C.
October 16, 1980

PRESIDENT WILLIAMS: The Secretary of State would have far preferred it if we, with our questions, had the logistic capabilities of having you just stand at your places and ask anything you would like to ask. Everyone understands that is not possible here.

Do write your questions. Hostesses are moving around to bring them up. I want everyone to understand you can ask any questions that you would like, and any sorting that you see me doing is not trying to weed out any questions; it is simply trying to consolidate. We normally have numbers of questions on the same subject.

The first question: Do you see Iran's Prime Minister's visit to the United Nations as a hopeful sign in the hostage issue? And will you or some other U.S. official try to meet with him?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no way of knowing what his objectives may be beyond the stated one that he intends to participate in the Security Council debate on the Iraq-Iran war and Iran's interest in the Security Council condemnation of the Iraqi attack.

Whether or not he has objectives beyond that that may impact upon the hostage issue is something that we have yet to determine. We indicated early on in this hostage issue our willingness to discuss at any time with representatives of the Government of Iran this hostage question. In my letter to Prime Minister Rajai when he was selected, I indicated that willingness a second time. And then in New York, on the occasion of the opening of the General Assembly, at a time when I met with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, I indicated my interest in meeting with the representative of Iran. So the door is open for such discussions. Whether or not such discussions will materialize is something I cannot, at this point, predict.

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For further information contact:

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QUESTION: What is the justification for the sale of nuclear fuel to such an unstable and volatile nation as India?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, without commenting on the last part of that question -- I doubt that that's an accurate description from my point of view -- but with respect to the Tarapur fuel decision, let me say that on the non-proliferation issue alone, I think that the decision to send two shipments to India is justified.

We entered into a contract with India in 1963 to provide fuel for the Tarapur reactor, and in return for that commitment, we received India's contractual commitment to honor international safeguards with respect to that reactor and the spent fuel produced by that reactor.

If we were to refuse to send the fuel requirements of that reactor, India could -- and presumably would -- conclude that we had abrogated that agreement unilaterally, and that they were no longer subject to the restraints imposed upon them by the Agreement. Presumably, they would then begin reprocessing the spent fuel which Tarapur has generated, reprocessing it not only for the purpose of refueling the Tarapur reactor, but also for whatever other purposes served their interest as they saw it, shipment to other countries, generation of plutonium which is, of course, a weapons-usable material, and so on. So, although our Agreement with India in 1963, which was entered into long before the non-proliferation regime within which we now judge this facility, that agreement, although it does not apply across the board to India's nuclear program, does apply to this particular facility, and we saw merit, from a number of points of view, in continuing with our obligation under that agreement.

Obviously, there are two sides to this question, and others will have to present the other side.

QUESTION: Under the SALT II treaty, do you feel the proposed monitoring supposedly allowed us under that treaty will really give us an effective insight into what the Russians are doing arms-wise?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It is the judgment of the experts in this field who know more about the technical means for monitoring Soviet capabilities that that is the case. As I'm sure all of us know in a generalized way -- those of us who are not experts -- that when these weapons are tested, they are tested and they emit signals so that those who launch them can evaluate their performance. Those signals can also be read by us so that we can evaluate their performance.

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Encryption, which is the art of scrambling the signals so that they cannot be read by the other side, is an art available to each of us, to deny information to the other side. We have long ago accepted the idea that these technical means, as a substitute for the physical opportunities for verification which were discussed in the earlier days of the nuclear age, is something that adds to deterrents and adds to our ability to achieve stability in the nuclear arms race.

Up to now, we have both honored the objective of permitting the other side to read those signals, but encryption can be used -- and presumably would be used -- to deny us that kind of information if arms control collapses.

QUESTION: This question is addressed to both Secretary Muskie and Ambassador Linowitz: Rumors are ripe that in the autonomy talks, Israel has agreed to give up even more in their quest for peace. Where do the negotiations stand now?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I would not presume to try to substitute for an upper classman in answering a question of that kind. (Laughter) I don't believe, from my own discussions with Sol -- and he surely is free and welcome to respond to the question; I'm not sure what restraints he feels himself subject to, since these discussions are confidential -- but I think that that may be an over-statement of what has happened. But my impression is that both sides have brought a very positive attitude to the talks, and are responding to the Memorandum of Understanding which was developed by Sol and his team at the request of the parties, and that there are exchanges, there are changes in points of view that Sol regards as constructive. I hope I haven't overstated the situation, but I think that is a more accurate description of what is happening than the question might imply.

QUESTION: Is there any substance to press reports that Iran is offering to release hostages if we provide spare parts for their military equipment?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've seen the rumors. (Laughter)

QUESTION: I have such a hard time reading everybody's handwriting. He's supposed to give longer answers.
(Laughter)

In reference to the Iraq-Iran war, doesn't it show that the so-called Palestinian question is not the only, or even the main issue in the Middle East has the media often imply -- kind of after the media today!

There are deep divisions in Arab lands and societies, aren't there? Please discuss this... ..

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: As you can see, I can read more than one language. (Laughter)

The question does make an obvious point that sometimes eludes Israel's enemies and others who have different points of view as to how the Israel-Arab issues ought to be resolved. Clearly, there are other sources of instability and other possible confrontations and divisions in the Middle East than the Palestinian question. That doesn't mean that any source of instability, including the Palestinian question, ought not to be resolved if we can find the means to do so; but from the perspective of supporters of Israel who felt themselves beleaguered by those who think there is only one issue, and only the issue that involves Israel, there may be some comfort in this broadening of the focus. But I don't find comfort in war in whatever form it comes or from whatever source. And I'm sure that those who prompt this question, including the leaders of Israel, see the continuation of this war as a disservice to Israel's interests as well as to that of all nations.

QUESTION: This may be redundant, but from our own self-interest point of view, what are the advantages to an Iranian victory or to an Iraqi victory in the present war?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Those are both hypothetical.

I repeat what I just said, that the pursuit of this war to either conclusion suggested by the question raises risks that are unacceptable from the point of view of those who seek peace as the answer to the situation in the Middle East.

Continuation of the war in that particular area of the world carries more risk to people from more different sources and from a wider range of potential power than almost any other place on the face of the globe. Its continuation is the highest risk I can consider, and it should not be pursued to victory for either side.

QUESTION: Do you see Nicaragua going the way of Cuba?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: May I put it in this way? What you have in Nicaragua and other countries in Central America is a competition between the left and the right -- some would say the extreme left and the extreme right -- both of them inclined to use violence. What we are seeking to do in Nicaragua and other countries of Central America is to support moderates in the hope that a moderate political solution can be achieved by them, the people in the center, with the proper, appropriate support.

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In the case of Nicaragua, we are supporting the junta because the junta represents the moderates; it includes civilian elements which have now established control over the Nicaraguan military. And the junta is working with the private sector to seek to deepen and broaden its support, looking eventually toward elections and a restoration of the democratic process. In other words, as between the three horses in that race, that's the one, the moderate one, that we regard in the best interests of Nicaragua, the Caribbean, and our own national interests.

There is the risk of losing that race, obviously. If violence continues promoted from the left or the right, and of course, in the effort to maintain order, it also springs out of the government's actions itself. So it is a risky proposition. I won't say high risk at this point because I think progress has been made, and we will continue to support that progress.

QUESTION: What is Governor Reagan's program for arms control, if any?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I promised not to make a political speech. I get in trouble with these folks down here if I deal in any issues on an ad hominem basis. But in my prepared speech, I think I described the choices in the end that we face in this campaign on the arms control issue, and I've framed that issue as objectively and clearly as I understand it to be. And I think that contains the answer to the question.

QUESTION: We find it impossible to not think politically, you see. We just can't stop ourselves.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But you don't have to be Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Yes. We don't have to be Secretaries of State. We're glad you are.

We understand you devoted earlier attention to improving the stature of women in the State Department. We would like to know what steps you have in mind for the future improvement of the stature of women in the State Department?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I'm interested not only in improving their stature but also their numbers, which is a way to get at it, of course. We do have an affirmative action program in the State Department, and I think Secretary Vance had a great deal to do with its improvement and progress.

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There are a number of complicating factors: Number one, it takes time for turn-over in the State Department. I mean as people retire or go on to other pursuits, vacancies occur, so you have that question that is involved in how to make room for women and for minorities -- women, of course, are a majority, not a minority, I'm constantly reminded. (Laughter)

Then, there is the question of recruitment and training. On these two fronts, I think the training program is proceeding well, and I think we ought to work at the recruitment thing.

The other day, I did three television spots. It was my suggestion that I do it, that hopefully, stations will use all over the country urging women and minorities to positively pursue a career in the Foreign Service. I think it is a very exciting thing, and I thought that perhaps if the Secretary of State -- whoever he happened to be at the time -- made that.

In other words, the Outreach Program has to be strengthened but on these three points, the people in charge of it are dedicated to it, and incidentally, my sense is that not only is it the target of a particular agency within the State Department to pursue, but the commitment is spread through all the agencies of the State Department so that it is not the sole responsibility of one agency, but of every agency as it seeks to recruit its personnel to pursue these objectives of bringing women and minorities into the State Department.

I hope the day may come when I can look out and see a representative group of Americans from that point of view. I might add that I've been highly impressed by the quality of people I've found in the State Department, men and women, younger and older. I have no complaints on that score. (Applause)

QUESTION: We have a number of questions on SALT II. Do you plan to get SALT ratified before January? Can the Senate meet at a special session?

This questioner says 34 senators, under the Constitution, can veto the SALT II treaty. How can the Administration possibly overcome this 34-senator veto power?

Another question says: Can we make progress in SALT while the Soviets are still in Afghanistan? You may address those in any order that you'd like.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the timetable, we have considered the one suggested here -- before January. That seems the least likely possibility, given the time constraints and the other business that the Congress

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must complete after the election in its special post-election session which will last from November 15 to December 15. Even if one added the rest of the year, that's a pretty tight time frame.

Secondly, I suspect it will be critical to have additional hearings, given the passage of time and the different focus and perspective that gives us on the issue, and to help build, of course, support.

With respect to the difficulty of getting the two-thirds vote, Sol knows something about that, and he knows it's possible to go from less than 50 percent of the Senate to two-thirds of the Senate if one works at it hard enough and works on public opinion, which brings me to the last question: Afghanistan.

We've labored with the apparent -- and I underline apparent -- inconsistency of maintaining our policies with respect to Afghanistan against Soviet actions there and at the same time proceeding with SALT. Today's speech was constructed with the view to indicating and suggesting the compatibility of the two objectives.

If we had no Afghanistan-like problems with the Soviet Union, we wouldn't have to be so worried about what they would use nuclear weapons for. It's because we are competitive, because we are superpowers, because there are risks that could provoke violent confrontations between us that we came to an appreciation of the importance of arms control in the first place.

An arms control treaty between the United States and Canada isn't all that important, not because Canada isn't important, but because the likelihood of that kind of a confrontation doesn't exist there. So, it's in the one situation in which that possibility exists that we need to reach agreements that impose restraint. That's why in our judgment, the pursuit of SALT II ratification and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are perfectly compatible and consistent objectives.

With respect to making up this gap of votes, I'm sure that we start behind. I suspect that even without Afghanistan, we had less than 50 votes for ratification on January 1 of this year; but I have always felt -- and I said this to the Russians -- that but for Afghanistan, a full debate on the Senate floor, and especially one covered on television, which I think is what would have been arranged, that public support for the treaty could be developed; and it is only with public support that we can hope to get Senate support.

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People criticize the Congress, I think, largely because it is too representative of the people. (Laughter) Well, proceeding on that assumption, what we want to do is to create a constituency for SALT II among our people.

And that is the reason for this speech. I knew if I spoke in a political forum to this speech that I'd get the kind of attention that enables me to speak to the country on this issue. (Laughter) and that's what this meeting is all about. (Applause)

QUESTION: It was reported that the President has requested you to move Congress to give more assistance to developing countries. Have you been involved in this as yet?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You bet your boots I have.

I'm not going to make a foreign aid speech here on top of the one I've already made; but of the subjects which I've discussed in this campaign and before, that one has been at the top of my list.

I had the opportunity and the privilege the other day of speaking on the anniversary of John Kennedy's first Peace Corps speech at the University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor, this week. Incidentally, I confronted hecklers for the first time since the 1968 campaign, and had as much fun this time as I did 12 years ago. But I converted that into a foreign aid speech. I think it is terribly important.

Again, we have got to get to our people because the support in Congress simply is not sufficient, and we need to get the people to prod the Congress, and it's possible to do that. You know, when one considers that between now and the year 2000, which is 20 years, less than the years I spent in the Senate, the population of this globe will climb from 4-1/2 billion to 6 billion people. That increase is more than the entire population of the planet in 1950. Ninety percent of that increase will take place in the developing world. It seems to me that one needs only ponder the implications of those facts to understand the importance of creating opportunities for food, justice, and decent standards of living for those growing numbers of people.

There are 15 million refugees around this world -- on every continent. Refugees from what? Refugees from home and country. What prompts people to leave home and country? Unacceptable living conditions, persecution -- all of the ingredients of those situations which can be improved by a determined, wide, and focused effort on the part of those nations whom the Good Lord has blessed.

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It is in our own interest to spend the dollars, to spend the resources, to send out the people to provide the expertise, the technical know-how. At the moment, our foreign aid resources, which are all too limited, are focused on helping people grow their own food, deal with their own health problems, teach their own children.

You know, the average age of people in the most disadvantaged countries has grown from 35 to 50 since World War II, even given the inadequacies of the efforts that have been made.

This story could unfold, and I can't think of an audience in America which wouldn't be impressed with the importance in our own interest of doing this job more effectively. It's a road to peace; it's a road to stability -- it's more than a charitable effort. It's something we must do, just as we must do it in communities for the gap between unacceptable poverty and excessive wealth is too wide. That is the lesson of history, and I hope we don't forget it when history is running at such a fast pace in the last 20 years of this century. (Applause)

QUESTION: One final question: We would feel better about the future if you would assure us that you will remain as Secretary of State. Will you? (Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Aside from being my wife's husband, I can't think of a job I'd rather have. (Applause)

PRESIDENT WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Ambassador Linowitz and head table guests. Thank you for joining us, and have a good afternoon.

(At 2:00 p.m., the meeting/luncheon adjourned.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 19, 1980

No. 292

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON ABC-TV'S "ISSUES AND ANSWERS"
WITH
BOB CLARK, ABC'S CHIEF CORRESPONDENT
AND
BARRIE DUNSMORE, ABC-TV'S DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

* * * * *

The State Department
October 19, 1980

For further information contact:

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MR. CLARK: Iran's Prime Minister indicated yesterday that the prospects for the release of the American hostages would improve if we removed our radar planes from Saudi Arabia and kept Jordan from helping Iraq in the war between Iran and Jordan (sic). He also said that Iran's Parliament would set the conditions for the release of the hostages very soon.

Where does this all leave us? Does it give us any cause of optimism about the hostage issue?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the prediction that the Majlis may act soon, we have heard statements like that so many times over recent weeks, indeed, that we've learned not to raise our expectations. I hope it does act soon, and there are some indications that it may.

With respect to the AWACS and Jordan issues, I think first that they ought to be put in the perspective of two principles which the President announced early in the hostage crisis: one, that we would of course pursue the safe and prompt release of the hostages as soon as possible. The second principle was that we would do nothing that was not consistent with our national interests and national honor.

Having said that, with respect to the two issues which Mr. Rajai raised yesterday, I consider them to be expressions of concern by Iran on the two points -- AWACS and the posture of the Government of Jordan. With respect to AWACS, we deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia at the Saudis' request. They are friends; we share mutual interest in the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. We are interested in preserving the territorial integrity of the Saudis. The AWACS is a purely defensive piece of technology that has the radar capacity to see longer distances than any capability which the Saudis had at the time. It has no offensive capability. The information which is produced by AWACS goes only to the Saudis. It does not go to either of the belligerents, as suggested by Mr. Rajai yesterday; and we have indicated this through appropriate channels to the Iranian Government directly.

With respect to Jordan, we have said to Jordan, as we have to all nations -- you will recall that I had some 50 or more bilateral meetings at the United Nations just two or three weeks ago -- we have said to all nations that we are impartial, that it is in our interests and the interests of all nations to bring the hostilities to an end and to do nothing which would have the effect of widening it or prolonging it. We have said that to Jordan as we have said it to other nations. Jordan, of course, is a sovereign nation and will have to make its own decisions. But our own view with respect to any actions which would have the effect of widening or prolonging the war is clear to Jordan and other countries.

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MR. CLARK: Mr. Secretary, just talking about the AWACS or radar planes for a moment, you give the impression that there is no room for compromise in our position on this; that if this was intended to be a condition set for release of the hostages, it is a condition that is unacceptable to us. Is that the impression you meant to leave?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: First, I don't think there is anything in what Mr. Rajai said to indicate it is a condition. He has said, indeed, as you reminded us in your question, that the Majlis will lay down what they conceive as the conditions. So I think to treat it as a condition would not serve a useful purpose. I have chosen to treat it as a concern of the Iranians, and with respect to that we consider our decision to deploy the AWACS as being in our national interest, consistent with the principle laid down by the President earlier.

MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, you have indicated that the United States doesn't want to see anything happen which would have the effect of expanding the war or prolonging the war. However, last week you also said that if Iran would release the hostages, the embargo, the sanctions, would be automatically lifted, which would seem to indicate that we would then provide them with some of the military equipment which was paid for by the Shah some time ago. Is there some inconsistency there? Or, in fact, did we get the wrong message?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The point I sought to make there was that the trade sanctions, which are multinational in nature -- you will recall the effort we made to persuade our NATO allies and the European Community to impose trade sanctions, which they did. And it's clear that the trade sanctions were related to the release of the hostages. I would therefore expect, and I would think it a reasonable expectation, that if the hostages were released those trade sanctions would be lifted.

Now with respect to other aspects of the situation involving the hostages, we took a number of steps at that time on our own related to the seizure of the hostages and the refusal to release them. I would think that all of those would be on the table if at some point we establish a negotiating contact with the Iranians. Just how they would be dealt with I think is highly speculative, and I don't think it's productive to try to pick out one or another of them to deal with them.

MR. DUNSMORE: But the issue of spare parts is a major issue; and if the United States did provide military spare parts and missiles and tanks and so on to Iran in the middle of a conflict, certainly that would make it very hard for us to claim neutrality.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the actions taken by the United States in connection with the hostages, those actions were taken long before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. It would seem to me that that is one issue to be dealt with separately from the war.

With respect to the war, our position in one of impartiality. That may have to be adjusted as circumstances develop. The AWACS deployment, as I said, raised some questions which I think we carefully considered; and I think our response produced a decision which was consistent with impartiality.

MR. CLARK: Mr. Secretary, it seems to me a clear line has to be drawn here as to how far we might be willing to go if the hostages were released. We would clearly resupply military parts, spare parts for planes and that sort of thing. Is it conceivable that we might move beyond that to rebuild our former military relationship with Iran or to supply Iran with new weapons -- new tanks or planes or anything of that sort?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Mr. Clark, let me make it clear that I don't think this program is the place to negotiate for the terms of the hostages' release. In the first place, we are not in contact with Iran; we are not in negotiations with them; we do not yet know what requests they might make or what terms they may lay down. To try to anticipate them and give them a response in anticipation I don't think would be useful. That's the first point I would make.

The second point I would make is that a number of Iranians have spoken out on what they think ought to be the terms of release. Since they have not yet appeared to agree with each other, again I don't think it's useful to set up hypothetical situations. I do emphasize the point that the hostage issue arose long before this war broke out. We were not consulted by Iraq and Iran with respect to the date for hostilities to begin. The hostage situation was pending then: the actions we had taken with respect to it had been taken then. The hostages were still being held; and it is in our national interest, and we've announced it, that we're going to proceed when the time is right, when the Iranians are ready, to discuss the terms for their release, consistent with the two principles which the President has laid down.

MR. CLARK: Mr. Secretary, granting all that you have said, when you do not say that we would not move beyond the resupply of spare parts, don't you leave the door open to our doing something else, to our taking a more active role in supporting Iran in the war?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I do not think, Mr. Clark, that refusing to discuss hypothetical situations with respect to the conditions which the Iranians might ask us to consider in order to release the hostages ought to lead to any conclusions with respect to the question you've just asked.

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MR. DUNSMORE: What about the war itself, Mr. Secretary? How is it going? Is there a danger that Iran could be dismembered permanently as a result of it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Whenever hostilities of this kind break out, of course, the possibilities of a wider war, a deepening war, and the impact on the combatants are uncertainties which are difficult to put a cap on in advance. The Iraqis have said, and the Foreign Minister of Iraq has said to me directly, that their aims are limited to the disputed territory over which they claim jurisdiction and that they have no interest in any piece of Iranian territory. If that is the case, then the question of how far they may seek to penetrate into Iran seems to be limited by that statement of Iraq's war aims.

With respect to the impact upon the political situation in each country -- and each country has political vulnerabilities, from the perception of outside analysts -- whether or not those vulnerabilities would produce instability in either country depends to a great extent on the intensity of the war, how long it continues, and the ability of each to sustain the fighting with the support of the people. My impression, with respect to Iran, is that the people are pretty solidly behind this war effort. Indeed, it seems to have had a unifying effect, at least in the first 30 days. Khomeini seems to be still in control of the situation. President Bani-Sadr is in control of the war effort, and there is every indication that the Iranians do not feel vulnerable in their ability to sustain the fighting and seem determined to continue it. That's true also of the Iraqis.

Now whether indeed they both continue it to the point where it threatens to widen and to deepen and to involve an ever-increasing risk of intervention by other countries is an uncertainty that we need to guard against by pressing for an end to the hostilities through the United Nations, through the Islamic Conference, through other multinational groups which may be influential.

MR. DUNSMORE: Would you be afraid more or less now of possible Soviet intervention at this stage?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The Soviets have told us that their posture is one of impartiality. To the best of our knowledge they are maintaining that posture. We are maintaining the same restraint. We each do it in the light of what we perceive to be our national interests. I'm sure we are each conscious of the fact that the other is carefully monitoring our stated policy with respect to our actions.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, in the past few days you seem to have been determined if you could to make SALT and the Treaty itself, its benefits to the United States and so on, a major political issue in the Presidential campaign. It seems you are determined to try to get the Treaty ratified very soon. Do you think realistically that that can happen as long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it depends upon our success in presenting the merits -- indeed, the crucial importance -- of the SALT II Treaty in terms of our national security interests. I am determined not so much to make it a political issue as I am to make it a substantive issue which will attract the attention of the American people, because I think it is critical. Time is running out on it. There are provisions in the SALT II Treaty requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle certain systems; the time for dismantling is running out. If that time runs out, the Soviets would be in a difficult position to implement that provision of the Treaty within the time constraints of the Treaty. That may then require reopening the Treaty; and if it's reopened, great uncertainties are created. So I think it's terribly important that we focus on this issue, that the American people focus on it; and I can't think of a better time for them to do so than in a Presidential campaign when they are more alert to issues of this kind than they are otherwise.

MR. DUNSMORE: In your speeches you almost never mention Ronald Reagan or the Republican Party by name, but certainly the inference is there. Do you feel that, if Mr. Reagan were to be elected, the Treaty would effectively be finished and that arms control as we know it might be very, very difficult to ever put together again?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If I understand what the Republican platform says and what Mr. Reagan has said, the two together say (1) the SALT II Treaty is not satisfactory, they would not support it -- which means, in effect, tearing it up and going back to square one; and (2) Mr. Reagan has said and the Republican platform has said that we must first achieve superiority over the Soviet Union before we negotiate. I don't see any way in which either we or the Soviet Union would accept superiority on the part of the other as the basis for an arms control treaty.

Now both those points are very clear. If my interpretation of them is not an accurate reflection of Mr. Reagan's views, then I hope that, having raised the issue, he will have an opportunity to modify his views or give his own interpretation. But I think those points need to be clarified because they have to do with the question of whether or not SALT II will be ratified and, if we do not, the effect of that upon arms control of any sort. : That has to be debated.

any sort. That has to be debated.

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I realize there are those who think that by participating in that debate I am somehow becoming part of the politics of this campaign. I find that an incredible notion -- that, with foreign policy being shaped by this campaign, the principal spokesman of this Administration on foreign policy should not be speaking it. If I were to follow that line, I shouldn't be sitting here with you two gentlemen discussing foreign policy. I'm getting a bigger audience through this program than I would in speaking to a Foreign Policy Council in Chicago, and yet somehow that's described as political and this is not. I should not have appeared on "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press," to mention a couple of other well-known programs. So I think it's rather incredible, this point that the Secretary of State ought not to be debating foreign policy.

I don't think that I ought to be involved in partisan gatherings or that I should be out doing some partisan cheerleading. That kind of politics I should not be engaged in, and I have not.

MR. CLARK: Mr. Secretary, let me quote the sort of language that you have used that has enraged or infuriated or incensed the Reagan camp. In your speech at Notre Dame, as I recall, a week or so ago, you said that the Reagan defense policies could keep the United States endlessly at war all over the globe. Should the Secretary of State be involving himself in domestic politics to that extent with that kind of language?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course not. And I never said that. That's the worst presentation of a speech by a wire service that I've seen in this campaign. I have the text of the speech. It's available. You'll find no such language in the speech; you'll find no reference to Mr. Reagan. The only thing I said about Mr. Reagan on the Notre Dame campus was this: I said, "I didn't come here to urge you to win one more for the Gipper." That's the closest that I came to mentioning Mr. Reagan or his policies.

That quotation you've just given me is a wire service version, totally distorted and inaccurate, of what I actually said on the Notre Dame campus.

MR. CLARK: Let's explore for a moment what you did mean. As I recall the wire service story, it said that the pursuit of Reagan version defense policies, or some such phrase, could keep the United States "endlessly at war all over the globe." Is that what you meant to say?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I did not say it, and I did not mean to say it.

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MR. CLARK: You never used the phrase "endlessly at war all over the globe"?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In connection with Mr. Reagan or anything that he has said or any foreign policy he has announced, absolutely not. You're free to have a copy of the text, Mr. Clark. And if I am misstating to you what I said on the Notre Dame campus, you would be free to challenge my veracity. But that statement does not in any way reflect what I said on the Notre Dame campus.

MR. CLARK: Perhaps we would serve a more useful purpose by just asking you whether you think that Ronald Reagan as President would be dangerous if he pursues his defense and foreign policies as they are now perceived.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't believe that he has policies designed to take us to war. Now whether or not his policies might raise the risk of war is a question that I think is the subject of legitimate debate between those who have the responsibility of political debate in this campaign. He has criticized President Carter's policies as leading into a position of weakness which could lead to war, so policies and their implications for war or peace are important things to discuss. But I don't regard Mr. Reagan as a war-like man who intends to take us to war, and I certainly never made the kind of reference to him or to his policies that was contained in that wire service story.

MR. CLARK: Do you think the Reagan policy of seeking military superiority for the United States before there is any new SALT agreement or the conclusion of a new arms control agreement would be likely to increase the risk of American involvement in wars somewhere in the world?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've already said, in response to Mr. Dunsmore's question, that with respect to SALT, as I understand both the Republican platform and Mr. Reagan's position, we must have nuclear superiority before we will negotiate, and we must have that superiority after negotiations are finished. If that's the case, there will never be an arms control treaty because, as I said a moment ago, I can't conceive of either the United States or the Soviet Union accepting a treaty which freezes itself into a position of nuclear inferiority and freezes the other into a position of nuclear superiority. If that is a correct prognostication of what would happen following the policy that I've just described, then what we would have is an arms race as each side sought superiority; and the whole basis of the SALT process, the whole basis of arms control -- which has been supported by President Nixon, President Ford, President Johnson and by President Carter -- would be out the window. The

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whole basis of arms control was that an arms race increases the possibility of war, that arms control would diminish that possibility. The risks of war associated with the two differing policies are appropriate issues to raise and to discuss.

MR. DUNSMORE: On the subject of differing policies, we have read of late of your future and differences that you may be having with the National Security Advisor -- once again a rather old story. But I think you have taken the position that you will come back if indeed Mr. Carter is re-elected, and he has said that he would love to have you. Did those stories make that decision for you? Or is indeed that your decision?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Barrie, I've been perfectly happy in this job, and indeed I get along very well with Mr. Brzezinski. On a day-to-day basis, we couldn't have a more amicable relationship.

With respect to my future in this job, there is no job I'd rather have after January 20 than this one.

MR. CLARK: Let me ask one question. We have a little less than 30 seconds left, I believe. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Poland today, conferring with the new leaders there. Do you think the danger of Soviet military action to back up the Polish Government in its dispute with labor unions has passed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that the Polish Government, the Polish workers and the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to Russian reactions to how they finally achieve and resolve the issue which is before them. I think that the Soviets have been restrained up to this point: and, indeed, I gather in one story I read today that there was even a Soviet almost approval of the agreement that was negotiated between the Polish Government and the workers. Implementation of that agreement is still a difficult challenge; it obviously is, as we read the day-to-day reports. But I think that the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union but from other countries in the Eastern bloc.

MR. CLARK: Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us today on "Issues and Answers."

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A NOON MEETING

SPONSORED BY

VARIOUS CHICAGO ORGANIZATIONS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

OCTOBER 20, 1980

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REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
PRUDENTIAL AUDITORIUM
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

OCTOBER 20, 1980

MR. MAZEWSKI, MR. RIELLY, IT IS A PLEASURE AND AN HONOR TO ADDRESS THIS FORUM, SPONSORED BY A NUMBER OF VITAL AND VALUED CHICAGO ORGANIZATIONS.

ON MARCH THIRD OF THIS YEAR MY PREDECESSOR AS SECRETARY OF STATE, CY VANCE, CAME HERE TO ADDRESS THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. HIS TOPIC WAS THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN -- A PROFOUNDLY SERIOUS DISRUPTION IN A CRITICAL REGION.

I AM HERE TO ADDRESS YET ANOTHER CRISIS IN THE SAME PART OF THE WORLD. AGAIN THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS, OUR INTERESTS, AND PEACE ITSELF ARE AT STAKE. AND I WANT TO DESCRIBE WHAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO SECURE PEACE AND GUARD OUR INTERESTS.

I AM SPEAKING ABOUT THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, AND MORE GENERALLY ABOUT OUR POSITION IN THE GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA.

THE WAR BETWEEN THESE TWO PERSIAN GULF STATES HAS ENTERED ITS FIFTH WEEK.

09:15:30:10:30

WHATEVER ITS POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS, THE CONFLICT HAS ALREADY BROUGHT TRAGEDY TO COUNTLESS IRAQI AND IRANIAN FAMILIES. EVERY ARTILLERY BARRAGE, EVERY AIR RAID, EVERY PASSING DAY BRINGS MORE DREADFUL SUFFERING -- THE LOSS OF LIFE, THE ANGUISH OF THE WOUNDED, THE WRECKAGE OF HOMES AND HOUSEHOLDS, THE DISRUPTION OF THE MEANS OF LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE OF BOTH NATIONS.

BEHIND THIS NEW WARFARE LIE YEARS OF BITTERNESS AND RIVALRY. BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO VIEW THE CONFLICT ONLY AS A LOCAL FLAREUP BETWEEN TWO RIVAL STATES. ITS IMPLICATIONS ARE FAR BROADER. IF NOT CONTAINED AND RESOLVED, IT COULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE TO OUR NATION'S VITAL INTERESTS.

SEVERAL THINGS ARE AT STAKE -- FIRST AMONG THEM THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF. IN THE TENSIONS AND INSTABILITIES OF THAT AREA, EVEN SMALL WARS THREATEN TO BECOME LARGER ONES. ALSO AFFECTED ARE THE SAFETY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO LOOK TO US FOR SUPPORT AND HELP TO SAFEGUARD THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE. AND POTENTIALLY AT STAKE IN THIS CONFLICT ARE VITAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

WE BUY LESS THAN ONE PER CENT OF OUR OIL FROM IRAQ AND NONE FROM IRAN. BUT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, JAPAN, AND MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE MAJOR BUYERS OF OIL FROM IRAQ: IRAQ IS THE WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER OF OIL AFTER SAUDI ARABIA. CLEARLY, IF THE ECONOMIES OF OUR ALLIES ARE DISRUPTED, OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS WILL SUFFER.

FOR OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS WILL
BE PROSECUTED.

MOREOVER, THE WAR COULD SPREAD TO INTERFERE WITH SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. AND IT IS THROUGH THIS VITAL CHOKE-POINT THAT SIXTEEN MILLION BARRELS OF THE WORLD'S OIL MUST PASS EACH DAY, NOT ONLY OIL FROM IRAQ AND IRAN BUT ALSO OIL FROM KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND OTHER PRODUCERS IN THE GULF -- A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE WORLD'S DAILY OIL SUPPLY.

IN LIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN, WE MUST ALSO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW INTERVENTION PRESENTED BY ANY INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

FINALLY, IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN, OUR POLICY WILL NEVER NEGLECT THIS ABIDING OBJECTIVE -- ON GROUNDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND COMMON DECENCY, OUR HOSTAGES MUST BE RETURNED.

THE UNITED STATES HAS NOTHING TO GAIN BY TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT, AND WE HAVE REFUSED TO DO SO. BUT TO BE IMPARTIAL IS NOT TO BE INACTIVE; TO DECLARE THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE SIDES IS NOT TO DECLARE THAT WE HAVE NO INTERESTS AT STAKE. IN FACT, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN WORKING STEADILY, SINCE THE WAR BROKE OUT, IN PURSUIT OF THREE GOALS.

FIRST, WE ARE WORKING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. WE HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE, TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO BRING IRAN AND IRAQ TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

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UNFORTUNATELY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING LAST FRIDAY BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS THE WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF IRAN AND IRAQ. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE THAT A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO BRING BOTH PARTIES TOGETHER TO END THE CONFLICT. THAT WILL REQUIRE AN AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT WILL BE RESPECTED BY ALL PARTIES -- ONE THAT WILL WITHSTAND REAL OR APPARENT SHIFTS IN THE CHANGING MILITARY AND POWER POSTURES OF THOSE CONCERNED.

WE BELIEVE THIS CONFLICT CAN AND MUST BE RESOLVED THROUGH RESPECT FOR CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- THAT TERRITORY MUST NOT BE SEIZED BY FORCE OF ARMS; THAT DISPUTES SHOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN. WE BELIEVE THAT THE COHESION AND STABILITY OF IRAN IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE. THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN IS TODAY THREATENED BY THE IRAQI INVASION. WE NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT IT HAS NO CLAIMS TO IRANIAN TERRITORY.

AND LET US ALSO REAFFIRM ANOTHER PRINCIPLE THAT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT. IT IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SEEK TO INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER.

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IF IRAN AND IRAQ ARE PREPARED TO RESPECT BOTH OF THESE PRINCIPLES -- THAT TERRITORY MUST NOT BE ACQUIRED BY FORCE, AND THAT NO STATE SHOULD SEEK TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER -- IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING THIS NEEDLESSLY PROLONGED CONFLICT TO AN EARLY END. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH DOES JUSTICE TO THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES.

SECOND, WE ARE WORKING TO KEEP THE CONFLICT FROM SPREADING BEYOND IRAN AND IRAQ. TO THIS END, FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE HELPING OUR NONBELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO ARE THREATENED BY THIS CONFLICT. THE PRESIDENT'S PROMPT DECISION TO SEND, ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, ADVANCE WARNING-AND-CONTROL AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA UNDERSCORES OUR DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSES OF SUCH FRIENDS -- SO THAT THEY CAN GUARD THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

WE ARE ALSO URGING ALL OTHER NATIONS -- IN THE REGION AND BEYOND -- TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT AND TO WORK TO LIMIT AND RESOLVE THE FIGHTING. IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST TO SEE THE HOSTILITIES WIDEN. WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. EACH OF US HAS ASSURED THE OTHER OF IMPARTIALITY IN THE CONFLICT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE.

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AND THIRD, WE HAVE PLEDGED TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT FREE SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ FROM ANY INTERFERENCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS MUST BE FREE FROM EXTERNAL COERCION OR CONTROL AND FREE TO SHIP THEIR OIL SAFELY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE AND OUR ALLIES DO NOT SEEK TO DOMINATE THE OIL PRODUCTION DECISIONS OF THE OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS. BUT ALL NATIONS -- NOT ONLY INDUSTRIAL BUT THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS AS WELL -- HAVE A PROFOUND INTEREST IN THE FLOW OF OIL FROM THE PERSIAN GULF.

TODAY, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PURSUE THIS POLICY OF FIRM BUT PRUDENT ACTION. OUR CAPACITY TO PURSUE OUR GOALS -- AND OUR CAPACITY, IN PARTICULAR, TO MAKE A CREDIBLE PLEDGE TO PROTECT FREE SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ -- ARE NO ACCIDENT. OUR POSITION IS THE RESULT OF CAREFUL, DELIBERATE STEPS BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID LAST JANUARY IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, "...WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER COUNTRIES...TO SHARE A COOPERATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK THAT RESPECTS DIFFERING VALUES AND POLITICAL BELIEFS, YET... ENHANCES THE INDEPENDENCE, SECURITY, AND PROSPERITY OF ALL."

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THAT IS A TALL ORDER, BUT NO ONE SHOULD DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION OR OUR ABILITY TO FULFILL IT. WE, AND OUR ALLIES, HAVE BOTH THE POWER AND THE WILL TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND TO SUSTAIN OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. OUR ALLIES ARE PLAYING AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSES OF EUROPE ITSELF AND THROUGH THEIR OWN MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

LET ME REVIEW WITH YOU SOME OF THE SPECIFIC STEPS WE HAVE BEEN TAKING -- SINGLY AND WITH OTHERS -- TO BUILD AND STRENGTHEN THAT VITAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT SPOKE. OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THREE BROAD FRONTS: MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMIC.

I WILL MENTION OUR MILITARY ACTIONS FIRST, BECAUSE OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, IF THEY ARE ASSAULTED, IS ABSOLUTELY BASIC.

-- WE HAVE MOVED TO STRENGTHEN OUR PEACETIME MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF. SINCE EARLY 1979, THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD ON STATION THE MOST POWERFUL NAVAL FORCE EVER DEPLOYED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. AND OUR MIDEAST NAVAL FORCE INSIDE THE PERSIAN GULF ITSELF HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM THREE TO FIVE SHIPS. WE WILL MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA, COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF OFF-SHORE NAVAL FORCES BUT INCLUDING ALSO PERIODIC DEPLOYMENT OF AIR AND GROUND UNITS FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES.

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-- WE ARE WORKING WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS IN THE AREA TO IMPROVE THEIR SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MILITARY FACILITIES. AND WE HAVE EXPANDED OUR ACCESS TO NEEDED FACILITIES IN THE REGION.

ALL THESE STEPS, LET ME EMPHASIZE, ARE TAKEN IN THE INTERESTS OF DEFENSE AND PEACE. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO BUTTRESS THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGION AND RIGHTS OF FREE PASSAGE IN ITS WATERWAYS. OUR ACTIONS WILL REMAIN CAREFULLY CALIBRATED TO THESE GOALS, SO WE NEITHER CREATE NEW, NEEDLESS TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION NOR APPEAR TO THREATEN THE FREEDOM OF DECISION OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, TWO SPECIFIC EFFORTS ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT.

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS STAND AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IS NOW A REALITY. AND THE ULTIMATE AIM OF THE PEACE PROCESS -- A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER OTHER ARAB NEIGHBORS -- WILL, IF WE CAN ACHIEVE IT, SERVE ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTERESTS, THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, AND INDEED THE INTEREST OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IT WILL NOT ASSURE STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THE ABSENCE OF A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THIS PEACE WILL ASSURE CONTINUED DANGER.

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THE SANCTIONS LEVIED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN ARE ALSO HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR THEY ARE A STRONG SIGNAL THAT WE WILL FIRMLY OPPOSE ARMED AGGRESSION; THAT WE SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS IN THIS REGION AND ELSEWHERE.

OUR OTHER MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE BEEN IN PURSUIT OF BETTER TIES WITH NATIONS IN THE REGION WITH WHOM WE HAVE SHARED INTERESTS. IN SEVERAL CASES, NOTABLY EGYPT AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. IN OTHER CASES, SUCH AS IRAN, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE WILL NEVER YIELD ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, WE STAND READY TO COMPOSE OUR DIFFERENCES. BUT WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL ALL OUR CAPTIVE CITIZENS ARE HOME AND FREE. WE ARE CONTINUING, THROUGH EVERY AVENUE AVAILABLE, TO SEEK THEIR RELEASE.

THE THIRD FRONT ON WHICH WE HAVE MOVED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IS THE ECONOMIC FRONT. AND HERE THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TO GUARD OUR ENERGY SECURITY ASSUME KEY IMPORTANCE. THESE ENERGY-SECURITY STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN TWO DIRECTIONS -- TOWARD CONSERVATION AND TOWARD INCREASED PRODUCTION OF ENERGY HERE AT HOME. THEY ARE WORKING.

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IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE REDUCED OUR CONSUMPTION OF OIL, WE ARE WEATHERING THE WORLD MARKET LOSS OF OIL FROM IRAN AND IRAQ. AND OUR CAREFUL COOPERATION AND PLANNING WITH OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE AND JAPAN GIVE US REASON TO HOPE THAT TOGETHER WE CAN FACE FUTURE EMERGENCIES -- EVEN SERIOUS SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS -- WITH A MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE AND A MINIMUM OF DISRUPTION AND PANIC.

SINCE PRESIDENT CARTER SIGNED THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT OF 1978 -- THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY LAW IN OUR NATIONAL HISTORY -- OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY CUT. OIL CONSUMPTION HAS DECREASED IN BOTH OF THE LAST TWO YEARS. OUR NET OIL IMPORTS HAVE DECLINED STEADILY: DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THIS YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR IMPORTS DECLINED BY 25 PER CENT FROM THE SAME PERIOD IN 1977.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY POLICY -- WHICH INCLUDES A WINDFALL TAX ON OIL PROFITS TO PAY FOR NEW FUEL DEVELOPMENT -- WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE STEPPED-UP ENERGY PRODUCTION HERE AT HOME. THE EVIDENCE IS ALREADY APPARENT. COAL PRODUCTION IS UP 16 PER CENT OVER LAST YEAR. A NEW SYNTHETIC FUELS CORPORATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. AND WE ARE AGGRESSIVELY PROMOTING SOLAR ENERGY AND OTHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES.

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WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO. BUT THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT OVERCOMING OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL SUPPLIES AND ABOUT DEALING SKILLFULLY WITH POTENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS OF SUPPLY. THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE EFFORTS.

MY PURPOSE IN CITING ALL THESE EFFORTS -- MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMIC -- IS TO UNDERSCORE OUR PROGRESS, NOT TO CLAIM THAT THE JOB IS DONE. IT IS TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT ROAD, NOT THAT WE RELAX OUR EFFORTS TO FOSTER PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS CRUCIAL REGION OF THE WORLD.

ACHIEVING OUR PURPOSES WILL NEVER BE EASY. THE REGION IS A TANGLE OF ANCIENT HOSTILITY, OF RELIGIOUS RIVALRY, OF COMPETITION FOR TERRITORY AND INFLUENCE. ITS WEALTH AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE HAVE LONG MADE IT AN ARENA OF COMPETITION AMONG OUTSIDE POWERS.

OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THE REGION ARE COMPLEX AND MAY SOMETIMES SEEM CONTRADICTORY. WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH SEVERAL NATIONS WHICH ARE ADVERSARIES TO ONE ANOTHER. THE VARIETY OF OUR INTERESTS GUARANTEES COMPLEXITY AND DIFFICULTY IN SHAPING OUR POLICIES. AND WE MUST BE AWARE THAT THE NATIONS OF THIS REGION ARE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT. THIS SENSE OF INDEPENDENCE IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST. THEY ADAMANTLY RESIST DOMINATION BY ANYONE, BUT THEIR STRONG FEELINGS MAY CAUSE THEM TO MISINTERPRET EVEN FRIENDLY GESTURES AS INTERFERENCE.

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FACED WITH SUCH INTRICATE CHALLENGES, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO RELY SOLELY ON OUR MILITARY FORCES, IMPRESSIVE AS THEY MAY BE, OR ON DIPLOMACY ALONE. BECAUSE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE ARE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT OUR RESPONSES MUST BE EQUALLY VARIED. I CANNOT WARN STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST ONE DIMENSIONAL APPROACHES TO THIS OR ANY OTHER AREA OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

GREAT AS THE DANGERS AND UNCERTAINTIES ARE IN IRAN AND IRAQ -- IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA -- I BELIEVE OUR POLICIES ARE WISE AND PRUDENT. I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. AND WHILE THE TIMES MAY NOT PERMIT AN EASY OPTIMISM, I DO HAVE FAITH -- FAITH THAT WITH TIME AND PATIENCE AND WISDOM, WE CAN ACHIEVE A COMPELLING AMERICAN OBJECTIVE: TO HELP BUILD PEACE IN THIS TROUBLED REGION AND A GREATER MEASURE OF PEACE IN THE WORLD.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 23, 1980
No. 293A

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION FOLLOWING THE SPEECH BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
PRUDENTIAL AUDITORIUM
Chicago, Illinois
October 20, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you very much, I am ready for your questions. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

As is our custom here, the Secretary will take questions, both from the floor -- and I also want to encourage my colleagues here on the platform to put forward questions. We will start right down here, the first question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the light of our deteriorating relations with Iran and Iraq, can we be an effective mediator in this conflict?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The question is whether, given our deteriorating relations with Iraq and Iran, can we be a mediating influence in this area.

Well, it is the awareness of our problems with each of these two countries which prompts us to direct our efforts toward international efforts to resolve the issues -- as well as bilateral talks with other areas of the region and elsewhere who might have an influence.

Peace in the area is not a peculiar interest of the United States, it is an interest of almost all other nations in Europe and the Middle Eastern area as well as Japan and other countries outside. So by working with them through international fora; the United Nations, the Islamic Conference which has undertaken its own initiative, by indicating our firm and steady purpose to follow a policy of impartiality; we hope that we can exert an influence.

And let us not forget that this is an area in which many nations are suspicious of the possibility of superpower intervention. That suspicion was triggered and enhanced by the invasion of Afghanistan and our response to it. The last thing the nations in the area want is superpower intervention.

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So that by constantly emphasizing the risks of a widening war and a prolonged war, and the benefits of a peaceful resolution we can indirectly (and perhaps even directly) -- but at least indirectly we can influence the course of events in that area.

THE CHAIRMAN: I forgot to mention that there are microphones in the middle and in the back for those of you without strong, booming voices.

Let's take the next question right down here in the center.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would the United States exchange spare parts for Iranian airplanes, just for the release of the hostages?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me answer that question in this way:

Following the seizure of the hostages and in the weeks that followed, we took a number of steps in order to indicate our disagreement, and indeed our serious challenge to the step that Iran had taken. We froze Iranian assets in banks here at home and deposits elsewhere. We persuaded European allies to impose sanctions. We took other steps of that nature.

Now I would assume that if and when we enter negotiations with Iran either directly or indirectly (we have not done that yet) but all the steps we have taken in response to the taking of the hostages, will be on the table in addition to the question of the release of the hostages. Now to seek to anticipate the issues that might be raised at that point, I do not think would be useful.

There is no way of negotiating publicly with Iran over any aspect of the actions that we took at that time --and I remind you that the actions that we took far antedated the Iraq-Iran war in the Middle East. When we get to questions of that time we will deal with them, hopefully effectively.

THE CHAIRMAN: Now we will go to the microphone in the back.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if you learned that the AWACS radar information was being relayed to the Iraqis, would you recommend that those planes be returned to the United States?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, such information is not being relayed to anyone else but the Saudis. We have control over that information and I would not expect that set of contingencies to arise.

There is a very clear understanding between us and the Saudis as to the purposes for the deployment of the AWACS plane, they are defensive only -- defensive to the Saudis -- and are not to be used in any way whatever outside those limitations.

We have found the Saudis to be people who keep their commitments of that kind and I would not want to speculate that they might not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my question is on Afghanistan.

To what extent are we giving significant military assistance to the non-Communist side there -- particularly surface-to-air missiles? And if we are not giving significant assistance could we have some idea as to why not?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: What we are providing to Pakistan at this point is a possible debt rescheduling to ease Pakistan's debt burdens and we also are sympathetic to any request for economic assistance which Pakistan might make.

You ask me in effect: Why haven't we declared, or at least practiced undeclared war in this situation, on the Soviet Union. We have not seen that to be in our national interest. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: The next question down in front.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in a recent speech you suggested that if the SALT Treaty were a weapons system, that the Congress would buy it in a second.

I wonder if you could discuss the prospects for the SALT Treaty, and also some of the subtle differences between the Carter Administration and the prospective Reagan Administration on foreign policy.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Now you are edging me very close to a political answer, which I am not supposed to make.

This question has to do with the SALT Treaty -- what are its prospects for ratification -- and is it in our country's interest to do so -- and what are the positions of the two principal candidates for the Presidency, on the issue?

Well, I regard the ratification of SALT II as crucial to our national security interests, and I have said that.

I believe it to be consistent with our Afghanistan policies because both SALT II and our Afghanistan policies are designed to impose restraints upon the Soviet Union. And indeed, to the extent that the Soviet Union is expansionist in its policies I think the case for SALT II becomes even more urgent.

If we were dealing with Canada, we wouldn't need a SALT II Treaty. It's because we are dealing with another superpower which has the capability to launch nuclear war and which has expansionist tendencies, that those of us who have supported the SALT process believe it to be critical to reach agreements that limit the potential for nuclear war and limit the expansion and advancement of nuclear technology.

That is the case for arms control.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, obviously the votes in the Senate were not present. That invasion created an atmosphere which was totally negative on the SALT II process and so we have had to put it aside.

But now as the dust has settled and as we take a colder look at our own security interests, I believe we should go forward and ratify SALT II. We urge doing so, not as a favor to the Soviet Union, but as being in our own interests.

The SALT II Treaty would limit:

First, it would require that the Soviets dismantle many of their present systems. It would not require us to dismantle any.

The Treaty, among other things, limits to 10 the number of warheads that the Soviets can place upon their larger missiles. Without such limitations they could increase the number of warheads to 20 or 30. The same limit, of course, applies to us -- but we do not have the big missiles that would enable us to counter it.

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In addition, the Treaty would limit the number of launchers that the Soviets could have by 1985 substantially below what they would have, given their present production trends without a treaty, by 1985.

Fourthly, the Treaty gives us the right to monitor Soviet missile development -- as it gives the Soviets the right to monitor ours. As missiles are launched and tested by either country, they emit signals which enable the launching country to evaluate the performance of the missiles. Those signals can also be read by the other country. Thus, each of us has the technical means for evaluating the development of the other's nuclear technology, its missile technology, and so on.

The SALT II Treaty includes a provision against encryption, which means against the scrambling of those signals in a way so that the other side cannot read them -- so that with the Treaty we would have access to information with respect to the Soviet program that we would not have without the Treaty.

In addition, the Soviets presumably would have a larger program than it would have with the Treaty -- so that in effect, we would know less about more.

Now, when coupled with that we consider the suggestion that we ought not to conclude an arms control treaty with the Soviets until we had achieved superiority -- we are being asked to consider an impossibility. I cannot conceive of either the Soviet Union or the United States agreeing to a treaty which would freeze itself into a position of inferiority and freeze the other side into a position of superiority.

So that if the policy is to reject SALT II and to seek to negotiate a treaty which would have the kind of imbalance which is suggested -- in effect, the result would be a nontreaty -- and in my judgment the beginning of another nuclear arms race and I don't think that is in the interest of either side.

I hope I have answered the question effectively, without mentioning anybody's name. (Laughter and applause.)

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, thank you for your answer to the last question. Now there are two questions to follow:

Several times throughout your address you have referred to "our friends" in the area who are affected by this conflict between Iraq and Iran. Who, aside from Israel and Saudi Arabia, do you identify as the friends of the United States.

And secondly, do you anticipate making any announcement regarding the hostages prior to November 4? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to the second question, if the hostages are released you can bet your boots we are going to announce it whenever it happens. (Laughter.) I don't know of any way to conceal it. (Laughter.)

But I will say to you also in all candor, that although we have heard signals such as that sent out by Prime Minister Rajai, of Iran, the other day that the Majlis, the Parliament, was close to a decision -- we have heard that for weeks. It hasn't produced anything yet and I would do nothing to raise expectations here or anywhere else. It could happen -- it might happen -- and I am sure there are those in this campaign who fear it is already programmed. Well, it is not "already programmed." But we could find a way to do it very quickly if we're given the opportunity.

Now as regards the first part of the question: "Who are our other friends in the area, other than Israel and Saudi-Arabia," I guess the use of words such as "friends" and "adversaries" are not useful in characterizing our relations in various areas around the world -- particularly one like this.

I mean, there are nations in the area with which we have disagreements about policy.

We have others with which we have agreements.

And in most cases it's a mixed bag. But we have learned over the years that we can work constructively with them.

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Nations such as Oman, for example, which has just entered into an agreement with us giving us access to facilities -- a nation with whom we have not previously had such relations but a nation with which we share interests similar to those we share with Saudi Arabia.

And there are others. But it is not particularly useful that all of them be publicly identified as a friend of the United States -- even though their policies may be consistent with ours and supportive of ours -- so that I don't know that I would want to read off a list even if I had a complete list. But we have had constructive relations, obviously, with Israel who is clearly identified as one of our friends. Egypt.

In the past we have had sound relations with Iran -- which Iran now totally rejects either with respect to the past or the future -- but who knows what happens with respect to the future. I predict nothing because they are obviously quite turned off on us.

Iraq, we have not had positive relations with Iraq for quite some time -- but Iraq is an emerging country in that area who, whatever happens in this war, is going to have a strong influence in the area.

So that obviously it is in our interest to have improving relations with all of the nations of the area -- improving relations that are healthy from their point of view as well as from our point of view. And I suppose I ought to be careful about announcing in advance that some are friends and, implicitly, others are not -- because I then tend to prejudice the possibilities of the future. (Applause.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, many Americans are now concerned about something vaguely defined as a "foreign policy." As I understand it a "policy" if we had one, is to be used to predict and control the extent and degree of our external involvement.

Is it proper for the Administration (this Administration or any administration that seeks to be) to continue to play with the American public and lead them on to believe that such a cohesive policy is possible through any complexity of international relationships today?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I am afraid I missed just enough of your question so that I can't even manufacture an answer.

QUESTION: Well you shouldn't have to do that.

It appears that foreign policy is like a jazz solo -- it's improvised -- the circumstances determine in many instances what the policy will be. Is it proper for administrations to continue to mislead American publics into thinking that we will, at some point reach and have in place, a cohesive foreign policy?

Or should we always be prepared to be classic, to be ready to make quick adjustments in terms of our internal relationships?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I guess the key word was "cohesive?"

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The question is, whether it is possible for any government -- ours, or any other -- any administration -- to put in place a cohesive foreign policy and hold out to our people that we do.

Well obviously, the world is a world in ferment and no one comes to appreciate that more than a Secretary of State. You know, the world is awake 24 hours a day and this job is a 24-hours-a-day job because somewhere on the face of this planet -- I often think to myself as I go to bed at midnight: "Some son-of-a-gun is out creating trouble for me. (Laughter.)"

So to the extent that it is not possible to build a cohesive world -- to that extent, your point is valid.

Nevertheless, I would say that not only is it possible but imperative that our foreign policy move consistently with publicly-stated goals and objectives and directions.

For example, our policy now rests on strong alliances. We think we need to maintain them as strong alliances and improve them and broaden them. And I think that has been done in the last four years. Not only NATO, but Japan and others. And I think that is an important thing to do.

Secondly, I think we need to establish a community of interested nations in various parts of the world.

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Let's take Southeast Asia and the emerging ASEAN countries in that area -- an area which we turned our backs on not so long ago and which now is looking to us for leadership, for support in international foras. And they include not only the nations of the immediate Indo-China Peninsula but also Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Peoples Republic. They are all asking us to look toward a positive and comprehensive Pacific Oceans policy, for example. Now it's important that we do that.

So there are these threads and elements of foreign policy. Everything ought to be clearly identified:

What do we do, for example, about North-South issues? And by "North-South" we don't mean the Confederacy vs the North here in the United States. We mean the Northern Hemisphere vs the Southern Hemisphere -- the Northern Hemisphere consisting of the industrialized, advanced countries -- the Southern Hemisphere by and large consisting of the developing, disadvantaged countries. Now the gap between the two in terms of access to resources, development, opportunity for their peoples; you know is wide and growing wider. We need a policy with respect to that.

Foreign aid is simply one source, or one element of the policies that we ought to be putting in place in order to reduce the possibilities for instability that arise out of that gap -- and out of its exploitation by those whose purposes may not be as benign as ours.

So surely it is possible to put in place the various elements of what ought to constitute our world view and what we do about moving to deal with the problems that are created thereby.

I think it's -- you know, administrations have indulged in a constructive practice, I think, beginning with President Nixon if I am not mistaken, perhaps before that time in presenting a world view posture statement of foreign policy at the beginning of each year. I think that is a useful thing to do even after you have agreed on basic elements and principles and goals, the application of those elements -- those principles and goals -- will vary because circumstances and different situations will vary.

So applications are one thing, but you ought to have a basic thrust to your foreign policy that is no secret to your people and will give your people a chance to hold you accountable for what you do or fail to do -- and hopefully to assure them that we are not off on wild goose chases and that we don't have some rational basis for what we do in this world community of nations. I think in that sense, you ought to have a rational foreign policy, if not a cohesive one. (Applause.)

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QUESTION: Well, taking off with that very last point, M. Secretary of State, are you prepared to tell us now that in the eventuality of the attempt of the United Nations to expel Israel that this time you would cast a veto rather than an abstention?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, that issue would not arise in the Security Council. If it did, we would veto it, of course. But it would arise, I'm afraid to say it, in the Assembly.

But I think it is quite clear to thoughtful Members of the Assembly that if that effort were made and if it were to succeed, that in effect the United Nations would be destroyed.

That's our view.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

(Proceedings ended at 1:30 p.m. Chicago time.)

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(P41)



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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE

THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INLAND DAILY PRESS ASSOCIATION

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

OCTOBER 20, 1980

03:15:58 7030

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
BEFORE THE
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
INLAND DAILY PRESS ASSOCIATION
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

OCTOBER 20, 1980

MR. MODEER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I AM VERY GLAD TO HAVE THIS CHANCE TO MEET WITH YOU.
I KNOW THE PRESIDENT WAS SORRY HIS SCHEDULE DID NOT LET HIM
DO SO.

IT'S ALWAYS A PLEASURE TO SEE THE FACES BEHIND THE
EDITORIALS WHICH BRING SUCH PLEASURE TO MY MORNING READING.

SOMEONE ONCE SAID THAT THERE ARE ONLY THREE INDIVIDUALS
WHO CAN REFER TO THEMSELVES AS "WE" RATHER THAN "I";
MONARCHS ... EDITORS ... AND PEOPLE WITH TAPEWORMS.

BUT YOU, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER GROUP IN OUR NATION,
HAVE THE RIGHT TO WRITE YOUR OPINIONS AS "WE" RATHER THAN
"I", BECAUSE YOU NOT ONLY SPEAK TO OUR COMMUNITIES -- YOU
OFTEN SPEAK FOR THEM.

SO I AM HERE TO LISTEN -- AS WELL AS SPEAK.

BEFORE DISCUSSING YOUR QUESTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS,
HOWEVER, I WANT TO SPEND A FEW MOMENTS OUTLINING HOW THE
UNITED STATES IS DEALING WITH FUNDAMENTAL NEW REALITIES
IN THE WORLD. 0315007030

MY BASIC MESSAGE IS THIS: TO DEAL WITH THIS RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD, THE UNITED STATES MUST BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS AT ONCE. AND WE ARE.

FIRST, WE ARE BUILDING OUR MILITARY STRENGTH.

WE ARE ENGAGED IN THE MOST FAR-REACHING MILITARY MODERNIZATION SINCE THE EARLY 1960s.

WE ARE UPGRADING EACH ARM OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THE NATO ALLIANCE IS EMBARKED ON A LONG-TERM MILITARY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. AND WE ARE STRENGTHENING OUR CAPACITY TO RESPOND SWIFTLY TO SERIOUS CRISIS WHEREVER IT MIGHT ARISE, INCLUDING THE VITAL PERSIAN GULF AREA.

THIS IS A STEADY AND RELIABLE PROGRAM, NOT A WASTEFUL AND WANTON EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN UNACHIEVABLE "SUPERIORITY" -- AN EFFORT THAT WOULD PRODUCE THE DANGERS OF A MASSIVE NEW ARMS RACE.

SECONDLY, THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS EXERCISING ITS LEADERSHIP TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL STAND AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION.

THE SOVIET EFFORT TO DESTROY THE INDEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE STERNLY RESISTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE STANDS WE HAVE TAKEN -- ON GRAIN, ON TECHNOLOGY SALES, ON THE OLYMPICS -- HAVE CONVEYED OUR RESOLVE CLEARLY AND CONCRETELY.

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THE GRAIN EMBARGO AND OTHER COMMERCIAL PENALTIES WILL COST THE SOVIET UNION MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR THE SOVIETS WERE DENIED AT LEAST A TENTH OF THEIR TOTAL FEED GRAIN REQUIREMENTS. IN TURN -- INSTEAD OF THE LONG-PROMISED GROWTH IN THE SUPPLY OF MEAT -- EACH PERSON'S SHARE IS SLIPPING BACK TO THE LEVELS OF A DECADE AGO.

THE GRAIN EMBARGO TAKES ON ADDED IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SHRINKING SOVIET CROP. THEIR PLAN CALLED FOR A 235 MILLION TON HARVEST IN 1980. THE RANGE OF CREDIBLE ESTIMATES NOW GOES AS LOW AS 190 MILLION TONS.

THERE HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN IN THIS COUNTRY OVER THE EFFECT OF THE EMBARGO ON OUR EXPORTS. THE PRESIDENT HAS MOVED TO SEE THAT ANY SACRIFICE IS SHARED FAIRLY. IT ALSO HELPS THAT WE ARE NOW IN THE FINAL STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA FOR A FOUR-YEAR GRAIN AGREEMENT INVOLVING SIX TO NINE MILLION METRIC TONS A YEAR.

OUR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN APPLIED NOT TO RESUME THE COLD WAR, BUT TO BUILD THE ONLY RELIABLE BASIS ON WHICH EAST-WEST RELATIONS CAN IMPROVE -- DEMONSTRATED SOVIET RESTRAINT.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST SEEK SOVIET RESTRAINT THROUGH BALANCED, ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS THAT LIMIT THE GROWTH OF ARMS.

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RIISING TENSIONS DO NOT WEAKEN THE CASE FOR THE SALT II TREATY; THEY REMIND US WHY ARMS CONTROL IS ESSENTIAL -- TO CURTAIL THE ARSENAL AIMED AT US, TO AVERT A FUTILE ARMS RACE, TO LESSEN THE CHANCE FOR A FATAL FINAL MISCALCULATION.

THIRD, THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE REGIONAL DISPUTES.

FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE ITS CREATION, ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ITS MOST POWERFUL ARAB NEIGHBOR, LIVE NOT AT TRUCE ... BUT IN PEACE. AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY FOR A BROADER PEACE.

OUR UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN RHODESIA HELPED BRING AN END TO A BLOODY CIVIL WAR THERE -- AND A SETBACK FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY HAS IMPROVED OUR POSITION THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. THE CANAL IS FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY AND EFFICIENTLY.

IN EACH CASE, PATIENT DIPLOMACY HAS SERVED OUR NATION'S INTERESTS.

FOURTH, THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS WORKING TO STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE WORLD.

WE HAVE REACHED A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT THAT WILL HELP US COMPETE FAIRLY.

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WE ARE PURSUING A PROGRAM FOR INCREASED AMERICAN
PRODUCTIVITY.

MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, WE ARE COORDINATING OUR ECONOMIC
POLICIES WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIES.

AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, WE HAVE IMPROVED OUR ENERGY
POSITION. US OIL IMPORTS ARE DOWN ONE-FOURTH COMPARED TO 1977;
OUR DOMESTIC ENERGY PRODUCTION IS UP; WITH OUR ALLIES, WE
HAVE IMPROVED ENERGY-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN CASE OF SERIOUS
SHORTAGE.

FIFTH, THE UNITED STATES TODAY HAS A FOREIGN POLICY THAT
IS ASSERTING OUR NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

AMERICA'S STRENGTH IN THE WORLD RESTS NOT ONLY ON OUR
MILITARY POWER, BUT ON OUR COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM.

FREEDOM AND STABILITY STRENGTHEN EACH OTHER. REPRESSION
CAN BREAK THE TIES BETWEEN A GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE,
INCREASING THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENT CHANGE.

WE HAVE SEEN HOW SUCH CHANGE -- AS IN IRAN -- CAN
DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR OWN NATION. WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL ALL
OF OUR PEOPLE ARE SAFELY HOME FROM IRAN.

BUT AS WE LOOK AT THE WORLD CLEARLY, WE ALSO SEE A
RESURGENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES WE SUPPORT. IN PORTUGAL,
SPAIN AND GREECE .. IN NIGERIA, GHANA AND ZIMBABWE ... IN
ECUADOR AND PERU ... DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN RESTORED. OUR STAND
FOR FREEDOM RESONATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

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SIXTH AND FINALLY, THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS BUILDING STRONGER RELATIONSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES OF GROWING IMPORTANCE ON THE WORLD SCENE.

WE ARE BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. AND WE ARE GIVING NEW ATTENTION TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

IN LESS THAN 20 YEARS, FOUR OUT OF FIVE PEOPLE WILL LIVE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS MUST BE A TIME WHEN WE MOVE AHEAD -- NOT SLIDE BACKWARD -- IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT IS ONE REASON I HAVE BEEN URGING SUPPORT FOR STRONGER SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. THEY ARE INVESTMENTS IN OUR OWN FUTURE AS WELL AS OTHERS'.

* * *

THESE POLICIES, AND THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ARE HELPING TO SHAPE A WORLD OF CHANGE.

THERE INEVITABLY WILL BE DEBATE ABOUT SPECIFIC DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE.

BUT I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT, FOR ALL THE FRUSTRATIONS IN DEALING WITH THIS NEW WORLD, AMERICA IS ON THE RIGHT ROAD -- THE ROAD OF ENGAGEMENT AND PROGRESS, NOT ISOLATION AND REACTION. WE SHOULD STAY ON IT.

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PRESS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 23, 1980

No. 294A



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE SPEECH BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
DRAKE HOTEL
Chicago, Illinois
October 20, 1980

THE CHAIRMAN: The Secretary will be glad to accept questions now. We would ask you to go to the microphone in the center aisle, please identify yourself and speak distinctly. And I will try to measure up to the same standard.

QUESTION: Tom Small, "The Daily Journal" Kankakee, Illinois. Mr. Secretary, what is the Administration's policy on nuclear energy?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: On nuclear energy?

QUESTION: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, this is not an area in which I have jurisdiction but I will be glad to give you my perception.

I think the Administration sees nuclear energy as a short term or near term necessity until we develop alternatives that may be regarded as, and will be, safer environmentally and in other ways. But there is no substitute that I can see and I speak for myself as well as what I believe to be the Administration's point of view, there is no other substitute in the near term which can provide the energy that a measured and careful development of nuclear energy can provide.

I would hope that the day when we can turn to other sources of energy will come more rapidly than now appears certain but in the meantime, it seems to me it's an essential source.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am John Levine, from "The Herald Telegram" in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.

Many of us read the Washington reports that if President Carter is reelected, you would not serve in another Carter Administration because of the continuing lack of clarity about who sets foreign policy for the Administration -- you, or Mr. Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor.

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One, if President Carter is reelected, will you serve in another Administration?

And two: Do you feel problems with lack of clarity in the area that apparently plagued Secretary Vance with the National Security Adviser?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well first of all, the story to which you refer was without basis. I hadn't even admitted that kind of a thought to myself -- let alone in print.

I am perfectly happy in this job. I can't think of a job I would rather have be it either now or next January 21st -- except being my wife's husband, that's the only thing I can think of.

With respect to the structure of our foreign policy-making institution, I have been in government for 35 years and I have never seen a time when governmental institutions couldn't stand improvement -- and that is true, in my judgment, in our foreign policymaking institution and I think we need to constantly review those arrangements -- and I am speaking not only of the NSC but all the other multiple government agencies which have an impact on foreign policy. That includes: Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Special Trade Representatives and many others.

It is a complex structure which we have and the problem of accommodating them all in order to achieve consistency, uniformity and pursuit of the same direction, is a constant one.

Unfortunately, that problem tends to get personalized in the relations between myself and Mr. Brzezinski.

I couldn't ask for a more congenial personal relationship and when we have institutional hangups we'll deal with them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Richard Growson, Council Bluffs, Iowa, "The Nonpareille."

With regard to the Iraqi-Iranian situation, and that tinderbox, did the State Department or anyone in government anticipate that particular event, i.e., the Iraqi invasion, and what do you anticipate will happen within the next couple of months?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Was the first part of your question, "Did we -- "

QUESTION: Did we anticipate that invasion?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well in the sense that we were aware of the border, the disputed territory, as being a point of conflict and sporadic violence in that area. To that extent the hostilities now taking place were a possibility. Just as the present hostilities could well trigger a wider and more prolonged struggle -- and that is in the nature of violence and confrontations of that kind.

Nevertheless, we were not advised in advance that this particular invasion was going to take place, nor were we advised as to the aims of Iraq. And of course we were not advised as to what the Iranian reaction would be.

With respect to predicting the future in this area, that is not easy to do.

Iraq has stated publicly, as well as to me personally that their aims are limited, that they have no desire for a single square inch of Iranian territory beyond the disputed area of Shatt-al-Arab, which is the immediate provocation for the hostilities.

But whether or not their aims escalate as the war is prolonged, is always a possibility. And they are now moving to occupy Khuzestan Province, which is the area there closest to Iraq and it contains most of Iraq's oil -- and there is speculation that Iraq may have entertained the idea of a separate Khuzestan, independent of Iran, cut off from Iran. If so, that would complicate the possibility of negotiating an end to the hostilities.

Or secondly, that she, herself, may entertain broader territorial gains than she has indicated up to now.

On the other hand, the Iranian resistance has been stronger and has been sustained to a greater degree than outsiders had anticipated would be possible. And the Iranians have displayed, I think, a fervor, a zeal, a patriotism that could sustain them for quite some time. No one really knows the extent of their military supply or their ability to sustain the conflict physically.

But in terms of their willingness to do so, I think they are more unified now and more supportive of their government in a unified way than they were before the war began --

03:15:00

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So the possibilities of a war continuing for at least weeks and maybe months, perhaps more, seems to be greater now than we thought five weeks ago.

On the other hand, I think all countries in the area with the possible exception of the two combatants see it as in the interests of the area to bring the fighting to an end as speedily as possible.

Efforts are under way in the United Nations and the Islamic Conference, who are the mediators, to try to persuade the parties to bring their differences to the negotiating table. Whether or not those efforts will succeed, I think, is still an "iffy" proposition.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Scott Loth from "The Patriot Ledger" in Quincy, Massachusetts.

During your talk you referred to our relations with the Soviet Union, to our relations with developing countries and to the question of human rights generally.

Earlier this summer, a delegation of newspaper people met with you in Washington and discussed the issues of the free flow of information at the upcoming Belgrade Meeting of UNESCO. That meeting is currently going on, dealing with substantial issues relative to the free flow of information, and the word is that things are not going well for the United States there.

Do you have any rabbits up your sleeve in terms of the issues that have to be dealt with there? And does your Department have a strategy for the upcoming Third Basket Helsinki Discussions on the grid later on this fall?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, number one, the meeting now under way deals with procedure. That meeting started in September and it is continuing, and it is the strategy of the Soviet Union to drastically reduce the opportunity for reviewing human rights performance by the signatory nations.

It is our objective and it's our unchanging objective, to provide for adequate review of human rights performance. That, we regard as one of the three -- and in many ways maybe the most important -- but at least one of the three important objectives of the Final Act of Helsinki, to monitor on a regular basis the human rights performance of the 35 signatory nations, including ourselves.

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The Soviet Union, understandably, resists that. It is clear that when the substantive meeting begins (if it ever does) if the rules of procedure are adopted, that the invasion of Afghanistan will be the subject of discussion and review, as well as the treatment of dissidents and other behavior on the part of the Soviet Union -- and also other countries.

We think it's a healthy thing to provide for this kind of review. We think it should be done without polemics but concentrating on the facts and concentrating on the importance of expanding human rights in the effected countries. That is what we understand to have been the objective of the Final Act and we intend --

The procedures used in Belgrade, at the last review conference, we think, are adequate for these purposes. The Soviet Union seeks to modify them and to drastically reduce. If the Soviet Union persists in this position, it may well mean there won't be a substantive meeting of the Review Conference at Madrid.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my name is Michael Fordham, of Gary, Indidana. My question is, whether the State Department knows for certain if there is 52, by tabulating, hostages in Iran at this moment?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Your question, I gather, is whether we know for certain that there are 52 hostages in Iran.

QUESTION: Yes, alive, sir.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We don't know for certain in the sense that we don't know where they are. We think they are all in Teheran at this point on the basis of the best information we can get. But since the rescue effort last Spring, we have not had access to them although we have received -- there have been letters from some of them since.

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We have no information that there are not 52 hostages alive and well, but we do not have positive evidence of the kind that your question requires.

QUESTION: John Hanethon, "News Herald" Litchfield, Illinois.

In talking about the grain embargo I believe you mentioned that other industries have "shared the sacrifice."

Governor Reagan in a recent speech has denied that this has occurred. Would you please give us some examples of some other sacrifices, by other industries?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well we have limited the export of high technology, and our allies have joined us in that.

With respect to high technology that has a military connection or the so-called COCOM List, there have been no exceptions to that since the invasion of Afghanistan -- contrary to the previous experience in the detente period. And we intend to continue the COCOM policy that we have had, and it is our conviction, I think with sound basis, that one of the important benefits to the Soviet Union from Detente was technology transfer, and I think that is rather generally recognized -- in the computer field particularly.

They are now denied access to our developing technology, which they were gradually acquiring in the pre-Afghanistan period.

And our allies are joining with us to restrict, and indeed, to limit these kinds of transfers.

It is more difficult to put a dollar value on those results because it is difficult to predict what "might have been" contacts, contracts, actual transfers if there had been no ceiling nor limit, no discipline imposed upon such negotiations. These take place, after all, in the private sector and we don't know how fully the private sector might have taken advantage of the freer atmosphere. But it is the judgment of experts, that there have been billions of dollars lost.

Now with respect to the grain picture, let me give you a couple of additional points:

In fiscal 1980, notwithstanding the fact that the United States embargoed the 17 million metric tons of discretionary sales to the Soviet Union, farm exports in 1980 should top \$40 billion up from \$32 billion from the previous year. So the world market for U.S. grain has expanded sufficiently to more than overcome the 17 million metric tons which we did not send to the Soviet Union.

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We have the prospect of a growing market exceeding that of the Soviet Union, in the Peoples Republic of China.

With respect to the number of countries which bought at least \$1 billion in U.S. farm products in a given year there were five last year, there were eight this year. So that the United States is a producer of farm products on a scale never matched by any other country. There are growing markets for what we produce and those markets are developing and absorbing our farm exports this year on a scale greater than that ever before.

And the Soviets are paying the price.

QUESTION: Tom Reeve, Medlin, Colorado: Mr. Secretary, there is a great deal of discussion about an "October Surprise" from the Carter campaign.

Since this surprise is most likely to be in foreign affairs, could you tell us what it will be? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me say this, if I had such a surprise in my pocket, I would have used it long ago. The polls have been too close for my comfort for some time. (Laughter.)

But I can understand the political instincts that moved people to suggest such a thing.

I hope there is a surprise. I hope it's the return of the hostages. But that is not programmed at this moment. We are not in negotiation with Iran on the hostages at this moment. We have no idea what they will officially present to us as terms. We have no idea whether the terms that they may request are acceptable.

Now whether or not that can all be brought together in the next two weeks to produce the so-called "October surprise" I wouldn't lay much money on it.

But if it happens, we will not conceal the announcement until November 5th. (Laughter and applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we have time for a question or two more for the Secretary; but I have been requested by the Security people that you please remain seated until the Secretary has been escorted from the room.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That is not to suggest that we think you are a challenge to my security. (Laughter.)

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if there were a deal struck that was basically a trade of hostages for arms, what are your concerns for possibly being a party to the escalation of the Middle East war?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I wish that, for just once, I could put that question into the proper context.

When the hostages were seized, we took a number of steps in retaliation. You will remember that we:

Froze Iranian assets held in banks and other depositories, to an estimated extent at that time of some \$8 billion;

Included in our actions were the withholding of certain spare parts and other purchases which had been made and paid for and which belonged to Iran at the time; I don't have any figure to put on those.

And there were other steps including sanctions -- trade sanctions which we imposed -- and with the support of our European friends who imposed sanctions with us.

Now obviously, if we were to enter negotiations with Iran on the return of the hostages, they would want us to put on the table the things that we did in retaliation -- and we don't know what that would be. We don't know what their terms would be.

But I think one could anticipate that they would want the return of what belongs to them. But to debate that question publicly -- you know, to negotiate publicly -- I remember the story -- it's an old story which must be part of legend here in the Middle West -- of Ulysses S. Grant when he was a boy.

He dearly wanted a horse and their neighbor had a horse which seemed like a likely buy, so his father told him he could go next door and negotiate for it.

So he asked his father what to offer.

The father said, "Well, offer \$25.00 -- and then if he won't take that, go up to \$50."

So the boy went next door and when his neighbor asked him what he was prepared to offer for the horse, he said, "Well, my father told me to offer you \$25.00 but if you wouldn't take it, to go to \$50.00." (Laughter.)

Well that sort of negotiation never appealed to me. (Laughter.)

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I am constantly asked the question which was just put to me -- and I just think it's not useful in terms of our interest or in terms of persuading the Iranians to come to the negotiating table, to try to lay down any terms and make any offers public.

I think when they are ready for negotiation, we will be -- and we will try to take into account our obligations. The President said at the outset that there are two principles would govern our actions: One, to do nothing inconsistent with our national interests and national honor. Secondly, to pursue the safe and prompt release of the hostages. Those two principles still apply.

Well, that is the first time that answer has ever stopped the questions. I may try it again. (Laughter.)

Well let me thank you all very much again for welcoming me this afternoon. I do appreciate these opportunities.

(Rising ovation.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, we are deeply grateful for your taking the time to be with us this afternoon.

Good luck.

03:15:07:30

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

SPONSORED BY

THE MISSOURI ATHLETIC CLUB
AND
KMOX

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

OCTOBER 21, 1980

OPENING REMARKS
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
MISSOURI ATHLETIC CLUB/KMOX
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
OCTOBER 21, 1980

PRESIDENT RICHEY OF THE MISSOURI ATHLETIC CLUB, MAYOR CONWAY, MAYOR OFFICER,

IT'S A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE BACK IN MISSOURI,
AND HERE IN ST. LOUIS.

I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE QUESTIONS
OF THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE HERE AT THE MISSOURI ATHLETIC
CLUB AND YOU WHO ARE LISTENING TO US OVER KMOX.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT I WILL
KEEP MY ANSWERS STRICTLY NON-POLITICAL.

BACK IN WASHINGTON, THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO HAVE
ACCUSED ME OF BEING A "POLITICAL SECRETARY OF STATE."

FOR SOME, THOSE TWO THINGS JUST DON'T SEEM TO FIT
TOGETHER -- LIKE BEING AN "HONEST BURGLAR," I SUPPOSE,
OR A "VIRTUOUS MADAME."

WELL I AM SECRETARY OF STATE, AND I AM A POLITICIAN.
AND I DON'T THINK THE COMBINATION IS SUCH A BAD IDEA.

AS USUAL, MISSOURI'S FAVORITE SON, HARRY TRUMAN,
PUT IT BEST:

"A POLITICIAN," HE SAID, "IS A MAN WHO UNDER-
STANDS GOVERNMENT. USUALLY, IF HE UNDERSTANDS IT WELL
ENOUGH AND HAS MADE A REPUTATION, AS HE SHOULD HAVE, HE
WILL WIND UP -- AFTER HE IS DEAD -- BY BEING CALLED
A STATESMAN."

"YOU HAVE TO HAVE YOUR OWN DEFINITION OF WHAT TO CALL THINGS POLITICAL," TRUMAN SAID. "IT DEPENDS ALTOGETHER ON WHAT YOUR VIEWPOINT IS. IF YOU ARE FOR IT, IT IS STATESMANLIKE. IF YOU ARE AGAINST IT, IT IS PURELY LOW POLITICS."

LIKE TRUMAN SAID, YOU HAVE TO HAVE YOUR OWN DEFINITION OF WHAT TO CALL THINGS POLITICAL.

AND BY MY DEFINITION, FOREIGN POLICY IS A POLITICAL ACT.

IT'S NOT SOME MYSTICAL EXERCISE CONDUCTED IN WASHINGTON APART FROM THE GRASS ROOTS OF OUR COUNTRY. IT INVOLVES FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES ... CHOICES WHICH SHAPE AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ... CHOICES THAT AFFECT YOUR LIVES EVERY DAY.

IN OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, THOSE CHOICES ULTIMATELY ARE MADE BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. AND I BELIEVE IT IS MY OBLIGATION AS SECRETARY OF STATE TO HELP DEFINE THEM AS CLEARLY AS I KNOW HOW ... SO THAT YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT IS AT STAKE AND SO THAT YOU CAN BEST SHAPE OUR COURSE IN THE WORLD.

THESE FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS I'VE BEEN HAVING WITH CONCERNED AMERICANS AROUND THE COUNTRY ARE NOT ONLY SOMETHING I LOOK FORWARD TO AND ENJOY; I SEE THEM AS A CENTRAL PART OF MY JOB AS SECRETARY OF STATE.

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LET ME MENTION SOME OF THE BASIC CHOICES I SEE AMERICA FACING IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

-- WILL WE CONTINUE THE SUSTAINED AND STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, OR WILL WE PLUNGE HEADLONG INTO A WASTEFUL AND NEEDLESS NEW ARMS RACE?

-- WILL WE RATIFY THE SALT II TREATY AND MOVE ON TO FURTHER LIMITS AND REDUCTIONS IN SALT III, OR WILL WE TEAR UP THE AGREEMENT AND RUN THE RISK OF ENDANGERING THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL ITSELF?

-- IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL WE PERSEVERE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WHICH HAS ALREADY GAINED PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER MOST POWERFUL ARAB NEIGHBOR, EGYPT, OR WILL WE LET IMPATIENCE DIVERT US FROM THE MOST REALISTIC HOPE YET FOR A BROADER PEACE?

-- WILL THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO STAND UNMISTAKABLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OR WILL WE FORGET THAT OUR STRENGTH IN THE WORLD DEPENDS ON OUR IDEALS AS WELL AS OUR ARMS?

-- WILL WE MOVE AHEAD IN DEVELOPING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA, ASIA AND AFRICA, OR WILL WE SLIDE BACKWARDS INTO AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFRONTATION?

THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF THE QUESTIONS I SEE OUR NATION FACING. I'M SURE YOU HAVE OTHERS.

03:15:00:00

SO ANY QUESTION IS FAIR GAME. I'M ANXIOUS TO
HEAR YOUR CONCERNS AND HOPES FOR AMERICA. AND I HOPE
OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MINUTES, WE CAN HELP DEFINE
TOGETHER SOME OF THE BASIC CHOICES AMERICA FACES IN
THE WORLD.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 24, 1980

No. 296A

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE SPEECH BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Missouri Athletic Club
and
Radio Station KMOX
St. Louis, Missouri
October 21, 1980

KMOX MODERATOR: We are at your service from the Missouri Athletic Club in a special Town Hall forum today on KMOX Radio in St. Louis. Our special guest, the United States Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie.

Mr. Secretary, according to the format of the program the moderator is now permitted to ask a couple of questions from the top.

By your leave, sir, many of us are confused about the way this country's foreign policy is accomplished. Would you explain exactly the role of the State Department and the National Security Adviser, and tell us if those roles are compatible.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The role of the State Department is the principal role of foreign policy-making; but, perhaps more accurately, foreign policy adviser to the President of the United States.

As Harry Truman once said, when he was asked the question whether or not he supported a certain State Department policy, he said, "There is no State Department policy unless I say so." (Laughter and applause.)

So it is with all of the State Department, and its 10,000 employees spread around this planet in embassy and consulate offices and in the State Department here in Washington, gathering information. It constantly pours across the desks of the State Department from all corners of the globe, to evaluate it in terms of its impact upon foreign policy as a nation and to advise the President as to its implications so that he can make the decisions.

03:15:08:1030

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Other departments of the government also impact on foreign policy. The Department of Defense, obviously, the Department of Commerce, the Office of the Special Trade Representative, the Department of the Treasury, and so on through the Government.

The National Security Council was created after World War II for the purpose of coordinating all of these activities and agencies which have an impact upon foreign policy. And that is the statutory role of the National Security Council.

Obviously, to the extent that the National Security Council, in playing the coordinating role, may accommodate differences in view on policy. To that extent it is also involved in policy-making, and sometimes that role is misunderstood and I suspect at times it is expanded.

But, in any case, that is the nature of bureaucracy, but the fundamental role of the two I think is quite clear, and I think can be worked out to the extent that it tends to become confused.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there any discussion or negotiation, formal or otherwise, currently under way that might lead to the release of our hostages in Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: For several months now we have been pursuing every channel which we could identify: governmental, non-governmental, private, in order to establish indirect and, hopefully, eventually, direct contact with established authority in Iran to resolve this issue.

We have used those channels to communicate our government's views on questions that emerge as areas of concern to the Iranian people and the Iranian Government; to offer reassurances as to the implications of our actions in areas of concern to Iran. And we've tried also, through the good offices made available to us, to make clear to Iran, its government, and people that the hostages are a problem for them as well as they are for us.

One can never be sure when all of these efforts which are given, which continue on a daily basis, may eventually result in establishing contact and a basis for negotiation. We can anticipate some of the questions that may be on the table in such negotiations, and we've tried to anticipate them and tried to prepare ourselves to deal with them when we get to that point. But we are not at that point yet.

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There are signals from time to time from Iran, and there have been a couple this week, to the effect that the Majlis or the Iranian Parliament may be two or three days away from a decision. But we have heard such statements before and we have not yet reached the decision point. So we have learned not to raise our own expectations, and we've tried even harder not to raise the expectations of the families of the hostages or the American people. We're ready to go whenever we get the signal to go.

MODERATOR: To follow this up, if I may, sir, President Carter has declared neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, and yesterday he talked of releasing those frozen Iranian assets, sending spare parts and other actions should Iran release our hostages. Would that action not nullify the position of neutrality and perhaps force the issue with the Soviets?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The first point I would make is that it is not useful to speculate about what terms the Iranians may be interested in laying down for discussion in any negotiations, and to try to prejudice that negotiation in advance to exclude subjects for discussion we don't believe is productive.

I would only remind you that early in the hostage crisis, the President laid down two principles which would govern his actions, and I can assure you that that is his determination today. One, to press for the safe and prompt release of the hostages; and, two, to do nothing in that connection which is inconsistent with our national interests or national honor.

MODERATOR: But, sir, would not the supporting of one side in such a war be inconsistent with our policy in that Persian Gulf area?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Your question involves an assumption which isn't necessarily accurate.

MODERATOR: Mr. Carter made those proposals yesterday.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Mr. Carter made reference to the fact that when the hostages were seized, there were certain specific actions that we took and I suspect those actions are very fresh in the recollection of everybody in this room.

What he was saying is what has been implicitly our policy with respect to the hostages from the beginning; that if they would undo what they did, we would undo what we did.

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That policy has been outstanding since the beginning of the hostage crisis and antedate the Iraq-Iran war by months. Nobody consulted us, either the Government of Iraq or the Government of Iran, with respect to the timing of these hostilities. So our hostage problem is as it has been and we will deal with it in that context.

I will not undertake to characterize on the basis of some assumption as to the implications of what may or may not be done. I don't think that's helpful or useful.

MODERATOR: Our guest here today is the Secretary of State, Edmund S. Muskie. We invite our listeners at KMOX Radio to join us on 436-7900 -- that's in the Metropolitan St. Louis area -- for the Metro East, 397-8600; suburbs, ENTERprise 9808. You might start calling now. We want our listeners to know that Secretary Muskie personally liked to pick those questions from his audience, so I'll ask you here to raise your hands, if you will, if you have a question for the Secretary of State. I see some hands back there. All right. There's one back there. We'll ask that gentleman to step forward to the microphone. And, while he's doing that, Ann Keefe, if you have one of those calls on the line back there at KMOX Radio, let's take that one first while we sort of get people established around tables and microphones here.

QUESTION: Secretary of State Muskie, what is the Secretary -- what is the State Department doing to try and convince China to stop testing nuclear bombs in the atmosphere? There's now a cloud directly over our head and we're tired of this radioactivity coming down on our children. Thank you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The People's Republic of China, of course, is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the Test Ban Treaty. Other countries also are not signatories. It should be our effort, and I'm sure will be, to persuade all of these countries to become signatories and to accept the limitation that these treaties have imposed upon those who have signed them.

May I point out that the non-nuclear countries have a complain with respect to the nuclear powers, including the United States; and I'll mention just one point: Ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

In the Non-Proliferation Treaty we made a deal with the non-nuclear powers. We said we would exercise arms control

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restraint, and we moved toward a comprehensive test ban. In return for that commitment from the nuclear powers, non-nuclear powers around this planet signed that treaty.

So that there are complaints going in both directions, may I say to our questioner. Every five years there is a conference reviewing performance under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That conference broke up a few weeks ago without a final declaration because of the unhappiness of the non-nuclear powers with respect to our failure to ratify SALT II, and the failure of both superpowers to move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty.

So the total job to which your question refers has not yet been done. In order to achieve it and get it done, we have part of the job to do as well as other nations, including the People's Republic, India, Israel, other countries which have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is why the SALT II issue is so critical. That is one reason, in addition to others, in this campaign.

QUESTION: Going back to the Mideast crisis, with the increasing intensity of the war over there, what precautions have we taken to protect the 52 hostages?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the 52 hostages, we do not have precise information as to where they are or the conditions under which they are held. We have made it clear to the Government of Iran that we hold Iran accountable for their safety, well-being, and release.

To the best of our knowledge, the hostages are alive -- at least we have no information to the contrary -- and well. But, again, we have no information to the contrary or supporting that assumption.

QUESTION: Mr. Muskie, sir, why can't someone on Capital Hill that's on President Carter's team suggest to the President to get in the money game; that when big oil moguls from the East put the squeeze on us for higher and higher oil prices, please have Mr. Carter tell them, "Sure, okay, we'll buy your oil; how many Chryslers or Chevrolets will you take in return for payment?" And let's get these companies back to work and the nation's labor force off unemployment and welfare rolls. (Applause.)

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MODERATOR: It was a little difficult for us to hear, Mr. Secretary, but what the gentlemen was asking, why don't we adopt a new policy in our dealing with the oil people in OPEC; say, yes, we'll pay the higher prices for your oil, but how many Chryslers and how many Chevrolets would you take?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course, at the present time these countries are taking dollars in return for their oil, dollars that are depreciating in value, and they're using those dollars to import goods and services from the United States, whether they're automobiles. I'm sure that there are some very expensive automobiles going to some of them from America. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But there is trade, and they have excess dollars to invest and they're now considering -- although the dollar at the present time is strengthening in value -- because of the uncertainty of currency values, they're thinking of selling oil for a basket of currencies rather than the dollar. So the whole equation may be changing.

But I think the fact that up to now the OPEC countries have used the dollar, have accepted the dollar, in exchange for their oil is an answer to the question that's been asked, and those dollars have been used to purchase American goods and to invest in American industry.

MODERATOR: But realistically, given our need for that OPEC oil, there really isn't much that we can do to dictate the policies of buying and selling, is there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. I think what our approach has been with the responsible people in the OPEC countries -- and the Saudis have been particularly responsive to this -- those who are now making economic and oil policy in Saudi Arabia, most of them are educated here in the United States, educated in economics, energy, and they're in a good position to represent their country's interests, which is what we'd expect them to do.

And we find that they are responsive to our arguments that an unstable Western economy, a Western economy in which recession creates unemployment and an economy in which inflation is ripe, is not in their own interests. They understand that. They understand the impact upon our economy, upon the Western economy as a whole, of energy prices and energy price stability, and assured oil supply.

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I point, for example, to the fact that, although many of the OPEC countries have been interested in reducing production in order to sustain current price levels, or even higher ones, that in response to the Iraq-Iran war, led by Saudi Arabia, they have increased production above previous levels in order to make up some of the shortfall that we will experience as a result of that war.

So they are sensitive in terms of their own self-interests and the importance to them of healthy, stable Western economies.

QUESTION: My name is Delphine Kominsky. I'm Editor of the Polish-American Culture Society Quarterly. Secretary Muskie, an unnamed State Department official stated that Poland is an enemy of the West, in particular the United States. Could you elaborate on this statement? All Polish-Americans are concerned about this type of attitude. We feel that Poland was put into this position at Yalta, and could you please comment on that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That newspaper report came to my attention several months ago, and we did undertake to trace it to its source. It is not based upon any State Department position, and does not represent the State Department view, and it is not an accurate story. We have reassured all of the Polish leaders from all over the country who approached us on it at the time they were concerned. I was concerned. You can't really believe that the Department over which I preside would hold that point of view. (Laughter and applause.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, one of our better news media has told us that the Iraqis have been sent in by our dear friend, Anwar Sadat. Now, if we were to help Iran, we would be hurting our dear friend, Anwar Sadat. Would you elaborate on who the Iraqis are? Thank you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If I understand the question correctly, it is that behind the Iraqi attack was the figure of Anwar Sadat. That doesn't conform to any information which I have. I think it is a totally inaccurate picture.

The Iraqi war a result of the decision of Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, his decision, and I don't think there is any involvement whatsoever on the part of President Sadat of Egypt.

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MODERATOR: Who is supporting the Iraqi war? Who supports them with arms, materiel, men?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think you have to distinguish between countries whose sympathies may lie with Iraq; and I think that that is a delicate kind of evaluation to make, and I'm not inclined to make that kind of evaluation. And the one country which, to my knowledge, has explicitly supported Iraq, is Jordan.

On the other side, you have Syria and Libya, which have put themselves on the side of Iran in the conflict. Others may have their sympathies in one direction or another.

MODERATOR: Is that purely sympathetic support, Mr. Secretary, or is there actually money and materiel being provided by those in support of either side?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Which group are you speaking of? The three countries I named or the nameless ones? (Laughter.)

MODERATOR: Perhaps the nameless one, since you chose not to name them. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: As far as I know, the nameless ones in whose position we're most concerned, are not involved in directly supplying either side.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary of State, recently many people have been worried about the United States losing its leadership role. My question is why are so many people worried, considering the United States, as far as my view, should be working more toward cooperation of many nations rather than few large forceful nations controlling the decisions of many smaller nations? (Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: First of all, on this whole question of American influence around the world and the extent to which that reflects an interest on the part of other countries in American viewpoints, American influence, American policies, I've not experienced any shortage, or any diminution of, interest. As I put it to a Congressional questioner who put

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a similar question to me, I haven't felt like Little Orphan Annie as I've traveled around the world, establishing contact with various countries.

At the United Nations General Assembly, which opened a few weeks ago, I spent nine days, as Secretaries of State traditionally do, meeting with foreign ministers who come to this country to address the United Nations. I met with 49 of them individually and with many others in so-called multi-lateral meetings, a total of 55 sessions in nine days.

I found nations from all over the world, including several with whom we do not have relations, interested in United States' views, United States' policies, interested in soliciting United States' support. So I don't think we've lost our influence in the world.

The world has changed since the days when we were the dominant power following World War II. Europe has become an independent and powerful economic force in its own right, no longer the helpless Europe of the days immediately following World War II.

Japan has become one of the world's great economic forces with its own interests.

A hundred new nations have come into being since World War II, and there is this great drive towards nationalism, which motivates most of those new nations, more than any particular ideology. They're all interested in establishing their nationhood; they're all interested in establishing an environment within which their people can find opportunity and living standards that are acceptable to them, all seeking to have their own life and their own future, their own government.

They find themselves in many cases in circumstances which can be exploited by more powerful neighbors or more powerful nations, seeking to exploit them for their own ends. So what we have is a more diverse world, a world influenced by new forces, new values, new understandings of the limitations of this planet. But, as far as I have been able to detect, whether it is in Vienna, or Ankara, or in Kuala Lumpur in Southeast Asia, or Japan, or in any other area of the world, the people of this planet look to the United States for leadership. Not always agreeing with the directions which we suggest, or the directions in which we seek to lead, but still looking to us; still respecting our values, especially in the human rights field. Still

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respecting the fact that we do not try to abuse our power, but to use it, rather, to eliminate problems, to reduce tensions, to bring stability; and I think most people on this planet understand that to be our objective.

But that doesn't mean they always agree with us, or that they will rubber stamp our positions, or that we don't make mistakes. But American influence is very pervasive and very strong on this planet; and I'm speaking about a very amateur Secretary of State unexpectedly for just six months. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Following the last portion of your statement, given the reelection of President Carter, should that happen, would you continue on as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is only one job I'd rather have, if I have to choose, and that is to continue to be my wife's husband. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Other than that, there isn't another job I'd rather have than the one I've got. That's the way it goes. (Applause.)

QUESTION: Gee, I almost called you Senator Muskie.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's a good title.

QUESTION: That sounds pretty good. Why do we sit at attention, waiting on demands of other countries who depend on us, without making our own demands on them? Why isn't the Administration more assertive? Why do we wait for these countries to make up our policies?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Could you give us the specifics, sir? What exactly have you in mind?

QUESTION: One caller earlier said why don't we trade oil for cars, et cetera, and it sounded like he made the comment that they know what's good for them and they'll, by George, decide when they want to do that. Well, we know what's good for us now, why won't we decide and put some pressure of them from our point of view?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: As an old Yankee trader, I agree with you 100%, and that's what we try to do. If you had a specific in which we had failed to do that, and within my experience so that I could add information to reassure you, I would be glad to do it. But you've made a general statement, a general criticism, which may not necessarily be based upon a full understanding of the facts in any particular situation.

With respect to the Saudis, for example, since that's the one specific to which you refer, given the fact that the question arose earlier, we are constantly in consultation with the Saudis with respect to the impact of energy prices upon our economy, with respect to the imperatives of energy-pricing supply upon our policies, undertaking to achieve a balance. I think we have a good two-way conversation going with them constantly on those subjects.

We're constantly in communication with them on the whole security problems of the Persian Gulf and that area, considering what we might be able to do to ease their concerns, and they're quite aware of what accommodation or modification or their views we might expect in order to be able to have a meeting of minds. It's never a one-way conversation.

I don't know why Americans assume that when an individual citizen, such as myself, is appointed to a job like this, that we suddenly lose any ability to understand our own interests or our own country's interests. And I suspect that you must have some specific situations in mind, and that if you felt free to present them, that I might be able to reassure you as to some of them, although I haven't been in this job too long.

But we are not a give-away organization, the State Department. We make mistakes, we make bad trades from time to time, we make bad judgments. After all, we're Americans. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Mr. Muskie, I believe that most people in this room have expressed themselves outwardly, their belief, that if the hostages had been taken by the Iranians during a time when Harry Truman were President, that we would not be going through the experience of a one-year anniversary of that event. I would ask you to speculate on what Harry Truman would have done; and, point two of that, do you believe that a personal trip to Iran by our President would bring home the hostages?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to what Harry Truman would have done, that's like asking how many home runs would Babe Ruth have hit if he had played after Henry Aaron had played. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't know how you make judgments for dead presidents on issues that we confront today. And I might say something in Harry's name that he'd remind me of when I got to where he is, wherever that is. (Laughter and applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But with respect to the dramatic kind of gesture you're discussing, believe me, I would suspect there are any number of people at the top of your government who would be glad to make that kind of a dramatic journey if there were any evidence that it would achieve a result. We're prepared to do it at any time, but we have ways of determining whether or not it would.

This is an unprecedented situation, and you said if Harry Truman were President, this wouldn't have happened. What's wrong with the other 30-odd presidents we have had. Would it have happened in each of their administrations? We had a hostage situation in connection with North Korea at the time of the 1968 election. Those hostages were captured for 11 months. You remember the Pueblo. They were finally released, all of them, safe and sound.

We had another hostage situation later in Cambodia, when the crew of a merchant ship -- I forget whether or not it was a tanker -- some 40 were taken hostage by the Cambodian Government. The President sent in a military force. The military force achieved their release, but at the cost of over 40 American lives among the servicemen who were sent in.

Of the two ways of rescuing hostages or achieving their release, which would you choose? With respect to these 52, a rescue effort was undertaken in the spring. It failed. At some point we'll all make a judgment of wisdom of trying that or the effectiveness of the plans and what-not, and that's a proper judgment for us to make, proper for us to hold those accountable that made a mistake in any case; but that kind of an effort was made.

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It was our judgment that that approach wouldn't work, and so we have been working at this quieter approach. It isn't very visible, and can't be very visible if it's to be effective, in our judgment. What you have in Iran is a constant competition for power, the country has moved through a revolution, various power centers are seeking to accumulate the power necessary to take control, and the hostages have been part of that power struggle.

It includes the hard-line clerics or mullahs, it includes the militants who hold the hostages, it includes the moderates like President Bani-Sadr, the recent foreign minister, Ghotbzadeh, and there are others; and there is a constant competition.

In the course of this competition they have undertaken to shape their political institutions, the Majlis, or Parliament. That seemed to take forever, but finally they organized, appointed a Prime Minister, and the moment that took place I wrote the Prime Minister a letter, indicating our interest in direct contact or indirect contact or contact in any way that would serve their purposes to try to resolve the hostage issues.

He read that letter publicly. We have reason to believe that they intend at some point to reply to it, but that's been several weeks. Now in recent days there has been an acceleration of predictions by Iranians that a decision is approaching. We don't know whether it's in the air or not. But if it is near, and if they're interested in sitting down at a table, whatever shape table they prefer, we're ready to sit down and we've prepared ourselves to discuss any of the issues which we've tried to anticipate that they might raise.

I think it's in that slow, painful, agonizing way that it's got to be done. That approach worked once in 1968. Hopefully it will work again, but don't ask me to set a time frame. I just have the feeling that this is at some point going to work. I just think that what we are going to see at some point is a final realization on the part of the Iranian leaders -- and they may not have resolved their political competition at that point -- that it is in Iran's interest to get this behind them, to end their isolation.

For example, the sanctions that we persuaded our allies in Europe to impose. This deprives Iran of access to markets, not just for military supplies, but for other supplies that

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they need to sustain their economy, the lives of their people. The sanctions closed the door. Surely in a time of war they must begin to feel the pinch.

It's these kinds of pressure, the pressure of political fragmentation within their own country, the pressures of their declining economy, the pressures of the war, the pressures of the Soviet presence of their northern border, the presence of unfriendly neighbors. These kinds of pressures, we think, some point will reach them to the judgment that they've got to resolve the hostage issue.

It's on that assumption that we've been proceeding and I hope we're right, but there's no way I can guarantee it.

QUESTION: I have a two-part question. It's not really related, though. I would like to know the status of the situation in Cambodia and what is Secretary Muskie's assessment of the seemingly new attitude of the Cuban Government in the form of the recent statements Castro has made? Thank you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to Kampuchea, the situation is, of course, that the resistance to the Vietnamese invasion continues and spills over the Cambodia-Thai border. The Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia continues, some 200,000 Vietnamese troops, in addition to pressures along the Chinese border where additional Vietnamese troops are deployed.

The Thai-Kampuchean border is a sensitive area. It is where the refugees have congregated, which has triggered this massive world-wide effort to feed them, to resettle them; and we're all familiar with that.

Vietnam is very stubbornly holding to its position that its invasion of Kampuchea is irreversible, meaning, I take it, that they intend to maintain their presence there and impose a puppet government of their own choosing. They have, in fact, announced elections next year, which may or may not be credible.

At the same time, Vietnam neighbors, the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and others, see in this Vietnamese expansionism, in the Cambodia threat to themselves, and so they have mounted a common effort in the United Nations to seek to force the Vietnamese to a political settlement of the struggle, leading to elections, the election of a government of Cambodia which is responsive and representative of the Cambodian people.

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So there is a rather uneasy kind of a balance at this moment. The Vietnamese haven't moved to wipe out the remnants of Cambodian resistance, which is represented by Pol Pot and maybe 30,000 to 40,000. The Vietnamese charge that as the Cambodian refugees cross the border into Thailand and are brought back to health by adequate food and feeding, that the younger ones then return to replenish Pol Pot's forces; and they see that as an unneutral act on the part of Thailand.

The PRC supports Thailand and the effort to turn the situation around on the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese economy is in rather rough shape, and this problem is growing, but it is getting substantial support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has used the opportunities there to expand their own geopolitical resources. They use Cam Ranh Bay, the base which we built in the course of the Vietnam war, for the uses of their own growing Pacific fleet.

They're well aware of the strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca south of the Chinese peninsula, so Soviet naval presence in the Pacific is growing around the facilities that they've acquired from the Vietnamese as a result of their support. So it's a very, very unstable and important region of the world that we've tended to avoid looking at in America in our preoccupation with Afghanistan and now with the Iran-Iraq war. But the strategic implications, implications for our own interests, for those of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Indochinese countries, the People's Republic, they're all very significant.

So we have undertaken in the last five, six months to reestablish our own interests there and our own concerns about the area in our relations with those countries.

And the other part of that question was --

MODERATOR: She was curious to know, Mr. Secretary, about the seeming change in the Cuban attitude and its relationship to this Government.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I can only speculate. Mr. Castro has cut off the flow of refugees from Mariel Harbor. He has, in addition, released American prisoners, and the rhetoric is certainly cool. All of that has been done by him. We know, of course, that he has broader objectives, and that is discussions with us of a broader range of issues, including, I assume, from our point of view, such issues as Cuban troops in Africa, escalating Cuban activity in the Caribbean, the close military relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

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So there are a lot of issues that we could discuss. He's interested in Guantanamo Bay and our base there, and the possibilities of changing its status, normalization of trade, lifting of the embargo. Castro has been pushing and this is really what was behind the flow of refugees from Cuba. He was applying that kind of pressure to get our attention and hopefully to persuade us to sit down at the negotiating table over that range of issues.

I would expect that maybe he has given us a quieter signal with these steps that he has taken, but we'll have to wait and see what that is.

MODERATOR: Is that our intention, to sit down and negotiate some of those issues?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: When he stopped that flow of refugees, that gets our attention. What we do about it, we'll deal with later.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we certainly appreciate your coming to our fair city and I know we all welcome this opportunity to ask you questions.

Mine is this: You said we will hold Iran accountable for the hostages. Just what is meant by that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think we'll have to deal with that contingency if and when it arises.

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, in regard to the SALT II Treaty which the President and the Russians negotiated, I believe in 1979, it is just as good as tabled or scrapped by the Congress when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Now, why is the President using this as a ploy now right before the election when the Congress isn't even in session? Thank you.

MODERATOR: Did you hear the question? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: First, a correction and secondly, an explanation. First, the Congress did not scrap SALT II. SALT II is scheduled for full debate in the Senate in January of this year. The invasion of Afghanistan took place in December. It was obvious that we could not at that point

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get the votes in the Senate to ratify the treaty in those circumstances. The treaty was left on the Senate calendar, to be considered at such point as it seemed feasible to do so. It was not rejected or scrapped, because we still appreciated its importance to our national security interests.

Why has the issue been raised here? I raised it first, I think, following the party conventions when it was clear to me that there was a campaign issue here. And, secondly, because it was clear to me that if we were to get the votes in the Senate to ratify the treaty, it was important to persuade the American people that the treaty was in our interests.

The best way to influence the Congress is to influence the constituents of Members of Congress. So I made the decision, personally, and the President concurred in it, that we would use this campaign -- and the attention of the American people is focused on national issues and foreign policy issues particularly -- to make the case for SALT II. So that we could never be charged with the accusation that we had not made that effort.

If SALT II is rejected and the consequences of that rejection are finally understood by the American people, we wanted it to be understood that we had done our best to present the case for it. That's why we're in this campaign.

If you can't discuss an issue like that in a Presidential campaign, then what do you discuss? How you scramble eggs? This is a fundamental issue, of fundamental consequence, to our national security for years to come. It should be debated in this campaign.

That isn't to say that everybody needs to agree with it or to approve of it. But the case for and against ought to be understood. A lot of us in the Senate spent hundreds of hours studying this treaty. We are convinced that its approval is in the national interest. Our military studied it before the hearings in the Senate, supported it then. As time has passed and the prospects of a SALT-less world and its consequences become clearer, the military is even more strongly convinced that this treaty is in the national security interest.

That being true, then we think we have a responsibility to bring those points to the attention of the American people. Our allies in Europe believe it to be critical. So much so,

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that if we fail to make the effort, our failure could be a serious blow to the alliance. So it is an important issue, and I can't think of a place, or a time more suited to its discussion and debate than a national political campaign. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, once past the election, past the political implications of this time, can SALT II be considered as long as the Soviets remain in Afghanistan? Would the Senate consider it as long as those Soviet troops are there?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think they should, because I think both our Afghanistan policies and the SALT II are aimed at the same objectives, imposing restraints on the Soviet Union. SALT II and restraints on nuclear arms are particularly important in relations between the superpowers at times when those relationships could erupt into nuclear war.

So it's important to separate the two. I have said to the Soviet Union, and said to Mr. Gromyko, that the invasion of Afghanistan has reduced the possibility of ratification; and that any change in their policy there would be a positive force in our effort to ratify the treaty. They understand that, and we hope that out of this debate and these communications that we have with the Soviets, that we may get both restraints working.

But time is running out on us in SALT II. The Soviets have to dismantle several hundred systems under the treaty. In order to get that job done by the end of 1981, which is called for in the treaty, they're going to have to begin pretty soon. They're not likely to do so. But there's no indication there's a determination on our part to strive for ratification. They have not done anything yet inconsistent with SALT II; we have not, so we have sort of an informal, unstated on their side, commitment to behave consistently with SALT II for the time being.

But that time may run out at some point. So it is now time -- that's what I am saying -- and we've got to make a decision for or against it. We ought to do so on the basis of our understanding of the consequences of each course of action.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as a former military career person, I'm quite concerned about where we're going militarily. It looks like we're, if we're not already there, sliding toward maybe number two in the world. I would like for you to comment on maybe what can be done to stop that slide; and, secondly, I'm aware that the SALT program was in the works for quite awhile, and it seemed that maybe it might have been a political motive for the announcement at this time. Would you comment on that, please?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the so-called slide, let me tell you that, number one, there's been an increase in defense spending in real terms beyond inflation since 1976 of 10%. Seven years prior to that there was a decline in real terms. In real terms that increase in defense spending in the next five years will reach 27%.

How much money is that? I was Chairman of the Budget Committee in the spring of last year, a year ago this spring. When the Senate Budget Committee reported to the Senate Floor, we projected five-year defense spending at the then current levels, which we recommended, totaling \$800 billion.

Now the five-year projection is over a trillion dollars. I don't think that's selling defense cheap. In the \$3 trillion economy -- just under a \$3 trillion economy -- to project defense spending at that level, if it's spent wisely and well; and there are four areas in which we have to do it. We have to do it in terms of force structure, in terms of modernization, in terms of readiness, in terms of personnel.

With respect to the second and third, particularly, we fell behind during the Vietnam war when defense spending tended to go for those things which were consumed in a war. So modernization and readiness tended to be sacrificed in order to keep the war effort going. We've been slowly building back, and not so slowly. The present budget will put us on track.

In addition to that, in response to the Afghanistan war, we have built up a readiness posture, a Rapid Deployment Force, in the Middle East which has progressed at amazing speed. It still has got a way to go, but we've got the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean ever deployed there in the entire history of the Indian Ocean to stand by ready to protect our interests.

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Under President Carter's leadership, NATO is committed to a 3% annual increase in its defense budget for modernization and readiness. In addition to that, NATO, at the meeting I attended in May, committed itself to increasing its contribution to NATO defense so that if American forces need to be deployed outside NATO territory, that our other NATO allies can fill in behind us for the defense of Europe.

All those steps have been taken under the leadership of President Carter. In my judgment it reflects a prudent, sustained concern for the state of our readiness and our ability to fight if we need to and to fight effectively in our nation's interest.

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, permit me to interrupt, if I may. What you say is in somewhat direct contradiction to so many other statements we've been hearing around the country, perhaps grounded in the political campaign. But the American public sometimes finds it a little difficult to try to understand who's right and who's wrong. We're all talking about the same Army, the same Navy, the same Marine Corps, we're all taking about the same budget, and yet one side says we're in great shape and the other says we're really in trouble. Which is it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We each have to make our own judgment. I bring to that judgment six years as Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee in which the defense posture and the dollars put into defense were very much under my jurisdiction and responsibility. I say it from my perspective as Secretary of State and I say it as a non-candidate.
(Laughter.)

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, we are accommodating our radio audience with a portion of an open line to the next hour. We're doing that so that we may perhaps take a few more because you have plenty of questions here. So let's take a couple of more questions from our audience right here.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my question to you, sir, is what is the official response of the Soviets or other Communist block nations to the State Department in regard to our deployment of the MX missile system? What recriminations might have been given to our State Department from these countries; and, regardless of that, how soon will the MX missile system be deployed and will be completed?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't have the timetable in mind. First of all, the MX missile is not prohibited by the SALT II treaty. Neither are the cruise missiles, ground cruise missiles or air launch cruise missiles, which we are developing and which will not be deployed before the end of the protocol year. The protocol expires the end of 1981, and these American initiative -- the MX and the cruise missiles -- would not be prohibited by the treaty. They would be prohibited, as I understand it, by the protocol.

So that's another reason why time is so urgent with respect to making a decision on SALT II. The fact is that none of these initiatives that we've undertaking in order to achieve balance with the Soviet Union would violate the SALT II treaty; but they may well become the subject of negotiations with respect to the SALT III treaty, depending on what the Soviets, of course, are willing to give up with respect to SALT III.

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, our time is up. We thank you very much for your response to the questions here, and we hope you'll come back. (Applause)

(This session concluded at 2:00 p.m.)

03:15:07:30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 21, 1980
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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

SPONSORED BY

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE
AND
INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

OCTOBER 21, 1980

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REMARKS BY
 SECRETARY OF STATE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
 BEFORE A PUBLIC FORUM
 AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AT MILWAUKEE

OCTOBER 21, 1980

THANK YOU, DR. HORTON AND DR. GARNHAM. I'M DELIGHTED
 TO BE HERE.

MY PURPOSE TONIGHT IS TO LISTEN AS WELL AS TO SPEAK --
 TO GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK QUESTIONS. SO I WILL
 BE DELIBERATELY BRIEF. BUT I DO WANT TO BEGIN WITH A FEW
 FORMAL, STAGE-SETTING WORDS ABOUT THE ROOT PURPOSES OF
 OUR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

A FEW YEARS AGO, IN A TOAST HE DELIVERED AT THE WHITE
 HOUSE IN PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ADMINISTRATION, THE FRENCH
 PHILOSOPHER ANDRE MALRAUX OBSERVED THAT AMERICA WAS THE
 FIRST NATION ON EARTH CONSCIOUSLY ORGANIZED AROUND AN
IDEA.

THAT IDEA, OF COURSE, WAS THE IDEA OF HUMAN FREEDOM:
 THE IDEA OF UNFETTERED INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION, OF RESPECT
 FOR THE SANCTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL; THE IDEA OF FULL
 PLAY FOR THE CITIZEN'S POLITICAL RIGHTS.

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THAT IDEA, OF COURSE, REMAINS CENTRAL TO OUR POLITICAL UNION. IT IS WHAT MAKES AMERICA THE WELLSPRING OF THE WORLD'S CONTEMPORARY HUMAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT TO THE CRUSADE FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS.

AND THAT IDEA OF HUMAN FREEDOM IS ONE OF THE MOTIVATING FORCES OF OUR NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY.

TONIGHT I WANT TO TALK BRIEFLY ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I WANT TO TOUCH SPECIFICALLY ON A FORTHCOMING EVENT OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO ALL OF US WHO CARE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS: THIS YEAR'S MADRID CONFERENCE OF 33 EUROPEAN NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. IN NOVEMBER THESE NATIONS WILL BEGIN TO REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ESTABLISHED CSCE -- THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE -- AS A CONTINUING PROCESS, AND IT MADE FIDELITY TO CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS A MATTER OF JOINT OBLIGATION AND CONCERN TO ALL 35 SIGNING NATIONS.

LET ME BEGIN WITH AN OBSERVATION OR TWO ABOUT THE EMPHASIS PLACED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS A MAJOR THEME OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

PRESIDENT CARTER CLEARLY SIGNALLED THAT NEW EMPHASIS IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS. "BECAUSE WE ARE FREE," HE SAID, "WE CAN NEVER BE INDIFFERENT TO THE FATE OF FREEDOM ELSEWHERE."

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FROM THE BEGINNING, PRESIDENT CARTER WAS DETERMINED THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD GIVE ACTIVE, EXPLICIT SUPPORT TO THREE IMPORTANT CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS:

* FIRST, THE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN PERSON -- TORTURE, ARBITRARY ARREST OR IMPRISONMENT, SUMMARY EXECUTION AND DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS;

* SECOND, THE RIGHT TO FULFILLMENT OF VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS SUCH AS FOOD, SHELTER, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH CARE;

* AND THIRD, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS -- FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY, TRAVEL, AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS.

IN THE PAST THREE AND A HALF YEARS, HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BECOME AN ACTIVE ISSUE ON OUR DIPLOMATIC AGENDA. SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NOW TAKE PLACE BETWEEN US AND THE NATIONS WITH WHOM WE DEAL. AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE HAS BECOME ONE OF THE KEY CRITERIA WE USE IN DETERMINING WHETHER AND HOW WE DEAL WITH OTHER NATIONS.

WE DO ALL THIS NOT OUT OF A NAIVE IDEALISM, AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT. WE DO ALL THIS BECAUSE WE HAVE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO PROMOTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. AS SIGNATORIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND BY OUR OWN LAWS, WE ARE REQUIRED TO WORK FOR INCREASED OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY ALL COUNTRIES. WE ALSO ARE CONVINCED, IN THE MOST HARD-HEADED, PRACTICAL SENSE, THAT EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SERVES OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

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WE ARE CONVINCED, FIRST OF ALL, THAT EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SERVES OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE HEAVY SILENCE OF REPRESSION IS NOT STABILITY: IT IS TOO OFTEN THE OMINOUS CALM BEFORE A STORM.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT BY ALLEVIATING THE SOURCES OF TENSION AND DISCORD BEFORE THEY ERUPT INTO VIOLENCE, NATIONS CAN HELP BUILD REAL STABILITY. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES, BY ENCOURAGING THIS PROCESS, CAN HELP PREVENT DAMAGE TO ITS LONG-TERM INTERESTS -- AND CAN HELP REMOVE THE INVITING TARGET THAT SOCIAL UNREST PRESENTS FOR INTERVENTION BY OUR FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.

THERE ARE SEVERAL CASES I COULD CITE AS ILLUSTRATIONS, BUT I NEED MENTION ONLY ONE: THE NEW NATION OF ZIMBABWE. THERE, A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND A FREE ELECTION -- WHICH WE UNSWERVINGLY SUPPORTED -- ENDED A VIOLENT CIVIL WAR, GAVE NEW CREDIBILITY TO UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA, AND FRUSTRATED THE HOPE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPLOIT RACIAL VIOLENCE TO ITS OWN ENDS.

SECOND, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE MORE SECURE IN A WORLD WHERE MORE GOVERNMENTS RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THEIR PEOPLE.

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WE BELIEVE THAT COUNTRIES WHICH RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS MAKE STRONGER ALLIES AND BETTER FRIENDS.

OUR ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE ANDEAN PACT NATIONS, JAPAN AND ISRAEL UNDERSCORE THIS POINT. BECAUSE THEY STRIVE TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, THEY HAVE AN INNER STRENGTH AND RESILIENCE THAT HELPS THEM STAND WITH US AGAINST THE CHALLENGES WE FACE TOGETHER. AND TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR OTHER FRIENDS IN THE WORLD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, WE BELIEVE THEY WILL GAIN THE SAME KIND OF INNER STRENGTH: INNER STRENGTH WHICH ENHANCES THEIR SECURITY -- AND OURS.

THIRD, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ENHANCES THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPORTANT WORLD ARENAS.

I CAN ATTEST, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA, THAT OUR VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA HAVE IMPROVED OUR STANDING ON THAT CONTINENT.

AND I BELIEVE THAT OUR EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS -- HERE AT HOME AND IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY -- WILL STRENGTHEN US AT THE FORTHCOMING MADRID CONFERENCE. WE WILL GO TO THE TABLE AT MADRID ARMED NOT JUST WITH RHETORIC, BUT WITH A SOLID RECORD OF DEVOTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY.

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FOURTH, OUR VISIBLE DEVOTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER-
SCORES THE DRAMATIC DIFFERENCES -- DIFFERENCES OF PHILOSOPHY
AND BEHAVIOR -- BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WE UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS FUNDAMENTALLY BECAUSE TO DO SO IS RIGHT: BECAUSE TO DO SO COMPORTS WITH OUR OWN BEST IDEALS. BUT IT IS INESCAPABLE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLOSED SOCIETIES ARE INCOMPATIBLE. AND TODAY, AROUND THE WORLD, THE CONTRAST BETWEEN OUR SYSTEM AND THE CLOSED SOCIETIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES IS DRAMATICALLY VISIBLE. THE SOVIETS DISLIKE AND FEAR OUR EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS -- BECAUSE THEY KNOW WHAT A POWERFUL ATTRACTION FREEDOM HAS FOR MILLIONS OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ON EARTH.

FEW PEOPLE COULD HAVE PREDICTED IN THE EARLY 1970'S THAT THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE SUCH FAR-REACHING EFFECTS. FOR YEARS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN CALLING FOR A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EARLY 1970'S, AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND WITH FIRM UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE MUST INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, WE AND OUR ALLIES ACCEPTED THE IDEA. AND WE INSISTED FURTHER THAT THE CONFERENCE MUST COVER A FULL RANGE OF ISSUES INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS NATIONS.

THE CONFERENCE BEGAN IN 1973, AND IN 1975, THE 35 NATIONS REPRESENTED IN HELSINKI SIGNED A DOCUMENT WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROCLAIMED TEN PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.

THOSE PRINCIPLES -- TO WHICH THE SIGNATORIES FREELY OBLIGATED THEMSELVES -- INCLUDED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, OF CONSCIENCE, AND OF RELIGION OR BELIEF.

THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT HAS THREE SUBDIVISIONS, OR "BASKETS."

ONE BASKET CONCERNS MILITARY SECURITY, AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO REDUCE MILITARY TENSIONS.

ANOTHER CONCERNS COOPERATION IN ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

"BASKET THREE" DEALS WITH IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. BUT IT IS PRINCIPLE SEVEN -- THE DECLARATION CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS -- THAT HAS BECOME PERHAPS THE MOST FAMOUS AND CONTROVERSIAL SINGLE FEATURE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THIS PRINCIPLE REQUIRES SIGNATORY STATES TO ABIDE BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS. IT HAS BEEN OUR POLICY TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AS SOLEMN AND IMPORTANT AS ALL ITS OTHER PROVISIONS.

OUR GOAL HAS BEEN -- AND IS -- TO BRING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR, AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE KNOW HOW, TO ENSURE THAT ALL THE SIGNATORIES -- INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION -- LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS THEY HAVE THEMSELVES FREELY UNDERTAKEN: INCLUDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS PROCLAIMED IN PRINCIPLE SEVEN.

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THAT IS EMPHATICALLY OUR GOAL AS WE APPROACH THE CONFERENCE IN MADRID.

IN THE FIVE YEARS SINCE THEIR SIGNING, THE HELSINKI ACCORDS HAVE BECOME A REAL FORCE IN THE WORLD. THEY HAVE BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. AND THEY HAVE IMPROVED DAY-TO-DAY LIFE FOR THOUSANDS OF EASTERN EUROPEANS, ENHANCING OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT LOVED ONES, OFFERING THE CHANCE FOR MANY TO EMIGRATE AS THEIR NATIONS SEEK TO LIVE UP TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. EVEN BEFORE THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT OF 1980, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A SLOW BUT VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POLAND. ROMANIA'S EMIGRATION POLICIES HAVE BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE SINCE HELSINKI. HUNGARY HAS BEEN MORE COOPERATIVE IN RESOLVING FAMILY REUNIFICATION PROBLEMS.

UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE ARE DARK CORNERS WHERE HELSINKI OBLIGATIONS ARE IGNORED. IN THE SOVIET UNION, ANDREI SAKHAROV HAS BEEN BANISHED TO EXILE. MORE THAN 40 OTHER INDIVIDUALS -- MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE MEMBERS OF HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS AND TOOK SERIOUSLY THE SOVIET COMMITMENTS AT HELSINKI -- HAVE BEEN ARRESTED; THEIR ONLY CRIME WAS TO MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACCORDS.

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EMIGRATION BY SOVIET JEWS HAS BEEN SEVERELY RESTRICTED AGAIN THIS YEAR. PENTACOSTALISTS FACE INNUMERABLE OBSTACLES IN LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL. WE SEE THESE RESTRICTIONS AS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI PROVISIONS CONCERNING FREEDOM TO TRAVEL AND EMIGRATE.

SO CLEARLY, THERE IS A LONG WAY YET TO GO TOWARD FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THE PRINCIPLES PROCLAIMED IN HELSINKI.

THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT GO TO MADRID TO MAKE PROPAGANDA. NOR WILL WE NEGLECT OTHER ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. BUT TO IGNORE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THAT ARE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE HELSINKI ACCORDS WOULD BE TO WEAKEN THAT AGREEMENT AND TO DIMINISH THE FORCE AND POWER OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE CLEAR IN MADRID THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS -- WHETHER AT HOME OR IN EUROPE; WHETHER IN AFGHANISTAN OR EAST ASIA; WHETHER IN SOUTH AFRICA OR THE SOVIET UNION.

AND WE WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS -- SUCH AS ARBITRARY LIMITS ON DISCUSSION AND OTHER ARTIFICIAL CURBS -- DESIGNED TO PREVENT A FULL DISCUSSION OF ALL ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE IN MADRID.

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OUR GOALS AT MADRID ARE THREEFOLD:

FIRST, WE WILL PRESS FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR APPROACH WILL BE FORTHRIGHT AS WE ASSESS THE RECORDS OF COMPLIANCE OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

SECOND, WE WILL WORK AT MADRID FOR AN INCREASE IN CONTACTS BETWEEN ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN THE WEST. WE WILL SEEK SPECIFIC PROGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN RESOLVING EMIGRATION PROBLEMS AND REUNITING FAMILIES. WE ALSO WILL SEEK PROGRESS IN THE CASES OF THOSE PERSECUTED OR IMPRISONED FOR THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR FOR MONITORING THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

THIRD, IN THE SECURITY FIELD, WE WILL EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MEASURES WHICH CAN REDUCE MILITARY TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE THESE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES SHOULD APPLY TO THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. BUT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN COSMETIC MEASURES, OR TALKS WHICH GO NOWHERE. AND WE WILL NOT PERMIT DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY AT MADRID TO OVERSHADOW OR IN ANY WAY DIMINISH THE ATTENTION PAID TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE CHAIRMAN OF OUR DELEGATION TO MADRID, FORMER ATTORNEY-GENERAL GRIFFIN BELL, PUT IT THIS WAY NOT LONG AGO: OUR DELEGATION TO MADRID, HE SAID, WILL BE A BIT LIKE TWIN-FACED ROMAN DEITY JANUS, WHO LOOKED BOTH FORWARD AND BACK.

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"WE SHALL FOCUS OUR GAZE ON THE EASTERN RECORD AND SPEAK PLAINLY ABOUT IT," JUDGE BELL SAID, "LEAVING NO DOUBT OF OUR CONCERN FOR THE HELSINKI MONITORS, FOR ANDREI SAKHAROV, AND OTHER CHAMPIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SHALL ALSO LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE STEPS FORWARD IN ALL THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT."

BY DISPLAYING THIS SPIRIT, IN MY JUDGMENT, THE UNITED STATES CAN BEST SERVE BOTH THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OUR OWN INTEREST. AND IN THE PROCESS, WE CAN HELP BUILD A WORLD IN WHICH FREEDOM, THE DREAM OF ALL PEOPLE, BECOMES A REALITY FOR MORE PEOPLE.

THANK YOU.

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October 27, 1980
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As Prepared

ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

SPONSORED BY

THE UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON

SCRANTON, PENNSYLVANIA

OCTOBER 27, 1980

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON
OCTOBER 27, 1980

FATHER BYRON, DR. SEDGEWICK, HONORED GUESTS, AND
MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY,

I AM GLAD TO BE HERE, AND TO DISCUSS WITH YOU,
IN MY NON-POLITICAL WAY, OUR NATION'S FOREIGN POLICIES.

IT'S HARD, OF COURSE, TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT THIS
WEEK WITHOUT ITS SOUNDING POLITICAL. EVEN SPORTS. I
WOULD TELL YOU THAT I'M GLAD THE PHILLIES WON THE WORLD
SERIES, BUT YOU MIGHT THINK I WAS TRYING TO PLEASE A
PENNSYLVANIA AUDIENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. OR EVEN
WORSE, THAT I WAS FOR THEM BECAUSE, WHEN THE NATIONAL
LEAGUE HAS WON THE SERIES IN RECENT ELECTION YEARS, THE
DEMOCRATS HAVE WON THE PRESIDENCY. THAT IS A FINE TRADITION
ON WHICH I WILL NOT COMMENT.

WE ARE NEARING THE CLIMAX OF THE POLITICAL
RITUAL HENRY ADAMS ONCE CALLED "THE DANCE OF DEMOCRACY."

I SUPPOSE HENRY ADAMS WOULD BE SHOCKED AT HOW NOISY
THAT ELECTORAL DANCE HAS BECOME. BUT I DON'T THINK
WE SHOULD BE TOO TROUBLED BY THE TUMULT AND THE SHOUTING.

03:15:00 10:00

I REMEMBER HARRY TRUMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN 1948. HE LASHED THE OPPOSITION AND THE "DO-NOTHING EIGHTIETH CONGRESS" SO HARD THAT PEOPLE WOULD SHOUT, "GIVE 'EM HELL, HARRY!"

AND HARRY TRUMAN ALWAYS CALMLY REPLIED: "I DON'T GIVE 'EM HELL. I TELL THE TRUTH AND THEY THINK IT'S HELL."

YET IN THE MIDST OF THE CUSTOMARY NOISE OF A CAMPAIGN, IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO HEAR SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS BEING ASKED -- QUESTIONS THAT DESERVE CAREFUL THOUGHT.

SOME OF THOSE QUESTIONS CONCERN AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD. WHAT DOES LEADERSHIP ENTAIL? DO WE HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL, MORALLY AND MATERIALLY, TO PROVIDE IT? HOW CAN WE BEST DEFEND AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN A TURBULENT, DISORDERLY WORLD.

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WE SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT ONE FACT IN THE BEGINNING:
THE WORLD IN WHICH WE SEEK TO DISPLAY LEADERSHIP IS NOT
THE WORLD IT WAS A GENERATION AGO OR EVEN TEN YEARS AGO.
AND SO THE APPROACHES OF A GENERATION AGO -- OR TEN YEARS
AGO -- ARE UNLIKELY TO DO MUCH GOOD.

AS THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES ENJOYED
A NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND AN ESSENTIALLY UNDAMAGED INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMY. THESE CONDITIONS -- AND THE RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF
MUCH OF THE WORLD -- GAVE US A KIND OF VETO POWER IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

THE WORLD IS VERY DIFFERENT NOW:

- * SINCE WAR WAR II, MORE THAN A HUNDRED NEW NATIONS HAVE
BEEN BORN OUT OF THEIR COLONIAL PAST.
- * ONCE-PROSTRATE NATIONS -- NOTABLY JAPAN AND WEST
GERMANY -- HAVE BECOME MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWERS,
WITH STRONG MINDS OF THEIR OWN.
- * THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER IN
THE 'FIFTIES, IS NOW A SUPERPOWER. AND THE SOVIET
UNION HAS BEEN STEADILY BUILDING ITS MILITARY MIGHT.
- * IN RECENT YEARS, MOREOVER, WE HAVE LEARNED HOW
FRAGILE, INTRICATE AND INTERDEPENDENT THE WORLD ECONOMY
IS, AS SOARING ENERGY PRICES HAVE BUFFETED NATIONAL
ECONOMIES EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

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FACED WITH SUCH A CHANGED AND CHANGING WORLD, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SEE IT CLEARLY.

AMERICA, FOR ALL ITS PROBLEMS, IS LEADING. BEFORE I BECAME SECRETARY OF STATE, I HEARD THE APOSTLES OF AMERICAN WEAKNESS, WHO SAY WE HAVE LOST OUR WAY AND OUR WILL FOR LEADERSHIP. AND I WONDERED IF THEY COULD BE RIGHT. I KNOW NOW, FIRST-HAND, THAT THEY ARE WRONG. IN MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS -- IN EUROPE, IN SOUTHEAST ASIA -- I HAVE SEEN THE RESPECT IN WHICH OUR NATION IS HELD. THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD STILL LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES FOR LEADERSHIP.

TO MAINTAIN THAT RESPECT ... THAT LEADERSHIP ... THERE ARE THREE THINGS WE MUST MAINTAIN.

FIRST A STRONG, SECURE AMERICA.

THIS IS BEDROCK. FOR UNLESS WE ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND STAND BEHIND OUR FRIENDS, WE WILL LACK THE MINIMUM MEANS FOR CARRYING OUT A FOREIGN POLICY.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE, AND NOW AS SECRETARY OF STATE, I HAVE WATCHED PRESIDENT CARTER PERSISTENTLY REBUILD OUR DEFENSES OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. AFTER YEARS OF DECLINE, HE HAS PRODUCED FOUR STRAIGHT YEARS OF INCREASES IN AMERICAN OUTLAYS FOR DEFENSE. WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN THESE YEARS THE MOST SWEEPING DEFENSE MODERNIZATION IN MORE THAN A DECADE.

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PRESIDENT CARTER INSISTED UPON A FIRM RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN -- FOR HOW SECURE WOULD WE AND OUR FRIENDS BE IF WE SHOWED OURSELVES UNCONCERNED ABOUT SUCH AGGRESSION?

AND HE HAS SOUGHT TO ENHANCE OUR SECURITY IN ANOTHER IMPORTANT WAY: THROUGH PRUDENT STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. PRESIDENT CARTER BELIEVES -- AND I AGREE -- THAT TO SET OFF A NEW, UNBRIDLED ARMS RACE WOULD NOT BE A SIGNAL OF RESOLVE, BUT A SYMPTOM OF BLINDNESS TO OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RATIFICATION OF THE SALT II TREATY.

ECONOMIC SECURITY IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO A STRONG AMERICA. AND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AMERICAN HISTORY, UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER'S LEADERSHIP, WE HAVE FASHIONED A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY. AND THE FACT IS, IT IS WORKING. WE ARE REGAINING CONTROL OF OUR ENERGY FUTURE, U.S. OIL IMPORTS ARE DOWN 25% SINCE 1977, AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS UP. IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THIS YEAR, WE INCREASED THE PRODUCTION OF DOMESTIC OIL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVEN YEARS. AND AMERICAN COAL PRODUCTION IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH. THIS YEAR, WE'LL SET A NEW RECORD -- NEARLY 25% MORE COAL PRODUCTION THAN IN 1977.

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AMERICA IS ON THE ROAD TO ENERGY SECURITY,

SECOND, BEYOND BUILDING OUR OWN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
STRENGTH, WE AMERICANS ARE LEADING IN BUILDING PEACE.

I NEED CITE ONLY ONE EXAMPLE HERE.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE STAKES COULD NOT BE HIGHER,
NOR THE ISSUES MORE COMPLICATED. BUT IN LARGE PART
BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKABLE PERSONAL
STATESMANSHIP, ISRAEL TODAY LIVES IN PEACE WITH ITS MOST
POWERFUL NEIGHBOR, EGYPT.

WE HEAR COMPLAINTS THAT THE PROCESS IS TOO SLOW,
BUT SURELY THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, PAINSTAKING AS IT IS,
OFFERS MORE HOPE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PREVIOUS THREE
DECADES OF CEASELESS TENSION, WITH FOUR BLOODY MIDDLE
EAST WARS. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, THE CAMP DAVID
ACCORDS STAND AS A SHINING ACHIEVEMENT.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE WAY TO AN ENDURING PEACE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST LIES IN A DECENT RESPECT FOR THE
INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES IN THE REGION -- INCLUDING
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ISRAEL. WE INTEND TO KEEP
FAITH WITH ISRAEL -- AS A SIGNAL TO OUR FRIENDS AND
ADVERSARIES ALIKE THAT THE WORD OF THE UNITED STATES
IS STRONG.

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FINALLY, BEYOND BUILDING OUR STRENGTH AND BUILDING
PEACE IN THE WORLD, WE CAN EXERT LEADERSHIP BY STANDING
FORTHRIGHTLY FOR FREEDOM: FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

IF WE SEEK TO LEAD IN THE WORLD, WE CANNOT BE
SATISFIED MERELY WITH DEFENDING FREEDOM -- WE MUST SEEK
TO EXPAND IT.

FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENT
CARTER HAS INSISTED THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY REFLECT OUR
DEEPEST AMERICAN VALUES. HE IS DETERMINED TO SUPPORT
ABROAD WHAT WE DEFEND AT HOME -- THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
OF OUR FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS.

SO HE HAS BROUGHT TO THE HEART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY
WHAT IS AT THE HEART OF THIS COUNTRY'S STRENGTH: OUR
DEVOTION TO HUMAN FREEDOM.

TO CARRY OUT A POLICY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOT
EASY. WE MUST BALANCE ALL OF OUR INTERESTS -- SECURITY,
ECONOMIC NEEDS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS -- AS WELL AS
HUMANE VALUES.

BUT HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT HAS BEEN TO PURSUE, OUR
EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BROUGHT REAL REWARDS.

IT HAS MOVED HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE FOREFRONT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA.

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IT IS AN INVESTMENT IN LONG-TERM STABILITY. FOR THE POTENTIAL FOR RADICALISM AND VIOLENCE CAN BE REDUCED IF PEOPLE PLAY A REAL PART IN THE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEIR LIVES.

AND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY ALIGNS AMERICA WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD -- FROM THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN AFGHANISTAN TO THE NATIONALISTS IN EVERY NATION OF THE THIRD WORLD, FROM THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN ZIMBABWE TO THE GALLANT WORKERS OF POLAND.

THESE BRAVE WORKERS IN GDANSK AND LUBLIN AND ELSEWHERE HAVE WON REAL GAINS. WE HAVE EXPRESSED CLEARLY OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE POLISH WORKERS AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHART THEIR COURSE FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

AND FINALLY, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY HAS A DIVIDEND AT HOME. THROUGH IT, OUR OWN PEOPLE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR NATION IS A FORCE FOR PROGRESS ON THIS PLANET.

IF WE BACK THAT POLICY -- AS WE MUST DO -- WITH GENEROUS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE LIFE FOR PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD, WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT OUR EFFORTS WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING PRACTICAL EFFECTS.

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I HAVE SERVED IN WASHINGTON FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES. IN ALL THOSE YEARS, I HAVE BEEN A PART OF MOST OF THE DEBATES -- AND JOINED IN MANY OF THEM -- ABOUT AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO LEAD: TO BUILD OUR DEFENSES, TO SEEK PEACE IN TROUBLED REGIONS, TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN WELL BEING. I CAN TELL YOU TONIGHT THAT I AM CONFIDENT OF OUR NATIONAL CAPACITY TO LEAD -- AND CONFIDENT OF OUR NATIONAL LEADERSHIP.

LET US HAVE NO ILLUSIONS:

OUR MISSION MUST BE TO SUSTAIN ALL THE ESSENTIALS OF STEADY LEADERSHIP, NOT JUST SOME OF THEM. FOR IF WE WERE TO IGNORE ANY OF THEM...IF WE WERE TO RELY, FOR EXAMPLE, UPON ARMS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR POLICY...IF WE WERE TO TRADE WISDOM FOR IMPULSE, WE MIGHT SATISFY SOME MOMENTARY PASSION -- BUT WE WOULD ILL-SERVE OURSELVES AND OUR FRIENDS, AND WE WOULD FAIL AS LEADERS IN THE WORLD.

ONE OF THE GREAT MINDS OF OUR CENTURY, WALTER LIPPMANN, ONCE WROTE THESE WORDS:

"WHETHER WE WISH IT OR NOT WE ARE INVOLVED IN THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS;...ALL THE WINDS OF HEAVEN BLOW THROUGH OUR LAND."

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THOSE WORDS WERE A DESCRIPTION OF AN EARLIER TIME,
BUT THEY ARE ALSO A PROPHECY FOR US. TODAY, THE
CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP ARE EVEN MORE DEMANDING -- AND
THE CONSEQUENCES FAR MORE SUDDEN AND MORE DEADLY IF
WE FAIL.

BUT I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT WITH WISE AND SOBER
GUIDANCE, OUR NATION CAN LIVE WELL -- AND LEAD WELL - AMID
ALL THOSE BUFFETING WINDS OF CHANGE.

THANK YOU.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 27, 1980
No. 298A

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING SPEECH
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE
THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE
AND ITS
INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
October 21, 1980, 7:30 p.m.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said in your speech that an emphasis on human rights is necessary and that the stability in a country is always the calm before the storm. You also said that the United States is more secure in a world where governments respect human rights.

I would like to ask you, don't you think there is a little bit of hypocrisy in this? If you look at the United States' providing so-called non-lethal military aid to El Salvador, supporting a government in Korea, South Korea, which denies human rights (applause) supporting South Africa which has certainly denied rights to the vast majority of its citizens (applause), and also to Palestinians who do represent a large proportion of the Middle Eastern and Israelian populations, but aren't given fundamental human rights in that region (applause). Not only are these countries given short form (sic), but South Africa and Israel have been shown to have nuclear weapons -- and we're talking about stability before the storm!

I would like to know what your response to this is.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Is that one question? (Laughter)

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For further information contact:

HECKLER: Yes. Human rights.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, then, treating it as one question, if what you're saying to me is that every country's policies, including our own, appear to be inconsistent, represented in most of the cases to which you refer there is a balancing of other interests as well as our concern with human rights, requiring a judgment call with which you or others may disagree, you are right.

If you want me to deal with any of those specific cases, I think I'll have to treat them as individual questions or we'll never get to other questions on the floor.

HECKLER: I thought you were going to talk about human rights, and you just didn't even answer the question. You're here tonight to talk about human rights.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Young lady, --

HECKLER: You're --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Young lady, you seem to be more interested in raising your voice than in letting me respond. I asked the young man whether or not he was asking me one question.

(Applause) If he wants to select from that multiple question, one question for me to respond to, I would be glad to do it; but I simply cannot permit one member of the audience to read a laundry list of foreign policy issues, presented to me as one question, and require me to consume the rest of the evening covering it. (Applause) If he wants to select one, I'd be glad to do it. (Applause)

QUESTION: Other people in line here say they have specific questions about specific situations, so I'll let them ask their questions.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: All right.

(HECKLER made inaudible statement.) I've still got (inaudible).

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You waited too long. There is someone at another microphone

QUESTION: May I ask a question about El Salvador?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is another waiting at another microphone. I'll turn to him and come back to you.

QUESTION: My name is Mike Jacobs (local TV Station announcer): Mr. Secretary, yesterday President Carter seemed to be a little more optimistic about the release of the hostages in Iran, indicating that the United States would lift the embargo and release Iranian assets,

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and try to resume normal relations with Iran in return for the release of the hostages. Today, we got some negative statements from Iran indicating that perhaps they were not willing to negotiate, even if we were to give them spare parts for their military equipment. And the Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly said that even President Carter should be put on trial.

How do you interpret these statements made today, and are you as optimistic this evening as you were last night at this time?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I was not optimistic last evening. I do not permit myself optimism with respect to this situation. As I've said over and over again, I think we should be very cautious about raising expectations with respect to this issue. I regret that it has emerged in the way that it has in this campaign, with people and the press reading the most careful statements we make as expressions of optimism and statements that are made in Iran as expressions of pessimism.

I mean there is a dialogue going on outside the public dialogue, an indirect dialogue which would create different impressions than those to which you have referred.

The problem of establishing contact with authorities in Iran who are capable of making a decision to resolve the hostage issue and to begin talking about terms has been a long, frustrating process. We have pursued it quietly through governmental and non-governmental channels almost too numerous to name, for the purpose of shaping official and public opinion in Iran in the direction of the decision that solving the hostage crisis is in the interest of Iran as well as the United States.

Iranian politicians are like American politicians -- they often say things publicly that may not necessarily reflect the positions they are willing to take privately, and so it's not useful to raise our expectations. I am neither optimistic or pessimistic, but I am convinced that at some point, Iran, when it has its governmental authority properly organized and focused, is going to reach the conclusion that Iran's best interests will be served if the hostage problem is put behind them.

Until that point comes -- and I have no way of predicting when that point will come; I've not heard the words "October surprise" come to us from any source in Iran -- it is simply unrealistic to let our hopes rise and fall like a thermometer responsive to heat and cold, in connection with this proposition.

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There are some general statements that we've made privately as well as publicly in order to reassure Iranians with respect to the general attitudes of the United States and our people. We recognize the Islamic revolution -- I mean to us, that's a given; but to them, it doesn't seem to be, and so we have said that privately and publicly.

Another obvious situation is this, that in response to their seizure of the hostages, we seized certain resources of Iran. Obviously, at such point as we are at the negotiating table with them, the actions we took as well as the actions they took will be on the table, and we've tried to prepare ourselves to negotiate those issues at such time.

You cannot do it in the press and in the media. You can't do it shouting at each other across the thousands of miles between us. It won't work that way, and to try to convert the problem into that kind of a negotiation is counter-productive and it is not going to be effective. So we continue to press in that fashion. Unfortunately, with the "October surprise" syndrome that afflicts one side in this campaign, they raise these questions -- the press raises them. The President hasn't made a statement. Neither have I made a statement except in response to a press question, so we have not initiated this dialogue for the very reason that we think, and have been convinced for some months now, that the way to deal with this is through quiet diplomacy of the kind I've tried to describe.

(Applause)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are many people who say that the President has not taken full advantage of his expertise available to him in the Department of State in foreign policy decisions and that this might be one of the reasons for his vacillations in our foreign policy. At no other time in history has the United States been faced with the problem of letting our adversaries know who the greatest country in the world is, but also our allies.

The President suggests in his campaign rhetoric that others are prone to make some bad decisions, including chiefs of state -- when there is a President who has reversed every one of his major policy decisions for the past three years. My question is: What is it that should make the population of the United States believe that it will change in the next four years?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you appear to have already made your judgment. You haven't really given me specifics to address. You described your impression of President Carter's approach to foreign policy and your judgment that he has made some bad decisions, and that he has vacillated. Well, that doesn't give me anything to sink my teeth into. You've already sunk your teeth into that, and are shaking it pretty well.

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(Applause)

QUESTION: I don't mean to say that you are not doing a good job.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not asking for you to pat me on the back. I just want to know what the question is.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: My comment is that I don't think the President is making adequate use of the Department of State, and since you have taken the position as the Secretary of State, this is supposedly to have been changed. Now with his failure to talk with you, consult you in this change in strategic, his nuclear strategy, what is to make the population believe that he is going to change his mind now?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Now you have given me something I can deal with because what you have just said is based upon some erroneous assumptions. Number one, you say he doesn't consult me: that's an erroneous assumption. He does, on a daily basis.

Number two, all the evidence I have is that he has confidence in my judgment, and I have no reason to believe otherwise. There have been press stories to the effect that I'm embittered by his failure to give me the support that he indicated he would. I never entertained such a thought. I found him to be very supportive. And there is no job I'd rather have than the one I now have, for as long as I may have it. So that assumption of your question is erroneous.

Getting away from that which is ad hominem and a personal kind of thing to the question of using effectively the foreign policy resources that are available, I found on coming to the State Department that there are excellent resources of people, particularly in background and experience available to the Secretary of State, and through the Secretary of State to the President -- and I have made use of them.

I have not undertaken in the short months since I was appointed Secretary to focus on possible personnel changes or organizational changes -- I did not think it appropriate for the time. I came into office at a very difficult and confused, perplexing and troubled time in our foreign policy. My role, it seemed to me, was to try to apply a steady hand, and to help explain American foreign policy to the people of this country so that they might be reassured that we were not going wildly in all directions, but that we were moving in the pursuit of rational directions and objectives -- and that's what I've been trying to do.

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If the President wins, and if he wants me again as Secretary of State, I will address myself then to organizational questions, personnel questions, and the questions of how we better use the very valuable resources which we have, not only in State but other departments involved in foreign policy-making -- the Department of Commerce, the office of the Special Trade Representative, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense -- that the relations between them, which are supposedly to be coordinated by the National Security Council, all of that deserves continuing study, and especially at the beginning of any new administration. That I hope to address if I'm in a position to do so next year, so that questions such as you have raised that indicate your concern that we are not doing as good a job as we ought to be will arise less often.

QUESTION: I'm with several anti-draft groups. There is talk about some inconsistencies in foreign policy. I don't really think they are that inconsistent. I really think the bottom line is what countries the United States can do business with.

I also want to say that I picked up this pamphlet when I came in. It's a propaganda sheet for Carter and Mondale -- and I'm voting for Reagan; but I mean, to come here at a time, just before elections obviously to campaign for Jimmy Carter, and to try to pass Jimmy Carter off as some sort of a dove! But Jimmy Carter is not a dove, he's a hawk.

Is Reagan a hawk or is Carter the hawk? Now tell us the reason.

This pamphlet with Carter and Mondale, right on the back page it says, "A vote for Jimmy Carter may save your life." A direct question: What if you're 19 or 20 years old, how does that save your life?

(Heckling and cat-calls)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You really got my attention in the first ten seconds I was here.

(Interruptions of hecklers and raising "Freedom from the draft" placards.)

HECKLER: Don't talk to me. I'm --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Then, why did you come here?

HECKLER: That's just my point. Where is my freedom from the draft?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you made my point, but you don't want me to answer.

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HECKLER: Why don't you answer the man's question?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If you would learn the discipline of silence occasionally, I can answer his question.

(Loud applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You know, I was your age once!

HECKLER: You're kidding!

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not kidding! I hope you get to be my age!

(Laughter)

HECKLER: Answer the question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm having more fun dealing with (inaudible)

HECKLER: Go ahead. He's afraid to answer the question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not afraid to answer any question. You're afraid to listen, young fellow.

HECKLER: (inaudible)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Why don't you shut up and let me talk?

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You've now made the only argument you've got: I'll be glad to answer your question, which is in more than one part. First, you accuse me of coming here to campaign politically. Now, may I ask you a question? Is foreign policy an issue in this campaign?

HECKLER: Sure it is. But what are you doing the other parts of the year? Only just before campaigns is the only time people show up here.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, why, then, don't the candidates campaign other parts of the year instead of the last two weeks?

There is an obvious point. Foreign policy is an issue in this campaign -- it should be -- and the reason that those who are qualified to speak on foreign policy, or who have responsibilities to speak on foreign policy, ought to speak to it in this period is because in this period the attention of the American people is focused on it to the degree that it isn't three of the other four years of the Presidential quadrennium.

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One or the other of the candidates is going to win.. The foreign policy over which he presides is going to be shaped by this campaign. If President Carter is reelected and I am Secretary of State, I will have to preside over that foreign policy. Why, then, do you draw the conclusion that I ought to be silent in this campaign, when foreign policy is that significant an issue?

QUESTION: I never said --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I take it you would say that I ought not to hold any press conferences in this period, that I ought not to appear on programs like "Issues and Answers," "Face the Nation," or "Meet the Press" during this period. Why?

QUESTION: I'm not saying that.

Why aren't you here during other parts of the year, during the other four years?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I speak all parts of the year. Maybe you listen only at this time of the year.

(Loud applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I spent 35 years in public life, speaking 12 months a year.

QUESTION: You still haven't answered his question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'll get to his question, in my time -- not yours.

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: So maybe you ought to try listening 12 months a year, and you might hear me or others occasionally.

Now, your question has to do with the draft, is that right? What is the position of the two candidates on the draft?

QUESTION: Three.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Three.

QUESTION: Carter is for it; Reagan is for it.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: So what is the issue?

QUESTION: Carter tries to portray himself as a dove on this piece of literature that he puts out. How are we supposed to believe that?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I haven't seen the piece of literature, believe it or not; but I've asked you to shape the issue. You've asked me about the draft. The two principle candidates have taken identical positions apparently, according to your view.

Now, do you want my personal position? I'd be glad to give you that. But as between the two candidates, you've answered your own question, haven't you? And you have to make a decision on the candidates or on whatever other grounds you think significant, whichever you think is right.

With respect to my own position, I oppose the volunteer army, voted against it, because I did not think it served our national interest. And for other reasons I believe that a volunteer army would have the effect of making the army a non-representative, minority-dominated force, that it would tend to exclude those who have access to privilege, to higher education, to skill development, and tend to track those who didn't have those opportunities. That is why I objected to the volunteer army.

(Loud applause)

The position that President Carter has advanced in the aftermath of Afghanistan is two-fold: One, he would retain the volunteer army, but ask young people to register. Registering for the draft is something different than being drafted, I assure you.

QUESTION: Are you telling us there is going to be no draft?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That depends entirely upon events outside our borders, beyond our control. It depends upon the extent to which our national security interests may be impacted by confrontation or by violence initiated elsewhere, for which we need to be prepared.

QUESTION (Heckler): How about the oil companies' needs?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not prepared to send you to war for the oil companies.

HECKLER: Good.

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But that isn't the issue. The question is, you young people who are going to inherit this country very soon are going to have to answer the question in ways that are going to impact upon your lives more than upon mine. The question you have got to answer is not just this question of service obligation, but how you build a country that is worth saving, and then what you are willing to do to save it if it is attacked. Those are the two principal questions you are going to have to answer -- and they are not easy to answer!

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Every major European country has the draft today, because they regard the draft as the most credible evidence that they are willing to fight to save themselves, to protect their values against any threat -- not that they want to go to war, not that they intend to go to war, but that they are prepared to defend themselves. That is the heart of the question!

QUESTION: I won't take up everyone else's time, but I find it hard to believe that when this country has the ability to incinerate the world about 13 times I don't think anyone is going to attack us -- and I'll pass.

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I hope you'll find those simple answers satisfactory as your life proceeds.

QUESTION: My name is John Lindquist. I'm a Vietnam veteran. I didn't get drafted -- I enlisted. (applause)

My question as it pertains to foreign policy: How can the U.S. Government use registration and the threat of a draft as a tool of foreign policy when they haven't even taken care of the Vietnam veterans? How can they use the threat of this as a tool when we still have problems? We were forgotten!

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are two separate questions, both legitimate questions. With respect to registration, in the first place, there is no threat of the draft implicit in it. Registration is part of preparation; it's not a threat.

Secondly, with respect to our failure to deal adequately with the problems of the Vietnam veterans, that's a problem to which we ought continually to address ourselves until we do that job right. I have supported programs to strengthen our treatment of Vietnam veterans, and will continue to do so. I couldn't agree with you more: you've got a legitimate case!

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my name is Jan Nowak, North American Study Center for Polish Affairs. Last Sunday on "Issues and Answers" you said, and I quote, "The Polish people ought not to be insensitive to the pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union, but from other countries in the Eastern Bloc."

I'm sure everybody appreciates your motives and your concern, but I'm sure also that the Polish people appreciate your previous statement when you said, "The problems between the Polish working class and the Polish Government is an internal affair of the Polish state which should be solved without any external interference."

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Is not the Soviet pressure on the Polish regime and Polish workers such an interference in Polish internal affairs? And should it not be resisted in the name of the Helsinki Accords on human rights?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I agree with that.

(Applause)

I don't see any inconsistency between the two. If we were not sensitive to the possibility of outside intervention, we would not have made that first statement that this is a problem for the Polish people and the Polish Government to resolve. It is because we believe that to be the case that we address that statement to all who have a different idea. So in making that statement, we were sensitive to the fact that there were possibilities outside Polish borders that we wanted to restrain.

Maybe I should not have been explicit about it, is that what you are concerned about?

QUESTION (Mr. Nowak): No. I think that your statement could have been misinterpreted as an endorsement of the Soviet pressure rather than --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: How, in heaven's name, do you read that as an endorsement?

QUESTION (Mr. Nowak): If the Polish workers should be sensitive to the Soviet pressure, it means they should yield to it.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Or suppose they were insensitive?

QUESTION (Mr. Nowak): I think they should be sensitive to any outside interference, whether it comes from the west or the east.

SECRETARY: So you're saying the same thing I said.

QUESTION (Mr. Nowak): No, because you really considered that they should be sensitive to outside pressure.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you just said that.

QUESTION (Mr. Nowak): No, I quoted you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm afraid you've drawn too fine a line for me to see.

QUESTION: This is concerning El Salvador once again. I support your presentation of the three principles that should guide American foreign policy, that they should be secure in their existence, obtain their daily bread, and have civil and political rights.

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However, a former Cabinet Member of El Salvador is speaking tomorrow at Marquette University. As I understand it, he is going to detail (inaudible) life in the Cabinet and the government when he found he could no longer guarantee those human rights. In fact, it grossly violated all three of those principles. Why the United States is virtually the only prop of that government, I would like to ask you. And when, in God's name, is the United States going to drop support for the most awful junta in all of South and Central America?

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In El Salvador, as in Nicaragua, violence surfaces from the extreme left, from those who would change the system by force and violence; from the extreme right, from those who would hold onto privileges acquired in a different period; and the government which is made up of a junta representing moderates as well as the military, undertakes to suppress that violence, and in the process, on occasion, goes too far, so you have the three to choose from.

We opt for the moderates, recognizing that it is a risk, that we may lose that gamble; but we see it the only gamble which has any chance of ultimately resulting in elections and a people-supported government. You're not going to get it with either of the other two alternatives, from our reading of the situation.

QUESTION: Mr. Muskie, he was a moderate -- he was a leader of the Christian Democratic Party. He quit the junta when he found the moderates no longer had a chance. In fact, the junta was the threat -- they were one and the same. He has now joined the revolutionary movement.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Not all the moderates in any country agree with each other. No one man has yet emerged as the voice of the moderates in El Salvador any more than one man emerged as the voice to represent the two extremes. What we seek to support, the alternative, is what, to turn our backs on El Salvador and let confusion reign until the strongest violator succeeds? We think we need to exert an influence, and it has been supported economically.

QUESTION: Militarily.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, it has not been supported militarily.

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QUESTION: What's the draft for?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You can make your own judgment about it, but please let me make mine.

What we do is to provide police training for the purpose of enabling and training the police forces of the government to control violence, with proper respect for human rights. That's not an easy assignment for them to assume, or an easy assignment for us to promote, but we think it is worth trying.

QUESTION: Then, there is no point at which the United States will cut off aid, I take it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: What's that?

QUESTION: You are saying that there is no point at which the United States plans to cut off aid to El Salvador, no matter how bad --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It is conceivable this effort could collapse. I don't wish for it to collapse and I hope you don't. But short of a collapse, we're going to keep trying until we either fail or succeed. That's our view.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. On behalf of those of us here, I thank you very much for your very astute control of the crowd this evening.

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It hasn't been very astute.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I direct this statement to you and ask for your comment. It seems that two of the three major Presidential candidates are not poles apart when it comes to our country's China policy. When Mr. Reagan addressed himself to the United States' relationship with Taiwan as an "official, diplomatic connection," he was loudly criticized. When Mr. Carter signed the agreement approximately two weeks ago to upgrade diplomatic relationships with Taiwan, granting limited diplomatic privileges and immunity to representatives of this country -- an essence of what Mr. Reagan had proposed -- the Administration shrugged off any negative comments from

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China. The Communist Party decided, stated that it marked the return to the two-China policy for this country. That was raised at this time.

I would like to know if you feel and if it is the policy of the United States -- this is the question, sir. This comes from an editorial from the Milwaukee Sentinel of July 17. When it comes to China, apparently it is not what you say or do, but who you are that makes the difference. Is this true or not true, sir?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, it is not true. I'll be glad to review the record for you, and let you judge for yourself. Number one, the single issue that stood between us and the normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of China was Taiwan and our relationship with Taiwan. And we ought not to forget that both the Peoples Republic and the people of Taiwan held then, and hold now, that there is only one China, not two. The question of how to resolve the Taiwan dilemma is a very sticky one.

Finally, what was used was a device -- there's no question about it -- a device which was consciously adopted by both governments, and that is to convert our relationship with Taiwan to an unofficial one, while establishing an official, normal relationship with the Peoples Republic. So, two quasi-private institutes were created, one in Taiwan and one in this country, to continue our commercial and cultural relations with the Taiwanese people.

In that Taiwan Relations Act, among other provisions, was a provision that the representatives of those two unofficial organizations would be given certain functional privileges which they required in order to perform their functions in each country. They are not of the scale of full diplomatic privileges and immunities, by any means; they are functional privileges.

There was a precedent for this approach to the Taiwan dilemma in connection with Japanese normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic before we did, so it is not an unusual one.

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Mr. Reagan's position, as I gather -- and I don't intend to misstate it; it's his to hold if he so concludes -- is to call that artificial relationship and official one, thereby ripping away the mask, if you will, that made it possible for us and the Peoples Republic to normalize our relations.

I think that if the effect of this device makes possible the normalization of relations with a country that includes one out of every four human beings on this planet, it is a useful device; and if calling it official rather than unofficial tends to undermine that relationship, it's not useful to call it official, and I don't see anything positive to be gained by calling it official. That's what it's all about.

Incidentally, the Peoples Republic knew of that provision in the Taiwan Relation Act with respect to immunities and privileges, and it was sensitized to it all over again because of Mr. Reagan's comments.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, was this agreement signed just about two weeks ago or was this an agreement when we first took diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic in Mainland China?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The provision of which I speak was included in the Taiwan Relations Act. It was implemented administratively two or three weeks ago.

QUESTION: What is your comment, sir, on the Chinese Communist Party stand that this relationship, unofficial or official, is a return to the two-China policy, sir? Thank you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I discussed that with the Chinese Ambassador. It would not serve a useful purpose in our relationship for me to reveal the nature of that discussion except to say that normalization of our relations is proceeding -- proceeding more rapidly than we expected -- and it has not been interrupted by these events to which your question refers.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir, very much. You are always welcome in Wisconsin, by the way.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you.

(Applause)

QUESTION: My question is a little bit more general. How can the United States promote ethics in foreign policy, for example in human rights, when terrorism is present across-the-board, whether it be capturing human beings or freezing another country's assets? With terrorism becoming more prevalent as a form of warfare, how does it uphold any form of ethics in foreign policy, and if it does, what is the criterion?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: You chewed up one word which seems to be the key word in your question. Would you read it more slowly?

QUESTION: I'll read it again: How can the United States promote ethics in foreign policy, for example human rights, when terrorism is present across-the-board, whether it be capturing human beings or freezing another country's assets? With terrorism becoming more prevalent as a form of warfare, how does it uphold any form of ethics in foreign policy, and if it does, what is the criterion?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Our purpose in making human rights the objective is to strike at such developments as the growth of terrorism. You're not suggesting that we support terrorism, are you? We've got to find ways and means of striking at it, and we need, I think, international methods for doing so as well as concern, as practiced in their foreign policy, by the governments of this world.

It seems to me perfectly consistent, if you abhor terrorism that you support the reverse which is human rights.

I don't understand your question, frankly.

QUESTION: Basically, I'm asking to what extent that can be exercised, whether it be involving human beings or some other means to promote the ends. And if you bring an element of ethics in it, I don't understand the difference between one as being more ethical and one as not.

Do you understand?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I haven't used the word "ethics" at any time this evening until your question. I'm talking about human rights. Human rights goes far beyond ethics, in my judgment. It includes it, obviously, but in any case I simply don't understand your question.

I think making human rights a part of our foreign policy is a way to direct attention to terrorism and what terrorism does to destroy the individual and his rights, so how are they inconsistent?

QUESTION: Well, human rights was an example. Let me restate the question, that with terrorism becoming more of a prevalent form of warfare in the 1980s and for the future, to my generation and my children's generation, et cetera, how does that affect foreign policy and the ethics behind it -- and my example was the ethics behind human rights.

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Does that make more sense?

(Laughter)

QUESTION (Continuing): With terrorism, how can there be any ethics, and that's becoming the more prevalent form of warfare in the 1980s and the future?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you can say the same thing about murder. With murder, how can there be free people? Obviously, you have to fight it, and raise the level of morality in this world and in the governments of the countries of this world by bringing pressure through our bilateral relations with countries which encourage, support, or fail to do anything about terrorism; to approach it through our multi-lateral organizations, the United Nations, and I suspect that such groupings as the Islamic Conference, the non-aligned groups, that many countries in those associations would join with us in fighting terrorism. It's only by working together, and in effect putting human rights as a goal, that we can effectively fight terrorism -- and must.

I don't think it's necessary that terrorism be part of your children's lives, or even yours, if we fight it effectively now. That is one of the reasons that I think it is important, whether it is a Carter policy or a Reagan policy, or whoever may follow either one of them, or an Anderson policy, if he is elected -- that human rights ought to be, from now on, a very clear and visible part of our foreign policy so that we can exert pressure, as we can here, there, and elsewhere by various means exert pressure, to stamp out violations of human rights, including terrorism which is one of the worse.

(Applause)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the Administration withdrew the SALT II treaty from consideration by the Senate as a signal to the Soviet Union of its displeasure over the invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet troops are, as we know, still in Afghanistan. Why is the Administration now changing its position to renew its request for the ratification of SALT II?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have never linked the two. The treaty was scheduled for debate and action in the Senate in January of this year. The treaty was set aside and put back, left on the calendar, because in the judgment of Majority Leader Senator Byrd and those with whom he consulted in the Senate, that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union meant, pure and simple, that there were not the votes at that point to ratify the treaty.

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It was not set aside as a signal to the Soviet Union, but as a result of the consequences of the Soviet Union's invasion. Now, time has passed -- ten months have passed. Time is running out on the treaty. Certain provisions of it must be implemented by not later than December 31 of 1981, and so we face the question, how does it impact on our national security interests and should we proceed to make the effort to ratify it before time runs out on it?

In my judgment, it is that crucial to our national security interests that we must make the effort. The issue has been raised in this campaign in order to present to the people of this country the issues involved in SALT II, and let the people help us make the decision whether or not it ought to be ratified or rejected, because the issue involved is too crucial to be decided by default, by letting time run out on it, as it would next year.

With respect to the consistency between SALT II ratification and our Afghanistan policy, both would impose restraints upon the Soviet Union, and that is the objective of it all. SALT II would impose restraints upon nuclear power as developed by the Soviet Union; our Afghanistan policy is designed to impose restraints on the Soviets with respect to the expansionist tendency that most of us believe that invasion reflected. So I think both policies deserve our support.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

(Applause)

QUESTION: My name is Jeff Hitchcock. Mr. Carter recently announced that should the hostages be released, he would be willing to restore trade, in effect signalling that the spare parts would be sent over to aid Iran's military effort against Iraq.

We were slapped in the face on November 4th when they took the hostages. Are we just to stand back and turn the other cheek, and in effect legitimize the seizure of the hostages as a proper foreign policy tool?

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think he suggested that, and I haven't suggested it.

QUESTION: He announced that trade relations would be restored and that their assets would be released. Adding the two together, they will have the money necessary to buy the military hardware.

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He announced nothing with respect to punishment for the seizure of the hostages which I, for one, don't like to see our country taken advantage of in the world environment, and Iran certainly did last November 4. It just seems to be saying, "Well, let bygones be bygones, and let's forget about the hostages."

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think you have accurately described what the President said, in the first place, not from my reading of it.

Secondly, you know I can't add to the rather complete response that I gave earlier this evening to another question bearing on the hostages, and I'm not inclined to repeat it at this point. I mean, what I said basically was that the terms on which the hostages would be released would have to be negotiated. No such negotiation has begun, so neither side has put on the table the issues which it would want to have considered. And it is not useful to speculate about what the final result might be because such speculation might raise expectations on one side or the other that would tend to divert attention from the real issues of the problem.

I think I said it better earlier, but I hadn't been talking quite as long then.

QUESTION: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. I'm afraid we have time for just one more question.

QUESTION: The State Department presumably has primary responsibility for foreign policy, and yet I get the feeling that much of the source of things that actually occur in the world are due to corporate activity. I'm not a businessman and I'm not a political scientist, but it seems we can see environmentally there are many things that are so very wrong, socially.

As a matter of fact, I was just glancing at this magazine the other day, Business Week Magazine, and from other remarks here from a corporate officer of GM in South Korea, making cars over there, he says, "If Congress talks about bringing back troops, companies like mine are going to raise a lot of hell," the presumption being that we've got troops, Marines, over in South Korea not merely for the ostensible purpose of protecting a democracy, but also to protect very important corporate interests over there.

This is an observation, and I don't expect you to tell me the resolution, but I'm just telling you what I feel. I feel that international corporations have an overwhelming influence on the course of events in the world, and I'm worried about it.

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(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It is perfectly true, you know, that people in the private sector of our national life are active overseas as businesses, as cultural organizations, and as individuals. This is how we have made American influence and American values felt all around this planet over the last 200 years.

On the whole, the impact, I think, of American influence over those 200 years has been efficient. But obviously, just as in the case here at home, with people in those various aspects of our domestic life, they abuse the privileges of a free society from time to time. It also happens in their activities overseas. Now, whether any particular group -- you named that American industry particularly -- abuses its freedom to invest overseas, to make profit overseas, to develop and exploit resources overseas is a judgment call you'll have to make upon judging particular businesses, corporations, and whatnot.

Corporate activity in this country has grown in my lifetime. Businesses have become bigger; even the anti-trust laws aren't altogether relevant to the way that businesses have grown with the new forms of corporate life that have developed. They are bigger, have more resources, more impact and more power. That has happened here at home, and when they transfer their activities overseas, it happens overseas.

Many of them -- I suspect most of them -- are good citizens here at home and elsewhere. There are the others: there always been and probably always will be. But you are asking a question that really needs to be focused more precisely in order to give you an answer.

It's a proper question. Power, the growth of power and the possible abuse of power should be an ever-recurring question in American life because we created a society in which, hopefully, we established institutions -- at least at the political and governmental level -- which could check each other and minimize the possible abuses of governmental and political power.

With statutes that were written, basically, in the late 19th century and to which we have addressed ourselves since that time, we have tried to lay down rules and regulations to control the accumulation of too great power and abuses of power in the private sector, the private economy.

That has been our continuing effort as a country. We know that if we allow power to grow to too great an extent and to get too concentrated, then when it is abused, it becomes very destructive; and I think we have to constantly keep our eye

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on that ball, if I may mix my figures of speech, in our national life. So you've asked a very appropriate question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you managed to perfectly describe the question, and you know, restate it several different ways, but you never even got around to answering it.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In all this, there is a lesson you've got to learn.

QUESTION (heckler): And I have another question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, could I answer that one?

QUESTION (heckler): No. (Inaudible)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Then why don't I go, and you just stand and ask questions?

(Very loud applause).

(Whereupon, at 9:00 p.m., the session concluded.)

* * *

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 5, 1980
No. 301A



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE SPEECH BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
SPONSORED BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON
Scranton, Pennsylvania
October 27, 1980

QUESTION: My name is Francis Stabuck. I am
a student here at the University of Scranton.

Mr. Secretary, the Institute for Strategic
Studies recently estimated that the Soviet Union is now
superior to the United States in both conventional and
strategic military capabilities. Yet during the period
in which they acquired that superiority, you as Chairman
of the Senate Budget Committee fought against real defense
increases for this country while at the same time supported
the liberalizing of trade with the Soviet Union which has
allowed them, among other things, the technological
capability to become superior.

My question is: Would you explain or justify
those past actions? And, secondly, should we expect that
type of foreign policy thinking in the second Carter
Administration?

Thank you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, as you have described it,

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For further information contact:

I would say I probably agree with you. But that is not the nature of my record, and it is not a reflection of the foreign policy objectives of this Administration.

With respect to defense expenditures, if you would check with my colleagues in the Senate on both sides of the aisle, among conservative elements of my own party as well as liberal, I think you will find that they will give me credit for sustaining defense expenditures above the levels that would have been pursued by other more liberal-minded Senators.

I did it for a very simple reason.

As Chairman of the Budget Committee, a new process, it was my responsibility to make the process work, not only to hold down governmental expenditures and to limit the growth of government responsibilities, but to ensure that all of the priorities which need to be served by our national budget are served.

Early in my term as Chairman of the Budget Committee, I made the judgment that I would succeed only to the extent that I was perceived as undertaking to make a legitimate and fair judgment as between the competing priorities, from national defense to Social Security, and all the programs in between. And that was the kind of

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judgment I made.

And more often than not, in conferences with the House, I found myself defending the Senate's decision with respect to higher defense expenditures against the House decision for higher social program expenditures.

Both points of view were valid. My job was to try to balance them so that we could get a budget, and I don't apologize for those decisions, and so I challenge the characterization of my votes, which your question implies.

Now, with respect to the trade with the Soviet Union, which was the other question that you raised.

You have got to make your choice. At the present time, the Soviet Union, with its aggression in Afghanistan, has raised legitimate doubts in the minds of all Americans, including myself, as to what its ultimate objectives are.

With its invasion of Afghanistan, it has put itself geographically close to our oil pipeline in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, whatever their present intentions, if they were to stay in Afghanistan, a change in their geography puts the Soviet Union into a better position to challenge the pipeline than previously.

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Up until that point, our policy had been to undertake with the Soviet Union to reduce tensions, to build the prospects for peace by reaching agreement and accommodation in areas where we had mutual interests.

This included trade. When I first went to the Senate, trade with the Soviet Union was virtually nonexistent. If I remember an early figure, it was about 49 million dollars a year, which was inconsequential.

We had a very restricted policy in cooperation with our allies, a policy called COCOM, in which we sharply restricted, more so than our European friends, the trading in items that had a military connection.

So our trade was very small. But we made the decision in the sixties that so long as we lived on the same planet with the Soviet Union, it was wise to try to convert what has threatened to become a purely military competition to a more peaceful kind of competition in which the Soviets would be exposed to the advantages of Western technology, and what that could do for their economy and their people, and in the process perhaps be less inclined to pursue the military option.

Now, in response to their invasion of Afghanistan, we have sharply curtailed trade with the Soviet Union.

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We are denying them access to our technology. We are denying them access to our grain at a time when it is hurting them enormously. They had a short crop last year and they are going to have another short crop this year, which means they are going to have to draw down their reserves, reduce the production of meat, and that production already is one of the lowest per capita productions in Europe -- and a source of dissatisfaction among their people. So we have, in the course of our reaction to the Afghanistan invasion, reduced our trade.

They did not expect this kind of reaction. If, in any way, they are persuaded to change their behavior toward Afghanistan, it will be, probably, in my judgment, in response to their awareness that the consequences for them economically of that invasion are not in their best interests.

They would not reach that conclusion unless they had had a taste of what trade with the West could contribute to an improvement of Soviet life.

So, you take your choice. Try to isolate them from the West economically, try to out-race them in building up arms, or try to move with them carefully, always alert to a more open relationship economically, socially,

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culturally, and hopefully a less tension-ridden, a less competitive military relationship.

Those are the two choices.

Afghanistan has thrown a lot of Americans into doubt as to which is the better course. I still believe that unless we want to march with the Soviets down toward the ultimate catechism, which is a nuclear war, in which we cast our ability to destroy this planet, that we had better learn to live together.

Afghanistan has set us both back, and it is going to take us a long time to get back to the point where we were before that invasion. But if we can get back there, we have learned a lot of lessons about them -- but if we can get back there and begin again the joint policy of trying to find areas of accommodation, I think that that is the road most likely to lead us ultimately to peace rather than to a destructive World War III.

That doesn't answer specifically whatever you have in terms of my specific votes, but that is the philosophy that has motivated me.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I know that the United States has done everything it could so far and will be wanting to go the extra mile to get the hostages released,

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But can the United States credibly make a gesture toward Iran, be it economic or otherwise, after the hostages are released and still retain its international prestige when Iran's actions have been such an inhuman and barbaric act towards those American people and such a slap in the face of our national prestige?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't know, I seem to have run into an audience that prefers adjectives to facts, but let me put it this way. Maybe I can throw a question at you.

The Iranians seized the hostages. We froze their assets. We and our allies imposed trade sanctions. We held on to other properties that were theirs.

Now, what you are saying to me is contrary to what has been implicit in our policy through all these months.

What we have said, in effect, is: If you return our hostages, we will return those assets that we took from you -- even trade.

Now, you seem to suggest that we ought to impose additional conditions, that we ourselves should keep our hostages there in order to get some additional conditions.

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QUESTION: No, Mr. Secretary. What I am saying is that, would it be in our national interests and prestige if we were to, after the hostages are released, render a gesture of friendship and reconciliation to Iran after their actions of the past year.

In instances of wartime, as in the case of Germany and Japan that you mentioned, it was laudable after for whatever reasons the countries went to war. But this act, there was absolutely no reason for it, absolutely no justification. Would such a step of reconciliation be appropriate?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, just as one who lived through the thirties, horrendous as I think the seizure of the hostages was, I don't really think they compare with the horrors which Adolf Hitler visited upon his country in the Western World. And you are suggesting that this is worse.

But, in any case -- and Japan was just as guilty of acts just as destructive of human beings and of human rights. And there weren't just 52 people involved in those horrors, there were millions. There were six million Jews who were the victims of Hitler's holocaust.

But after the war, Germany and Japan, having

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learned the lessons of that war, readjusted their national values, adopted democratic institutions, and today are two of the strongest democracies in this world.

You are suggesting that Iran is not capable of similar adjustment to the world. Whatever our relations with Iran might be, if and when the hostages are released, we have said to them that our relationship can be what they want it to be. If they prefer what they have said with their rhetoric to have nothing to do with us, we can accept that. If they would like, at some point, after they have gone through that trauma, that expiation of their grievances, to normalize relations with us, I am sure we will be receptive to that, whoever may be President then. That may be four years or eight years from now.

I don't think that you freeze your relations with other countries permanently into place upon the basis of one unhappy joint experience.

At this point, there seems very little likelihood that we are going to move very soon to normal relations with Iran. And yet without doing that, I think it would be against our interests to see Iran dismembered, torn apart. It would be too tempting a target for the

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Soviet Union, for example, and for other countries in the area.

So, we don't have to love them. They don't have to be our friends for us to recognize their strategic significance. They lie between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf is our oil pipeline. And the Gulf nations are just significantly weaker, potentially, than Iran, and surely they could be overwhelmed by the Soviet Union.

So that dismemberment of Iran, whatever they have done to our hostages, is not in our national interests.

You have got to separate your emotions and your outrage at what they have done with those 52 Americans and others, from your perception of the strategic values that are involved there. And that is why we have said over the past week that dismemberment of Iran is not in the interests of peace or stability in that region nor in our interests.

Nevertheless, we hold them accountable for our hostages. Hopefully at some point--and I think at some point this will come to pass, and I am making no predictions on when, I have no time-frame--the hostages will be released. Because I think it is against Iran's own

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self-interest to hold the hostages. I mean, with the hostages, they are cut off from trade, not only with us but with our European allies, which puts Iraq in a very favorable situation vis-a-vis Iran. There are no sanctions applicable to Iraq. She can trade freely with her normal trading partners. Iran cannot because of the sanctions which were imposed as a result of her seizure of the hostages.

So, you have got to weigh these things properly. I don't know when they are going to release the hostages, but I think it must be increasingly evident to them -- I know it is increasingly evident -- that holding onto the hostages doesn't serve them well.

QUESTION: Thank you, very much. (Applause)

QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. Secretary, and welcome to Scranton.

My name is Steve Saunders and I am also a student of the University.

You mentioned in your speech America's future, and in answering the last question you just briefly touched on our relations with Iran.

My question is this:

Even if we maintain our non-involvement policy in the Iran-Iraq crisis, it seems to me that the United

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States has to reconsider its long-term goals in the Middle East.

After the conflict is resolved, what do you envision, regardless of who is elected on November 4th, as the necessary steps to improve America's relations with the OPEC nations and to stabilize our position in the Middle East?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to -- first of all, we have to recognize the interests of the OPEC nations, and they vary within that group. Not all of them are in the Middle East -- Nigeria on the eastern coast of Africa is an important member of the OPEC nations. Venezuela in South America is.

Their one obvious interest in common is the supply and price of oil on the international market, and they obviously don't always agree with each other about that, the rate of production, the price, or the rate at which the price ought to rise.

The Saudis have been the most cooperative of them all. But there have been others who have been helping us. Not as a favor to us so much as the fact that they recognize that what they get in return for their oil -- it happens to be dollars at the present time --although

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some of them are considering -- maybe all of them are considering -- whether or not they ought to change that and sell their oil for what they call a basket of currencies, so that they are not tied to one currency so solidly.

But whatever they get for their oil, there is a value that is subject to the same forces that bring inflation and recession to other parts of the world.

In other words, they are better served when they sell their oil, at whatever price, on a world economy that is stable and predictable than one that is subject to unanticipatable and volatile rises and falls and inflation and recession. So economic stability is a very important value.

Now, those who manage the Saudi Arabian resource understand that very well. And they do it in part because they make such a large contribution to the world's oil supply.

Some of the other more radical suppliers have a lesser sense of responsibility.

So, in trying to answer your question, what foreign policy could you adopt that would somehow bring all of them onto our side of the equation, I doubt that you could find such a policy.

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So what you try to do is to build your relationships with those members of OPEC most amenable to structuring a relationship with us which serves their interests as well as ours.

At some point there has got to be, it seems to me, that tacitly or explicitly, an understanding between the oil consuming nations and the oil producing nations on the question of supply and price.

The world supply of oil is probably going to run out, by all current estimates, by the end of this century at the latest. That will make the oil producing countries and the oil consuming countries equals at that point, so that both have a legitimate interest in trying to build a world economy that is not wholly dependent upon oil, that moves in the direction of conservation and less waste from use -- that moves in the direction of developing alternative sources, and all of this in a world economy which has great gaps between the industrialized countries and the disadvantaged countries of the southern hemisphere.

You have a tremendous problem of solving the energy problem in the context of those disparities.

Do you want a follow-on question?

Do you want a follow-on quest?

QUESTION: Well, I guess what I was asking --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I didn't impose that condition, so I won't enforce it.

QUESTION: Well, I think what I was asking was that you be as specific as you could be, on the basis of what you just said, what nations do you see now as being the nations that we should maintain more friendly relations with in respect to our immediate oil needs?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, diplomacy is a constant -- I mean, I don't think you can, at any point, freeze relationships between nations and say, now, we make our choices between friends and enemies.

It is a constant process, diplomacy, of establishing identity of interests with 150-odd nations of this world.

For instance, at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly this fall, I went through an exercise that American Secretaries of State do all the time, I met with 55 Foreign Ministers who came here to address the General Assembly. That is 55 countries in nine days. And the constant effort is to establish a community of interests, not only with respect to energy but with respect to all sorts of issues that prompt nations to go off in

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divergent directions. So you have got to constantly work at it.

You know, Japan and Germany aren't the only examples of countries who were once hostile who became friendly. You can constantly do that.

Now, there is an obvious, in my judgment, an obvious community of interests between the industrialized countries and the oil producing countries.

It looks like an adversary relationship and it is in the sense that they are the sellers and we are the buyers. But the other fact of the equation is the problem of the developing nations.

Let me give you just a couple of facts with respect to them.

Because of what has happened to the price of oil, the developing nations now are using all of the foreign aid that comes to them to meet only one third of the increased cost of energy. So they have gone backwards. They have gone backwards.

The second point I would make is that between now and the end of this century, the population of this planet will increase from four and a half billion to six billion people. And 90 percent of that increase will

The figure shows a 4x4 grid of dots. The dots are arranged to form the letters 'W', 'O', 'R', and 'L' in a stylized, pixelated font. The 'W' is in the first column, 'O' in the second, 'R' in the third, and 'L' in the fourth. The grid is composed of 16 dots in total, with some dots missing to create the shapes of the letters.

take place in these developing nations.

You know, that as just a single fact ought to pose for everybody in this room the nature of the economic challenge, the energy challenge, and the political challenge that just the demographics of world population poses for us in the next 20 years.

Given that as a fact, the industrialized countries have not just a charitable responsibility to exercise leadership, they have a responsibility in their own interest to exercise leadership to close these big gaps on energy, on the economy, on per capita income, on access to food, on access to health, on access to education.

These are the primary impulses that move people to choose political systems, to choose leaders, to respond to exploiters, whatever.

The forces for instability on this planet are enormous. So I think that the oil producing countries which happen at this point to have a lot of muscle because they happen to have a handle on the resources that the rest of the world hasn't learned to live without, are going to have to look to the future.

The industrialized countries which monopolized those resources for so long now have to scramble to find

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something else, are going to have to look at it. And the developing countries are going to become increasingly aware of their power and influence. The hundred nations that have grown up since World War II are in that group,

They have been neglected. They were colonies.
They were discriminated against. They were persecuted.
They were repressed where they were colonies.

Now, they are on their own. Many of them have important resources. Nigeria, Angola, just to name a couple, and there are others in South America. They are beginning to feel their power as a group. The United Nations gives them that power. They are joining in other groupings. The Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Nations. All of these disadvantaged countries, and they far outnumber the industrial world, and they far outnumber the OPEC nations -- increasingly are going to make their decisions about what happens on this planet, and the kind of life your grandchildren and children live, as well as mine.

So that when you look at it as simply an OPEC - U.S. confrontation, it is much more complex than that. And there are some enlightened people in Saudi Arabia and Oman and Kuwait and Nigeria.

[Voice breaks.]

[voice breaks.]
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Now what has happened? It is a helluva a time, one week from election and I have no voice left. (Laughter.)

I spent a very inspiring day with the new President of Nigeria. They happen to have found oil. I listened to this man talk about what he hopes to do for the future of his people, the future of Africa.

You know, it is inspiring. The new President of Zimbabwe who emerged out of that bloody war of so many years, practicing moderate politics, trying to be a unifying force, bringing together the people who were fighting each other not so long ago. And his country has tremendous resources.

Angola. You can go through that list. Those people are primarily motivated by a drive toward nationalism, a drive for the kind of nationalism that would enable them to build better lives for their people.

And we don't see it from a distance. We align them with all these various groups in OPEC and all the rest of it. We have got to get behind them and get to the people.

There is a universal message there if we can just find it, find a way to express it.

That is too long an answer, but you gave me

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that kind of a question.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir. (Applause)

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my name is Anderson Nelson, a biology major at the University of Scranton.

In light of the development and deployment of the SS-18 missile, the SS-20 missile, the Backfire bomber system, and the almost unilateral Soviet military build-up, and Mr. Brezhnev's reaffirming that the ultimate Soviet goal is the end of capitalism, why has the White House continued to follow a second-rate world power policy of appeasement with such examples as SALT II and mutual assured destruction --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Will you stop beating your wife?

QUESTION: Excuse me?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Never mind. (Applause and laughter)

If I ever heard a leading question, that is it. You inaccurately describe the White House policy. I think you are inaccurately describing Mr. Brzezinski's position, although that doesn't necessarily displease me. (Laughter and applause.)

But, number one, we are in a competitive posture

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with the Soviet Union. No question about it. But whether that competition has to take the form of nuclear war is a question the answer to which is as much our responsibility, to be answered by our behavior and policies, as it is the Russians. That is the heart of the question.

As we face the future, beyond this election, and I have been asked this by members of the press several times in the last week, I think the most important challenge we face is to read the Soviet Union right.

If we read them wrong, we could be propelled along policy lines, an arms race, an exclusionary policy, aggressive policies, which they would react to and which would propel us both to the ultimate war which we have all sought to avoid through all these years. But to assume that we can somehow reduce them to a non-competitive position in posture and policies is unreal.

If you measured the Soviet Union against the United States militarily, economically, culturally, technologically, there is no comparison still between our power to influence the future and theirs.

They have been engaged in an arms build-up for fifteen years straight, ever since the Cuban missile crisis when we faced them down because they knew that we had

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overwhelming nuclear superiority. And they determined never to let that happen again. So they have been building their nuclear posture.

It was in the late sixties, early seventies, recognizing this, we joined with them in an arms control process called SALT, the purpose of which was to restrain both of us from carrying that conflict to the point where technology would advance in such a way that there would be no way to control it.

That is what arms control is all about.

We both recognized, this competitor of ours -- and it is a formidable and powerful competitor with an economy much smaller than ours, but nevertheless, because they have a political system that enables them to force resources away from the consumer sector into the military sector, they can get away with it to the extent that we can't.

So, given that situation, we agreed on arms control, SALT, as an important objective. They still share it with us.

We have got to decide what to do about that.

Now, with respect to conventional arms, it is more difficult to measure their strength vis-a-vis our own.

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For instance, they have that long Chinese border which they regard as their great vulnerability with 900 million to a billion Chinese on the other side. They intend to defend that. They have got millions of men, untold armaments, conventional armaments, along that border to defend against the country that they fear more than any other.

They don't fear us because they know that our intentions aren't that hostile. But the Chinese, they are really in doubt about.

They are next door to our NATO allies, the strongest economies in the world other than Japan and the United States and the Soviet Union itself. They are next door, allied with us.

If you look at the world through Soviet eyes, you would see problems all around you. It is easy to do that. And if we each take that tunnel vision point of view, that we have got to be superior before the other guy becomes superior, we are going to be launched on a destructive kind of an arms race that will destroy us both.

We are not at that point now. We are not second to the Soviet Union. We are not vulnerable to the Soviet Union. There is rough equivalence at the present

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time. That doesn't say that every element of military strength which one could identify, we are superior in all respects.

We have and need a more powerful Navy than they do. Because of the Chinese border, they have and need a larger Army than we do. We don't need an Army along the Canadian border or the Mexican border.

So, if you go down through the elements of our military postures, you will find that they excel in some respects, we excel in others. The important one is the nuclear posture, and we cannot discount the strength of our NATO allies.

If you take the military posture and the military spending of our NATO allies and ours together, it far exceeds that of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies.

They don't have anything like the economic strength together that we have together. So I get impatient with those who downgrade the strengths that we represent, the values that we represent. They will go farther to mobilize these people behind our efforts against a real threat than that of the Soviet Union.

So, I just don't buy the underlying thesis of that question.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes.

QUESTION: Would you please address the second half of my question concerning mutual assured destruction, which is the policy of -- if I remember correctly -- the early seventies, and I believe it is still in today, where defense analysts have come to the conclusion that in any retaliatory strike or pre-emptive strike, the Soviets would lose ten million people and we would lose one hundred million people, or half of our population, roughly?

Can you say if the Carter Administration, will it continue to follow this policy of lack of defense for our people?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Your numbers are wrong, horribly wrong. I don't know whose book you read.

QUESTION: That is from the Security Council.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: A hundred million versus ten million? I have never heard that number.

Secondly, we can destroy the Soviet Union and they can destroy us at the present time.

Now, what is it that you are attributing to the Carter Administration?

QUESTION: I was wondering, will they continue

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this policy of lack of defense, civil defense?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have no such policy -- oh, no. Now you are talking about civil defense. This is the first time you used the word "civil."

QUESTION: That is what MAD is, it is the civil defense policies.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I was Governor of my state back in the early fifties when following World War II, in the pattern of World War II, we considered the viability of civil defense in the face of nuclear war.

We went through the whole exercise, the Governors, in organized programs. We mobilized volunteers. We built underground shelters. We undertook to develop traffic patterns, evacuation patterns, all the rest of it, and it didn't work.

The public wouldn't support it. It involved a kind of expenditure that nobody believed.

With respect to the Soviet civil defense program, none of the experts on our side consider it a threat to our ability to destroy the Soviet Union at the present time. And so they are installing it at enormous expense, as a defense against our ability to destroy them with our nuclear weapons, but we don't believe it will work.

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Now, what you are saying is, why don't we build a civil defense program of that kind?

No President, and I have served under all of them since World War II, after that initial review of the possibilities, has proposed a civil defense program. And I don't think Mr. Reagan has, unless I have missed something.

So, Eisenhower did not, Nixon did not, Ford did not. As far as I know, Reagan does not. I don't know of an expert who believes that a civil defense program makes sense, considering its cost and its inability to constitute a credible defense against a nuclear attack by the other side.

That is the answer.

QUESTION: Thank you. (Applause.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my name is George Evans and I am a Junior at the University.

In a recent television broadcast, it was reported that the United States was starting to build up a nuclear presence, specifically with cruise missiles, in the United Kingdom for NATO defense purposes.

Since many people of the United Kingdom are not in favor of this, I would like to know what the United

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States position is?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, the United States position is supported by NATO, including Great Britain. That isn't to say that everybody in Great Britain supports it, but the decision which was taken last December by the NATO Alliance to deploy the new Pershing missile in order to offset the Soviet build-up of the new modernized SS-20 which now numbers three to four hundred aimed at Europe.

In the light of that Soviet build-up, the NATO countries made a decision last December to deploy the new Pershing missile, but, at the same time, to offer to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union limiting both the Soviet SS-20 and the Pershing.

So the decision was taken to deploy the Pershing, and we have just begun this week, or this month, negotiations with the Russians hopefully leading to agreements to limit both ours and theirs.

Thank you. (Applause)

DR. SEDGEWICK: Mr. Secretary, I believe we have time for one more question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, we certainly have time for that one.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my name is Robert Mendes

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and I am in fifth grade.

I would like to know --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That may be a question I can answer. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I would like to know how can you prevent hostages from being taken from the embassies in the future? (Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to diplomatic personnel, there is only one way to do it, and that is through what we now have, and that is the International Convention to protect diplomatic personnel.

What Iran did ran counter to the tradition, this Convention, and the civilized behavior of nations going back hundreds of years.

This is not something that is likely to recur -- well, in the kind of world we live in, it might, but it may be that we need to consider ways of strengthening that Convention, which is a form of international law, to protect diplomatic personnel.

The fact is that if we cannot protect them, we will lose our ability on this planet to communicate as between nations, even nations that are hostile to each other.

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We have always had the ability to communicate with each other as the first and most important step toward accommodating our differences. And this is what the Iranian action is all about. I mean, they have weakened that commitment to protect diplomatic personnel. It could happen again, I mean.

I hope the Iranian situation and what has happened will add a deterrent effect to existing international law, but we made need to strengthen international law, perhaps automatically. One suggestion I have heard made is that whenever a nation does that, that all other nations will automatically break off diplomatic relations.

That would be a very tough punishment, but it may be that if it became a practice to do what Iran did, that we would have to consider something like that. Because all nations -- you can say that we really haven't been very popular in the United Nations as a country, or in the Islamic Conference, or in the Non-Aligned League, and as far as I know, only three nations all over the world failed to support us on this hostage seizure.

That says something about how important all nations regard the protection of diplomatic personnel.

So, hopefully what happened there won't happen

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very often.

QUESTION: Thank you. (Applause.)

DR. SEDGEWICK: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of all of the University community, as well as the Scranton community, we would like to thank you for speaking to us.

SECRETARY: May 'I' say to all of you -- I hate to say this with the Press present -- but you asked better questions than I usually get at press conferences.

(Laughter and applause.)

[The meeting concluded at 8:50 p.m.]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 28, 1980
No. 302

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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE

SPONSORED BY

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

PORTLAND, MAINE

OCTOBER 28, 1980

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For further information contact:

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
BEFORE THE
PORTLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OCTOBER 28, 1980

GOVERNOR BRENNEN; MAYOR LEARY; SENATOR MITCHELL;
COLIN HAMPTON AND BILL LOCKWOOD OF THE PORTLAND CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE; RICK BARTON OF THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL; LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN:

OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, I HAVE TRAVELED MANY MILES --
A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM TO AMERICAN CITIES WHERE I HAVE TALKED
TO PEOPLE ABOUT OUR NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. AND IN THE
COURSE OF THANKING MY HOSTS FOR THEIR COURTESY TO ME, I
TELL THEM HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE THEIR "MAINE HOSPITALITY."

NOT THE HOSPITALITY OF A NEIGHBORING STATE, WHEN DANIEL
WEBSTER KNOCKED ON THE DOOR OF A FARMHOUSE LATE ONE EVENING.
THE FARMER LEANED OUT OF A WINDOW AND ASKED, "WHAT DO YOU
WANT?" WEBSTER SAID, FROM THE DOOR STEP: "I WANT TO SPEND
THE NIGHT HERE." "ALL RIGHT, STAY THERE," REPLIED THE
FARMER, AND SHUT THE WINDOW.

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TODAY I FIND THAT THE REAL THING -- THE REAL MAINE HOSPITALITY -- HAS A SPECIAL WARMTH. I'M GLAD TO BE BACK.

"HOME," ROBERT FROST WROTE, "IS THE PLACE WHERE, WHEN YOU...GO THERE, THEY HAVE TO TAKE YOU IN." MAINE PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN ME IN, SO TODAY AS ALWAYS, I FEEL VERY MUCH AT HOME.

WE ARE, AS YOU KNOW BEST OF ALL, NEARING THE CLIMAX OF THAT POLITICAL RITUAL HENRY ADAMS ONCE CALLED "THE DANCE OF DEMOCRACY." HENRY ADAMS MIGHT BE SHOCKED AT HOW FRENZIED THAT ELECTORAL DANCE HAS BECOME -- BUT I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BE TOO TROUBLED BY THE TUMULT AND THE SHOUTING.

I REMEMBER THE STORY OF HARRY TRUMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN 1948. HE PLAYED THE OPPOSITION AND THE "DO-NOTHING EIGHTIETH CONGRESS" SO HARD THAT PEOPLE WOULD SHOUT, "GIVE 'EM HELL, HARRY!"

AND HARRY TRUMAN ALWAYS CALMLY REPLIED: "I DON'T GIVEN 'EM HELL. I TELL THE TRUTH AND THEY THINK IT'S HELL."

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IN THE MIDST OF THE CUSTOMARY NOISE OF A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN, IT IS POSSIBLE TO HEAR SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS BEING ASKED -- QUESTIONS THAT DESERVE CAREFUL THOUGHT. ONE OF THOSE QUESTIONS INVOLVES AMERICAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE WORLD. AND TODAY, BEFORE OUR DIALOGUE BEGINS, I WANT TO SAY A FEW BRIEF WORDS ABOUT OUR STRATEGIC POSITION.

I WILL BEGIN IN A BIPARTISAN WAY, BY QUOTING SOME REPUBLICANS. BUT I SHOULD WARN YOU OF SOMETHING ELSE HARRY TRUMAN ONCE SAID: "WHENEVER A FELLOW TELLS ME HE'S BIPARTISAN, I KNOW HE'S GOING TO VOTE AGAINST ME."

FOUR YEARS AGO, DURING THE PRIMARIES, PRESIDENT GERALD FORD SAID THIS: "A DISTORTION OF AMERICA'S MILITARY PREPAREDNESS COULD NEEDLESSLY ALARM AMERICANS AND ENCOURAGE OUR ENEMIES ABROAD." HIS SECRETARY OF STATE VOICED THE SAME CONCERN: "WE MUST RESIST A RHETORIC OF IMPOTENCE," HENRY KISSINGER SAID, "WHICH DISQUIETS FRIENDS AND EMBOLDENS ADVERSARIES."

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TODAY WE HEAR AGAIN THAT SAME RHETORIC, WHICH PORTRAYS OUR ADVERSARIES AS STRATEGIC GIANTS AND OURSELVES AS MILITARY MIDGETS.

OF COURSE THE WORLD IS A DANGEROUS PLACE. OF COURSE WE FACE AWESOME CHALLENGES -- THE CHALLENGE OF A SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP; OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ELSEWHERE; OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD; THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING UP OUR ECONOMIC POSITION. AND, INDEED, THERE HAVE BEEN SETBACKS. THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN; THERE ALWAYS WILL BE. THERE CAN BE NO PERFECT SAFETY NOR CERTAIN SUCCESS IN A WORLD OF CONSTANT, RAPID CHANGE.

BUT WHILE THESE CHALLENGES SEIZE THE HEADLINES -- AS THEY SHOULD -- WE ALSO NEED TO RECOGNIZE OUR GAINS. . . OUR STRENGTHS. . . AND THE PROBLEMS OF OUR OPPONENTS. FOR PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER WERE RIGHT IN WHAT THEY SAID THEN ABOUT THE DANGERS OF DOWNGRADING AMERICA AND BUILDING UP OUR ADVERSARIES. AND THE FACT IS THAT I WOULD NOT CHANGE OUR STRATEGIC POSITION FOR THAT OF ANY OTHER NATION.

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IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS, WE HAVE DECISIVELY REVERSED THE DECLINE IN AMERICAN MILITARY SPENDING WHICH BEGAN IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES. WE ARE MODERNIZING EVERY ELEMENT OF OUR DEFENSE FORCES. THE SALT II TREATY -- IF WE HAVE THE WISDOM TO RATIFY IT -- WILL LIMIT THE NUCLEAR THREAT WE FACE.

NATO, THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICIES, IS BEING STRENGTHENED: THROUGH AN AMERICAN-LED LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. • THROUGH OUR ALLIED DECISION TO MODERNIZE OUR NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. • THROUGH THE REINTEGRATION OF GREECE INTO THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND.

BEFORE AND DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, THE UNITED STATES HAS DEPLOYED THE MOST POWERFUL NAVAL FORCE EVER SENT THERE. WE ARE HELPING TO BUILD A COOPERATIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THAT REGION. AND WE ARE ORGANIZING A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE THAT CAN RESPOND QUICKLY WHEREVER NEEDED AROUND THE WORLD.

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THESE AND OTHER MILITARY FORCES GIVE US THE STRENGTH TO KEEP THE PEACE. AND IT HAS BEEN KEPT IN RECENT YEARS.

IN ADDITION TO THIS REVERSAL OF OUR MILITARY DECLINE, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY HAS BUTTRESSED OUR NATION'S POSITION IN THE WORLD.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED OUR RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY IN PERU, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND ELSEWHERE, WHILE PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AS A MODERATE ALTERNATIVE TO REPRESSION OR RADICALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

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IN AFRICA, PRESIDENT CARTER'S COURAGEOUS STAND ON RHODESIA HELPED PRODUCE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT NOT ONLY ENHANCED OUR STANDING THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. IT CALMED TROUBLED WATERS IN WHICH OUR ADVERSARIES WERE FISHING. THE RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA DEMONSTRATED HOW DRAMATICALLY OUR RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED WITH AFRICA'S MOST POPULOUS NATION -- AND ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF OIL.

IN ASIA, NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA IS OF HISTORIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE CONSTRUCTIVE, OUTWARD-LOOKING FOREIGN POLICY OF OUR ALLY, JAPAN. AND WE HAVE SOLIDIFIED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE FREE NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. OUR RAPID RESPONSE TO THAILAND'S NEEDS, WHEN THE FIGHTING IN KAMPUCHEA THREATENED ITS BORDERS, WAS A KEY ELEMENT HERE. . AND COMPLETION OF A REVISED BASE AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES HAS STRENGTHENED OUR ABILITY TO RETAIN THE MOST POWERFUL NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC.

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IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT CARTER, THROUGH DETERMINED PERSONAL DIPLOMACY, HELPED PRODUCE AN HISTORIC TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. ONLY A STRONG UNITED STATES COULD HAVE PLAYED THIS ROLE. WE HAVE IMPROVED OUR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WHILE DEMONSTRATING AN UNSHAKEABLE COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. TODAY, FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, ISRAELIS EXIST IN A STATE OF REAL PEACE WITH THEIR MOST POWERFUL NEIGHBOR. AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HOLDS OUT THE MOST REALISTIC POSSIBILITY THAT HAS YET BEEN DESIGNED FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN SOUTHWEST ASIA AS A WHOLE, WE HAVE ENHANCED OUR MILITARY PRESENCE AND NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS FOR ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES WITH OMAN, KENYA, AND SOMALIA. WE HAVE RESPONDED QUICKLY AND WITH POLITICAL SENSITIVITY TO SAUDI ARABIA'S REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN MARCH 1978 AND IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. AND WE IMPOSED, IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, SANCTIONS THAT IMPOSED REAL COSTS ON THE SOVIETS.

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EVERY ONE OF THESE ACTIONS HAS IMPROVED AMERICA'S STRATEGIC POSITION AND AMERICA'S STANDING IN THE WORLD. THEY ARE REAL ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN OR DISCOUNTED.

IN ADDITION, BY COMPLETING A MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT THAT WILL BENEFIT THE WHOLE WORLD ECONOMY. . . BY PUTTING IN PLACE AMERICA'S FIRST REAL ENERGY PROGRAM, AND EXPANDING OUR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS. . . BY NEGOTIATING THE FRAMEWORK FOR A COMMON FUND ON COMMODITIES THAT SHOWS PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE IN WORKING ON SUCH ISSUES WITH THIRD WORLD NATIONS. . .BY THESE AND OTHER ACTIONS, WE ARE IMPROVING OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS.

AND BY WORKING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. . .BY WORKING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. . .AND ON BEHALF OF WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WE ARE HELPING BUILD A FUTURE IN WHICH AMERICA IS MORE SECURE.

IN LISTING ALL THESE AREAS OF BASIC PROGRESS, I AM NOT CLAIMING THAT AMERICA IS OUT OF DANGER.

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THE PERILS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA ARE EVIDENT AND REAL. CONFLICT IN THAT REGION, IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IN KAMPUCHEA AND IN VARIOUS PARTS OF AFRICA REMAIN DANGEROUS TESTS OF OUR DIPLOMACY AND OUR WISDOM. FURTHER PROGRESS IN REDUCING OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL AND INCREASING OUR OWN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY WILL TEST OUR STRENGTH AS A PEOPLE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE, AND MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT, TO GAIN THE RELEASE OF OUR FELLOW AMERICANS HELD CAPTIVE IN IRAN.

BUT LET US BE CLEAR ABOUT ONE FACT: THE CHALLENGES OF THIS UNRULY WORLD ARE NOT CHALLENGES TO AMERICA ALONE.

CONSIDER, FOR A MOMENT, YOUR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IF YOU WERE AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION:

-- YOUR MILITARY BUILDUP HAS PRODUCED A NEW AMERICAN DEFENSE PROGRAM THAT WILL MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE.

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- YOU SEE, ON YOUR BORDERS, A STRENGTHENING NATU TO THE WEST.
- TO THE EAST, YOU SEE A STRONG JAPAN AND NORMALIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.
- THE UNITED NATIONS -- AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD -- HAVE CONDEMNED, OVERWHELMINGLY, YOUR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN -- WHILE YOUR FORCES THERE ARE BOGGED DOWN AGAINST THE DETERMINED RESISTANCE OF AN ENTIRE NATION.
- WHILE YOUR ECONOMY IS SLOWING DOWN, YOU FACE THE FUTURE OF AN ENERGY DEFICIT AND THE REALITY NOW OF A SECOND POOR AGRICULTURAL HARVEST IN A ROW, ON TOP OF AN AMERICAN-LED GRAIN EMBARGO THAT HAS FORCED A SIGNIFICANT CUT IN SOVIET MEAT PRODUCTION.

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- ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND HEIGHTENED INTERNAL TENSIONS
POSE DIFFICULT ISSUES IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME GAINS IN AFRICA, THERE
HAVE BEEN GREATER SETBACKS: IN SOUTHERN AFRICA,
IN A LOST BASE IN SOMALIA, IN A LOST CLIENT IN IDI
AMIN, IN DAMAGED RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF ONCE
FRIENDLY NATIONS.
- THE CUBANS, WHO ONLY A YEAR AGO HOSTED THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT SUMMIT CONFERENCE, HAVE JUST WITHDRAWN THEIR
CANDIDACY FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT BECAUSE OF A
LACK OF THIRD WORLD SUPPORT.
- AND AROUND THE WORLD, REFUGEES CONTINUE TO STREAM
OUT OF COMMUNIST NATIONS: A HARSH AND VISIBLE
JUDGMENT ON LIFE UNDER YOUR SYSTEM.

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I LIST THESE PROBLEMS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER A SUPERPOWER...NOR THAT THE THREATS POSED BY THEIR GROWING MILITARY POWER CAN BE IGNORED. I MENTION THEM TO TELL YOU THAT WE SHOULD NOT ASSIGN TO OURSELVES ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD AND TO THEM ALL THE SUCCESSES -- AS SOME WOULD HAVE YOU DO.

WHAT THIS ADDS UP TO IS A SITUATION IN WHICH TWO SUPERPOWERS, WHO HOLD LARGELY IN THEIR HANDS THE DESTINY OF MANKIND, FACE DIFFERING BUT DIFFICULT CHALLENGES IN A WORLD THAT IS INFINITELY COMPLEX AND EXTRAORDINARILY CHALLENGING. IT MEANS THAT, EVEN AS THEY COMPETE, THEY MUST PLACE LIMITS ON THEIR COMPETITION, IF THERE IS TO BE PEACE. THAT IS WHY WE ARE PRESSING FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT BY VIGOROUSLY OPPOSING THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THAT IS ALSO WHY WE SEEK TO GAIN THE RESTRAINTS ON ARMS THAT THE SALT II TREATY WOULD BRING.

THE SITUATION I HAVE DESCRIBED CALLS FOR A CALM APPRAISAL OF OUR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, OUR SUCCESSES AS WELL AS OUR SETBACKS. IN ANY NATION IN THE WORLD, A MOOD OF DEFENSIVE FEAR CAN LEAD TO A SELF-DEFEATING AND DANGEROUS DIPLOMACY.

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AND MOST OF ALL, IT CALLS FOR A CONTINUED LEADERSHIP OF STRENGTH BUT REASON -- LEADERSHIP FOR PEACE. FOR AS HARRY TRUMAN SAID THIRTY YEARS AGO, "WE CAN WELL AFFORD TO PAY THE PRICE OF PEACE. OUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS TO PAY THE TERRIBLE COST OF WAR."

I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE OF PEACE. AND I BELIEVE THEY WILL BE REWARDED FOR THEIR SACRIFICE WITH A NATION THAT IS STRONG ENOUGH -- AND WISE ENOUGH -- TO ENCOURAGE PEACE.

THANK YOU.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 5, 1980
No. 302A



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE SPEECH BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
The Chamber of Commerce
Portland, Maine
October 28, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think we have time for questions, and I'd be glad to answer them. There are microphones in the aisles, if anybody wishes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as Dolly Levy in the cast of "Hello, Dolly," would belt out -- and we're ready to do it here, "It's good to have you back in town."

(Applause)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you.

QUESTION: My question is, because of acrimony, not only in our political world, but also in the world beyond our borders, and looking ahead to the months and days ahead after the election, I think something has to be recovered, not only within our Nation, but beyond our Nation -- and what has to be recovered is good will! I think we can deal with it, as a nation ourselves, after the election.

Could you give us some idea of what you think about how, beyond our borders, especially in Iran and Iraq in the Middle East, how is there hope of the recovery of good will in that area?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is a lot more of it out there now than Americans are led to believe. I say that from my own personal experience of six months in this job. You may recall that almost immediately when I took office, I was plunged into a schedule of travel to which our Secretary of State had been committed before I took office, and so I went to Europe twice, Brussels, Vienna, Rome, Venice, and on to Ankara for a meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers, and on to Southeast Asia for the meeting with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, which also included Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and so on, and then back to Japan for Mr. Ohira's funeral.

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For further information contact:

In those four to six weeks, I had a very quick and rapid exposure to foreign attitudes toward the United States, because I did not assume when I walked into a room that the response was to me as an individual, but to me as a representative of this country. And as I told a House Foreign Affairs Committee several weeks later, I was never made to feel like Little Orphan Annie. I mean, people were interested in my country's point of view, my country's policy, interested in soliciting our support -- and I don't mean always economic or financial -- interested in understanding our values and what we are doing to pursue them. Throughout the world, there is an enormous good will of people who see still in the United States the values to which they would like to aspire in their own day-to-day lives.

The magic which brought my father to this country and so many in this room are sons and daughters of people who came to this country. That magic is still out there.

The world has changed a great deal, of course, and we are not the dominant power that we were at the end of World War II when we were about the only power undamaged as a result of World War II. Europe has recovered; Germany and Japan, our World War II enemies, are two of the five great economies of the world, with strong democracies and powerful friends, but with minds of their own.

The Soviet Union, once it acquired the nuclear bomb, became a super-power, and with a history of being a closed society, a sense of paranoia about its relations to the rest of the world that makes it a threat. Nevertheless, the potential for American leadership and influence is there, even among people who disagree with us from time to time, and I don't find disagreement that abhorrent.

I remember the story they used to tell me when I was a young lawyer looking for a job after I got out of law school. I visited a law firm in which the senior partner's message to the younger members of the firm was that if we all agree all of the time, only one of us is necessary.

(Laughter)

Differences of opinion within the parameters of shared values can be a very healthy sort of thing, provided we communicate and consult.

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I remember when I took office as Secretary of State, there was a great deal of talk about disarray in the NATO Alliance. I haven't seen that word "disarray" used with respect to our relations to our NATO friends for weeks now. We consult closely; we have come to trust each other, so it is possible for us to identify common policies more readily.

Even though West Germany has just had an election, we're in an election, France is facing an election, and so on, in spite of all of this, I think that our relations with our NATO Allies, given our differences of circumstance, differences in resource, and different points of view, are strong and healthy and will continue to be.

With respect to Southeast Asia, in a sense we abandoned Southeast Asia at the end of the Vietnam War, and we're inclined to forget it. When I was considering my travel schedule after taking office, Kuala Lumpur was on the schedule and we cancelled it because the President wanted me to spend more time in this country. But after I looked into it, I decided that I ought to go. I discussed it with the President, and he said, "If that's your feeling, by all means." It was a very positive thing to do. Indonesia and Malaysia represent one of the strong potential economic areas of the world, one of our strong trading areas. They are interested in what we think, what we do. They would like us to be supportive of their policies.

They are not asking us to reestablish a military relationship that led to the Vietnam War, but they would like to feel that they are in a positive, healthy relationship with the United States. They are interested in our leadership. One may say, "What influence does the United States have?" There were ten foreign ministers, five representing the ASEAN countries and five representing the United States and others. The five ASEAN countries spent a whole afternoon with me alone, undertaking to present their policies with respect to Kampuchea, with respect to Thailand, with respect to the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea, soliciting our support and our concern about the future of that area.

All of these contacts convinced me -- and I run into this in the United Nations and elsewhere -- that the opportunity for American influence to play a constructive role is there. Whether we use it wisely or not then comes back to some of the issues I raised in my

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prepared remarks. People aren't going to follow a leader unless they have confidence in the direction in which he would lead, so it is important for us to have a clear perception about what our options are, where we ought to go.

I remember making a speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers Council -- I made the last one because I was a freshman and there were 16 others.

VOICE: No longer!

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I said I recognize we are a superpower and one of two superpowers, and so I recognize that we have a responsibility as a superpower, but I also recognize that if we try to discharge that responsibility, we'll be criticized and if we don't we'll be criticized; if we try to lead, we'll be criticized and if we don't lead, we'll be criticized. If we try to lead, the policies we urge will be criticized, and so on. I said, "I understand all that," but I said, "What is important for you to understand is that the United States is not an adversary to NATO; the people of the United States come from NATO -- we are of you. My father was born in Europe." I said, "We have the same values we're seeking to preserve, the same liberties that we're seeking to defend, and so we are OF YOU." You know, those kinds of fundamental values have to be stated from time to time, and then we have to consult, because in this changing world, there are 100 new nations that have been formed out of the colonial past of this planet since 1950 -- all of them seeking what, communism? By no means. National identity, independence, the right to decide for themselves how best to serve the needs of their people -- 100 new nations.

They are not going to be our rubber stamps, but they are looking for leadership; they are looking for a helping hand, whether it's technical assistance or an occasional lift with a loan or even a grant; but they are all seeking to build a future for themselves, in Africa, in Latin America, in Southeast Asia. They are worth cultivating.

In the next 20 years, the population of this planet will grow from 4-1/2 billion to 6 billion. That 1-1/2 billion increase was the total population of the world 30 or 40 years ago; and of that 1-1/2 billion increase, 90 percent will come from these developing countries who have no future at the moment, who have just emerged as countries, and whose people will begin to

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overwhelm in numbers those of us in the industrial, affluent nations.

Building a world community is the challenge, and if we establish our credibility and our commitment to that objective, given the values that we represent, the values that have made life good for our people here, we can lead this world of tomorrow.

QUESTION: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, you already touched on part of material I wanted to ask you about, namely about Europe, because I didn't think you referred to Europe in your prepared remarks very extensively. Let me try, then, to ask a couple of specific questions in that direction.

You referred to the leadership and consultative functions in American-European relations -- certainly that was a major problem in the spring. Let me ask two specific questions: What could you say about the expectations of the United States concerning defense spending and the general defense situation in the NATO alliance? For instance, in Denmark, and perhaps in some other countries there are indications that the spending for military budgets is falling behind projections. I wonder if you could comment on the American expectations with regard to contributions by European countries towards common defense.

The second is, could you comment on American outlook toward different roles that west European countries might play in different areas of the world? For example, is it a reasonable expectation that West Germany should play a role in various parts of the world as part of the NATO partnership beyond the European Continent?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me take your last question first: NATO's Charter has geographical limits, as you know. NATO is not inclined to act as an institution with respect to problems which arise outside NATO territory; nevertheless, we recognize that we have shared interests in crises that arise outside NATO territory. We haven't really yet devised a consultative mechanism with respect to those kinds of problems, and we need to develop one. We're conscious of that and we're working at it.

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With respect to sharing burdens, which was your question, first as to support for the defense programs of NATO itself, overall they have kept their commitment to the 3 percent annual real growth. Some of the smaller countries like Denmark, which has severe economic problems and also a very splintered political picture, have found it more difficult. But overall, especially with the support of the larger NATO countries, NATO has held to that commitment, and we expect it will continue to do so.

Let me make one other point, because it bears upon the first two: When the Afghanistan invasion occurred, we were able to persuade the NATO countries to adopt the principle of building up their support of NATO's direct defense so that if we had to deploy our forces to regions like the Persian Gulf, for example, that they could fill in behind us in Europe.

One final point: Germany, of course, is restricted by its constitution from military involvement outside its own territory, just as Japan is; but with respect to the other NATO countries, they have responded to the latest crisis in the Persian Gulf by recognizing the possible need to join in an effort to protect the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf.

With respect to the southeastern flank of NATO, Turkey, West Germany has led the effort to provide economic assistance to Turkey in order to maintain its viability and strength as the southeasternmost member of NATO, so that in various ways, they have fallen in behind us and given us support.

QUESTION: Just one second one, do you anticipate any difficulties with the decision to follow through on theater nuclear weapons in NATO?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, at the moment, it seems to be in place. Denmark, which agreed to accept deployment, is having difficulty selling it domestically. The Netherlands also. But with respect to the others -- Italy, West Germany, and Britain -- they are holding to their positions, and will so long as at the same time, we are engaged in talks with the Russians on limiting such weapons. And that is why I

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emphasized in my prepared remarks the importance of our proceeding with SALT II and with the talks on theater nuclear weapons.

MR. HAMPTON: Time for one more question.

QUESTION: How is everybody today? It's so warm in here and so cold outside. I thought it was going to snow, but -- Secretary of State Muskie said, "It's nice to be home" and I think everybody is glad to have you home. It's so warm and nice in here!

My first question, and I want to ask it, where you could write if you have a solution for the hostage question, and since I'm talking to the top man, I have a solution if I might talk for a few minutes. Do you want to hear it? Just a second -- it will take five seconds.

(Audience making negative murmurs.)

QUESTION (continuing): It's so beautiful: What you do, you take the Iranian assets that are frozen and you start to build a mosque. I went to school with Iranians for five years -- I went to Maine Maritime Academy; I'm a Mainer. Just one second.

MODERATOR: Would you like to ask a question?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Go ahead. Let him ask the question.

QUESTION: Can you hear me?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I can hear you. I don't need the microphone to hear you. I'm not that old.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: I went to school with Iranians for five years at Maine Maritime Academy. I don't think Americans really understand the Iranians too much. I was looking at the map of Iran and noticed that the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers come right together near the Iran-Iraq boundary, with a bead of light ?? A bead of light starts: when they go, "Khomeini, Khomeini, Khomeini," they are going to one beat. The only time I've seen Americans is during a peace movement, so (inaudible) So Americans, they don't really understand Americans - they are so diversified, and one government can "blow it" (inaudible)

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But what I want to say is, you build them a mosque. The Islamic religion -- they need a good PR job done in the United States -- and we start to build a mosque for them with the unfrozen assets. In that way, I want to get the hostages together in this mosque in the heart of America, somewhere like in Utah, like in Tehran, and come and try to understand the Islamic religion because you don't understand it.

Have you ever been in a mosque? I was, in Morocco. But it's so easy, understanding what developed. Is there a place that I can talk? Is there a place that we can write?

(Boos from audience, asking speaker to sit down.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The State Department, Washington, D. C.

My impression from the contacts we have had with the Iranians -- and we have some indirect ones -- is that they would really like to spend those dollars and build their own mosque.


(Applause)

MODERATOR: Please remain seated. The Secretary has to leave. If you would please remain seated, we would appreciate it very much. Thank you again.

(The luncheon program concluded at 1:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 28, 1980
No. 303A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
and
AMBASSADOR SOL M. LINOWITZ

at

THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK
Grand Ballroom, New York Hilton
New York

MR. EDMUND T. PRATT, JR: Now we come to the questions and, in our normal fashion, the questioners will alternate questions and each questioner will have some questions for each of our speakers. I'll ask the first question to be asked by Robert Roosa.

MR. ROBERT V. ROOSA: I'm delighted to have this opportunity as a good Democrat in sharing in the non-partisan presentation of views that we have just heard.

(Laughter and applause.)

MR. ROOSA: I would remind you that as we appraise every issue that's been discussed here tonight, there is going to be a continuity, as there was a continuity, from the last Administration to this one. I think that at least in recognizing that most of these developments require a step-by-step process, it is important also to recognize that at times steps may be backward rather than forward.

I think the current hostilities between Iraq and Iran raise that kind of possibility again. And, although we may return to this with further questions, the first one, and a very specific one, Mr. Secretary, is: In the present circumstances, is it possible for us, the United States, to fulfill whatever commitments we may have for the release of the spare parts to Iran without, at the same time, triggering an explosive delivery of military supplies

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including aircraft, to Iraq, by France, the U.S.S.R., or others?

Don't we have in this new tinder box a potential for exploding what has, step-by-step, been progress in associating many of our allies and, in a limited degree, in terms of neutralizing some of their influence on the Soviet Union in the developments that we've been encouraging and that Ambassador Linowitz has been so nobly furthering?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Like all questioners, you make assumptions designed to make your question valid. And one of the assumptions in your question is that somehow the hostage crisis, which predated by many months the Iraq-Iran war, is a determinating influence in the Iraq-Iran war.

Let's look at that a moment. Had it not been for the hostage crisis, Iran would not now be subject to trade sanctions invoked by us and our allies which puts Iran at a disadvantage in this war with Iraq. So that if a resolution of the hostage crisis were to result in a lifting of those trade sanctions, that action would be not unneutral with respect to Iraq but, rather, neutral with respect to Iran. So I think to try to tangle the two --

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: -- creates obvious difficulties. Iraq decided to launch its attack upon Iran in full knowledge that we were faced with a hostage crisis in Iran; but, with unsuitable lack of delicacy with respect to our problem, it did not seek our advice as to the timing of its attack nor consider our interests in doing so. And so I think that the two problems are separable, and hopefully can be resolved without impacting upon each other.

On the question of spare parts, let me put that in context. When the Iranians seized our hostages, we took several actions. We froze their assets in banks and other institutions; we withheld certain properties, including spare parts, which had been bought and paid for but not yet delivered to Iran; we persuaded our allies to impose sanctions upon Iran; and we would assume that at such time as we enter into negotiations with Iran, a posture we are not yet in, that all of these actions we took will be on the table as well as the action they took.

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I would think that in order to persuade them to undo the action they took, they might reasonably be expected to ask us to undo the actions we took in retaliation. To expect anything else is to ignore all we've learned about Iranian reactions over the last 11 months. I think we've got to take that into account.

With respect to the spare parts, one further point. Iraq has a \$2 billion arms supply agreement with the Soviet Union, and made it clear from the outset that whatever was in the pipeline would be delivered. These spare parts that Iran purchased from us and paid for, in a sense, are in the pipeline, undelivered only because of the hostage crisis. One could also make the argument that if the hostage crisis had not intervened to disrupt Iran's normal trading relationships with her own trading partners, including ourselves, the attack by Iraq might not have taken place. So you sort it out for us.

(Laughter.)

MR. PETER G. PETERSON: Mr. Ambassador, I'm happy to second Secretary Muskie's notion that you're a very gifted negotiator. I also assume, Sol, that you don't really need this job. Why, then, does the Administration appear to discourage a European initiative in trying to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement, particularly in view of the fact that our own diplomacy may be understandably constrained by domestic political factors?

If we persist in leaving Europe out of Mideast diplomacy, yet do not produce a Palestinian solution, won't we invite serious divisions with our Western allies, particularly in view of their much greater dependence on Persian Gulf oil; and the view that some have expressed to me that we may be pursuing a course of action that does not, and some would say cannot, come to grips with the really hard questions?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: Pete, the first point I would make is that our European allies have not put forward an alternative route toward the settlement of the Palestinian question in their declaration which they issued. What they did was issue a pronouncement which undertook to say that they thought at some point the PLO would have to be associated with the negotiations, and they called for self-determination which has become a code word in Israel for an independent Palestinian State. But at no point do they indicate how they hope to get from here to there.

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They have very carefully said that they support the Camp David process and don't want to do anything which will cause us difficulty. Since we have the only viable process, since ours is, as I said before, the only game in town, it is of concern to us that nothing be done which would suggest to the Palestinians, whom we are hoping to attract into the negotiation, that if they wait awhile, something better may be coming down the pike.

At this moment we have no reasonable to believe that there will be formulated an alternative approach more promising, more favorable to the Palestinians, than the Camp David process. So while we are not saying that we are opposed to the Europeans asserting their interests, and giving us the benefit of their judgment and advice, we are pleading with them not to do anything which will derail or even destroy the only ongoing peace process which promises the Palestinians a better way of life.

MR. ROOSA: Mr. Ambassador, I think just to follow a little further one of the other points you had made, stressing that there is now a spirit on which much more depends than any individual specifics, I noticed at least a report recently that President Sadat said he now stands ready to commit his armed forces to the defense of Arab and Moslem interests virtually anywhere in the world.

Does that raise any question about the present state of the spirit that you described? Is any weakening apparent there? Does it foreshadow for the time being any hardening of his attitude toward Israel, given the commitment he's apparently made to support the Arab or Moslem cause broadly defined?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: I haven't seen that particular quotation from President Sadat. Let me tell you about President Sadat. He is a wonderful man and he makes a lot of statements. He is genuinely concerned about the problems of the Middle East, and he not only says what he thinks, he does what he thinks.

There's not the slightest question in my mind about his own commitment, full commitment, to these negotiations. He believes that this is the only process that can bring us to the resolution of the Palestinian problem in a way that he thinks will avoid any future hostilities on that score in the future.

He says that he wants to do everything he can to assure that Israel is reassured about its own security in reaching such an agreement, and he even says that he believes his Arab brethren, who did not

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join with him in Camp David, had all made a mistake. He believes that some day they will come to recognize that this course is the best course for all of us.

Having said that, the quotation you just read, does seem somewhat at variance; but I think upon further probing we would find that nothing he would have said, in my judgment, would have intended to be anything less than a total commitment to Camp David, and he would probably explain it if we gave him the chance.

MR. PETERSON: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to press you a bit on a point that Ambassador Linowitz touched upon. I find some people wondering whether we can ever come to grips with the hard issues of Palestine and Jerusalem so long as we refuse to deal with the only spokesman that I would think most Palestinians acknowledge: the PLO.

Can we expect the PLO to give up their stated intention to destroy Israel so long as the Israelis offer no promise of self-determination at the end of the negotiation?

Isn't the important point to get the parties together and to see if they can finally agree? And, finally, put another way: Was it appropriate for the United States Government to agree that we would not talk to the PLO? Should we, as a leading sovereign power, have committed ourselves not to talk to anyone that we choose?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me make this point first: That we are the only major power today to which both sides will talk, the Arabs and the Israelis. This is a point that my predecessor, Henry Kissinger, made very persuasively to those of us in the Senate over and over again.

In order to maintain our credibility with respect to both of those audiences we have to display some sensitivity to the interests of both. It's easy to say, why shouldn't Israel move first to speak to the PLO. Well, Israel is interested in speaking to some Palestinians. As a matter of fact, that Camp David process invites Palestinians to become part of it. The PLO hasn't indicated any interest in talking to any Israelis.

So you're faced with that age-old dilemma with getting together on a talking, negotiating basis, two sides, who up to this point have not found a face-saving way to do it. So the whole

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theory of the Camp David process -- as Sol has explained it much better than I, having been closer to it -- is that we hope that this process, in its evolution toward a definition of the autonomy phase of the transition, will demonstrate to the Palestinians that they can in terms of their own interests as they perceive them move from the rigid posture they have taken with respect to the survival of Israel toward a more flexible one, and that eventually there will be Palestinian participation in the process.

But since the process itself is now under concentrated attack from the PLO and from other even more radical Arab groups, I think the important thing to try to sustain at the moment is the viability of the process, prove that it will work by settling some of these very difficult half dozen issues which Sol described, and eventually engage the interest of the PLO or whatever other organization may represent the Palestinians, or persuade the PLO to abandon what some of them will say is no longer their objective: the destruction of Israel.

So there's a rigidity to both sides on that question, Pete, and how you break through it is part of the challenge. And we all recognize that we must break through it at some point.

Another point I would make, in this Middle East crisis with respect to the Camp David talks, is that there is a time urgency about it, because attitudes tend to get frozen if they are not moving and changing. And one of Sol's real challenges, and I think he's shown remarkable ingenuity in the approach that he's taken, is to keep the thing moving.

For example, he's got them moving now around a document that one side calls a memorandum of understanding, that Sol chooses to call, out of his corporate experience, a heads of agreement which is a technique to try to get the parties to agree on certain principles; then, having agreed on the principles, to flesh them out. In other words, it's a kind of an evolutionary process in an attempt to bring people together and break through some of the hard-shelled rigidity that separate them.

But you've touched on a very important problem, and somehow the Palestinians and the Israelis who, in the last analysis, must find a way to live together; they've got to find a way to break through each other's rigidity.

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MR. ROOSA: Mr. Secretary, let's move just a little further across the globe to Afghanistan. Pete asked Sol about the way in which we develop our joint relations with our allies in coping with the particular problems of the Israeli development.

I would like to put the same kind of question with respect to the sort of ~~S~~emate that seems to have developed with respect to Afghanistan, and I wonder whether there, there isn't a scope for not only a fuller sharing of views with our allies and perhaps even learning something from them, but even for finding ways to rely on them to take a considerable share of the leading role in trying to cope with the implications that Afghanistan has created for the entire Western world.

I think we are a bit fragmented. I think there has been some concern that we develop our policies alone and then expect conformity. I wonder how you see that prospect now.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I don't think there is the disarray -- as a matter of fact, I haven't even read or heard that word used for quite some time as a description of our relations with our allies, vis-a-vis Afghanistan. So let me tick through what our shared interests and policies are at this point.

Number one, they have never yet disagreed with our perception of the strategic implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; never once did they agree with it. Disagreement or differences of opinion -- there's a difference between those two -- differences of opinion have arisen as to what a viable and necessary policy is with respect to it.

Now, on the military side there has been no disagreement. Number one, in response to President Carter's initiative, the alliance has responded to his standard of 3% real growth in defense expenditure beyond inflation designed with the objectives of modernization, improved readiness, and modernization particularly of our Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe.

Beyond that, they have agreed in principle to the notion that if American forces have to be redeployed outside NATO territory, that they would pick up the load to fill in behind us in the defense of Europe. So in the military side, there has been very good support and very good agreement. Some of the weaker economies -- and I'm not going to mention countries -- are finding it difficult to meet the 3% standard, but the larger ones have; and so we

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have, for the first time in years, got a positive, ongoing, and, I think, effective defense policy with respect to NATO.

Outside the territory of NATO and including NATO, in addition, the Allies have moved. The Federal Republic has taken the leadership in mobilizing the economic resources to shore up Turkey as the southeastern flank of NATO. Turkey, as you know, has had great political instability, a reign of terrorism, and, in addition to that, has found its own defense posture deteriorating, its economy particularly. And I think the Alliance, with the leadership of Chancellor Schmidt and the German Republic, has rallied behind the effort to stabilize Turkey's economy and to push for and to support the reintegration of Greece. Those things have been done with the support of our allies.

With respect to the transfer of technology, we have also had the support of the Alliance, with some fractionation of it at the edges. But I think with respect to COCOM which deals with military-isolated technology, there have been no exceptions requested by any of our NATO friends since last December, and I don't think there's any indication of a departure from that. We're trying to persuade the Alliance to go beyond that. With respect to technology, that has the effect of strengthening the Soviet economy as a whole, to get the advantage of higher technology; and that's been, I think, an effective policy.

The grain policy has been most effective, a very targeted policy, initiated last year because the Soviets last year had a short crop: 170 million metric tons as against a target of 230; and so as a result, the Soviet Union has had to dip into its grain reserves, has had to cut back on its meat production, and its promises to its consumers, and has not been able to make up the shortfall created by our denial of 17 million metric tons. It has paid a cost and the reduction in meat reached, I think, as much as 10% in recent months.

Then on top of all that, after initially optimistic estimates of the Soviet crop this year of about 230 million metric tons, the most optimistic estimates now with a large part of the crop in, is that it won't go above 180. So, again, the Soviets face this this very considerable cost.

Now, what's the importance of this? People to me, well, they haven't withdrawn the troops from Afghanistan. That's true. But they have paid a price, a price in excess of what they

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thought they would have to pay for this departure from international norms. And that we hope will do a number of things: One, restrain them from future adventures. One must speculate as to the effect of their miscalculation in Afghanistan upon their attitude toward Poland, for example. So I think these policies have been soundly targeted, has imposed a cost, and hopefully will act as a restraint with respect to future Soviet policy.

My own gut instinct -- and I can only describe it in that sense -- is that the Soviets now are interested in extricating themselves from the dilemma into which that adventure has plunged them. They won't say that. They deny, indeed, that they're bogged down in Afghanistan; but the fact is our best information is that they are.

So I think these have been important policies to put in place. Where we go from here is important. In my judgment the central question that we've got to face in the years immediately ahead is how to read the Soviet Union and its intentions. Because if we misread them on the pessimistic side, we could find ourselves launched on an arms race that would be terribly costly and provocative and conceivably leading to consequences that we wouldn't want to foresee.

On the other hand, if we are optimistic, we could err on the other side. So I think reading the Soviet Union in the aftermath of its invasion of Afghanistan and what it sets as its priorities -- it is now involved in putting in place its next five-year plan, reallocation of its resources -- those decisions will be made by next February, so what is at stake here is how they read us, how we read them. Very important reading on both sides.

MR. PETERSON: Mr. Ambassador, we are told that the Iran-Iraq war may result in a breakdown of both countries' ability to export oil for as much as a few years. This would result in over 4 million barrels less oil than just prior to the war, which was already 3 million barrels down due to the Iranian revolution.

For several months the world can draw upon its excess stocks, but beyond this does this not mean that one of the worst-case oil supply situations that some of us have dreaded may be upon us? Now, since whatever we do can't increase the supply of oil, or anything like this over the next few years, is this Administration ready to ask Americans to significantly reduce their consumption of oil as, for example, with a major gasoline tax closer

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to what all of our major allies have instituted? If not this, what are you prepared to do to reduce our vulnerability and to provide for this most unfortunate development?

Now, Sol, even playing the role of a provocative Economic Club questioner, which I realize is a redundancy, even I wouldn't suggest this kind of political medicine before next Tuesday.

(Laughter.)

MR. PETERSON: But after next Tuesday, are we at the point where the political and economic requirements, require a closer conversion between rhetoric and reality on reducing oil demands?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: Pete, I'm flattered that you asked me that question. I'm deeply touched.

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: But I am not the guy to whom you ought to be talking about that. I think the distinguished Secretary of State would probably love to have a chance to deal with it. I can't give you any more of an authoritative answer than I did when we talked about it last time.

MR. PETERSON: I'd be delighted to hear from the Secretary of State.

MR. PRATT: I'm going to save the Secretary of State on that one. We've come to the end of our time --

(Laughter and applause.)

MR. PRATT: -- if we're going to make our schedule to see what some other people have to say about these questions. Let me first, speaking for all of you, thank Robert Roosa and Pete Peterson again for their efforts in making this a more interesting evening.

(Applause.)

(This meeting concluded at 9:24 p.m.)

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SECRETARY OF STATE

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REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK
OCTOBER 23, 1980

THANK YOU FOR THAT INTRODUCTION.

TONIGHT YOU WILL HAVE THE PLEASURE OF HEARING TWO SPEECHES AND THEN THE PRESIDENT IN HIS DEBATE WITH GOVERNOR REAGAN. SHOULD YOU PERCEIVE ANY SLIGHT VARIANCE IN WHAT WE AND THE PRESIDENT SAY -- AND I TRUST YOU WILL NOT -- LET ME REMIND YOU OF WHAT HARRY TRUMAN ONCE SAID, WHEN ASKED IF HE SUPPORTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ON SOME ISSUE, HE REPLIED THAT, "THE STATE DEPARTMENT DOESN'T HAVE A POLICY UNLESS I SUPPORT IT..."

ANY OCCASION WITH MORE THAN ONE SPEAKER REMINDS ME OF THE SKILLFUL REMARKS OF A LOCAL COUNTY CHAIRMAN WHO HAD TO INTRODUCE TWO CANDIDATES FOR SENATE IN A RACE THAT THREATENED TO TEAR HIS LOCAL PARTY APART. THE COUNTY CHAIRMAN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE FIRST SPEAKER OF THE EVENING WAS A MAN OF EXTRAORDINARY INTELLIGENCE ... A MAN WHO WAS AS MUCH A STATESMAN AS A POLITICIAN ... A MAN WHO WOULD MAKE A TREMENDOUS SENATOR AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR STATE. THEN, TURNING TO THE RIVALS SEATED BEHIND HIM, HE SAID: "AND NOW, WHICH OF YOU GENTLEMEN WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK FIRST?"

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IT IS A SPECIAL PLEASURE TO SHARE THIS PLATFORM
WITH A UNIQUELY GIFTED AMERICAN DIPLOMAT, SOL LINOWITZ.

IN THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ
TOOK ON AN ASSIGNMENT OF VAST COMPLEXITY AND GUARANTEED
CONTROVERSY. HE SUCCEEDED.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE ISSUES HE MUST ADDRESS ARE
STILL HARDER ... THE STAKES STILL HIGHER. AND I BELIEVE
HE WILL SUCCEED AGAIN.

TONIGHT I WILL MAKE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT
OUR BROAD INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ
WILL DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

THAT IS OUR DIVISION OF LABOR HERE TONIGHT. IT IS
NOT A DISTINCTION OF ISSUES. THESE TOPICS -- OUR INTERESTS
AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE -- ARE INSEPARABLE.

LET ME BEGIN WITH A PARTIAL LISTING OF MIDDLE EAST
CHALLENGES DURING THE YEARS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

-- A PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAS BEEN AGREED,
AND A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEXT STAGE IS IN PLACE. BUT THE
TASK OF BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
ALL OF HER NEIGHBORS LIES AHEAD.

-- TODAY LEBANON IS CAUGHT UP IN A WEB OF VIOLENCE,
STRUGGLING TO ESCAPE THE RAVAGES OF CIVIL WAR.

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-- IN IRAN, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL UPHEAVAL HAS CREATED A STARK NEW REALITY WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS -- AND AN AFFRONT TO LAW AND DECENCY IN THE CAPTIVITY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS. WE ARE PURSUING EVERY AVENUE TO ACHIEVE THEIR RELEASE. WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL THEY ARE HOME.

-- HOSTILITIES ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH YEMEN HAVE THREATENED THE STABILITY OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. THEY HIGHLIGHT THE POTENTIAL FOR MISCHIEF OF A SOVIET CLIENT STATE IN A VITAL PLACE.

-- AND LAST MONTH IRAQ AND IRAN WENT TO WAR -- A CLASSIC CASE OF A LOCAL CONFLICT HARBORING DANGER FOR NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THIS BRIEF SURVEY UNDERSCORES FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.

ONE IS THAT THE REGION IS A MOSAIC OF MANY PEOPLES, WITH RIVALRIES REACHING BACK TO ANTIQUITY.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST LONG PREDATE OUR OWN CREATION AS A NATION. INDEED, SOME STRUGGLES -- INCLUDING THAT BETWEEN ARABS AND PERSIANS, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE TO FIND A SECURE EXISTENCE -- PREDATE THE BEGINNING OF MODERN WESTERN CIVILIZATION.

ANOTHER REALITY IS THAT THOSE ANCIENT ANIMOSITIES NOW EXIST IN THE CONTEXT OF RAPID AND PROFOUND CHANGE.

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THE REGION HOLDS SOME OF THE RICHEST NATIONS OF THE WORLD, AND SOME OF THE POOREST; SOME ADAPTIVE CULTURES, AND SOME DEEPLY TRADITIONAL. THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION INEVITABLY STRAINS THE SOCIAL ORDER. OFTEN THE RESULT IS INSTABILITY AND TURMOIL.

SO WE HAVE TWO SETS OF INFLUENCES -- ANCIENT TENSIONS AND NEW FERMENT -- BOTH CONTENDING FOR DISORDER.

THESE INFLUENCES ARE FACTS. WE CAN NEITHER IGNORE THEM NOR WISH THEM AWAY. RATHER WE MUST TAKE THEM FULLY INTO ACCOUNT AS WE DESIGN OUR POLICIES AND CARRY THEM OUT.

WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, LET US EXAMINE THE NATURE OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

FIRST, WE WANT TO SEE LOCAL DISPUTES IN THE REGION CONFINED, TO AVOID WIDER THREATS TO PEACE.

THE REGION'S TANGLE OF INTERNAL TENSIONS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE VULNERABLE TO OUTSIDE POWERS SEEKING TO EXPLOIT LOCAL DISPUTES. THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS THAT MAKE THE REGION A CHALLENGE TO PEACEMAKERS MAKE IT A MAGNET FOR TROUBLEMAKERS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS A TRADITION OF AMBITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NOW ITS EFFORT TO CRUSH A SOVEREIGN NEIGHBOR, AFGHANISTAN, HAS ADDED A GRAVE NEW DIMENSION.

FACING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR BEST COURSE IS TO WORK TIRELESSLY FOR PEACE -- AND STEADILY TO BUILD OUR STRENGTH.

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WE WILL PLAY WHATEVER ROLE WE CAN TO RESOLVE LOCAL CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY. THUS WE HAVE REMAINED IMPARTIAL IN THE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE UNITED NATIONS AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE EFFORTS TO END THE FIGHTING.

BUT THERE MUST BE NO MISTAKE ON ANOTHER COUNT: WE ARE PREPARED TO DO ALL THAT IS NECESSARY, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS OF SIMILAR PURPOSE, TO ASSURE THAT THIS CONFLICT DOES NOT DISRUPT THE FLOW OF PETROLEUM FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AND THEREBY RUPTURE ECONOMIES ALL OVER THE WORLD.

A SECOND OVERRIDING AMERICAN INTEREST IS IN THE SECURITY THE STRENGTH, AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO ISRAEL IS IRREVOCABLE. IT HAS BEEN SUSTAINED AND INTENSIFIED BY PRESIDENT CARTER.

LET ME EXPRESS THAT COMMITMENT IN A PERSONAL WAY.

WITH SO MANY AMERICANS, I HAVE FOUND INSPIRATION IN THE VISION, THE ENERGY, THE BOUNDLESS COURAGE OF THE PEOPLE WHO ENDURED THE POGROMS ... WHO SUFFERED THE DARKEST EPISODES IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE IN THE HOLOCAUST ... WHO THEN CAME TO FOUND A NATION AND MAKE IT PROSPER.

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I RECALL THE SENSE OF AWE AND THE SENSE OF HISTORY I FELT IN 1971, IN THE PRESENCE OF DAVID BEN GURION ON HIS KIBBUTZ.

I REMEMBER VIVIDLY MY CONVERSATIONS IN JERUSALEM WITH PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS.

I REMEMBER THEN GOING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESSING ON SOVIET LEADERS THE CASE FOR FREE EMIGRATION.

AND I RECALL, IN 1975, JOINING IN THE SENATE EFFORT THAT EFFECTIVELY PUT A STOP TO THE SO-CALLED "REASSESSMENT" OF OUR POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY HALF A DECADE AGO.

A COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL HAS BEEN A PART OF MY PUBLIC LIFE FOR THIRTY-FIVE YEARS.

AND IT IS FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE THAT I SAY: AMERICA HAS A PRESIDENT DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY AND THE PROSPERITY OF ISRAEL.

THAT IS NOT ONLY MY OPINION. IT IS SOMETHING I KNOW TO BE TRUE.

I KNOW IT IN THE SUREST POSSIBLE WAY -- NOT BECAUSE I HAVE HEARD IT PLEDGED, BUT BECAUSE I HAVE SEEN IT HAPPEN, TIME AND TIME AGAIN, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER I BECAME SECRETARY OF STATE.

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AS A SENATOR, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEE, I SAW PRESIDENT CARTER SEEK FROM THE CONGRESS OVER \$10 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL. IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS, WE HAVE PROVIDED ALMOST HALF OF THE AMERICAN AID ISRAEL HAS RECEIVED IN ALL OF HER 32 YEARS.

I SAW AN ADMINISTRATION INSIST THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE THE MOST ADVANCED AND EFFECTIVE DEFENSES WE COULD SUPPLY -- INCLUDING MODERN SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, THE M-60 TANK, AND THE F-15 AND F-16 AIRCRAFT.

AND I WAS THERE WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT -- A MISSION THAT MANY THOUGHT WAS FAR TOO RISKY ... FAR TOO DIFFICULT.

YET WE SAW HIM DEVOTE HIMSELF -- DAY AFTER DAY -- TO THE PAINSTAKING SEARCH FOR PEACE. AT CAMP DAVID WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, HE LABORED TO HAMMER OUT AN AGREEMENT ONCE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.

AS A RESULT THERE IS A FIRST PEACE -- A TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THAT TREATY MEANS THAT ISRAEL, TODAY, KNOWS MORE REAL SECURITY THAN EVER BEFORE.

AS MOSHE DAYAN HAS SAID, PRESIDENT CARTER "HAS DONE MORE AND GONE FARTHER TO BRING PEACE THAN ANY OTHER PRESIDENT". AND THAT MAY BE THE CLEAREST DEMONSTRATION OF ALL OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT.

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WE INTEND TO HELP MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S STRENGTH. WE INTEND, AS SOL WILL DISCUSS IN A FEW MINUTES, TO PERSEVERE IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, TO SEEK A BROADER PEACE THAT WILL PROVIDE A GREATER MEASURE OF LONG-TERM SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND FOR HER ARAB NEIGHBORS. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO STOP THE ABUSE OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES -- FROM UNESCO TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITSELF -- AS FORUMS FOR UNJUSTIFIED ATTACKS UPON ISRAEL.

ALL THE WORLD MUST KNOW OUR POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES.

-- WE WILL VETO ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UPON ISRAEL.

-- WE WILL VETO ANY CHANGE IN RESOLUTION 242.

ALL AVAILABLE MEANS WE WILL REJECT ANY EFFORT TO WEAKEN THE UNITED NATIONS; AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, SUCH ACTION WOULD RAISE THE GRAVEST DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITSELF AND OUR OWN PARTICIPATION IN IT.

-- AND I PLEDGE HERE TODAY, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER, THAT WHENEVER, IN THE FUTURE, THE UNITED NATIONS IS MISUSED AND ABUSED ON ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES, WITH MALICIOUS, UNFAIR OR ONE-SIDED RESOLUTIONS, WE WILL OPPOSE THEM AND, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, VETO THEM.

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OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS FOUNDED MOST OF ALL ON
THIS TRUTH: ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS A MATTER OF AMERICA'S
NATIONAL INTEREST.

WE KNOW THAT NO GREAT POWER CAN LONG RETAIN GREATNESS IF IT DEALS LOOSELY WITH ITS CLOSEST FRIENDS. AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS ESSENTIAL TO US BECAUSE IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE -- FOR ISRAEL MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT AGREEMENTS MADE WILL BE KEPT.

SUCH A PEACE, IN TURN, IS CENTRAL TO ALL OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND MANY BEYOND. SO THERE IS THE MOST DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL'S STRENGTH AND OUR ABILITY TO PURSUE OUR MOST BASIC INTERESTS.

THIRP,, WE ALSO HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN SOUND
RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB WORLD.

THE ARAB NATIONS INCLUDE MORE THAN 150 MILLION PEOPLE. THEY LIVE ALONG THE SHORES OF CRUCIAL WATERWAYS. -- THE STRAIT OF GILBRALTAR, THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, THE SUEZ CANAL, THE RED SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. WE HAVE LONG SHARED AND SUPPORTED THEIR ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE AND PROGRESS.

WE HAVE AN ABIDING INTEREST IN ASSURING THAT THE
BALANCE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE GULF REGION AND
THE INDIAN OCEAN DOES NOT TURN AGAINST THE WEST.

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THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES
TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THAT AREA WILL DEPEND GREATLY
ON THE QUALITY OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ARAB STATES
IN THE REGION.

THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARAB STATES SHARE OUR INTEREST IN THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. THEY SHARE OUR DESIRE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THUS FAR THE UNITED STATES AND MOST OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERED ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE KIND OF RELATIONS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH ALLOW US TO DISCUSS THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF COMMON PURPOSE RATHER THAN IN ONE OF HOSTILITY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS UNABLE TO ACHIEVE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD IS AN AGREEMENT WHICH CANNOT ENDURE.

IN RECENT YEARS THE ENERGY ISSUE HAS MADE AMERICANS MORE SENSITIVE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ARAB COUNTRIES. BUT EVEN IF THAT ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED OVERNIGHT -- AND IT CANNOT BE -- THE QUALITY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WOULD STILL BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO US, TO THEM, AND TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

* * *

[illegible]

THIS EXPLAINS WHY NO PRUDENT MIDDLE EAST POLICY CAN BE PROCLAIMED IN A SINGLE RINGING PHRASE -- BUT MUST ATTEND TO A RANGE OF CHALLENGES.

WE MUST WORK TO HELP OUR FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
BUILD THEIR STRENGTH -- IN WAYS THAT DO NOT THREATEN
OTHER FRIENDS.

WE MUST REFLECT THE CONCERNS OF OTHER NATIONS WITH
SIMILAR INTERESTS IN THE REGION -- INCLUDING OUR EUROPEAN
AND ASIAN ALLIES -- BUT ALWAYS RECOGNIZING THAT THE
AMERICAN ROLE IS UNIQUE AND THAT WE HAVE A PARTICULAR
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADERSHIP.



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AND ABOVE ALL, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SUSTAIN, AS THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR POLICY, THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. FOR IT IS THIS ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY WHICH MOST CLEARLY SERVES EVERY ONE OF OUR INTERESTS.

THE SUREST TEST OF OUR STRATEGY IS HOW IT SERVES OUR INTERESTS IN TIMES OF RISING UNCERTAINTY -- SUCH AS THE PRESENT.

THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ DEEPLY CONCERNS US. BUT IMAGINE HOW MUCH GREATER THE PERIL WOULD BE IF THERE WERE NO TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

CLEARLY WHEN PROGRESS IS BEING MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING AGREEMENT, ISRAEL ENJOYS GREATER SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, SUCH PROGRESS ENHANCES OUR ABILITY TO BUILD OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER KEY STATES IN THE REGION AND REDUCES THE PRESSURE ON THEM TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR SUPPORT. WITH EACH PRACTICAL STEP TOWARD PEACE MODERATE FORCES ARE STRENGTHENED, THE MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE GROWS, AND OUR VITAL INTERESTS REINFORCE EACH OTHER MORE.

* * *

AT THE BEGINNING OF MY REMARKS I LISTED SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY AND TURMOIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE REGION FULLY REFLECTS WHITEHEAD'S PHRASE: "IT IS THE BUSINESS OF THE FUTURE TO BE DANGEROUS."

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BUT THESE ARE ALSO TIMES OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE REGION.

THAT IS TRUE IN MAJOR PART BECAUSE OF THE COURAGE OF THREE NATIONAL LEADERS -- PRESIDENT SADAT, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, AND PRESIDENT CARTER -- AND THE HOPEFUL NEW REALITY THEY HAVE CREATED.

OUR TASK FOR THE FUTURE IS CLEAR. WE MUST RESIST IMPATIENCE. WE MUST NOT GIVE WAY TO THE LURE OF SIMPLE ANSWERS -- TO THOSE WHO THINK SLOGANS ARE SOLUTIONS.


WE MUST HOLD TO THE COURSE WE ARE ON.

AS WE DO, WE WILL HELP DEFINE THE FATE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR ROLE THERE, AND THE WELL-BEING OF MUCH OF THE WORLD -- FOR THE REST OF THIS CENTURY AND BEYOND.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 28, 1980
No. 303A



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
and
AMBASSADOR SOL M. LINOWITZ

at

THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK
Grand Ballroom, New York Hilton
New York

MR. EDMUND T. PRATT, JR.: Now we come to the questions and, in our normal fashion, the questioners will alternate questions and each questioner will have some questions for each of our speakers. I'll ask the first question to be asked by Robert Roosa.

MR. ROBERT V. ROOSA: I'm delighted to have this opportunity as a good Democrat in sharing in the non-partisan presentation of views that we have just heard.

(Laughter and applause.)

MR. ROOSA: I would remind you that as we appraise every issue that's been discussed here tonight, there is going to be a continuity, as there was a continuity, from the last Administration to this one. I think that at least in recognizing that most of these developments require a step-by-step process, it is important also to recognize that at times steps may be backward rather than forward.

I think the current hostilities between Iraq and Iran raise that kind of possibility again. And, although we may return to this with further questions, the first one, and a very specific one, Mr. Secretary, is: In the present circumstances, is it possible for us, the United States, to fulfill whatever commitments we may have for the release of the spare parts to Iran without, at the same time, triggering an explosive delivery of military supplies

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including aircraft, to Iraq, by France, the U.S.S.R., or others?

Don't we have in this new tinder box a potential for exploding what has, step-by-step, been progress in associating many of our allies and, in a limited degree, in terms of neutralizing some of their influence on the Soviet Union in the developments that we've been encouraging and that Ambassador Linowitz has been so nobly furthering?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Like all questioners, you make assumptions designed to make your question valid. And one of the assumptions in your question is that somehow the hostage crisis, which predated by many months the Iraq-Iran war, is a determining influence in the Iraq-Iran war.

Let's look at that a moment. Had it not been for the hostage crisis, Iran would not now be subject to trade sanctions invoked by us and our allies which puts Iran at a disadvantage in this war with Iraq. So that if a resolution of the hostage crisis were to result in a lifting of those trade sanctions, that action would be not unneutral with respect to Iraq but, rather, neutral with respect to Iran. So I think to try to tangle the two --

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: -- creates obvious difficulties. Iraq decided to launch its attack upon Iran in full knowledge that we were faced with a hostage crisis in Iran; but, with unsuitable lack of delicacy with respect to our problem, it did not seek our advice as to the timing of its attack nor consider our interests in doing so. And so I think that the two problems are separable, and hopefully can be resolved without impacting upon each other.

On the question of spare parts, let me put that in context. When the Iranians seized our hostages, we took several actions. We froze their assets in banks and other institutions; we withheld certain properties, including spare parts, which had been bought and paid for but not yet delivered to Iran; we persuaded our allies to impose sanctions upon Iran; and we would assume that at such time as we enter into negotiations with Iran, a posture we are not yet in, that all of these actions we took will be on the table as well as the action they took.

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I would think that in order to persuade them to undo the action they took, they might reasonably be expected to ask us to undo the actions we took in retaliation. To expect anything else is to ignore all we've learned about Iranian reactions over the last 11 months. I think we've got to take that into account.

With respect to the spare parts, one further point. Iraq has a \$2 billion arms supply agreement with the Soviet Union, and made it clear from the outset that whatever was in the pipeline would be delivered. These spare parts that Iran purchased from us and paid for, in a sense, are in the pipeline, undelivered only because of the hostage crisis. One could also make the argument that if the hostage crisis had not intervened to disrupt Iran's normal trading relationships with her own trading partners, including ourselves, the attack by Iraq might not have taken place. So you sort it out for us.

(Laughter.)

MR. PETER G. PETERSON: Mr. Ambassador, I'm happy to second Secretary Muskie's notion that you're a very gifted negotiator. I also assume, Sol, that you don't really need this job. Why, then, does the Administration appear to discourage a European initiative in trying to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement, particularly in view of the fact that our own diplomacy may be understandably constrained by domestic political factors?

If we persist in leaving Europe out of Mideast diplomacy, yet do not produce a Palestinian solution, won't we invite serious divisions with our Western allies, particularly in view of their much greater dependence on Persian Gulf oil; and the view that some have expressed to me that we may be pursuing a course of action that does not, and some would say cannot, come to grips with the really hard questions?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: Pete, the first point I would make is that our European allies have not put forward an alternative route toward the settlement of the Palestinian question in their declaration which they issued. What they did was issue a pronouncement which undertook to say that they thought at some point the PLO would have to be associated with the negotiations, and they called for self-determination which has become a code word in Israel for an independent Palestinian State. But at no point do they indicate how they hope to get from here to there.

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They have very carefully said that they support the Camp David process and don't want to do anything which will cause us difficulty. Since we have the only viable process, since ours is, as I said before, the only game in town, it is of concern to us that nothing be done which would suggest to the Palestinians, whom we are hoping to attract into the negotiation, that if they wait awhile, something better may be coming down the pike.

At this moment we have no reasonable to believe that there will be formulated an alternative approach more promising, more favorable to the Palestinians, than the Camp David process. So while we are not saying that we are opposed to the Europeans asserting their interests, and giving us the benefit of their judgment and advice, we are pleading with them not to do anything which will derail or even destroy the only ongoing peace process which promises the Palestinians a better way of life.

MR. ROOSA: Mr. Ambassador, I think just to follow a little further one of the other points you had made, stressing that there is now a spirit on which much more depends than any individual specifics, I noticed at least a report recently that President Sadat said he now stands ready to commit his armed forces to the defense of Arab and Moslem interests virtually anywhere in the world.

Does that raise any question about the present state of the spirit that you described? Is any weakening apparent there? Does it foreshadow for the time being any hardening of his attitude toward Israel, given the commitment he's apparently made to support the Arab or Moslem cause broadly defined?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: I haven't seen that particular quotation from President Sadat. Let me tell you about President Sadat. He is a wonderful man and he makes a lot of statements. He is genuinely concerned about the problems of the Middle East, and he not only says what he thinks, he does what he thinks.

There's not the slightest question in my mind about his own commitment, full commitment, to these negotiations. He believes that this is the only process that can bring us to the resolution of the Palestinian problem in a way that he thinks will avoid any future hostilities on that score in the future.

He says that he wants to do everything he can to assure that Israel is reassured about its own security in reaching such an agreement, and he even says that he believes his Arab brethren, who did not

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join with him in Camp David, had all made a mistake. He believes that some day they will come to recognize that this course is the best course for all of us.

Having said that, the quotation you just read, does seem somewhat at variance; but I think upon further probing we would find that nothing he would have said, in my judgment, would have intended to be anything less than a total commitment to Camp David, and he would probably explain it if we gave him the chance.

MR. PETERSON: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to press you a bit on a point that Ambassador Linowitz touched upon. I find some people wondering whether we can ever come to grips with the hard issues of Palestine and Jerusalem so long as we refuse to deal with the only spokesman that I would think most Palestinians acknowledge: the PLO.

Can we expect the PLO to give up their stated intention to destroy Israel so long as the Israelis offer no promise of self-determination at the end of the negotiation?

Isn't the important point to get the parties together and to see if they can finally agree? And, finally, put another way: Was it appropriate for the United States Government to agree that we would not talk to the PLO? Should we, as a leading sovereign power, have committed ourselves not to talk to anyone that we choose?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me make this point first: That we are the only major power today to which both sides will talk, the Arabs and the Israelis. This is a point that my predecessor, Henry Kissinger, made very persuasively to those of us in the Senate over and over again.

In order to maintain our credibility with respect to both of those audiences we have to display some sensitivity to the interests of both. It's easy to say, why shouldn't Israel move first to speak to the PLO. Well, Israel is interested in speaking to some Palestinians. As a matter of fact, that Camp David process invites Palestinians to become part of it. The PLO hasn't indicated any interest in talking to any Israelis.

So you're faced with that age-old dilemma with getting together on a talking, negotiating basis, two sides, who up to this point have not found a face-saving way to do it. So the whole

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theory of the Camp David process -- as Sol has explained it much better than I, having been closer to it -- is that we hope that this process, in its evolution toward a definition of the autonomy phase of the transition, will demonstrate to the Palestinians that they can in terms of their own interests as they perceive them move from the rigid posture they have taken with respect to the survival of Israel toward a more flexible one, and that eventually there will be Palestinian participation in the process.

But since the process itself is now under concentrated attack from the PLO and from other even more radical Arab groups, I think the important thing to try to sustain at the moment is the viability of the process, prove that it will work by settling some of these very difficult half dozen issues which Sol described, and eventually engage the interest of the PLO or whatever other organization may represent the Palestinians, or persuade the PLO to abandon what some of them will say is no longer their objective: the destruction of Israel.

So there's a rigidity to both sides on that question, Pete, and how you break through it is part of the challenge. And we all recognize that we must break through it at some point.

Another point I would make, in this Middle East crisis with respect to the Camp David talks, is that there is a time urgency about it, because attitudes tend to get frozen if they are not moving and changing. And one of Sol's real challenges, and I think he's shown remarkable ingenuity in the approach that he's taken, is to keep the thing moving.

For example, he's got them moving now around a document that one side calls a memorandum of understanding, that Sol chooses to call, out of his corporate experience, a heads of agreement which is a technique to try to get the parties to agree on certain principles; then, having agreed on the principles, to flesh them out. In other words, it's a kind of an evolutionary process in an attempt to bring people together and break through some of the hard-shelled rigidity that separate them.

But you've touched on a very important problem, and somehow the Palestinians and the Israelis who, in the last analysis, must find a way to live together; they've got to find a way to break through each other's rigidity.

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MR. ROOSA: Mr. Secretary, let's move just a little further across the globe to Afghanistan. Pete asked Sol about the way in which we develop our joint relations with our allies in coping with the particular problems of the Israeli development.

I would like to put the same kind of question with respect to the sort of stalemate that seems to have developed with respect to Afghanistan, and I wonder whether there, there isn't a scope for not only a fuller sharing of views with our allies and perhaps even learning something from them, but even for finding ways to rely on them to take a considerable share of the leading role in trying to cope with the implications that Afghanistan has created for the entire Western world.

I think we are a bit fragmented. I think there has been some concern that we develop our policies alone and then expect conformity. I wonder how you see that prospect now.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, I don't think there is the disarray -- as a matter of fact, I haven't even read or heard that word used for quite some time as a description of our relations with our allies, vis-a-vis Afghanistan. So let me tick through what our shared interests and policies are at this point.

Number one, they have never yet disagreed with our perception of the strategic implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; never once did they agree with it. Disagreement or differences of opinion -- there's a difference between those two -- differences of opinion have arisen as to what a viable and necessary policy is with respect to it.

Now, on the military side there has been no disagreement. Number one, in response to President Carter's initiative, the alliance has responded to his standard of 3% real growth in defense expenditure beyond inflation designed with the objectives of modernization, improved readiness, and modernization particularly of our Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe.

Beyond that, they have agreed in principle to the notion that if American forces have to be redeployed outside NATO territory, that they would pick up the load to fill in behind us in the defense of Europe. So in the military side, there has been very good support and very good agreement. Some of the weaker economies -- and I'm not going to mention countries -- are finding it difficult to meet the 3% standard, but the larger ones have; and so we

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have, for the first time in years, got a positive, ongoing, and, I think, effective defense policy with respect to NATO.

Outside the territory of NATO and including NATO, in addition, the Allies have moved. The Federal Republic has taken the leadership in mobilizing the economic resources to shore up Turkey as the southeastern flank of NATO. Turkey, as you know, has had great political instability, a reign of terrorism, and, in addition to that, has found its own defense posture deteriorating, its economy particularly. And I think the Alliance, with the leadership of Chancellor Schmidt and the German Republic, has rallied behind the effort to stabilize Turkey's economy and to push for and to support the reintegration of Greece. Those things have been done with the support of our allies.

With respect to the transfer of technology, we have also had the support of the Alliance, with some fractionation of it at the edges. But I think with respect to COCOM which deals with military-related technology, there have been no exceptions requested by any of our NATO friends since last December, and I don't think there's any indication of a departure from that. We're trying to persuade the Alliance to go beyond that. With respect to technology, that has the effect of strengthening the Soviet economy as a whole, to get the advantage of higher technology; and that's been, I think, an effective policy.

The grain policy has been most effective, a very targeted policy, initiated last year because the Soviets last year had a short crop: 170 million metric tons as against a target of 230; and so as a result, the Soviet Union has had to dip into its grain reserves, has had to cut back on its meat production, and its promises to its consumers, and has not been able to make up the shortfall created by our denial of 17 million metric tons. It has paid a cost and the reduction in meat reached, I think, as much as 10% in recent months.

Then on top of all that, after initially optimistic estimates of the Soviet crop this year of about 230 million metric tons, the most optimistic estimates now with a large part of the crop in, is that it won't go above 180. So, again, the Soviets face this this very considerable cost.

Now, what's the importance of this? People to me, well, they haven't withdrawn the troops from Afghanistan. That's true. But they have paid a price, a price in excess of what they

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For several months the world can draw upon its excess stocks, but beyond this does this not mean that one of the worst-case oil supply situations that some of us have dreaded may be upon us? Now, since whatever we do can't increase the supply of oil, or anything like this over the next few years, is this Administration ready to ask Americans to significantly reduce their consumption of oil as, for example, with a major gasoline tax closer

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to what all of our major allies have instituted? If not this, what are you prepared to do to reduce our vulnerability and to provide for this most unfortunate development?

Now, Sol, even playing the role of a provocative Economic Club questioner, which I realize is a redundancy, even I wouldn't suggest this kind of political medicine before next Tuesday.

(Laughter.)

MR. PETERSON: But after next Tuesday, are we at the point where the political and economic requirements, require a closer conversion between rhetoric and reality on reducing oil demands?

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: Pete, I'm flattered that you asked me that question. I'm deeply touched.

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ: But I am not the guy to whom you ought to be talking about that. I think the distinguished Secretary of State would probably love to have a chance to deal with it. I can't give you any more of an authoritative answer than I did when we talked about it last time.

MR. PETERSON: I'd be delighted to hear from the Secretary of State.

MR. PRATT: I'm going to save the Secretary of State on that one. We've come to the end of our time --

(Laughter and applause.)

MR. PRATT: -- if we're going to make our schedule to see what some other people have to say about these questions. Let me first, speaking for all of you, thank Robert Roosa and Pete Peterson again for their efforts in making this a more interesting evening.

(Applause.)

(This meeting concluded at 9:24 p.m.)

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 29, 1980
No. 316



QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
WITH RADIO STATION WOR
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC 20520
October 29, 1980

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, what is the latest word on the hostages? Any late news?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. There is no late news. The Majlis, or Iranian Parliament, met again today -- I say today, it's nine hours ahead of us -- without announcing a decision. The latest information is they expect to have an open session tomorrow. We'll have to wait and see what they do in their open session. That may be the first news we get with respect to the terms they may be considering, the terms which they may propose.

MS. HENRY: Do you have any guess, yourself, sir, when the hostages will be returned?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. I have no guess. I think it's not useful to try to speculate what these unpredictable people will do.

MS. HENRY: Do you even have any outside limits, say, by Christmas, by the first of the year?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't know of any way to set an outside limit.

MS. HENRY: The Iranian President, when he was in the country not long ago, said that we had acceded to all of their demands. Have we acceded to their demands?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They haven't presented any to us yet. It's a little difficult to accede to demands that haven't been presented to us.

MS. HENRY: Did it surprise you when he said that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. We hear all sorts of statements from leaders in Iran. We have a number of channels through which we can receive information as to what is going on in Iran, what is being said in Iran. We can get messages to Iranian leaders through these channels, usually a number of channels through which we can receive information as to what is going on in Iran, what is being said in Iran. We can get messages to Iranian leaders through these channels, usually

For further information contact:

indirect and not directly attributable to us unless they be viewed with suspicion as our agents. So that most of the information we get is of that indirect source. Some of the sources are very good, some of the channels are people who know Iran and who are well regarded in Iran.

So there are ways for us to learn what is going on. But, not unlike politicians in other countries, public statements aren't always accurate reflections of what may be in the minds of those who are speaking, nor what they may be saying privately, so one must always discount public statements, or be prepared to. When they are ready to send us an official statement, they know that there are ways of doing so. In my letter to the Prime Minister shortly after his selection I indicated a willingness to communicate with him directly or indirectly.

So we get all sorts of messages and statements that we seek to evaluate and we undertake to do so without exaggerating their significance, trying to get at the hard facts, and trying to move slowly to that point where the Iranians are ready to make a decision to which we can respond.

MS. HENRY: Well, the Iranian President also said at the same time that the United States had met their demands of an apology in practice and all we needed to do was to put it on paper. Have we, in fact, met their demand of apology, and will we put it on paper?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Whether or not they have regarded statements that we have made publicly here, or in the letter which I addressed to the Prime Minister, as some form of acknowledgment of their grievances, which they choose to regard as an apology, I have no way of knowing.

We have not consciously made an apology. But whether they have accepted -- in my letter, for example, I made the statements that each side had its perceived grievances against the other. How they regard that statement, I have no way of knowing.

MR. HENRY: Would you put an apology on paper, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. The President has made that very clear.

MR. EVANS: Secretary of State Muskie, to clarify for people not in Washington -- to clarify for the laymen -- are there written messages that go through channels, are there specific words that go from us to them?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, messages involve specific words. You would have to clarify your question.

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MR. EVANS: My question is this: Whether it's you or the President of the United States who expresses a thought to be conveyed through channels to the Government of Iran, is it an attitude that is expressed or is it a message in diplomatic words from A to Z -- that is, spelled out on paper -- and then this is conveyed through channels to Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The messages that have been sent directly have been made public in this country, so you have had access to them and, presumably, you know what they say.

MR. EVANS: Are those through channels?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes, through channels. I think my letter was delivered to -- I don't want to identify the channels -- but my letter was delivered and received; and its receipt publicly acknowledged by Mr. Rajai -- who is the Prime Minister -- and read publicly by him. I think he referred, and said he was referring, the letter to the Majlis. There were two Congressional messages, the contents of which were made public in this country. And I can't recall whether they were each read publicly in full -- they may have been -- but, in any case, they were referred to the Majlis.

And then the hostage families, through their representatives, sent a letter to the Majlis, and that was acknowledged publicly and referred to the Majlis. Those are the direct communications which I recall since I have been Secretary of State.

With respect to indirect messages, they have taken the form of suggestions or guidelines to be followed and communicated by interlocutors who have served to convey messages. Those have been carefully phrased, of course.

MR. EVANS: We have no difficulty with channels.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have channels, if that's what you mean.

MR. EVANS: Comfortable channels is what I'm asking.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, yes.

MR. EVANS: Fine.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, we were also told, when the President was in the country, that the latest demands include bringing the radar planes back from Saudi Arabia and removing our warships from the Persian Gulf; those were to be met before the hostages would be returned. As long as the Iranian-Iraqi war is raging, would those be negotiable terms?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: As I said on "Issues and Answers," I read Mr. Rajai's press conference statement, and those points were not made as conditions. They were not described by him as conditions. I interpreted them as being specific concerns of the Iranian Government -- not the second -- I've not heard about removal of any of our Navy from the area.

But with respect to the AWACS, we had previously reassured the Government of Iran through indirect channels that those were purely defensive, sent there for purely defensive purposes. No information acquired by the AWACS' planes in monitoring the skies of Saudi Arabia was sent either to Iraq or Iran, but made available only to the Saudis for the purpose of their self-defense. I said that on "Issues and Answers," and we had said it previously through channels to the Government of Iran.

I have not had any indication that they have been imposed as conditions, but then I don't know what the Majlis is likely to propose for conditions until the Majlis tells us so. We can only speculate.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, there are cynical voices abroad in the land now that are saying that, after the hostages are returned -- particularly if they come back before election day -- that then we will find out what deal was made to get them back. Can you tell us now that any other things might have been discussed with the Iranians, such as rearming them, or such as helping them regain lost territory to Iraq, that might not have been made public up until now?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: As I have already said, we have not been in that kind of contact with the Iranians. We haven't been talking about any terms because they haven't presented any to us, as they've made clear. They're debating those terms in the Majlis. Khomeini and others have said that the Majlis will make the decision as to the terms, and the Majlis hasn't at this point communicated anything to us. So, again, we can only speculate.

MS. HENRY: But you could communicate to them through your channels and make an offer without them asking anything from you.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have found it not useful to make offers. The effect of that, and this pre-dates my taking office as Secretary of State, is to increase the possibility of escalating demands on their side. We have been waiting to hear what they have to say and what they have to propose. I said that many times in the last three weeks.

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It's as true today as it has been at any time that I have made that statement in the last two or three weeks.

MS. HENRY: I know that as a people we want our hostages back more than anything. On the other hand, at the beginning of the situation the President repeatedly said he would not negotiate with terrorists for the release of the hostages. Now we, in effect, are waiting for them to present their terms to us which we will then consider and, I suppose, negotiate with them.

Doesn't that, in effect, reward terrorism, and doesn't it set a precedent for the future?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I could suggest that your question implies that we ought to condemn the hostages to life imprisonment. What what we have been waiting for is to deal not with the militants who seized the hostages, but with the government which is being formed by the people of Iran following a revolution. That government has been taking shape and there now is a Parliament representing the people of Iran.

They have a President, elected by the people of Iran. There is a Prime Minister selected in accordance with the process as they've established. So that the instruments of authority and government over Iran as a result of a revolution -- the results of which we have accepted publicly -- are falling into place. And it is with that authority that we have been seeking to establish contact so that we could discuss the release of the hostages and the conditions under which that release would be effected.

I don't know with whom else we could discuss such a problem. If we're not ready to discuss it with the Government of Iran, then the only alternative is for us to sit here on our hands and wait for them, unilaterally, to make a decision to release the hostages. I think we have a responsibility to the hostages, to their families, to our government, to our people, and to the objective of establishing peace and stability in the region, to deal with the governmental institutions which are in the process of being put in place -- and which, to a great extent, have been put in place -- by the people of Iran.

This government is the result of elections by the people of Iran, the elections in which there have been a substantial turn out of the people of Iran. That is something different from dealing with the militants who seized the hostages in the first place.

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MR. EVANS: Could I take you to Afghanistan, Secretary of State Muskie? The Soviet Union's Ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin, how often do you see him? How often have you seen him since the Russians marched into Afghanistan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Both of my meetings with him have been very public. I met him once in Vienna where we spent, I think, three to four hours -- four hours, I think. Once in New York recently in connection with the opening of this year's General Assembly in the United Nations in which we spent another three and a half hours. And, in addition to that, I think there has been an exchange of correspondence consisting of two letters on the part of each of us.

MR. EVANS: With your predecessors over the years, the Russian Ambassador used to be sort of a regular visitor here to the State Department. I was asking not about public meetings, but have you held any private meetings with him?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have met with Mr. Dobrynin in large part as a method of exchanging my correspondence with Mr. Gromyko; at other times to receive messages from Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Dobrynin has been, in effect, the messenger.

MR. EVANS: The hot line, to your knowledge, has that been used at any time since the Russians marched into Afghanistan?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Not since I have been Secretary of State.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, what do you think the chances are that the Iranian-Iraqi conflict could widen into a war which would include the greater powers, the United States and the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: So long as hostilities of this kind continue, there is always the risk of a widening war. I think the immediate explosive risk, or what was perceived as the immediate explosive risk, has stabilized; but it is still there, because as war proceeds, each combatant tends to harden its position with respect to its war aims, the conditions under which it might agree to a cessation of hostilities, and negotiations.

I met with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. Hammadi, in New York. He assured me that their goal was simply to reestablish their jurisdiction over the disputed territory in connection with the Shatt al Arab waterway, which is the heart of the dispute; and that they had no desire for any piece of Iranian territory beyond the disputed territory which, of course, each side claims in part.

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As the war proceeds, and as the cost of war rises for each, the war aims of each side rise, there is always a danger; and, with that, the risk of a prolonged war involving other parties also rises. Khomeini has said just yesterday that Iran, having had this war thrust upon it, intends to continue it until Mr. Hussein is overthrown. So his war aims are quite expansive.

It is in that situation where the two parties find themselves; and, because the war hinges upon the Persian Gulf and the important sea lanes which carry a such large percentage of the world's oil, the risk of its exploding into a wider war is always there.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, realizing that, then -- pray God it doesn't happen -- still there has been a lot of campaign rhetoric about the strength of the United States, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I wonder how you feel, personally, if indeed the United States were drawn into a war, even a limited war now? How would you feel about our strength to go up against the Soviet Union right now?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Our strength is being projected to that area to the extent that we cannot get into a war but to deter a war. That's the objective of military strength from the point of view of this Administration and, I suspect, all Americans. I don't see the prospect for our being involved in this war. I do see ourselves involved in efforts to bring this war to a halt, and to bring it to negotiations, so that the risks of escalation are minimized.

The fact that there are risks of a widening war, as I stated, is not intended to indicate that I see ourselves getting involved.

MS. HENRY: And you wouldn't speculate, then, if indeed the terrible happened and we did become involved in armed conflict, how we stand vis-a-vis the strength of the Soviets?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I would be glad to answer your question, which is in two parts. The first part I want to be very clear because in a campaign an answer to the question as you framed it could be distorted into my raising the possibility of our being involved in this war pitted against the Soviet Union. I don't see that happening. In my meeting with Mr. Gromyko, we each stated our position with respect to this war.

I stated our position, which is one of impartiality and an effort to bring it to an end. Mr. Gromyko stated his policy and his policy was parallel with ours. I phrase it in that way not

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to indicate that this was not an agreement between us, as to what our respective positions would be, it was simply a frank description of our respective positions so that there would be no misunderstanding on the part of either of us as to what our posture was.

That being the very carefully stated position of each side, I think that that is a reflection of an awareness on each side that the risks of a confrontation between us need to be very carefully avoided, and each side is seeking very carefully to avoid it. I don't see any prospect that this is going to escalate to that point. If the war widens at a different level than the super power level, one can imagine horrors but one does not have to discuss them if one does not see them happening.

MS. HENRY: John Anderson said the other night in his answers to the Presidential debate questions, he said that he thought that it was simply not possible to fight a limited nuclear war as, for example, is suggested by the Presidential Directive 59. Once again, a personal opinion from you: Do you think it's possible to fight a limited nuclear war today?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course not, and I don't accept that definition of PD-59. PD-59 is not designed to put in place a plan for limited war; but, rather, to put in place a strategy to deter nuclear war at whatever level we may be attacked, whether with an all-out attack or an attack based upon an adversary's view that a limited nuclear war can be fought.

In my view, any war involving however limited use of nuclear weapons, would escalate almost immediately into an all-out nuclear war. So in order to avoid that possibility, PD-59 is designed to deter the limited use of nuclear weapons, as well as the all-out use of nuclear weapons.

No, it is not possible, in my judgment, or conceivable that a limited nuclear war could be fought.

MR. EVANS: Why is Israel so important to the United States? There's no oil there; it's just a very small piece of real estate.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We've participated in the establishment of the Israeli state as a home for Jews following the holocaust of World War II in which six million of them were destroyed by war. The United Nations was the instrument for creating the State. Having participated in its creation and participated in the assurance of its survival, we still have that commitment to meet. That is the first ground.

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Secondly, Israel, as a democratic state in this area of the world which contains such important resources and which, at the same time, is a source of much political instability, is an important friend in that area, and our security interests coincide to a great extent in that area.

MR. EVANS: But as we support Israel, Secretary of State Muskie, it puts us in the awkward position with the Arab countries. Is this something that calls for superior diplomacy, or would you tell us?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course, it involves superior diplomacy; but I would also point out that the Iraq-Iran war demonstrates that Arab states can disagree with each other as well as with Israel, as they are in this war. So that's no basis, I don't think, for -- I mean, we happen to have a credible voice -- it's sometimes strained -- with both sides in the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

We are engaged, indeed, with both Egypt, the most powerful Arab State in the region, and Israel in an attempt to put together a comprehensive peace involving as many Arab nations in the area which can be persuaded at some point ultimately to join in this peace process. Because we're able to speak to both sides, we were able to be a party to the negotiation which resulted in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

With that kind of influence, and that kind of credibility on both sides of that equation, I think we have a responsibility, given our own interests in the area, as well as the interests of promoting world peace in the area, to use that voice and to use that influence in that constructive way.

I don't think there is any way for us to stay out of that region. To stay out of that region would be to ignore our own interests and ignore our responsibility as the leader of the free world to try to bring peace and stability to the area.

MR. EVANS: Were we terribly upset or surprised when King Hussein of Jordan took the position to assist Iraq? And, also, Mr. Secretary, do we have a concern that some of our military assistance to Jordan possibly can be used against Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We are concerned, whether it be Jordan or any other nation whose policy might have the effect of widening and prolonging the war. We said that to Jordan and we have said it publicly, of course, to all nations in the area. There are, obviously, sympathies in one direction or the other among the Arab States of the Gulf and the

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Islamic States of the region. Libya and Syria, supportive of one side; Jordan, supportive of another side; and some of the other Gulf States with sympathies that they seek to moderate in order not to contribute to a widening or deepening of the war. All nations have sympathies that fall one way or another.

MR. EVANS: The possibility that our war military materiel assistance to Jordan, that it can be used against Iran, how do we handle that concern?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Jordan understands the conditions under which we provide these instruments of war. They're provided in response to her request for American hardware to assist her in her own defense. Israel also understands that there is this restriction in our laws, arising, I might point out, out of the Pakistan-India war of some 15 years ago when American weapons were used by each side, to the consternation and concern of Americans and Members of Congress, so those restrictions apply.

Occasionally they're violated. I'm not going to anticipate that they will be in this instance; but, if they are, that will be brought to Jordan's attention and objected to.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, a couple of more questions about Israel. You called Israel our friend and, indeed, it is. We also are the chief support of Israel. Do you think that the Iranian-Iraqi war now is a plus or a minus for Israel at the moment?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the same question could be put with respect to every nation in the area. It all depends upon how long the war continues, what its ultimate result is, whether a peace is negotiated that leaves both Iran and Iraq intact, and leaves the power balance in the region without significant change.

MS. HENRY: We don't know yet.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We don't know yet and I would expect that, given the nature of the region, the fierce independence of all of them, none of them would like to come under the domination of outside powers -- all of them resist it -- and yet in the present vulnerabilities which they face because of the oil of the region, they understand that they are a target of outside powers, foreign influence, foreign alignment; and so they are in a situation in which they feel their vulnerabilities, in which they seek friends, in which they seek a capability to defend themselves without losing their independence. So it's a very, very sensitive situation for all of them; they understand that.

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They want, above all else, to minimize the possibility of super power intervention or intervention by any outside power; but, at the same time, they look to the outside, not only the United States, but other countries, including countries of Europe, for the weapons with which to protect themselves, the technology with which to protect themselves; and that is an understandable objective for any nation. But what it results in -- with all of these nations seeking to develop, to strengthen, themselves, to protect themselves -- they don't always come down on the same side of any particular controversy or argument or conflict.

MS. HENRY: One more question about Israel. Some people say that after the elections there's really no way to move the peace talks forward without some kind of a tilt toward the Arab world. Would you have a comment on that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think the best example of the fact that it's possible to achieve an agreement between Israel and the Arab world, without that kind of tilt, is the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. I mean, what you have here are ancient rivals, hostilities, with very hard positions on very difficult and fundamental issues; and to seek to resolve them through negotiation. And I submit that only through negotiation is there any hope of resolving them.

It is going to be a time-consuming, frustrating thing; and I don't know of any way through negotiation to tilt in which the parties to the negotiation don't have every opportunity to protect themselves against a tilt. So that what we are going to see if the Camp David process continues -- and it's a tough one to keep alive -- is that both parties --

MS. HENRY: Mr. Secretary, excuse me.

MR. EVANS: Could we change the reel?

MS. HENRY: Change the reel.

QUESTION: Would you like to finish that sentence, Mr. Secretary? You were saying that we see here -- if you don't, we can go on.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to negotiations -- perhaps I can make the point a little bit more clear -- so long as an effort to resolve the differences between Israel and her Arab neighbors is undertaken through negotiations, obviously, each of those countries has demonstrated ability to negotiate in a very hard fashion and to insist upon its own positions and without submitting to the domination of the United States.

The only reason that this process has worked up to now is that the United States has not undertaken to force its position on either or both sides. That we act as an interlocutor, in a sense, undertake to keep the dialogue going. For example, at the request of both sides, Mr. Linowitz, our Middle East Ambassador who is representing the United States in these negotiations, put before the two parties what he called a Heads of Agreement --that's a device from experience as a lawyer and a businessman. A Heads of Agreement is designed to get the parties to agree to certain basic principles, around which they might then flesh out an agreement. They also refer to it as a Memorandum of Understanding.

This has proven to be, or is proving to be, a very constructive way to get the parties to begin to move toward the beginning of an agreement. If he had sought to force them into this procedure, he would not have gotten anywhere, but by describing ways of proceeding, he persuaded them to ask him to put together such a paper. Now they have each come back with their own version of that paper, there are some differences to discuss. There is a framework within which the discussion can proceed. But if he had sought to impose upon one side a Memorandum of Agreement that was tilted toward the other side, he would have gotten nowhere with them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, President Carter seems to have relied for four years on moral suasion, on setting examples, on negotiating diplomatically our differences. During that time we have seen our embassies burned, an Ambassador murdered, hostages taken, and Afghanistan invaded. I wonder if perhaps our "turn the other cheek" policy has provoked attacks because of a perceived weakness -- which, of course, may not be the case -- and I wonder whether or not you, personally, feel that it is time to get tougher with the Soviets.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I don't recognize your description of his policies. With respect to NATO, for example, NATO defense was in a pretty poor state four years ago. Under his leadership, it has done these things: It has committed itself to the most wide-ranging modernization program for NATO forces in Europe in years. The countries have committed themselves to a three percent annual real increase in defense spending, and that has produced that kind of modernization.

When the Afghanistan war came along, he persuaded them to make plans to increase their involvement in NATO defense so that if it be necessary to deploy American forces outside the NATO territory -- in the Persian Gulf area, for example -- they could fill in behind us and sustain the defense of Europe.

Finally, he persuaded them to accept the deployment of the Pershing II Missile as an offset to the Russian SS-20s which the Russians are in the process of deploying. Therefore, NATO defenses, in response to his leadership, are in better shape today than they've been for years, and they are improving. That is hardly a "turn the other cheek" attitude. And it has provoked on the part of the Russians one of the strongest reactions to the decision to deploy the Pershing Missiles in Europe that we have had. Of all the actions we have taken to Afghanistan, that one seems to have provoked the strongest Russian reaction. They pressed and they finally yielded, because as part of that decision, NATO also made another decision -- an offer to the Russians to negotiate a limitation on those theater nuclear weapons with the Russians. The Russians refused that invitation unless NATO first reversed its decision to deploy the Pershing Missiles. We would not give away on that point.

The Russians have finally agreed to begin talks, so talks have begun pointing toward the limitation of those weapons, and the Russians dropped their pre-condition. This is hardly a "turn the other cheek" policy. With respect to Afghanistan --

QUESTION: Let me see if I can rephrase it or put it in a different light so that you will understand what I'm getting at: Barbara Walters asked both candidates and really got an answer from neither candidate in the debate -- whether or not we had learned anything from the hostage situation which would cause us to handle similar situations differently in the future. I'll put the same question to you: Do you, personally, feel that you've learned anything about the way the United States handled the hostage situation which might encourage you to handle a similar situation differently?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: You put the question as though the United States had provoked the hostage situation. In order to make that case, one would have to review American relations since World War II, and find in our handling of those relations a case which would justifiably provoke that kind of action on the part of Iran. That involves a lot of administrations and a lot of history. I'm sure that's not what you were driving at.

The other thing that the seizure of the hostages represents is another instance in the wave of terrorism which has swept over the globe over recent years that did not begin with the seizure of our hostages. There have been diplomatic hostages seized elsewhere. In this hemisphere, in the same time frame, hostages were seized in another country, another embassy, not ours. Our Ambassadors have been killed, but other diplomatic representatives have been killed.

What do we do about it? Well, obviously, we must deal with it on a global scale and at an international level. There is a convention which was the basis for the World Court judgment that Iran had breached international law which protects diplomatic personnel. The nations of the world have recognized for hundreds, if not thousands, of years that there cannot be communication between nations on this planet if our messengers are not protected -- and our messengers are the diplomats of the world.

Iran broke that law. Domestic laws are broken. The fact that there is a law does not mean that there won't be those who, from time to time, break the law. With respect to this incident, the world reacted overwhelmingly in repudiating Iran, including the Islamic Conference, of which it is a member, including the United Nations, including the World Court. And as a result of it, Iran finds itself in a disadvantaged position in this present war, because as the result of its seizure, the European Community, the NATO Allies, joined with us in imposing trade sanctions on Iran. This involves not only military supplies, but it involves all sorts of things that countries need to import. There are no self-sufficient countries, including the United States.

Iran is paying a penalty now in this war, and is being disadvantaged in this war because of the seizure of the hostages which the Government of Iran condoned after the act took place at the hands of militants not representing the government.

We may need to do something more. There are those who think that the international convention should be strengthened in some way. One idea that has been suggested is that perhaps there ought to be automatic discontinuance of diplomatic relations

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with nations which condone this sort of thing. That's an idea that surely needs some examination and analysis; but whether or not there is some way of writing into international law sanctions against nations which condone the seizure of other nations' diplomats is an idea that is worth looking at.

I noted that neither candidate answered that question yesterday too, and I thought that this answer which I have given you is an important one: Number one, it cannot be done without penalty today under the present state of international law, as Iran is learning. I mean, Iran itself estimates the cost of imported goods is 25 percent greater because of the trade sanctions which have been imposed, so Iran is paying a price. It is because Iran is paying a price that I think most of Iran's leaders have now made the judgment that the hostages are a liability to Iran, not an opportunity. They haven't yet implemented that judgment with a decision to release them, for whatever reasons we'll learn; but she has come to understand that being isolated from the world community is not in her interest, and certainly not in time of war!

QUESTION: Just one more quick question before Cliff has another for you. Mr. Secretary, suppose our hostages come back. Will we then resume trade with Iran? I know the integrity of that country is important to us in the Middle East; but will there be "business as usual" with a regime like Khomeini's that has perpetrated a real horror upon our country? Is there no way, in effect, that we can show the anger that this country feels toward Iran? Will we just go back and take them up as a friend again?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, I don't think that result will follow instantly at all. As a matter of fact, Iran has made it very clear that she doesn't want normal relations with us, and you can't have normal relations except on a mutual, two-way basis.

QUESTION: Then, you wouldn't resume trade, for example?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, we'd lift the trade sanctions. You know, governments don't engage in trade; businessmen and merchants do.

QUESTION: Would you suggest that our countrymen not trade with Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Then, in effect, we wouldn't be lifting the sanctions.

QUESTION: So, it is "business as usual," then?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, it isn't. Let me make clear, governments don't conduct trade; their economies do. If you lift sanctions, you know, whether or not trade occurs there --

Let's take the instance of the Soviet Union. When I came to the Senate -- this was in 1959 -- we had resumed normal relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, after refusing to recognize them following the Russian Revolution, and yet between 1933 and 1959, our trade with the Soviet Union, in that year, was less than \$100 million a year. We had diplomatic relations; there were no trade sanctions, but we did not trade because we had not yet made the adjustments that are essential to normalization. Diplomatic recognition is only one step.

I would also make this point, that our two greatest enemies in World War II today are our two strongest friends, Japan and Germany, so that the relations between nations don't stay frozen in ice; they change. It's a dynamic process.

When you put the question to me, I assumed you were asking whether the next day everything would be sunshine and honey as though nothing had happened. Of course, it won't be -- from either side. We have grievances against Iran; they have grievances against us, and it will be a long time, I suspect, before those are resolved. But what we are trying to do here, in order to deal with the hostage question, is to persuade them to undo what they did on the understanding that we will then undo what we did in retaliation for what they did. That's a very limited thing -- much more limited than "business as usual."

QUESTION (Mr. Evans): You've been a public official for very many years, and yet those of us who know of you or know you're here in Washington, know that you also are a private person. Historically, United States Senator Ed Muskie goes down as a great Senator, and one of your many great qualities is that of an outstanding and superb negotiator.

On the hostages, you have the frustration you cannot sit down as you would do on Capitol Hill, sit down with someone and negotiate, compromise, and work out an agreement.

I want to intrude: Personally, how do you renew your confidence each day? How do you put yourself together to keep going, to think that something good can happen? How do you do that as a person?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In all my public life, I've had to deal with problem-solving.

QUESTION (Mr. Evans): Not like this.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: A problem is a problem, and it usually involves other people whose points of view have to be influenced, sometimes changed. You know, in the Senate of the United States there is negotiation within committees which I chaired, often tough negotiations in conferences with the House over seemingly intractable problems. What keeps you going is the excitement of solving problems from time to time.

QUESTION: But you have no one to negotiate with here.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is more than one way of getting negotiations started; these indirect channels through which we have been working are one way. What we've been trying to do, in addition to waiting for their institutions to form so that you can have some authority to deal with, is through one channel or another, to persuade the Iranians that they are making a mistake in their own interest to hold the hostages.

Once they reach that judgment -- and I think they have reached it -- sooner or later, we will be negotiating in one way or another. It could begin tomorrow. I don't say that as a prediction because I think this raising of expectations is a disservice to the hostages, their families, and the country. Tomorrow, as I understand it -- unless they change it -- the Majlis are going to meet in open session. Now, whether or not that is for the purpose of discussing in public what they have been discussing in private, or whether they have made a decision that they will announce in public as to what the terms will be, or whether they have decided that the debate might just as well be held in public as in secret, now that they have sort of sorted out the issues, we won't know until tomorrow. But they have come this far.

What we have tried to do is, in order to stay on top of every conceivable condition that has been suggested in the dialogue that the Iranians have had with themselves, and to prepare ourselves to deal with them, to make preparations. Preparation is the most important thing, in my judgment, in negotiations -- preparing what you are in a position to do, preparing yourself on the other fellow's position, his vulnerabilities, the pressures that bear upon him. Iran is subject to enormous pressures -- economic, this war, the Soviet Union on her northern border, the war with Afghanistan next door. I mean, she is subject to all sorts of pressures.

The fact that even politically, she's splintered; there are several power centers competing with each other, so there are a lot of pressures. So you study the other fellow's situation; you prepare your own; and then you work to establish contact. Once that comes, then the hard negotiating usually begins.

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QUESTION (Ms. Henry): Mr. Secretary, I'm glad Cliff brought up your own personal feelings, because you, as an American with Polish origins, must have a particular feeling about what is going on in Poland today. And here we see a situation where the unions are really trying to change the political structure in Poland. We saw East Germany's Honecker's saying in very clear language the other day that, "Poland is and will remain a socialist country. Together with our friends in the Socialist camp, we will see to that." That's a very threatening statement.

I wonder how long you think that that kind of change, implicit change in the structure, can be in the process of taking place without Russia, at some point, moving in as Honecker says, to see that they will remain in the Socialist camp. Do you see it as a potential hot spot?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No one can give you an answer to that question. Obviously, what is going on in Poland is of interest and concern to the Soviet Union and the other Eastern Bloc countries, but also to the West, the United States, West Germany, and France -- all the freedom-loving countries. We all understand, on both sides, that the kind of change that is going on there involves some risks; and it also involves for a lot of people in the Soviet Union, especially the workers, some very important goals.

Whether they can achieve or make progress toward the kind of liberalization that they would like to see in their own situation within the constraints of their present system of government is always a very touchy thing to deal with. That is why we try to stay out of trying to influence that internal struggle. We think that it is a problem for the Polish people and the Polish Government to resolve, and we are undertaking, by setting that example, to influence others to follow the same course.

QUESTION (Ms. Henry): Mr. Secretary, again a personal question: You are certainly a man who cares about the political process. Heaven knows you've been a part of it long enough, from Governor to Senator, to running for Vice-President, aspiring to the Presidency, now the Secretary of State. This is a just a personal opinion; it has nothing to do with partisan politics: I wonder why do you think there are so many millions of turned-off voters today in the United States? What has happened to the political process? What has happened to the bond that we used to feel that was strong between government and the people?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you have certainly described our present situation. It is there, and we have to work at reestablishing it. You've heard all the answers -- all the

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Americans have heard answers as to how this condition has come about: the Vietnam War, Watergate, the growing disenchantment with the effectiveness of government, inflation, the energy crisis -- all of these problems seem overwhelming, and they are perceived to be beyond the ability of government to control or to do anything about. So as people struggle in their day-to-day lives under the pressure of inflation, and now for a while, unemployment for too many Americans (though that seems to be improving) but as it does, the inflation problem also becomes more difficult.

These problems, which in an earlier day when I was a young man living through the great Depression, at least seemed dual; and campaigns were conducted in that simplistic way in those days, with "pie in the sky" promises, that something could be done about it. Problems are more complicated now, partly because our society has grown a little more complicated; in part, because we've become more a part of the forces that influence life on the planet as a whole, and not just ourselves. We can no longer live unto ourselves.

The problems are complicated. They involve the kinds of cooperation within our own society and with other countries that we're not accustomed to. You can't solve problems with the passage of a single bill, the wave of a Presidential pen, or a fireside chat. It's a more complicated process, and so with the disillusioning events that I referred to, plus the intractability of some of these problems that have emerged since, American people do have doubts and they feel the burdens.

Looking objectively at our conditions as a people, we really are doing doing much better than we did when I was a younger man, in materials ways, not in spiritual ways, because we are so dissatisfied with where we are. But if we would only look at the reality of our condition. Except for those who are unemployed and so on, we are not that badly off. But that message is not a salable message at this point.

What we need to do is to reestablish the ties. There is a legal word that I like that I think used to describe the relationship between the American people and their political institutions -- the word "comity." Comity is not a blueprint; it is not anything tangible, but it is a condition or an attitude which makes it possible for each of us to understand that the other fellow has problems, the other fellow has rights -- none of us has rights unless each of us does; and that there has to be a certain flexibility in our relationship. We find it in our relations with other countries.

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Yesterday, I made a speech in New York, in which I described our foreign policy and the problems that we face; but then in the latter part of the speech, I described the world from the perspective of the Soviet Union at the present time. If you look at it from the perspective of the Soviet Union, it is not such a bright prospect. They have problems at home and abroad -- so comity is the ability to put yourself in the other fellow's shoes, and to adjust our own interests, values and objectives sufficiently to give him room to move toward his as well.

If we could bring ourselves to that which to me is a typical American attitude, the sort of thing that made our nation great, our ability to relate to each other in a positive, contributive, understanding way -- I think it's still there -- I think most Americans would like that. They would like to return to that position, but they have had so many disillusioning experiences that it is going to take a building program.

Leadership is going to, inevitably, be part of the effort to return to that day. Leadership -- improved communications. You know, I look at Presidential campaigns -- and I am not speaking just of this one because I've been in earlier ones -- and the level of the rhetoric in terms of illuminating the issues so that the American people can understand truly what the options are, the consequences of each, and the benefits of each, we have not had that kind of debate, and we need to have it.

You know, Thomas Jefferson was for education -- one of the strongest proponents of education in our country's history. Why? Because his assumption was that an educated citizen could develop the same capacity to make hard decisions, the hard choices that we expect of our leaders. In other words, that the average citizen could make decisions that called upon him to make sacrifices, that he could make decisions that limited his benefits in order to contribute to the overall scheme that brought benefits to the entire country.

You know Jack Kennedy's famous sentence: "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country." It was Jefferson's notion that an enlightened citizenry, educated, could develop that capacity for citizenship -- and in a sense for leadership as a citizen.

QUESTION (Mr. Evans): You were one of our great leaders on Capitol Hill. You offered yourself up for the Presidency, surely a thankless job. You go down in history, but while you are in the White House, it's the national game to kick the President around. You made yourself available. Why did you want to be President of the United States?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Because it's there.

QUESTION: Like the mountain, you're going to climb it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's an over-simplification -- it's an easy way of putting it. My view of life is, it achieves its maximum for fulfillment to the extent that it provides opportunities for stretching one's self to one's limit. And for someone who has been in political life as long as I have, that's the biggest challenge around.

QUESTION (Ms. Henry): Mr. Secretary, for someone who took the position of Secretary of State as you did back in May, with high ideals in saying you wanted to bring to the foreign policy of the United States a high level of conduct and assert the supremacy of the State Department and all the good, high-level values that you expressed, and now you are being criticized by such people as your former friend and colleague, Senator Dole, who has pointed at you as a political "hit man" for the President, and you are being criticized as a Secretary of State who has allowed himself to politicize the State Department. How do you feel about that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think Bob Dole knows better. I invite him to come down here. We've got a full text of every speech I have made. I defy him to find anything in them that's of a partisan, political nature.

I suppose I brought this criticism on myself when I described myself as a political Secretary of State, but let me make clear what I meant. First of all, I was making what I think is an obvious point, that I am the first Secretary of State who comes out of politics in a long time. That makes me different. But I also think it brings to this office a very valuable perspective.

The second point that I sought to make by describing myself as a political Secretary of State is that foreign policy-making, in my judgment, is the supreme political act because it can lead people to war or peace. Inflation is important; unemployment is important, and those questions are dealt with by politicians. I don't see why war and peace, in the policy-making that could lead to war and peace, ought not also to rest upon the support and peace and the will of the people who would benefit from the peace or have to fight the war. It seems to me that a Secretary of State who comes out of politics understands that with the greatest sense of reality about it.

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QUESTION (Ms. Henry): Mr. Secretary, may I have a question now about your own personal future? If President Carter wins the election, will you stay on as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is nothing I wouldn't rather -- that almost came out negative: There is nothing I'd rather do.

QUESTION: As Secretary of State, would you see any change in the relationship with the President's National Security Advisor, and if there is not, will you be as happy about the job?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've been happy with the job. I've never expected that my relationships in any job would lead to perfect happiness. When I went to the Senate, Lyndon Johnson was the majority leader, and I incurred his hostility. He didn't speak to me for the first six months I was a Senator. That wasn't very happy for a freshman Senator who had just been Governor, to enter those hallowed halls and be ignored by his own majority leader, but I worked it out.

QUESTION: Are you and Mr. Brzezinski speaking pretty well?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We are good friends. It's not a personal thing at all. I think the two institutions need some straightening out in terms of their relationships and areas of overlap -- I think that's an institutional question and I think we'll work it out.

QUESTION (Mr. Evans): We have just stepped into the 1980s. Be our mission (phonetic) for us; be Ed Muskie for us, Secretary of State, husband, father, whatever you like. What do you see ahead for us, the American people? What do you see ahead for us, the United States, and the world? Look ahead. What attitudes? War and Peace, nuclear?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, let me put it this way: I don't like to end a program on the note that I may be about to strike --

QUESTION: Well, Sherrye will ask you another question.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: -- but I think, increasingly, foreign policy will be the reflection of what we do about such things such as energy, the environment, world economy, and the relationships between the industrialized northern hemisphere and the disadvantaged southern hemisphere.

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There are the obvious facts that we find resources like energy increasingly limited. Even so-called renewable sources are likely to be limited -- a billion people on this planet to burn wood for fuel. If that were to continue, our forests are going to decline. As our forests decline, our rivers will lose a substantial portion of their life-giving water and their capacity to generate power, so that even the renewable resources, so called, are limited resources, so there is that question.

The environment, the fact that in the next 20 years -- and that's a shorter time than I spent in the Senate -- the population of this planet will grow from 4-1/2 billion to 6 billion. That increase is more people than there were on this planet in 1950. Ninety percent of that billion and a half will be born in the so-called disadvantaged, developing countries, so there is an enormous challenge facing us to make this planet livable, not only for Americans.

QUESTION: War or peace?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: War or peace can come out of that gap, and usually that's where it does come out, so there is a great challenge. But in the same way I've viewed my own life, challenges are the way to stimulate us to better performance, to growth, to improvement, to opportunities.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I will ask you your last question, then. Suppose President Carter loses and you, after this illustrious career of yours, which has been capped by being Secretary of State, how do you find a new challenge?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, I think I will.

QUESTION: What will you do? What are your plans?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Oh, I haven't made any plans. I'm superstitious about that. I'm planning only to be Secretary of State. But I've had indications, you know, with people who are interested, and particularly when they thought I might be taking the job for only eight months, and giving up maybe another term or two in the Senate -- it wasn't that much of a sacrifice, I might say; but as a result of that, a lot of people were interested in talking to me about the future if -- And there are interesting possibilities that have already been mentioned to me.

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But I have no intention ever to retire from activity because I've seen too many of my high school and college classmates retire, for after all, I'm 66; and when you reach that age, most of your contemporaries have retired. I don't intend to because I want to be alive, and the only way to do that is to stretch yourself to the limit. Your limits diminish as you grow older, in some respect, but there is one part of you that need never diminish if you keep it working -- no, two parts, heart and brain.

MS. HENRY: Mr. Muskie, thank you.

MR. EVANS: Secretary Muskie, thank you.

(The interview concluded at 5:30 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 29, 1980
No. 309



SPEECH and QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
BEFORE
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL
TRIANON BALLROOM, THE NEW YORK HILTON
Avenue of the Americas at 53rd Street
New York, New York
October 29, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I appreciate this opportunity to be with you this afternoon for the purpose of taking your questions and in the hope that I can clarify any issues which may be troubling you. I was delighted to hear that this is a non-partisan group, since I'm supposed to be a non-political Secretary of State.

Harry Truman once said, years ago, that whenever anyone presented himself being bipartisan, Truman always concluded that he was going to vote against him.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Tonight, of course, I'm going to have the privilege of speaking to the Economic Club with Sol Linowitz. Why anyone would want two speakers, including Sol and myself, I'm not sure. But, in any case, among other issues, we will be discussing issues relating to Israel which are also of concern to you. So I thought I might share with you some of the thoughts which I will express this evening on that subject.

First of all -- and I say these things in the context of what Larry has described as my long association with Israel issues, going over not just two decades, but 35 years of public life. And I always have in the background of my thinking, not only those years of exposure to these issues, but my single visit to Israel some eight or nine years ago when I had the opportunity to speak not only to Golda Meier who was then Prime Minister, but David Ben Gurion who was still alive; and visiting many of the key and sensitive areas of Israel, including the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the West Bank, and others.

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It is obvious that the highest priority in Israel's interest is peace. And I recall discussing that issue with Ben Gurion particularly, discussing what it would take to bring peace to Israel, peace between Israel and her neighbors, the question that still defies the statesmanship not only of Israel and her neighbors, and particularly Egypt, but the statesmanship of our own country.

The Camp David process, which at times seems to be a high priority only with ourselves and Israel and Egypt, we still regard as the best hope for moving toward that comprehensive peace which is and should be the highest priority for Israel and her neighbors. It's been a struggle to keep that process alive, and it will be a struggle to keep it alive from this point on; and it will be a struggle to broaden its negotiating base so that others who have a concern in the success of the Camp David process may be persuaded to participate in it, notwithstanding the struggle. But it's going to be difficult, it's going to be uphill; nevertheless, it is in the strategic interest of Israel, of the modern Arab states, and of the United States.

Beyond Israel's immediate interests in peace, it would strengthen the position of the United States in this area of the world, which seems to demonstrate increasing importance to us on a week-to-week basis. This is also in Israel's strategic interests with regard to the Soviet Union.

Secondly, I would like to say something with respect to President Carter, his Administration and his policies, vis-a-vis Israel. I've been exposed to him and his view of these issues and his proposals in Israel's behalf from my perspective as Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, as well as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

From that vantage point and my own long-standing commitment to Israel and Israel's security, let me make these points: That under President Carter over \$10 billion in economic and military aid has been provided to Israel, and that's almost half of the total aid to Israel over 32 years.

We have provided for Israel the most advanced defense equipment: surface-to-air missiles, the M-60 tank, the F-15, and the F-16. We've given daily attention to the process in spite of all of the interruptions and the diversions and the sideshows here in New York. We have paid day-to-day attention to the peace process, resulting in a treaty between Israel and Egypt which has made Israel more secure than previously.

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We have worked this year, since I have been Secretary of State, effectively to prevent international bodies from abusing Israel -- The World Bank, the IMF, UNESCO -- and those results are coming upon us almost daily.

So tonight I will reaffirm and pledge the following points: We would veto any attempt to impose sanctions on Israel. We would veto any change in Resolution 242. We would reject any effort to deny Israel its place in the United Nations. We would oppose, and in the Security Council veto, any malicious, unfair or one-sided resolutions, and this was publicly stated by President Carter last Friday.

He also said this last Friday on an issue of concern to you: "There will be absolutely no change in the assurance given to the Congress in 1978 by Secretary Harold Brown, acting under my instructions, on the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. In accordance with those assurances, we will not agree to provide offensive capabilities for the planes that might be used against Israel."

(Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Before turning to our questions and comments, let me emphasize one basic point that you will see in my speech tonight. Our commitment comes not only out of deep moral conviction, it comes from a clear sense of our national interest. As I will be telling my audience tonight, we know that no great power can long retain greatness if it deals loosely with its closest friends; and Israel's security is essential to us because it is indispensable to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace, for Israel must have confidence that agreements made will be kept.

Such a peace, in turn, is central to all of our interests in the region and many beyond. So there is the most direct relationship between Israel's strength and our ability to pursue our most basic interests. I think that perhaps is enough of your time to use up with formal comments, and I'm ready to take your comments or your questions, or both.

(Applause.)

MR. LAWRENCE TISCH: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, that was really a most enlightening statement. Now we turn to our panel to pose the questions you have submitted. We ask you to be as brief as possible. The panel chairman is Judah Gribetz, a noted attorney, who serves as Vice President of the JCRC. He is

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Chairman of Project Renewal in New York and holds many other leadership positions in the Jewish and general communities. He has also held high offices in both the city and state government.

Dr. Aaron Twerski, also a Vice President of the JCRC, is Professor of Law at the Hofstra University School of Law. He previously served as a trial attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice. He has published and lectured widely on the subjects of product liability and the conflict of laws.

Dr. Phil Baum is Associate National Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress. He is an attorney, author, lecturer, and a leading expert on international Jewish concerns.

Rabbi Seymour Siegel is Professor of Jewish Philosophy at the Jewish Theological Seminary. He has served on the board of JCRC and many other leading Jewish organizations. Judah, it's yours.

MR. GRIBETZ: Thank you, Larry. The questions will be asked by Phil Baum, Seymour Siegel, and Professor Twerski, and I'll try to coordinate them. The first question: Phil Baum.

MR. BAUM: Mr. Secretary, as you know, this is a meeting of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York; and, with all Americans, we have a deep and abiding concern over the safety of our fellow Americans who are hostage in Iran. Within the constraints of your office, would you indicate where matters now stand, what conditions are being demanded, what the prognosis is for their outlook; specifically, would our government ever accept conditions that contemplate the release of some of the hostages while others remain in custody? And, finally, would you comment on the view of some of those who observe that it seems passing strange and, perhaps, excessively coincidental that if the hostages are released between now and next Tuesday, after a year of incarceration, suddenly fortuitously, they're released on the eve of an American election?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Number one, let me touch the last point. If we had our preference over the release of the hostages between the first day of that year and the last day, we would have chosen the first day. And the idea that we would conspire to hold them there for a year until the last day in order to obtain an electoral advantage is absurd on its face.

With respect to the recent escalation of speculation about their release, no member of this Administration has initiated a statement with respect to the hostages and the possibility of their release at any time in the last month to my knowledge, for a

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very sound reason: That there's no way of predicting when the Iranian Majlis or Parliament will make a decision or a proposal for us to consider. We have considered it against the welfare of the hostages, their families, and our country to raise expectations, when we have no basis in fact for the expectations that are raised.

We have cautioned the press day after day after day against raising expectations. We have been watching closely, through indirect channels almost beyond number, developments in Iran since I took office as Secretary of State and before. The evolution of their political institutions, the resolution of the power struggle that's going on there, their willingness to accept authority for making a decision with respect to the hostages, has been a slow, frustrating process. And for anyone who has been watching that as long as I have been to predict that suddenly all of this is going to result in a release between now and November 4, simply is an unrealistic position to take. It's conceivable; but I don't think it's a reasonable expectation, and I would be willing to concede that I'm wrong if it happens tomorrow. But I just don't think that we ought to raise expectations.

Yesterday I met with some hostage families in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and afterwards they went out and the press asked them what I told them. They said, well, you'll have to ask the Secretary that. They said, well, how do you feel after you've talked to the Secretary? They said, "We feel much better." So that today the press asked me, "What did you say to the hostages' families that made them feel better?" I said, I told them the truth, and they liked the truth better than what they've been reading. They felt better about it. They felt I wasn't trying to hype them, that I wasn't holding out false expectations, that I was giving them the situation as it is.

Now you ask me about that. We have been undertaking for months now, since I took office and even before, to identify every possible channel of communication with Iranian leaders, and, as their political institutions are formed, their governmental leaders. We've tried in every way possible through government channels, friendly governments, even those not so friendly, who share with us the reaction against the taking of diplomatic personnel. And we've had in mind two objectives: One, through these channels to persuade the Iranians that holding the hostages is against their own self-interest. And we think that Iranian leaders, beginning with Khomeini on down, have reached that judgment now.

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But then, secondly, we have watched the development and concentration of authority in the Majlis or Parliament, a Prime Minister, a President, hoping that at some point somebody with authority who could be held accountable and responsible would make the decision to implement the judgment that I just described. Now at last the Majlis has begun to debate. We have not been in negotiation with the Iranian Government. As a matter of fact, I think the Majlis has prohibited direct negotiations with us.

But through these channels we have tried to reassure them on such things as retribution, once the hostages are released; assured them that we recognize that the revolution has taken place, and that we accept the result. Those kinds of things we've tried to communicate.

We have encouraged, since they seem to be reluctant to deal government-to-government with us, we've encouraged groups in Congress to communicate with them once the Iranian Parliament was selected. When Richard Queen was released, you may remember that the Iranian leaders said they were releasing him not to the Government of the United States, but to the people of the United States. So we have encouraged the hostage families to communicate.

We're willing to deal with them directly, indirectly, in any way possible, and now they are doing what they have been saying for weeks they would do: Leave the decision to the Majlis. Well, the Majlis is still debating. It is debating in secret. We get very little information out of it, much different from our Congress. When the Congress debates in secret, you know what they're going to say before they begin.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: But with the Majlis they seem to have better control over their security; and, in any case, we haven't learned very much about it. So we don't yet know what they consider to be the terms they would like to propose to us for release of the hostages. We didn't know whether they will ask unreasonable things or things that we can reasonably do. And, remember, the President said early on that we would not do anything inconsistent with our national interests or our national honor.

So that one ought not to conclude that when the Majlis makes a decision, that it will necessarily be a decision that we could accept. And so will we. We have tried to prepare ourselves to deal with every issue that we could anticipate might be laid on

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the table, from unfreezing -- the obvious ones -- unfreezing their assets, or lifting the trade sanctions, to others that they might conceivably raise.

We think we're in a position to respond to any conceivable issue they may raise, but they could surprise us. And so we're waiting, as all Americans are waiting, to hear what they Majlis does. There's been some talk in the Majlis, we gather, of postponing their decision until after our elections. But that's conceivable. So there we are, and I can only counsel patience. We're prepared when they're ready and I hope that when the two lines cross, that we'll find that they're ready to be reasonable, that we're ready to respond, that we can bring our people home, and still serve our national interests. That's our objective.

(Applause.)

MR. GRIBETZ: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The second question, Professor Siegel.

RABBI SIEGEL: Mr. Muskie, as the Chairman indicated to you, you hold a very important place in the heart of the Jewish community because of your previous activities on behalf of causes that we hold dear; and, consequently, several questioners raised the following questions:

There have been persistent press reports that you consider yourself to have a limited role in setting foreign policy, and that you are considering leaving your post after the election. One other questioner asked that as a direct question: Are you going to leave your post?

Therefore, what is your role in settling foreign policy and what is the likelihood that you will choose to continue in the second Carter Administration, if there is one; and what assurance can you give us that foreign policy commitments and positions that you are making during the course of this campaign will be validated during the second Carter Presidency even if you have resigned?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me say, I have never had --

(Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me say, I've never had a more rewarding, fulfilling experience in my life than I've had for the last six months. And I'm ready to stay here for as long as the President wants me to.

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(Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: And he has said that he wants me for his second term. Mrs. Carter said the same thing in Maine yesterday --

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: -- so certainly President Carter isn't alone. But, in any case, I've not been unhappy in this role. The President has given me every opportunity to play the role that he said he wanted me to play. That isn't to say that others don't influence foreign policy. DOD obviously does, as you folks know. Other departments do. Commerce, Treasury, Office of the Special Trade Representative, and so on.

But I think the President feels more comfortable about State. When most Presidents come into office they have been sort of turned off by the State Department. It seems such a big bureaucracy with its far-flung offices all around the planet. Actually, it's the second smallest department, but it looks sort of formidable to a President who's making foreign policy. But, in any case, I think he feels more comfortable now, appreciates more fully, I think, the resources that the State Department offers in terms of personnel, qualified people, analysis, option development, and so on.

So I foresee a healthier and stronger relationship between the State Department and the President in President Carter's second term.

MR. GRIBETZ: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Professor Twerski.

PROFESSOR TWERSKI: Mr. Secretary, in your remarks you indicated that the Carter Administration intends to stand by the unequivocal assurance that it gave the United States Senate that no additional armaments would be supplied to Saudi Arabia in the future that would enable the F-15s to attain offensive capabilities against Israel. Indeed, the President reiterated that position on October 24.

Could you comment on Richard Burt's article in today's Times that Secretary Brown has, indeed, ordered a comprehensive reevaluation of the Saudi request for bomb racks and refueling gear, and that there is a real possibility that the Saudis would receive additional fuel tanks in KC-135 tanker planes after November 30?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Incidentally, we have just been talking about people trespassing on State's jurisdiction. I don't want anybody, when I answer this question, to accuse me of trespassing on DOD's jurisdiction.

But, in any case, the study to which Mr. Burt's article refers must be the technical study that I think was begun in September with respect to these questions. That is overtaken by the President's statement of last Friday at our foreign policy breakfast, which I attended as well as Secretary Brown; and the test is does it provide an offensive capability against Israel?

And that test would apply to bomb racks; it would apply to range, among other things. Secretary Brown issued a statement, or read a statement, this afternoon that I have in one of my staff's handwriting and I'm not sure I can read it. It's almost as bad as my own.

But it essentially says what I have just said, and offensive capability against Israel is the test, and any equipment that has that capability will not be provided with the Saudi planes.

(Applause.)

MR. GRIBETZ: Mr. Baum.

MR. BAUM: Mr. Secretary, of course we are familiar with the government's declared position about dealing with the PLO. At the same time, as I'm sure you're aware, there has been some continuing uneasiness about the policies of this Administration in off-the-record, informal, private conversations of various kinds with representatives of the PLO.

Two things: Would you restate your understanding of the Administration's view of conversations or readings of that kind; and, secondly, would you indicate what diplomatic or other initiatives either are in place or are in prospect for persuading our friends in the Common Market countries that their positions on matters in this area are undermining the Camp David Agreements which many of us believe is the only viable peace process that we have.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: When you refer to conversations, I assume you must be referring to some specific ones of which I may not be aware. But so far as the President is concerned, so far as I am concerned, our public statement of our position on PLO is the same as our private one.

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MR. BAUM: Excuse me. What I meant to ask about was the position of the Administration with respect to off-the-record, private meetings of any representative of the Government of this Administration with representatives of the PLO.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There again, if such conversations are held, they are against this Administration's policy.

MR. BAUM: What initiatives are in mind to persuade the Common Market countries to adopt a position comparable to our own with respect to dealing with what many of us believe to be an unacceptable terrorist organization?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I discuss it with them constantly, whenever I meet with any of the EC foreign ministers individually, whenever I have occasion to meet with more than one of them. When Mr. Thorn returned from his Middle East journey, and he visited Israel at that time, he came to Washington to report to me and I urged him at that point to make it clear that whatever they do does not run counter to or undermine the Camp David process, and that it should be supported.

We have communicated that view to every other member of EC and of NATO. It's a constant thing. It's not something to start and stop. Whenever we have the opportunity, we make that point, because they are going to take it -- the meeting in December -- I think December the EC is going to be meeting, and we are doing our best to do whatever we can to make sure that doesn't go off on the wrong track; because the Camp David Summit will be taking place probably in January, possibly in December, and we don't want them to cross our wires. So we're going to make that point very strongly.

MR. GRIBETZ: Thank you. Professor Siegel?

RABBI SIEGEL: Several participants asked this question which I am summarizing or restating. When you addressed the Security Council on the night of August 20, you called the Jerusalem resolution under discussion "a fundamentally flawed, disruptive attempt to dictate to other nations" which seems "not to advance the cause of peace but to restrain it."

Speaking at a JCRC conference two weeks ago, our distinguished Senator, Daniel Moynihan said: "With all due respect to Secretary Muskie, he could have stopped debates like that which are hostile to the peace process right then by raising his hand and voting no."

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Could you please explain --

(Applause.)

RABBI SIEGEL: Could you please explain why you abstained that night, why you did not veto the Security Council resolution; and, in addition, Senator Moynihan went on to say that by not saying no, we have quietly said yes. These are direct quotations from Senator Moynihan and, therefore, not voting no is of serious consequence to the interests Israel in the United Nations.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Without denigrating the sophistication of my good friend, Senator Moynihan, with whom I discussed this issue at the time, he knows that my position at that time cannot be dismissed as simply as that quotation does.

Let me read this much from the speech, and we have reprints of the speech. You can get it if you'd like at any time. Let me read this part of it.

"The status of Jerusalem cannot simply be declared. It must be agreed to by the parties. That is a practical reality. It will remain so despite this Resolution or 100 more like it. We have encouraged all parties to refrain from unilateral actions which seek to change the character or status of Jerusalem. In line with this position, we would not vote against the resolution as presently written. So there can be no mistake, let me note that we will continue firmly and forcefully to resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. That step is contained in a draft resolution to be presented here but not to be voted upon. We are unalterably opposed to it; we will vote against any such resolution. But if we do not vote against the version before us today, neither can we find cause to support it, for the Resolution is still fundamentally flawed. It fails even to reaffirm Resolution 242 as the basis for comprehensive peace. Israel, for example, is to be censured, yet there is no censure. Indeed, no mention at all of violence against Israel or of efforts that undermine Israel's legitimate security needs.

"Further, the Resolution before us calls upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the Holy City. In our judgment this provision is not binding. It is without force and we reject it as a disruptive attempt to dictate to other nations. It does nothing to promote a resolution of the difficult problems facing Israel and her neighbors. It does nothing to advance the cause of peace. On these specific grounds we abstain on the Resolution."

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Now, to read that as being a vote for the Resolution is to ignore the plain meaning of the English language; and Senator Moynihan is not one to ignore the plain meaning of the English language. And he understands fully what I am saying here.

May I say in addition, that following -- I made this speech personally for one important reason. I am fed to the teeth with this proliferation of anti-Israel Resolutions. I find them diversionary, I find them undercutting the Camp David process, and I have been waiting for an opportunity to say so to the Security Council and I did so.

RABBI SIEGEL: With all due respect, Mr. Muskie, in that case, the questioners don't understand why you did not vote no. I mean after this very eloquent statement, why did you vote --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Why didn't you say so bluntly?

RABBI SIEGEL: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Unilateral actions have been taken in Israel with respect to Jerusalem. They had the effect of twice suspending and interrupting the Camp David process; and we have urged that they not be taken. Now, having urged Israel not to take those unilateral actions, it's a little inconsistent in order to cast a vote in the Security Council that is at odds with that position.

We predicted that that unilateral action, which would not dispose of the issue finally so far as the Camp David process is concerned, would have a disruptive effect on the Camp David process. Now we'll have to choose between the Camp David process and fighting these issues on the floor of the United Nations. And whenever there is a unilateral action taken in Israel, it provokes another U.N. resolution and we find ourselves expending our energies and our time fighting the issues there that are not going to be decided.

If we believe in the Camp David process, that's where they're going to be decided, and that's where we must concentrate our energies and our efforts. So I went up there to discourage the casting of the resolution, but I could not, at the same time, take a public position in New York inconsistent with the position we have been urging upon the Government of Israel with respect to this issue if I were to retain my credibility.

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May I say that Prime Minister Begin, who indicated publicly his unhappiness with my abstention vote, subsequently -- and I underline subsequently, not the next day -- complimented me on the speech after he had recovered his equilibrium.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I understand that there is the view that if you're with a friend, you ought to be with him 100%, you ought to give him a blank check. But we have some responsibility for keeping this process going; we have to make some judgments as to what will keep it going. If you want to give up on Camp David, and if you prefer to have us just fighting those -- losing fights, losing fights, in the Security Council, that's an option. But I consider that a diversion; I don't consider those votes meaningful. Those Embassies would have been moved whether or not that Resolution had been adopted. The pressures were already being brought, and they would have been moved; not because of this Resolution, but because of the action taken within Israel. Now, that's not talk, and I would have preferred to have said it to you privately, but that is the reason why we did what we did.

(Applause.)

MR. GRIBETZ: The next question, Professor Twerski.

PROFESSOR TWERSKI: Mr. Secretary, very much in line with your last remarks, there is widespread belief and very deep concern in the Jewish community that the language of anti-Zionism and anti-Israel is in reality nothing more than virulent anti-Semitism dressed up in appropriate political rhetoric. The belief has been bolstered by considerable evidence. Over the past 25 years, regardless of the issue, the hate spews forth from the Arab countries without abatement. This year the International Conference on Women self-destructed because it considered its major purpose to define Zionism as racism. Over the past year we have seen the explosion of unbridled anti-Semitism in many countries throughout this globe, all couched in anti-Israel rhetoric.

My question, and it's one that really reflects a whole series of questions that have been presented to this panel: Does the Administration concur in this view? And, if so, why has it not spoken out against this phenomenon with the intensity as it has denounced, at the domestic level, the robing of racism in the language of state's rights? Indeed, if the political issue is not political, but deeply anti-Semitic, shouldn't it be identified and shouldn't we call a spade a spade?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We all speak in different ways. I have denounced it; you haven't heard me, and we should. Whenever the opportunity arises, I have pointed out -- I think I did in my opening remarks -- that we have fought this fight in UNESCO, we have fought it in the World Bank, we will fight it in the United States if there is an effort to expel Israel.

Whether or not there is, in addition to these overt and specific actions -- which seem to be spreading through a lot of institutions, and we are being as alert as we can be with respect to those kinds of efforts -- whether in addition to this, outside of governmental institutions and international organizations, there is a spreading feeling, attitude of anti-Semitism, is something I think we have to be constantly alert to.

We're concerned about what happened in Paris, for example. If those kinds of incidents proliferate, I think that we've got to be alert to denounce them in the strongest possible terms. That's another level, and perhaps a more dangerous level, because that can affect public attitudes in communities and unsuspected places, and suddenly spring up. We certainly don't want to return to the years of World War II which so many of us remember so clearly.

But I think it's an appropriate charge that you make, that we be alert to what may be a spreading tide of anti-Semitism which is now reflected in some incidents that may be the tip of the iceberg. I couldn't agree more.

MR. GRIBETZ: Mr. Baum.

MR. BAUM: Mr. Secretary, if I may bend the rules of this forum just a bit and ask you a question of my own, after which I'll ask a question put through me from the audience.

To refer back to your remarks a moment ago, you indicated that one of the reasons for your abstention in the Security Council was the position, the unilateral action taken by Israel with respect to Jerusalem. I take it that one of those actions was the action of the Knesset in affirming the fact that Jerusalem is the capital instead of Tel Aviv.

Can you tell me why that was so destructive of Camp David and the spirit of Camp David when a comparable action adopted by the Egyptian Parliament before that act was not regarded as similarly destructive of the spirit of Camp David and was not so roundly condemned by our government?

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That's my question. Let me give you the question of the audience, if I may. One at a time, I'm sorry.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: First of all, you know, I don't applaud the action taken by the Egyptian Parliament, but it didn't have any bearing on any land within the jurisdiction of Egypt; they couldn't affect its status. They're expressing a point of view. The action by the Knesset -- I mean, do I have to describe how it was harmful? Do you regard the removal of 13 embassies from West Jerusalem as useful? As harmless? I mean that's what provoked the removal of the embassies.

MR. BAUM: Well, the Security Council Resolution provoked the removal of the embassies.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't believe that. I believe that was the -- because I happen to know that pressure was being brought on some of these countries before the United Nations Resolution was introduced by those who are the suppliers of oil. So if you think it was just the U.N. Resolution, you're sadly mistaken.

MR. BAUM: Well, I am concerned -- I think many of us are concerned by the fact that with the action by the Israelis as regarded as a unilateral act, as destructive of Camp David and deserving of world-wide condemnation to the point where you move to abstain rather than oppose.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I did not use those words, and, although I am your guest, I will not stand here and allow you to put my position in those words.

MR. BAUM: I'm sorry.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I didn't use the word destructive. I said it would have the effect, and could have the effect, or did have the effect of disrupting and interrupting the Camp David process. Now, whether that's destructive, you are able to make a judgment about that as well as I.

MR. BAUM: Right. Shall I ask the other question?

MR. GRIBETZ: Go ahead, Phil.

MR. BAUM: All right. The question put by the audience, Mr. Secretary, is the following: Last week at this same forum, Governor Reagan's representatives expressed the personal view that in any Reagan administration there would be a favorable

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attitude toward co-production rights for Israeli planes and tanks and to allow their sale with U.S. parts to NATO and other allied countries. That was his view as to what that administration might do. Could you tell us why such permission has not been granted thus far by the Carter Administration and that in fact it has disallowed sales of the Israeli Kafir to Ecuador and Taiwan, and what do you think prospects along these lines are in the future?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have no judgment on those questions which are not in my jurisdiction. If I had known the question in advance, I might have tried to get an answer for you.

MR. GRIBETZ: Professor Siegel, next question.

RABBI SIEGEL: The question that I'm asking in behalf of several people in the audience, quotes from The New York Times Sunday "News of the World in Review" section which in turn quotes a long cable which was sent by the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to yourself. I won't quote the whole -- you probably know it better than anybody else here, but I'll quote just the relevant parts to this particular question.

"The United States policy in the Middle East has created a sense of disillusionment and despair throughout the Gulf area. There is general support -- that is in the Gulf area, the Arab states -- for President Carter, based primarily upon the premise that no American president in his first term can ever take the actions necessary towards Israel which may result in an unacceptable Mideast peace. Likewise Governor Reagan's statements paint him, in the Arab view, as being wholly controlled by Israel and its supporters in the United States; and the hope of Carter's reelection and some measurable action being taken soon thereafter varies, but it is the only hope the Arab states have."

End of quotation from the Ambassador's cable to you, according to The New York Times this Sunday. The questioner asks the following question, and I quote from him: "Other than telling our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to stop sending embarrassing cables at such a politically sensitive time, what will your response to the Ambassador be?"

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'll tell you what. Why don't we do away with the government; let public opinion run matters? We have ambassadors; we have other representatives all over this planet whose responsibility is to report to us on opinion in those

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countries. I mean, are we supposed to anticipate what opinion is going to be and say in these areas don't send us any cables?

I don't know how you apply that kind of selective censorship. What attention we pay to the cables is another question, and we'll be held accountable. If we were to implement the sentiments allegedly reported, if we were to seek to implement them in our policies here, you people would hold us accountable, and others like you, of the same point of view.

If we were to say "send us nothing but favorable to American policy," what kind of reporting would we get, what kind of intelligence would we get? I suspect that sounds like a cable I received, but I receive all kinds of cables, thousands of them. That doesn't mean I implement them all. I read the polls, too, in this country. They report public sentiment to me, which isn't always favorable to one point of view or another.

What you've got to look at -- you know, I started this day going over the specific things that this Administration had done to indicate its support of Israel. The way I always count a friend, on a personal basis, is not only on the basis of what he says to me; but what he's done for me. Here you have a four-year record that is as productive as any four-year record from the point of view of Israel since I've been a member of the United States Senate.

Every election, obviously, could have the effect of changing policy, particularly if an administration is put out of office; and you know as well as I for those who are challenging an office to be more expansive and precise than those who have had the responsibility of office. That's no new phenomenon in this election, so that's not a personal attack on anybody.

But one thing that you can't erase is what's been done. And if you think that in these last six years when I was Chairman of the Budget Committee that it was easy for the administration to find \$10 billion for Israel -- it had to be squeezed out of other things. That was the time, you remember, 1974, the deepest recession since 1940. It was in that period that this kind of assistance to Israel was approved. I authored it, promoted by the administration and supported by the Congress and without reluctance, solidly, enthusiastically.

I think you ought to look at that rather than some cable from Saudi Arabia as to the commitment of this Administration to Israel and its security.

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(Applause.)

MR. GRIBETZ: The last question. Professor Twerski.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: They're getting better.

MR. GRIBETZ: Do you want to go another round?

RABBI TWERSKI: A two-part question, Mr. Secretary. The Carter Administration has taken the position that the status of Jerusalem is for the negotiating table under the Camp David Accords. The reality is that Israel and the American Jewish community in its corner have taken the position that Jerusalem is not negotiable.

The first question, therefore, is when push comes to shove on this question, will Israel be backed into a corner?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me put this to you. I don't know of an easy issue in these autonomy talks. I don't know of any issue as to which either side is soft to the other side's position; whether it's Jerusalem, land, water, management of security, or any of the rest.

Each side is going to take into negotiation its hard, tough position. What comes out depends on what their ingenuity is able to devise. I have seen apparently unsolvable problems with hard lines of each side somehow resolved through somebody's ingenuity. Jerusalem is the toughest of all, and when I say that it's part of the Camp David process, that it's on that agenda, at the end of the line, I say it not with any conviction that Israelis and Jews are going to change their present perception, or that their present perception is necessarily inconsistent with some device that might be framed.

We haven't got to that point. But as a legislator for 22 years, I've gone into tough negotiations, with people of opposite points of view and somehow come up with an answer. So we're not saying it's easy or we're not saying that the Israeli point of view with respect to Jerusalem may not be accepted as a result of those negotiations. All we're saying is that to say in advance that it's non-negotiable, that tempts the other side to say that something else is non-negotiable to my point of view; and you have no negotiation and the process is dead. That's all we're saying.

All we've said as a government is that our objective is an undivided Jerusalem with access to all the holy places. That's as

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far as we've gone. You have said it's the capital of Israel, which is understandable, but you've always regarded it as that; you didn't really have to pass a law in the Knesset --

(Applause.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You didn't really have to. And so your point of view is very, very clear to the Egyptians and to us without that action by the Knesset. So the action by the Knesset -- what purpose did it serve and what disruption did it cause? It seems to me that it by these tests that one ought to measure these things. Everybody in the world knows, without the action by the Knesset, that Jerusalem is the life blood of all Israelis. We know that. We didn't have to be told by the Knesset. We know it's a tough issue, a tough problem, and we're not sure it can be resolved; but we want to take the steps between now and the time we reach that to see if we can work out some of the other tough problems -- develop a habit of finding solutions -- so that when we get to that one, it may not be as hard as we now fear. That's all we ask.

(Applause.)

RABBI TWERSKI: The Partum refers to a quote from the President in July of 1976 and it is a matter of considerable interest how if this quote you, in your present circumstance, believe to be the position of the United States.

In an interview that the President gave to the Hearst newspapers in July of 1976 he said: "Ultimately, of course, Israel will have to withdraw from major portions of territory captured by them in the '67 war. That should be done on a quid pro quo basis. There are some exceptions that I would personally recognize. One is that I don't think Israel is going to relinquish to the Syrians direct control of the Golan Heights overlooking the Sea of Galilee and the Valley there; I would not. And I think that Israel is going to be reluctant, and I would support the reluctance, to relinquish control again of Christian and Jewish holy places in Old Jerusalem."

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That statement is part of the record of the President's views, but I think for me to reaffirm them at this point might well be regarded as an effort to impose those views now on the negotiating process while the parties are negotiating some of those very issues. So I think reaffirmation of those views -- I mean they're on the record; they're there -- to reassert them now in this context I think could well be a disservice to Israel and to the President's position.

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(Applause.)

MR. GRIBETZ: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for the questioners.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Thank you for a very relaxed afternoon.

(Applause.)

(This Question and Answer session concluded at 4:44 p.m.)

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November 7, 1980
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INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE EDMUND MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
October 31, 1980

NPR: The first question concerns the hostages in Iran. How do you read Khomeini's not mentioning the hostages in his speech this week, and an apparent purposeful attempt to delay the Majlis debate on the hostages? What is all that about? Do we have a read-out of what it means?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No, we do not. There is no way for us to read Khomeini's mind. That's been true of a lot of his actions since last November, not only with respect to the hostages but with respect to other issues including the selection of Prime Minister, and the struggle between the various elements of authority and power in Iran. He is a master of ambiguity, I would say, and uses it to his own ends.

NPR: Can we tell what the forces that play are who are delaying the discussion of the hostages and why they might be doing this?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, first there's the difficulty of characterizing the delay. Delay could simply be a prolongation of the process of making the decision. You don't need necessarily be obstructionists. It may even be useful in terms of the ultimate result, so to try to characterize the delay and to try to assume that it's obstructionist may not be accurate, or it could be accurate. I mean this is the kind of frustration you deal with in dealing with this hostage question and undertaking to get Iranians to move toward resolution of the problem. My own feeling is that increasingly Iranians, and in increasing numbers, and important elements of the Iranian governmental structure -- if you want to call it that -- have reached a conclusion and made a judgment that the release of the hostages is in Iran's best interest. They haven't yet apparently agreed on the terms or perhaps they are struggling with the difficulty of creating a mechanism for implementing their judgment. One can only speculate about those things since the debate has been held in secret. The public debate was postponed for lack of a quorum. That may have been the result of obstructionism; that may have been attributable to some other factors, and I have found that it isn't useful to speculate or to seek to characterize events in Iran because the effect has been in our own press here to hype the issue, to raise expectations, or to undermine them. It's better just to deal with the facts as we know them and not try to speculate about facts which we do not have.

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NPR: Mr. Secretary, in looking at this in American and Iranian political terms, do you think there is a danger that if this decision isn't made before the American Presidential election that it may be a long way off? In other words, if the hostages aren't freed at least in principle before the election, they may not be freed for quite some time additionally?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that's not a necessary result. If the Iranians have reached the conclusion that it's in their own interests -- and I think that's the only basis upon which they would decide to release the hostages, I think -- if they have reached the conclusion that in their own interest they ought to release the hostages -- I doubt that the date of our election would change that. The date of the election may or may not have the effect of accelerating their decision-making process but there isn't much evidence of that at this point. After all, the election isn't very far away and the Iraqi-Iranian war, which I'm sure adds to their perception the importance of releasing the hostages in their own interests, has been going on for several weeks. I think they're just having some division of opinion which is not unusual in a legislative body, at least it hasn't been unusual in those of which I have been a member.

NPR: Mr. Secretary, if we grant one of the apparent Iranian conditions -- that is, release their assets including about \$4 million in weaponry -- does that indicate or symbolize a tilt of American policy away from neutrality and toward Iran and will it be so perceived by our allies in the area, including the Saudis?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I don't think so for a number of reasons. In the first place, the hostage issue arose months before the Iran-Iraq war. When the hostages were seized, we took certain actions in retaliation in order to bring pressure on Iran to release the hostages. The assumption was, very clearly, if they would undo what they did, we would undo what we did in retaliation. And, that assumption was made long before anyone had any idea that Iraq was going to attack Iran and get the area involved in war. Secondly, I make the point that one of our reactions to the taking of the hostages was the imposition of sanctions in which we persuaded our allies in Europe to join us. Well, the effect of that policy is to tilt against Iran and in favor of Iraq. How then can one draw the conclusion that lifting the sanctions then tilts us toward Iran and away from Iraq? I mean the imposition of sanctions created a situation favorable to the Iraqi attack; so if we remove the sanctions -- for a reason totally unrelated to the war and related only to our issue, our problem of the hostages -- I don't see how that could fairly be interpreted as a tilt with respect to this war. As a matter of fact, in terms of trade, it would be to establish equilibrium in our policy toward both countries, not to tilt.

NPR: At the UN now, the Security Council is again debating the Iran-Iraq war. There's been a suggestion for at least a week that Iran's interest in releasing the hostages is connected somehow

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with an urge to get the UN to move forward and take an active role to bring a ceasefire in the war. Do you think there is a hope now that the UN might somehow be able to intervene either in the hostage question or on the war front?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, with respect to the hostage question, the Security Council, of course -- the UN took actions a year ago to condemn the taking of the hostages. A repetition of that, I don't think, is under consideration or necessary. The condemnation has been made. I suspect that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajai, when he visited the UN was certainly exposed to the atmosphere which isolates Iran. He may have felt even more clearly the isolation in which the seizure of the hostages has placed Iran. That's a fact, of course, economically; it's a fact in terms of trade; it's a fact in terms of access to military supplies from sources, whatever sources. With respect to the Iraq-Iran war, the UN is, of course, working at the objective of finding a way to persuade both sides to call a halt to hostilities and go to the negotiating table. The problem is, of course, that a ceasefire normally involves a withdrawal and, clearly, Iran would not agree to a ceasefire without a withdrawal and might not even with some form of withdrawal. Withdrawal is a complicated issue here because it involves disputed territory. The question is withdraw to what? What must be negotiated is territory and the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. Since that's disputed, then the question is a technical problem of how would you define a withdrawal which still leaves Iraq in a position to negotiate the disputed territory over which she claims total jurisdiction. So there are some technical questions. Then, in addition to that, of course, Khomeini has said they would fight until Mr. Hussein has been toppled from his position. That's a war aim that's inconsistent with a ceasefire and a withdrawal.

NPR: I would like to ask a question that concerns Iran in a wider context. What policy changes have there been, in view of the Iran experience and the Somoza experience in Nicaragua, about what the United States does when one of its authoritarian friends gets in trouble? Have we developed any kind of a policy or does it depend on the individual circumstances? Secondly, have we improved our language and intelligence capabilities so that we'll know in advance that a friend is in trouble? What lessons have we learned from the Iran experience?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not sure I understand what you're driving at with your question. I don't think we have policies exclusively related to the character of governments which might conceivably get in trouble, out of the 150-odd governments on the face of this planet. Other circumstances affect the nature of our vital interests and the nature of the options that might be available to us to protect them or to advance them. I can't think of an umbrella-kind of policy which is related wholly to the character of the governments involved. With respect to Iran, what we're dealing with here is the results, the consequences, of a revolution and the efforts of the Iranian people now to establish political institutions that relate and are consistent with the objectives of the revolution.

NPR: Zero? There's not a single American diplomat?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: There's not a single American diplomat. They have a People's Bureau here with some 15 or 16 representatives.

NPR: Who monitors our commercial interests? They still supply us with vast amounts of oil.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: In all countries where we do not have direct diplomatic representation, we operate through some other government to monitor our interests. It's not the ideal arrangement, obviously. But what I'm saying in answer to this previous question is that one way of indicating the unacceptability of a country's policies--Bolivia is another case--is the reduction of our official representation in that country. That does have an impact on governments. It's not a total control when you have a sovereign government which deliberately chooses terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. You don't go to war over it, but you use diplomatic means. You use whatever kinds of pressures are available. There are other governments as concerned as we are over Libya's tactics, governments which are in the immediate area which are even more concerned over Libya's tactics: Egypt, obviously, and there are others.

Getting to the question you raised about Iran and the hostage seizure there, I would hope that the countries of the world do not learn the lesson that we cannot have free diplomatic exchanges between countries. That would be a horrible condition to run into, and that's why the whole world, virtually, has condemned the taking of the hostages. Many countries have joined us in taking actions which carry a cost for Iran in that respect. It's important, and has been important for centuries, that diplomatic personnel be protected, that the whole world understands it, and, of course, there is an international convention which sets the standard for treatment of diplomatic personnel. Perhaps that convention could be strengthened, perhaps some form of sanction might be included in it. And so when I think this is behind us, we need to consider it. But let me point out to you, with respect to Iran's seizure of the hostages, that that act on her part has cost her enormously, put her at a disadvantage in this war, by her own estimate has increased the cost of her imports by 25 percent because of the sanctions, it has isolated her in world opinion, it has sharply reduced her normal trade with normal trading partners. So she is paying a price constantly, and it is that price which is prompting her to move to the resolution of the problem.

NPR: Let me take you, if you will, sir, to another part of the world--to Eastern Europe--and ask you for your assessment of the developing situation in Poland; any sense you have of how long Soviet patience for the Polish actions, particularly the new free trade unions, will go on? What do you think of the visit of the Polish leadership this week to Moscow, which has sort of ominous memories of Czech trips to Moscow in 1968 by Dubcek and his people? Where is that situation generally developing?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think anyone has any hard information as to what may follow events of this kind. It's obviously a very delicate and sensitive issue. Our policy is that it's an issue to be resolved by the people of Poland and their government. That's our view, and we think other nations ought to hold to the same policy. We've made that policy clear in the hope of deterring other nations, whoever they may be, from undertaking to intervene. The struggle there is obviously one between the Polish workers who seek to liberalize their place in the economic and political structure of Poland, and that carries the risk that it may challenge the political system which is in place in the Soviet Union; and just how much that system will tolerate or just how much liberalization the Soviet Union and Poland's neighbors will tolerate is the key question, obviously. I don't have the answer to that question. We think that the best way for that answer to be developed is to leave it to the people of the country and their government. I'm sure they feel pressures that are obvious. Whether or not this trip to Moscow means anything different than the last trip to Moscow from Warsaw, we'll know when it's over. The atmospherics surrounding it up to now seem to be reasonably friendly, but that could be a ploy. I don't think it's helpful for me to speculate and try to characterize these events from day to day that take place as the Polish people--under the watchful eye, I'm sure, of their neighbors--undertake to resolve this issue. You just don't want to push it in one direction or the other.

NPR: Let me turn to SALT. Is the Administration going to send up the SALT treaty for ratification again or ask that it be reconsidered by the Senate in the lame duck session that follows the election? What do you think the prospects are for its passage when it does get considered? And, suppose it fails, what does that do to the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the prospects for a SALT agreement?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The SALT II treaty is on the Senate calendar. The President doesn't have to send it up again. It's there. Debate was postponed at the request of the Senate leadership. I make that point because it was clear that, as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan, support for it in the Senate had plummeted. There was no chance, at that point. We never linked ratification of SALT II to withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, for example. But it was obvious that the invasion of Afghanistan had cost us votes, and that is the point I've made to the Russians constantly. They accuse us of linkage, and we say we don't link but you have to recognize by your own act--by your own behavior--you've cost us the

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votes necessary to ratify SALT II. I've said to them that had it not been for that even though the necessary votes weren't in hand prior to the invasion, I think that debate on the Senate floor would have produced those votes and that we might have had SALT II ratified by now, but for the invasion of Afghanistan. So they carry a heavy burden for the result. Nevertheless, we believe that ratification of SALT II is definitely in our security interests. We also recognize that it's going to be an uphill fight to get the two-thirds vote necessary, and the only way to get that, in my judgment, is to build public understanding of what is at stake and to build a constituency in the country -- Senators are responsive to constituents when they're not to presidents. So it's important to build that constituency, and that's why we've raised this issue in this campaign, when public attention is focused on such issues. We hope that in the course of this debate -- and I assume there will be discussion after the election -- also until the next session of Congress. The time constraints are very severe because there are time constraints built into the SALT II treaty. The treaty calls for the Soviets to dismantle 250 systems, and they're not likely to begin that dismantling if there is doubt about our ratification. That dismantling must be completed by the end of calendar year 1981. So time is getting very tight, and I think that an appreciation of that fact may tend to build support. Our military is even more concerned about the security implications of a SALT-less world than they were at the time of the hearings. The military support for the treaty is stronger, more urgent today than it was a year ago. I think, in addition, there is greater public understanding already of what is at stake. All of the constraints in this treaty bear upon the Soviets, not us. We do have to dismantle, I think, a few B-52 aircraft but that's not an important thing. But the Russians have to dismantle 250 missile systems. They are limited by the treaty with respect to the number of warheads they can place on their big missiles, which could take 20 to 30, so there's restraint there. And, in addition, the treaty ensures that we'll be able to monitor Soviet technological development in this field because of the definition of encryption that is in the treaty.

You asked what would happen if we don't succeed in getting ratification of SALT II. It's conceivable, I think, if we make an effort that the Soviets regard as credible and fair, we may be able to pick up the arms process again in some way. It would be a very complicated and difficult thing and might well fail.

NPR: You mean the negotiating process?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes. The problem is both sides now are exercising restraint; both are undertaking to ensure that, in practice at least, their policies are not inconsistent with SALT II even though it hasn't been ratified. We have committed ourselves to that kind of restraint; the Russians have not but they practice that kind of restraint so far as we know. Just how long that kind of restraint could continue is the real question. The negotiation of the SALT II treaty took seven years and, if you try to fold that into a SALT III negotiation, you're talking about years of negotiations. It's quite conceivable that the constraints will not be sustained over such a period, and the technology could advance to the point where it would be difficult to get a handle on the nuclear arms race.

NPR: Mr. Secretary, turning to another subject. A few weeks ago, we spoke on the same program to the President's National Security Adviser, Mr. Brzezinski. He said that despite all the reports to the contrary, the foreign policy system really works quite well, that he's very happy with the relationship between the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State, and that all these other reports have been exaggerated. Do you agree with that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, I'd agree that a lot of the reports have been exaggerated, but I also believe--as I've believed about every political institution of which I've been a part--that there can be improvement.

NPR: What kind of improvements would you like?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I will get into those when I've reached the point that I have solidly tested the ideas that I'm developing.

NPR: If I may, just to turn it around...

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Let me make this point, though, because you can save yourself some time on this broadcast. Every time I've discussed this question with the press, it immediately escalates into an ad hominem confrontation between Mr. Brzezinski and myself. I have never discussed it in those terms. Our personal relations couldn't be more friendly. That is another reason why I'm going to wait until the election is behind us, get my thoughts solidly in place, and then discuss them with the appropriate people, including the President, Mr. Brzezinski, and others. The National Security Council is the coordinating mechanism created following the war as a direct result of the enormously expanded Department of Defense presence all around this world as a result of the war, which gave it

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obvious foreign policy impact. It was essential at that point to coordinate the foreign policy activities or implications of various agencies of the government--that's why NSC was created. It's an essential instrument. Nevertheless, the relationship between the NSC and other agencies--and it's just not State, it's DOD, it's Commerce, it's Treasury, it's the Special Trade Representative, it's others--needs to be constantly reviewed for improvement from time to time. They do tend to over-lap, and that's not peculiar to this institution. You ought to see committee structures on Capitol Hill in the Senate. I've struggled with those for years as committees tend to impact on each other, overlap, and all the rest of it. That happens, and to pretend that it doesn't is unreal.

NPR: Turning it around, this is exactly six months since you became Secretary of State. What are the aspects of the job that have surprised you the most, that have pleased you, and perhaps disappointed you the most?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That I'm here.

NPR: Do you have a better job now than you did in the Senate?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've never had a more rewarding or more fulfilling job than this one.

NPR: Is it possible for one person to keep track of as many different parts of the world, in the kind of detail and with the intricate knowledge necessary for a Secretary of State?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If one person can do all that, you wouldn't need a State Department.

NPR: But to lead?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You can raise the same questions with respect to the Presidency, of the various departments of the government. Incidentally, State, you know, is the second smallest department in the government. Only Department of Education, which is new, is smaller in terms of numbers of personnel. But you're quite right that, in terms of our geographic scope, we cover the world. The world is always awake somewhere, there's always somebody somewhere creating a problem for the Secretary of State without realizing it and without the Secretary of State realizing it. The information-gathering instruments of the Federal Government, including the Operations Center here at State, are enormously efficient agencies for bringing the flow of information across my desk every day. It operates on a 24-hour basis, and we get information from our embassies, from press reports in all parts of the world, through our intelligence agencies, through our own intelligence agency. There are all kinds of sources of information. Obviously, the Secretary couldn't personally read all of that each day, so there has to be a traffic cop sending this information across his desk. It's a constant learning process.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think it would be an over simplification to try to find one thing. We certainly continue to work at the release of the hostages and, if that's achieved, that would be great. But I've never been in a transition period of that kind, and I'm not really sure to what extent we're lame ducks.

we're lame ducks.

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To me one of the great challenges we face in the years ahead, in addition to the North-South challenge I've just mentioned, is the challenge of reading the Soviets right. If we read them wrong--either too optimistically or too pessimistically--we can go off in a direction that does us harm. I must say they give us ample evidence to take a hard line but, on the other hand, they also have enormous problems. We ought to understand what they are, how those problems could influence their behavior, and how we can take advantage of that. But you're not going to do that in the months between Election Day and January 20.

NPR: To let you close this on an optimistic note, from your standpoint, suppose you are re-elected--the President is re-elected--what other priorities besides the hostages--I assume SALT--are the priorities for the next administration?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I've just given you the Soviet Union. That involves SALT, but it also involves the Afghanistan war. It also involves the Persian Gulf area, the developments there, the posture of the two superpowers with respect to it, and how we manage our policies to avoid polarizing the nations of the area. That is an obviously big challenge because of the energy implications and so on. That's an enormous challenge and involves our relations with the Soviet Union, it involves the Arab-Israeli dispute, it involves energy supply and price, not only impacting on the Arab oil producing countries but countries elsewhere. Some of them obviously understand that their own welfare can be impacted by unwise price and supply decisions on their part. But you don't have that kind of responsible global view on the part of all of them, so that's going to continue to be a problem for the next 20 to 25 years. At the same time that the North-South problems become more intense, the energy element is going to exacerbate that. The increases in oil prices that have taken place have gobbled up all foreign aid. Foreign aid designed to deal with education, health, economic development and so on has been gobbled up by these other developing nations which have the oil resources. As I look down the next 20 years, I see increasingly foreign policy is going to be the product of resources, international economies, trade, environment--limitations, in other words, and equitable sharing of those resources and the achieving of an equitable relationship between the 150-odd nations of the world in an environment of harmony and constructive cooperation. The global negotiations, which the emerging nations are pushing so hard to get, could well be one of the most important foreign-policy impacting institutions that are emerging now. It's no longer going to be just superpowers against each other, spheres of influence, and so on. All of those will play a part. The significant thing about the economic summit in

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Venice in June is that for the first time really--although there were two or three previous economic summits--there was agreement on the part of the Seven, the great industrial nations of the world, on economic policies designed not only to advance their own interests but also to deal with North-South problems. We are beginning to take a global view in the most fundamental areas of human concern, affecting human standards of living, affecting the hungry.

I often use this little fact to make a point. There are 15 million refugees wandering the planet at the present time, and too often we speak about that in terms of what we need to do to feed them and to resettle them. The real question is: how do we go about eliminating the causes that produce refugees? What is it that prompts people to run away--walk away--from home and country? Now if we can eliminate those causes, we won't have refugees. I can't think of any fact that's more dramatic to make that point than that 15 million number. And they're all walking away from Communist countries, all walking away from oppression, from hunger, from lack of opportunity, from persecution--all the conditions with which foreign policy must deal in the next 20 years.

NPR: Thank you very much.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 1, 1980
No. 310

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PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Loy Henderson Conference Room
Washington, D.C.
November 1, 1980

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Good morning.

QUESTION: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Do you have a statement?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you bring us up to date on the hostage crisis? When do you expect to see it end and do you expect to see it end soon?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the first part of the question, I have no basis upon which to set a time frame for a final resolution of the hostage question. Perhaps it might be useful if I were to briefly review the nature of our efforts up to this point, and in the context of that review, try to answer your questions. I have been hit with questions on the run, on the road so many times, and have not succeeded apparently in putting it in perspective.

Our efforts have been directed toward three circumstances which we regarded as essential to a final resolution of the problem. First, to contribute to a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians that it is in their interest to put the hostage issue behind them. The actions that we took almost a year ago were part of that effort: the freezing of assets, trade sanctions and so on; the resolutions adopted by several international institutions including the actions taken by the United Nations, the World Court, the Islamic Conference, and so on; and then with respect to diplomatic initiatives through all of the various channels to which I've referred before by which we could get messages to the Iranian people from their natural trading partners; from other countries; to develop that sense of isolation which we think is essential -- economic isolation, diplomatic isolation, and so on, that we think is essential to the development of that awareness on the part of the Iranians.

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For further information contact:

Secondly, we learned rather early on that they would have to develop political institutions, governmental institutions with authority and responsibility, before we could hope to have a decision on the hostage question, and we have seen those institutions develop. A parliament has been put in place -- it has been elected by a good turnout of Iranian voters; a prime minister selected, court put in place, and so on, so now that circumstance has been realized.

Then, finally, the question of how we get the hostages out and on what terms, that is the stage at which we now find ourselves. There has been and is a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians including Iranian leaders in all segments of their political environment -- a growing indication that it is in Iran's interest to get the issue behind them. We get statements of that kind every day; we read them in our press now, in addition to getting them in reports through the various channels through which we try to communicate.

Now the Majlis is engaged in the process of answering that question, how do we get them out, on what terms? Until they decide what terms they think are in their interest, it is difficult for us to respond to those terms. We have tried to prepare ourselves to deal with whatever terms they may propose -- and it is no secret what the range of options are. I mean, the first range of options are the actions we took in retaliation to the seizure of the hostages.

Another range of options is found in the various statements made by Iranians over these past months as to conditions that one or more of them think indispensable. Khomeini is perhaps at the top of the list because he is the supreme authority in Iran, so his four-point proposal of two or three months ago is one that we've looked at and undertook to analyze and prepare ourselves to deal with.

There have been others, and there may be some surprises because for the first time, the Majlis has been dealing with it -- they have been dealing with it in secret -- and we don't really know they may propose if they take a decision tomorrow. So when you speak about a time frame, one must take into account how long it will take for the Majlis to reach a decision, whether or not the boycott of the Majlis meeting will continue, and that's hard to read from where we are. It may very well be that they will have a quorum tomorrow, and then start debating.

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Secondly, it may take them as long to debate an issue as it takes our Congress to debate issues from time to time, so we don't know how long that will take. Then, presumably, that debate will conclude with a decision on terms, and then we will have to evaluate those terms, whether we are prepared to meet those terms in the light of preparation that I have already described, or whether or not they will require further consideration and even negotiation with the Iranians.

That could be a very time-consuming process, going through what is not yet finished in the process -- it could be, depending upon what they are prepared to suggest to us.

QUESTION: On that point of the conditions, Mr. Secretary, the other night in the debate, President Carter said the United States would be prepared, and is prepared, to send those arms which Iran has already bought and paid for. Is that not inconsistent with our other policy which is that we don't send arms to countries which support terrorism, since the taking of the hostages, I think, has been defined as an act of terrorism by this government?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I don't think it is useful to discuss possible terms. We don't know what the Majlis is going to propose. There are some of them who have said that they would not trade their freedom for spare parts. If they released the hostages, they would reject the notion of spare parts. Others have said that the spare parts ought to be part of the deal. Until we get their proposal, I'm not inclined to try to shape their proposal by speculation on what we may or may not do.

What the President was saying in effect is that these are two steps that we took almost a year ago when the hostages were seized, and we're prepared to undo what we did in retaliation -- that's the general proposition; but with respect to the details, I think we are better off responding when we know what we have to deal with.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I was going to ask you to peer into your crystal ball, and have a look at Poland, but your exposition of the Iranian situation, I think, calls for at least one question: Are you suggesting the arms question has always been an open question -- but

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I thought the President had dealt straight out and resolved the question of lifting the sanctions. In other words, I thought it was a simple matter, that if the hostages were freed, the sanctions would be lifted.

You are speaking of our seeing what they do before we really decide what we do. Is there any problem on lifting the sanctions if the hostages are released? Isn't that pretty much a straight-forward reflex action on our part?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Obviously, with the passage of time -- I think it is obvious, because it has been discussed in the press -- our flexibility in dealing with this issue has been somewhat constrained by developments beyond our control. There have been attachments; there have been other developments, and I am not going to go into those in detail -- I'm not technically qualified to go into all the technical details.

What the President was laying down was a general policy, which to be implemented would require an evaluation of the developments that have taken place since then; that may limit our ability to respond.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow that up. One of the legal constraints against acting on what Carter put forward as his negotiating position at the Tuesday debate is Section 3F1 of the Arms Export Control Act. State Department sources now say that the President would waive this restriction against arming terrorist countries, or terrorist-supporting governments, by claiming overriding national security interests.

Could you discuss what the overriding national security interest is in getting the hostages out by election day, and what implication does this definition of national security have for our future credibility in dealing with terrorists, military deterrence, and also the possibility of embroiling ourselves in the anti-Arab side of the Gulf war?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You see, your question is an excellent demonstration of the reasons why I don't think it is useful to speculate about a proposal which hasn't yet been presented. You've already made judgments about actions we haven't taken, and I don't

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think that's useful. All you do by that sort of thing is risk stirring up emotions in Iran or stirring up emotions here, and I don't think that's very helpful.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a question about taking action to prepare yourself to meet the conditions that might be imposed by the Iranians, can you describe what preparations have been made?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: To do that would be to do what I just said I wouldn't do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you have had any informal or formal warning from the Soviet Union that the provision of arms to Iran would be a breach of the neutrality that you have agreed on with the Soviets?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. No, we have not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY MUSKIE (Continuing) We have taken no action yet. We have had no proposal yet. Obviously, since we took certain actions in retaliation for the taking of the hostages, there are certain issues, areas, and problems which we expect Iran will ask us to deal with; and until we know specifically what they propose, it's not helpful to try to shape their proposal by responding to hypothetical questions as to how we would respond to hypothetical propositions.

QUESTION: Are you concerned at all that any provision of even spare parts to Iran will be interpreted in the rest of the Arab world -- in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, and in other countries -- as an American tilt towards Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That's a concern of which we are fully aware, bearing in mind that the hostage crisis and our actions in response to their taking, preceded the Iraq-Iran War by months, and taking into account that from the beginning it was clear that if the Iranians undid what they did, that we would undo what we did, as a general proposition. It seems to me that anyone reacting to whatever we may be asked to deal with and whatever our response may be ought to take that into account.

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As I told the Iraqi Foreign Minister, they didn't consult us on the timing of their invasion of Iran, and they were quite aware that we were involved with Iran in this very delicate hostage problem. They weren't deterred by that from following their interests as they perceived them; and we really have to be very careful, of course, about the implications of what we find it possible to do. But, on the other hand, we don't want to put ourselves in the position of making these 52 people hostages to Iraq.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you evaluate the situation in general now, do you think it will require negotiations with Iran to have the hostages released, or do you think it's possible they might just put all or some of them on an airplane and start shipping them out?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We try to evaluate all of those proposals without coming down hard on any of them.

QUESTION: In other words, you're not sure in your own mind that negotiations will be required? You think the other is a possibility?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, having dealt with Iran and their leaders for six months now, I exclude nothing from the range of possibilities. But that doesn't mean I think they are possible.

QUESTION: The question is interesting in particular because in, I think, your last news conference in this room, if I remember correctly, you said you thought negotiations would be necessary, and made a point of the fact that none had been started. I just wondered if your evaluation of that had changed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, there are some complicated questions, conceivably; but again, I don't know what the proposal will be. I don't exclude negotiations; I don't state that they are essential; I think that they are a probability because of the complexity of the issues.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the leading Iranian newspaper today had an editorial which advocated releasing the hostages, or at least taking that decision before the American election day, on the grounds that Iran would be able to get better concessions -- that's their word -- before election day than it would after election day.

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A similar viewpoint has been expressed, I think, by some political opponents of the President who have been charging, either directly or insinuating, that the President is ready to make a much softer arrangement because of the impending elections.

I don't want to be prolonging this question unduly, but I just want to ask another point: In April, the President did say, when he broke diplomatic relations with Iran, that inventories of Iran's assets were being drawn up as well as American claims, with an aim toward possibly submitting legislation to make Iran pay for the damages it had inflicted upon the hostage families as well as the embassy. More recently, nobody in the Administration has talked about securing claims from Iran. I just wonder, are those still on the table? And what about the charges about concessions before election day?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: If that is really the President's objective, his timing isn't very good. It, obviously, would have been much better to get the hostages home a week ago, two weeks ago, three weeks ago, a month ago. To wait until the last day is to minimize the prospects. I mean, if we could really control the Majlis, their decision-making process, and the time within which they would do it, anybody with an ounce of political brains or instincts wouldn't wait until the Sunday before the Tuesday of election. I find that an incredible proposition. In a political campaign, I expect anything, responsible or irresponsible.

Our objective has been to get the hostages home, and to do it consistent with their safety, their well-being, and consistent with the national interests and national honor. The President has said that from the beginning, and that is the test we are trying to meet. We are not dragging our feet. We have no way of knowing when it will come to fruition, and I certainly am not going to contribute to delay for political reasons. The question of whether or not it is done earlier than later is in the hands of the Iranian Majlis, not us.

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QUESTION: The second part of that question -- I'm sorry -- as to whether the United States would still expect Iran to pay some kind of damages for what it has inflicted on the hostages and on the American Embassy.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think that if you will reread Khomeini's four points, you will see that one of them could conceivably cover that issue, and so I would expect that the Iranian proposal may touch on it either directly or indirectly.

QUESTION: Well, his proposal, of course, is that the U.S. waive all claims and the implication from the statements in the last two weeks is that that's agreeable to the U.S., and I was just trying to check the guiding factors of the case.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I know what you are trying; you're trying to do what several questions have tried to do, to get me into a discussion of the specifics of our response to a proposal we have not yet received.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there is a report out of Paris this morning, saying that the Iranian public will be able to go inside the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Tuesday at the end of a major nationwide demonstration on the anniversary of the taking of the hostages. Every Iranian will be allowed inside. What's the State Department's reaction to that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's difficult, one, to characterize the demonstration until it takes place. There's nothing in the story that indicates it's intended to be a violent demonstration or an anti-hostage demonstration.

Secondly, we don't know whether the hostages are in the Embassy, so that that's a question.

So we have the same questions and concerns about the welfare and well-being of the hostages. We'd like to know more about it; we don't. I can't conceive that if the Majlis is debating a proposal to submit to us for the purpose of releasing the hostages, that the Majlis at this point would condone a demonstration that might be harmful to the hostages.

So I think at this point, although the situation there is often unpredictable, that there is no reason to assume that at one and the same time they're considering ways to release the hostages and also to harm them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us about a report that is out that the United States is going to try to settle the conflict between Iran and Iraq through the good offices of

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the United Nations in another new effort? And could you give us your evaluation of that conflict at the present time?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I notice that the story leaked the speech I gave two weeks ago as the basis for that speculation. That's the first time I've ever had a speech leaked.

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Maybe that's the best way to get attention to a speech. But, no, we are and have been since the beginning of that war working constantly with the United Nations, with countries in the non-aligned and Islamic movements, in an effort to produce a Security Council action that would be effective in dealing with the crisis.

We think that some additional time, obviously, is going to be required before both parties are as receptive as they need to be to those kinds of initiatives. We'll continue to do that. What the story this morning suggested is that we were going to take a more visible role, but I'm not sure that more visibility to our role is necessarily helpful in this situation since our relations with both of the combatants are not of the best.

And I think we still need to proceed as we have been, which is a major effort, which is a continuing effort, and hopefully we can eventually get a Security Council resolution that will have some effect.

QUESTION: Do you have a time frame in mind at all for when -- you said some additional time would be required before the two parties would be ready -- do you have any idea when that will be?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It will be some time, I expect, although there are internal pressures on both of them, political and also economic; but they seem to be digging in for a low-level war of attrition at the moment. If that proves to characterize their military posture, whether or not that also is designed to create an opportunity to end the conflict, we can judge only after we have pursued opportunities with them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us what standards our government uses for defining a terrorist government? And do you stand by President Carter's characterization Tuesday night of the PLO as a terrorist organization?

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: I stand by the State Department's characterization of the PLO which, I think, is essentially what the President intended to say.

QUESTION: Could you elaborate on that definition for me, please?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The PLO is an organization, elements and individuals of which have performed terrorist acts. That's different than characterizing the organization as a whole.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you and the President, in your speeches of the last few weeks, have made SALT into an effective referendum issue in the election next Tuesday. In the context of polls which show that the President is now given an even chance of losing --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Does that mean he has an even chance of winning, too?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: I'm wondering if you've considered that this may have been a risky approach, because if the President loses, it may be taken, at least in the terms that you and the President have set, as a defeat for SALT II, as an indication the American people do not want this kind of arms control?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It may have another effect, if I listened to the debate accurately. It may have produced a change in the other candidate's position.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you please elaborate on that? What change do you see in Mr. Reagan's position?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You've given me a very tempting opening, but --

(Laughter.)

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You know how reluctant I am to be political. Tease me a little.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you address yourself to the various reports that the United States and Iran have actually reached some kind, or at least a secret understanding of some sort, on the terms for release of the hostages and that what's

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really going here is an attempt by the Iranians to bring their side of it into line with some kind of agreement that's alleged already to have been made between the two countries?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: You don't have much respect for Parliaments. I don't see how you make a deal with Iran without getting Parliament in on the deal. No, there is no deal. We don't even know what terms the Parliament is debating. Until we know, we can't tell you whether there's been a deal.

I think one of the stories was to the effect we've shaken hands on it. I haven't shaken hands with Parliament. I don't know of anybody else who has, and so you can't have any deal. I think that's a story that's been floated in this election season to prejudice the political climate.

QUESTION: Quite apart from the Parliament, is there an understanding, as far as you know, with the other authorities in Iran. Have we reached any agreement with them?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No. We haven't reached any agreement with them. They are not inclined, obviously, to reach agreement with anybody until they've consulted with each other and reached agreement. They're having quite considerable difficulty in reaching agreement, and we would be foolish, indeed, to be committing ourselves to something to which they're not prepared to commit themselves.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a couple weeks ago you cautioned the Polish people to demonstrate an awareness of Soviet sensibilities. Is it your impression over the past couple weeks they have done so, and do you find anything particularly ominous in recent events there, including a fast trip by the Polish leadership to Moscow?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The word I used, I think, was "sensitive," that they should be sensitive to what is going around. The alternative to that, of course, is to be insensitive, which I would not think would be wise.

To answer your question directly, Barrie, the agreement which the workers and the government appear to have reached, following the visit of Kania and Pinkowski to Moscow, appears to have moved the Poles away from the kind of confrontation that everybody was worrying about.

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I don't know whether that is a premature judgment. I think we have to wait to see what the reaction to it is. But certainly there's a little more comfortable feeling about the situation today than there was a couple of days ago.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can I take you back to Don Oberdorfer's question? You keep telling us here today that you've got to wait to see what the Parliament does. But since you're so emphatic on the point of waiting to see what the Parliament does before we see what the United States does, can you be forthcoming to the degree possible about the succession of indirect contacts that may fall short of semantic precision about a deal being made, but to the effect that we, in fact, have been in a non-negotiation, but indirect communication, working out the terms that may be acceptable to Iran and to us?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The President has made statements today to which you people have made reference, which I'm sure the Iranians have read, and it may be that they regard those statements as concessions. There have been all sorts of indirect communications through many channels with them, and I wouldn't be able to characterize them. For instance, they said at one point that they thought we had made an apology. I'm not aware of any apology we've made, but in my letter to the Prime Minister, I acknowledged that we each had perceived grievances against the other. And I got some indirect report that he thought that was by way of a partial apology.

I don't regard that as such, but if he does, and if that eliminates that issue, I'm ready to accept his characterization of it. So I don't know what kind of leads have led them to what conclusions. Khomeini, obviously, on the basis of somebody's judgment, listed four points, and you know what they are.

Mr. Reagan, incidentally, responded to those very positively at the time. And that may be a basis for working out an agreement. I mean, if the two Presidential candidates could find a way to agree on terms, within the framework of Khomeini's proposals, you may have something to work on. And so it's that sort of preparation that we make, you know, what is within the realm of possibility; so that when we are asked to respond to a proposal, we may be as prepared as we can be to respond to specifics.

QUESTION: But you have, in fact, through the indirect communication, I take it, responded. It isn't something that you're doing in-house to be ready for any possible negotiations; you've let the Iranians know about this.

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: We've let them know about it publicly. We said, the President has said, you have reminded me of what the President has said, what would be involved is the unfreezing of the assets and the lifting of sanctions and military spare parts.

With respect to an apology which is, was, at one time another condition, I've tried to give you the best I can on that. The question of trials has sort of dropped out of their rhetoric for some time now, so we don't have as much concern about that.

The question of a staged release, we've said publicly that we want all the hostages, and all at once. Whether or not that has been impressed on them, I can't be sure until we hear tomorrow.

I don't know how I could go any further than that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I know you don't like to answer hypothetical questions, as you made clear --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It depends on whether it's useful.

QUESTION: Yes. But, if by Thursday of this coming week, the hostage situation is still in a state of flux, but shows signs of possible imminent movement, do you still plan to go ahead with your trip to Latin America?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not sure about that. The hostage thing could delay the trip. We would try to find another time frame. There's always a possibility of events that would require me to reconsider a trip of that kind or any other kind. This could happen.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Rajai is quoted to have said that one condition among the other conditions -- additional conditions to the Khomeini four -- which was the bringing back of the AWACS planes from Saudi Arabia.

In what circumstances are you ready to pull these planes out of Saudi Arabia?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'll answer what I think you asked, and if I don't touch your point, please repeat. As I said on "Issues and Answers," I had read Rajai's statement; and, as I read it, he was not imposing it as a condition for the release of the hostages, but simply expressing a concern. It's still con-

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ceivable, I suppose, that the Majlis might add that as a condition. I have no way of knowing, but as of now I don't see that emerging as a condition, but it might.

QUESTION: This is a hypothetical question: Would you be prepared to bring these planes out if they asked for it as a condition?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Would we consider it?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I doubt it. I'll say a flat no.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have stated your reluctance to talk in hypothetical terms to any possible proposal, but does the United States have any objections in principle to swapping the hostages for war materiel that Iran may need to carry on the war against Iraq?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Just another way of trying to get me to do what I've said all morning I'm not going to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I ask you another question on another area, please? There's been a debate, I understand, within the last few days within the Department over whether to forward the request to Congress, the President's decision to Congress, to sell arms to Morocco, tanks and planes, with some of your closest advisers urging you to do it and some of your closest advisers opposing it.

My understanding is that unless it goes to the Senate by the 12th of November, the deal will be dead and that has angered the Moroccans to a great extent.

Can you give us any idea how you feel about this, whether you are going to follow through on the President's decision to, in fact, sell these planes and tanks to Morocco?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The question is still under consideration.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.


(The press conference concluded at 11:35 p.m.)

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PRESS

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INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE EDMUND S. MUSKIE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE ABC-TV "ISSUES AND ANSWERS"
BY

TED KOPPEL AND BARRIE DUNSMORE OF ABC-TV
Washington, D.C.
November 2, 1980

MR. KOPPEL: If I may, Mr. Secretary, let me begin with this question. You heard the conditions that appeared to have been stated by the Iranian Parliament, and among those conditions is a conditional phasing of the release of the American hostages. In the past that has always been unacceptable to the U.S. Government; you've always insisted that there has to be an all-or-nothing release. If they want to let a few go without condition, that's fine. Has that changed?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That is still our position.

MR. KOPPEL: Therefore, if, in fact, this were conditional, there is no such thing, as far as the American Government is concerned, as one condition being met and a group of hostages being let out, if all the conditions are not met and all the hostages are not released.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Whether or not all the conditions are met or can be met is the first question. The predicate is not should there be a staged withdrawal, but whether or not all the conditions can be met and are met. And if they're all met at the same time, I gather all the hostages will be released.

MR. KOPPEL: All right. I stand corrected. Let me pose to you, your own question. Can they be met?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: No decision has been made on that point at this time.

MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, in your news conference yesterday you strongly suggested that it would require negotiations once the Majlis had made the decision. Could you give us some indication as to how things are going to proceed now?

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For further information contact:

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SECRETARY MUSKIE: First of all, let's get a little chronology established here. At this point what we've received are unofficial reports of what the Majlis has laid down. As I listened to the first half hour of this program, some of the oral descriptions coming from Tehran are modifications and significant changes of what we have achieved up to this point. So it is very difficult to respond definitively to what we have in hand at this point.

Secondly, the four points that have been described in the first half hour of this program and which have been covered by the information we've received from other sources seem to fit within the framework of the Ayatollah Khomeini's four points which I think he stated some time in September.

So we know generally the areas within which we have to make decisions. But until we see the fine print, or understand more clearly the fine print, we cannot be sure precisely the limits within which we are being asked to act by the Majlis. And I say that not to suggest a non-existent problem.

I think some of the problems have already been indicated in the first half hour of this program. And so we must deal with the actual problems once we know whether there are some and what they are.

MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, does the United States Government have the legal power to free all Iranian assets frozen by President Carter, including those under attachment by the courts?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The legal answer to that is a complicated one. But what is involved is not only the legal answer, but also what would be the wise answer, and at this point, in what we are being asked to do. We're not entirely sure about that at this point.

MR. DUNSMORE: Well, you have had some time now to study the Ayatollah's four points, and we understand that the American Government lawyers have been very busy trying to figure this out. Do you think that that's going to be a stumbling block, the unfreezing of the assets and also the elimination of all claims?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The difficulty with trying to answer a question like that at this point, before we know specifically, before we can be sure what, specifically, the Iranian Majlis is requesting, is that we might suggest a negative attitude about what they've proposed before we've determined whether or not a negative attitude is required. And to suggest a negative attitude to an Iranian Parliament which

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has labored to come to this decision, obviously with great difficulty, might well create an environment entirely negative to the prospect of achieving release of the hostages.

You could tick problems off with respect to the four points which may not be problems in the context of what the Parliament has said and means.

Secondly, the Iranian Parliament has said, as we understand from our reports, that the Executive is to present us with an official translation -- Persian text and English text -- of what the Majlis has said. And there is some ambiguity as to what additional authority the Executive may have. It may have some additional substantive authority, at least to the point of clarifying language, that has been at least contained in whatever the Majlis has enacted into law.

So until we've got that, I don't find it useful to indicate either positive or negative attitudes about specifics. It's very difficult to do. Bear in mind that these unofficial reports of what has taken place in the Majlis have come to us in the wee hours of the morning. We've had five or six hours at most to consider them.

There are obvious technical complications of the kind that you are raising with your questions that have to be evaluated in terms of specific language by our experts. That analysis is underway. Contrary to the impression that some would make about this Administration's attitude, we are not waiting to just leap at just any proposition. We have to study it; we have to evaluate it; and evaluate it in terms of principles which the President has laid down.

Number one, that what we do is consistent with American interests and American honor; and, secondly, whether or not what we're being asked to do is in accordance with American law and American principles.

It has to be evaluated in those terms, and that evaluation cannot take place quickly.

MR. DUNSMORE: It seems to me the bottom line of what you're saying, then, Mr. Secretary, is that it's absolutely unrealistic to expect that the hostages will be out before Tuesday or by Tuesday.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I have't found absolutes in this business, but this is obviously going to be time consuming. And you heard Mr. Ghotbzadeh's evaluation of the time that it

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might take. He said it might take as much as ten days from their point of view. So they must also envision some complexities that have to be worked out.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, you've alluded to two different sets of problems. One, the diplomatic problem, but also there is the political problem. Could you take us behind the scenes a little bit and let us know how you and the President, in resolving those two conflicting issues, how do you handle this issue politically and diplomatically, being true to both the demands that are upon you. The President has to get reelected, from his point of view.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I can speak only for myself. I would presume to speak only for myself on each of those questions. With respect to the politics of it, I never could see how this could be manipulated for political purposes. If there were such a way, we've certainly not used it. I don't think that this thing breaking on the Sunday before Tuesday, Election Day, is a maximum political resource for anybody.

It's a very delicate question, I would think, from both sides. What are involved are 52 Americans, 52 American lives, and what is also involved are our national interests. And we must make sure that they do not conflict with each other. We've got to serve both objectives. And that's been the President's attitude about this ever since I joined his Administration as Secretary of State. He's not regarded it as a political resource since that time. Of that I can assure you.

MR. KOPPEL: Insofar as you can, Mr. Secretary, would you walk us through the four points? For example, non-interference in Iran's internal affairs. Not really a problem, is it?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I think we've said that publicly, in effect, over and over again. Whether or not they're asking us something more than we've already said publicly, we can't be sure until we are sure that we have the precise proposal before us.

MR. KOPPEL: All right. Unfreezing of the Iranian assets in this country. More complex.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It is complex. In effect, what this, and other provisions which I'm sure the Iranians are interested in, is this: When they seized our hostages, we retaliated with some specific actions, including the freezing of

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Iranian assets, trade sanctions with our Allies, condemnation of the seizure in various places -- the U.N., the World Court, the Islamic Conference, and so on -- so that we've taken a number of steps, and implicit from the beginning has been this point: That if they undo what they did, we would undo what we did.

The passage of time and attachments which have been placed on Iranian assets have complicated the question, obviously.

MR. KOPPEL: What about U.S. claims, Mr. Secretary. That's, I believe, the third point.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We must understand precisely what U.S. claims they mean.

MR. KOPPEL: All right, the final point, then, the issue of the Shah's wealth. Can that be returned?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: With respect to the report from your correspondent in the early part of this show, what that means, as he understands it -- and he was in Tehran, I was not -- was that it seems to me an identification of the Shah's assets now. If it means nothing more than, that is something different than you suggest by your question, confiscation.

To which point should I reply? You see, I can reply to neither until I know which is which.

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MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, the Majlis made no mention of spare parts for its army from the United States. However, the whole issue of the United States sending military supplies, that were supposedly bought and purchased by the Shah, to Iran in the midst of its war with Iraq is one which has been kicking around for the last ten days. Could you clarify for us what the American position is vis-a-vis those spare parts?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Well, you have made the point which is obvious in all reports that we've had, about action taken by the Majlis that spare parts are not mentioned. We do know there has been a divided view in Iran about spare parts. There are some who rejected the notion that they should accept spare parts that they need from "the great Satan," as they like to refer to us, and there are others who think they should (accept spares). That is another clarification that needs to be made.

On this whole point of whether undoing what we did in retaliation for taking of the hostages represents a tilt in this Iraq-Iran war, let me make this point: that the hostage crisis emerged months before the Iraq-Iran war. The hostages were seized months before that war; and our retaliatory actions were taken months before the Iran war. And the fact that these various sanctions were in place when the Iraq-Iran war emerged was, in effect, to tilt in the direction of Iraq. If these sanctions had not been in place, Iran would not have been as vulnerable to the Iraqi attack as it was with the sanctions in place. Yet, nobody has accused us of tilting against Iran by maintaining the sanctions. It seems to me that one needs to put the two problems in perspective.

What is involved is not the opening of a new military supply line, in any case. What is involved is undoing what we did -- if spare parts are indeed involved in the Iranian proposal -- and doing what we did months before the Iraq-Iran war began.

MR. DUNSMORE: But if we send any military equipment to Iran in the middle of a war, we will find ourselves in an unholy alliance with Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea, against our traditional friends in the Persian Gulf, and even against our own planes that are protecting Saudi Arabia. How can we possibly rationalize that?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: What I just said to you is this, that by withholding months before this war, spare parts that belong to Iran, we put them in a vulnerable position with respect to Iraq. So, you know, you have to put it in that perspective. At this point we don't know whether or to what

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extent that may be an issue in what the Majlis has done. But I think that if that issue arises, as we examine their proposal, that we need to put it in the context which I have suggested and not the other context which assumes that we should have known that the Iraq-Iran war was coming, and that, therefore, whatever actions we took -- releasing the frozen assets, billions of dollars, strengthens Iran's position in this war.

I can't see making these 52 people hostages not to Iran, but to Iraq's war aims.

MR. DUNSMORE: One senior official has suggested that we might be prepared to send weapons, but non-lethal weapons only. Is that a distinction which we may draw?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It's been drawn, as Secretary Kissinger has pointed out earlier in this program.

MR. DUNSMORE: On other occasions.

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Yes.

MR. DUNSMORE: Might it be brought out on this one?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We exclude no possibilities. That doesn't mean that we include them all, until we know what we are dealing with.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask another question now about the possible release of the hostages. Let me use one of those horrible diplomatic words -- modalities. How do you now go about negotiating what you and the Iranians still have to resolve?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There are indirect channels available to us that we've been using for months, as I pointed out.

MR. KOPPEL: Do you still have to rely on those, sir?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We may or we may not. I indicated in my letter to Prime Minister Rajai at the time of his selection that we would be glad to deal with him directly or indirectly, whatever suited their purpose. The Majlis, presumably, directed the Executive to make an official translation of the Majlis action available to us. That would seem to presume a direct contact. If in fact it is a direct contact, I would assume that we would respond in the same way.

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MR. KOPPEL: Forget about whether it is or is not, Mr. Secretary; would this not seem an appropriate time for the United States to make a direct contact? It almost seems irrelevant to be arguing now about whether there should be direct contact or whether we still need to go through third parties.

Would you not, personally, prefer that it be direct at this point? Wouldn't that make it easier, clearer, simpler?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: It would make it easier for us. Whether it would for them is yet to be determined. What you're asking is, shouldn't we answer their message before we get it? That's what you seem to be suggesting.

MR. KOPPEL: No, what I'm asking is --

SECRETARY MUSKIE: There is no requirement for determining the nature of the contact until we've got the message.

MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Secretary, perhaps I could put it this way: On your schedule right now is a trip to Latin America, which I believe you are supposed to start on Wednesday. Is it possible that you will postpone that trip so that you could be available to participate in some kind of direct contacts with Iran?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Of course, that's possible.

MR. DUNSMORE: Is it likely?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: Again, you're asking me to try to predict a time frame. I think the odds are that it is likely.

MR. DUNSMORE: Would you participate in negotiations personally in some other place, other than Washington?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: That depends on whether there are negotiations.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, what role is the United Nations playing at the moment, or what role would the United States like it to play?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: The United Nations has indicated a willingness to play any role which would be useful to us. I talked to Mr. Waldheim this morning, and he reported to us the situation in Tehran as he had learned it through his representative there, and he indicated every willingness to be useful in any way that might serve our interests.

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MR. KOPPEL: Secretary Muskie, I think there is a voracious hunger by the American public to know as much as possible, understandably. Could you just take us through the night? How did the news reach you? How did the news reach the President? In what form did the news reach you? Through whom?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: We have been watching the developments in Iran through many eyes for months, and of course, the wire services are available to us.

When the Majlis assembled, about 1:00 a.m. our time, it was clear that a quorum was going to be present, unlike two or three days ago, and so we knew that there was going to be some kind of action. Whether or not they would resolve the issues today wasn't necessarily assured from our perspective at the beginning. I think it was about 4:00 or 4:30 a.m. that the news of the vote came to us and the first news about the content of what the Majlis had done came to us.

The President was called, I think, within 15 minutes of that time so that he would know what had taken place, and within a few minutes, made the decision to come back to Washington -- left Chicago sometime between 6:00 and 6:30 this morning. We assembled in the Cabinet Room about 8 o'clock at his arrival, and were in session together until shortly after 10:00, when I had to get ready for appearance on this show.

We had to put in motion certain decisions that were taken, and we are to meet again at 2 o'clock this afternoon in the Cabinet Room.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, will there be any direct contact with those three Ambassadors -- the Algerian, the Syrian, and the Libyan? Are they playing a useful role?

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm not sure that we've gotten to those three specifically today, but we are establishing contact with every useful channel that we have used over the past few months, to get whatever supplementary information, or even analytical information that we could get with respect to what the Majlis has done.

We do that every day, as a matter of fact. Our Iran Watch Group operates on a 24-hour basis, and has since the taking of the hostages, so that every morning, predating this, whenever I'm up, there is a report at my home of what has taken place in Iran the day which is just ending in Iran.

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MR. KOPPEL: Secretary Muskie, thank you very much. It was very gracious and very helpful of you to come and spend this half-hour with us this morning..

SECRETARY MUSKIE: I'm delighted to have this opportunity to make even an incomplete report.

MR. KOPPEL: Thank you, sir.

(At 12:30 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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